Islamic Fiqh > Hajj and umra > The pillars and obligations of hajj > The conditions of the obligation of Hajj
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Updated on 24 September 2026 at 7:46 PM
This chapter gathers the encyclopedia's sheets on the conditions making hajj obligatory: puberty as the third condition, then the istita'a (capability) with its four characteristics common to men and women, and the two conditions specific to women. Each sheet unfolds the schools' positions, their Quranic and prophetic proofs, the hadith takhrij and the classical references, down to the contemporary question of hajj permits. The differences are reported together with their practical benefit, in keeping with the work's method.
Puberty is a condition of the obligation of hajj by consensus, because the child is not addressed by the legal address: if an insane person performs the pilgrimage, his pilgrimage is not valid; if he recovers from his illness and regains sound judgment, the hajj of Islam becomes obligatory upon him (sources cited above). The following hadith bears witness to it.
The Pen has been lifted from three: the sleeper until he wakes, the child until he reaches puberty, and the insane until he regains reason.Authentic hadith; Abu Dawud 4399; Ibn Khuzayma in his Sahih 4/348
No hajj is obligatory upon the child, because the legal address does not concern him. If he performs it, however, his pilgrimage is valid and counts as a voluntary act according to the majority of schools, namely Malik, al-Shafi'i and Ahmad, meaning it is credited to him, on the basis of the hadith of Ibn Abbas, may Allah be pleased with them both.
A woman lifted up a child of hers and said: O Messenger of Allah, does this one have a pilgrimage? He replied: Yes, and you will have a reward.Muslim 1336
Bukhari reports in his Sahih, from al-Sa'ib ibn Yazid: "I was taken on pilgrimage with the Messenger of Allah, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, when I was seven years old." Abu Hanifa, for his part, rules the child's pilgrimage invalid, by analogy with the vow, and for further reasons:
The vizier Ibn Hubayra, may Allah have mercy on him, explains (al-Ifsah 1/455): the statement of Malik, al-Shafi'i and Ahmad, "it is valid from him", means it is credited to him as righteous works are, without anything being recorded against him: so it is credited to him without being charged to him. As for what some of his companions understood from Abu Hanifa, a validity to which the obligation of expiations would attach if he committed forbidden acts in ihram, it is an added kindness toward the child, not a stripping away of his reward for the pilgrimage.
But if the child reaches puberty after having performed the hajj, the obligatory pilgrimage becomes due upon him by the consensus of Muslims, by virtue of the Prophet's statement, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, and because he performed what was not obligatory upon him, which does not suffice for the obligatory hajj after puberty (Ibn Battal's Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari 4/528; al-Tamhid 1/108; Ibn al-Arabi's Ahkam al-Qur'an 1/376; Tafsir al-Qurtubi 4/145; Fath al-Qadir 2/410; al-Majmu' 7/31; al-Mughni 4/350; al-Iqna' 1/83).
When a child performs the pilgrimage, it counts for him until he reaches puberty; once he comes of age, another pilgrimage is due upon him.Authentic hadith; Ibn Khuzayma in his Sahih 4/349; al-Hakim 1/655
Imam al-Nawawi, may Allah have mercy on him, relates the question to the madhhabs of the scholars: our school holds the child's pilgrimage valid without being obligatory; its non-obligation upon the child is agreed upon, as Ibn al-Mundhir reports in al-Ishraf: the people of knowledge are unanimous that the obligation of hajj falls away from the child, the insane and the mentally deficient, and unanimous too that if the insane person performs the pilgrimage then recovers reason, or the child then reaches puberty, it does not suffice them for the hajj of Islam; they are also unanimous that children's inflictions of injury attach to them.
The validity of the child's hajj is the madhhab of our school, of Malik, of Ahmad, of Dawud and of the mass of scholars of the early and later generations, and Ibn al-Mundhir pointed to a consensus on it. Abu Hanifa, in the well-known version of his school, rules it invalid; some of his companions validated it, arguing with the hadith "The Pen has been lifted from three: the child until he reaches puberty", an authentic hadith explained above. The companions who validate it also argue by analogy with purity and prayer: Abu Hanifa does validate both from the child, and likewise validates his pilgrimage without disagreement, the transmission to the contrary from him being an error; he also validates the child's imamate in voluntary prayer. The companions of Ahmad and of al-Shafi'i finally argue with the hadith of Ibn Abbas (Muslim 1336), that of al-Sa'ib (Bukhari) and that of Jabir.
We performed the pilgrimage with the Messenger of Allah, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, and among us were women and children: we pronounced the talbiya for the children and stoned on their behalf.Weak hadith; Ibn Majah in his Sunan 3038; Ibn Abi Shayba in his Musannaf 3/242, no. 13841
The Hanafis answer the hadith of the lifted Pen in two ways: what is meant is the lifting of sin, not the invalidation of his deeds; or else its meaning is that nothing is recorded against him, without that preventing works being credited to him or his obtaining reward. Their analogy with the vow is likewise answered in two ways, both mentioned by the qadi Abu al-Tayyib and the companions: the analogy breaks against wudu and prayer, for neither can be validly vowed by the child while both are valid from him, and it was stated earlier that "breaking" is the presence of the cause without the ruling, whereas "negation" is their joint absence; the vow, secondly, is a commitment by speech, and the child's speech has no effect, unlike the pilgrimage, which is an act and an intention, like wudu.
To their statement "it is not obligatory upon him and not valid from him", two further answers: the thesis is destroyed by wudu; and the non-obligation is a matter of leniency, with no rigor implied by the validity. To their statement "if it were valid, its making up would be obligatory if he invalidated it", we affirm it: it is the correct position with us, as explained. And to their argument "a bodily act of worship whose contract a guardian cannot conclude for the child, like prayer", the difference is manifest: delegation enters the pilgrimage, not prayer; Allah, may He be exalted, knows best.
Imam al-Haramayn writes in al-Asalib that the decisive support in this matter lies in the authentic reports admitting no interpretation; he cites part of the preceding hadiths, then mentions arguments of the kind of analogy and meaning, then rules: "this is a forced effort after authentic reports", adding that no sound distinction holds between prayer and hajj at all: if they object that hajj involves expense, the expense falls, on the correct view, upon the guardian's wealth, with no harm to the child; if they object to its hardship, constancy in prayer, purity and their conditions is harder still; Allah, may He be exalted, knows best.
Ibn Abd al-Barr summarizes in al-Tamhid: the child's hajj was validated by Malik, al-Shafi'i and all the jurists of the Hijaz, by al-Thawri and all the jurists of Kufa, by al-Awza'i, al-Layth and all who followed their path among the people of Syria and Egypt; all those we mentioned consider taking children on pilgrimage recommended and command it, and this is the view of the mass of scholars of every generation. A minority claims children are not taken on hajj: a view not even worth mentioning, for the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, performed the pilgrimage with the young boys of Banu Abd al-Muttalib, the early generations performed hajj with their children, and the hadith of the woman who lifted the child makes everything contradicting it fall away. The qadi Iyad concludes: they are unanimous that the child who performs the pilgrimage then reaches puberty is not thereby discharged of the hajj of Islam, except for an anomalous fringe that receives no attention.
The conditions of istita'a required for the obligation of hajj fall into two categories: conditions common to men and women, and conditions specific to women. The general conditions comprise four characteristics:
The majority of jurists, namely the Hanafis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis, together with Sahnun and Ibn Habib among the Malikis, teach that the obligation of hajj requires the ability to secure provisions, a mount and sustenance, going and returning; the requirement of a mount, however, applies only to one who resides far from Mecca. The al-Hidaya puts it thus: "the mount is not among the conditions of obligation for the people of Mecca and those around it, since no additional hardship attaches to his performing it: the case then resembles hastening to the Friday prayer" (al-Hidaya with Fath al-Qadir 2/127).
The majority draws this rule from the fact that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, himself defined istita'a as provisions and a mount; Daraqutni reports from Anas, may Allah be pleased with him, concerning the words "whoever finds the means":
It was said: O Messenger of Allah, what is the means? He replied: Provisions and a mount.Weak hadith; Daraqutni 2/218
The Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, thus defined the lawful istita'a by provisions and mount together: neither suffices alone, and it follows that the ability to walk does not fulfill the condition of hajj; the worship requires covering a long distance, hence the requirement of provisions and mount, as with jihad. What the Malikis hold is not an istita'a, for it is a painful ordeal even if habitual; yet consideration is given to the generality of situations, not their particular cases, just as the concessions of travel benefit both the one who suffers and the one who does not (Badai' al-Sana'i' 3/45; Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/505; al-Ikhtiyar 1/150; al-Jassas' Ahkam al-Qur'an 2/307; al-Istidhkar 4/147; Hashiyat al-Dasuqi on the Sharh al-Kabir 2/204; al-Hawi al-Kabir 4/7; Mughni al-Muhtaj 2/225; al-Mughni 4/305; al-Ifsah 1/272, ed. Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya; al-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/498).
Ibn Qudama, may Allah have mercy on him, specifies that the requirement of a mount concerns the distant one whose distance from the House falls within the qasr journey: for the near one able to walk, the mount does not count, since the distance is short and walking possible, which is required of him, like hastening to the Friday prayer; if he is among those unable to walk, the existence of means of transport counts for him, for he is incapable of walking and equivalent to the distant one; as for provisions, they are indispensable: whoever finds none and cannot earn them is not bound to hajj (al-Mughni 4/306). The jurists' divergence over requiring provisions and a mount stems from the fact that they rode beasts, hence their expression "provisions and mount", meaning the beast prepared for carrying a rider, the known practice of their time; the divergence bears on two points.
First point: the Malikis contradict the majority over requiring the ability to have a mount even for a long distance: whoever can walk without great hardship, in safety for his person and property, has no mount among the conditions of obligation; hajj is obligatory upon him, unless reaching involves great hardship, meaning what exceeds the person's habit, a hardship that varies with people, times and places. Imam al-Qurtubi, may Allah have mercy on him, reports from Malik ibn Anas: whoever can walk and finds provisions owes the hajj, even without a mount; if he has no mount but can walk, he is given respite: if he owns provisions, hajj is due upon him; if he lacks provisions but can earn his need on the road, he is given respite as well; if he belongs to people of standing who do not earn their living themselves, nothing is due upon him; if he earns his living by trade or craft, hajj is due upon him; and if his habit is to beg from people, hajj is likewise due upon him. Malik thus made hajj obligatory upon one able to walk, even without provisions and mount: the view of Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr, al-Sha'bi and Ikrima (Tafsir al-Qurtubi 4/148-149).
The Malikis draw two proofs from that. First the words of Allah the Most High:
"And proclaim among the people the pilgrimage: they will come to you on foot."
Surah al-Hajj, 27
"on foot" (rijalan) meaning walkers: hajj belongs to the bodily acts of worship among definite obligations, so provisions and the mount cannot be conditions of its obligation, as with prayer and fasting; and even were the hadith of "provisions and mount" authentic, they would apply it to the generality of people, most of whom dwell in distant lands: departing from the absolute wording to the most common situation is frequent in the Sharia as in the speech and poetry of the Arabs. Then the words of Allah:
"And upon Allah rests the duty of the pilgrimage to the House for the people, for whoever finds the means to it."
Surah Al Imran, 97
The verse is general, not ambiguous (mujmal), and needs no explanation: Allah the Most High has therefore charged every capable person according to his capacity, by wealth or by body; in support, the Prophet's statement, peace be upon him: "Charity is not lawful for the rich man, nor for one of sound body able to earn a living" (authentic hadith, cited earlier): bodily soundness is there equated with wealth, and the thesis of the mount falls. Al-Qurtubi reports that Ibn Wahb, Ibn al-Qasim and Ashhab transmitted from Malik, asked about this verse: "people, in that, are according to their strength, ease and endurance"; Ashhab asked: does it mean provisions and a mount? He replied: "No, by Allah; it is only according to people's capacity: one finds provisions and a mount yet cannot travel, and another can walk on his two feet" (Tafsir al-Qurtubi 4/149).
Second point: the jurists differ over provisions and means of transport: is ownership by the obligated person of what secures them required, or not? The majority, namely the Hanafis, the Malikis and the Hanbalis, teach that ownership of what provides the provisions and the means of transport (the conveyance) is a condition for establishing the obligation of hajj: hajj does not bind him if another spends on his behalf, whether near or a foreigner, whether transport and provisions are given to him or money; for he owns neither the provisions, nor the mount, nor their price. The Shafi'is, for their part, teach that hajj is due by mere permission of the provisions and the mount when that permission involves no hardship for the one granting it, as with a son who gives his father provisions and a mount. If someone other than the son gives, there are two views: hajj does not bind him, for with the son it is due only because he is part of him, his wealth being his for food and the rest, a meaning not found elsewhere; or else it does bind him: al-Shirazi rules this the apparent sense of the text, for it is due from the one who gives, who thereby resembles the son (Badai' al-Sana'i' 3/44; Fath al-Qadir 2/21; Radd al-Muhtar 2/507; al-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/505; al-Sharh al-Kabir with Hashiyat al-Dasuqi 2/207; al-Muhadhdhab 1/198; Nihayat al-Muhtaj 2/176; al-Mughni 4/305; al-Ifsah 1/451).
The jurists then specify the conditions of the provisions and mount required for the istita'a of hajj: these are the explanation and exposition of this condition. The majority of schools, namely the Hanafis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis, teach that the required provisions are what he needs going and returning of food, drink and clothing, at a middle level of sustenance, without extravagance or dearth: one who can only reach less than the middle level he is used to is not counted capable of hajj; the provisions also include what he needs of the tools of food and provisions that cannot be dispensed with (Badai' al-Sana'i' 3/45; Fath al-Qadir 2/126; Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 3/505; al-Ikhtiyar 1/150; al-Rafi'i's al-Sharh al-Kabir 7/13; Minhaj al-Talibin, p. 39; Mughni al-Muhtaj 2/228; al-Mughni 4/306).
The Malikis, for their part, consider the ability to reach Mecca for one who has a craft that sustains him without degrading him; as for the return, the ability to cover its expense is not required of them in the preferred view, unless he knows that staying there would lead to his ruin and fears for himself, even a mere doubt: he then considers what gets him to the nearest inhabited place where he can live by a craft that does not degrade him (al-Sharh al-Kabir with Hashiyat al-Dasuqi 2/207; Mawahib al-Jalil 2/511; al-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/510; Sharh al-Risala 1/456). As for the mount, the majority teaches that he must find a mount fit for his like, by purchase or by hire, for going and returning; if he finds none, or finds it at a price above the price of the like, or a hire above the rent of the like, or cannot afford its price or rent, hajj is not obligatory upon him, whether he can walk or not, whether walking is his habit or not.
Imam Ibn Qudama expounds: the mount requires that he find a mount fit for his like, by purchase or hire, for going and returning, and what he needs of its equipment fit for his like; if he is among those whom the pack and saddle suffice with no fear of falling, the existence of that suffices; if he is among those whose habit is otherwise and who fear falling, the existence of a carrier or the like is considered, ridden without hardship and without fear of falling; for the mount, in the case of one able to walk, was only considered to repel hardship: so what repels hardship must be considered here. And if he is among those unable to serve themselves or manage their affairs, the ability to have someone serve him is considered, for that is part of his path (al-Mughni 4/307).
Third condition: the majority likewise teaches that ownership of the provisions and means of transport must exceed what the basic need touches upon during the period of going and returning. The Malikis consider only what takes him there, even if he, his family and his children have only the amount that takes him, with no regard for what his own and his family's and children's situation will become: that is Allah the Most High's affair; the thesis rests on the view that hajj is obligatory immediately, and on the view of deferral, devoting the children's and parents' sustenance to hajj poses no difficulty, like the wife's sustenance, which is preferred over the view of deferral (Hashiyat al-Dasuqi 2/206; Balghat al-Salik 2/8; Sharh al-Risala 1/456; Mawahib al-Jalil 2/500-502). The exposition bears on three characteristics of the basic need:
On the first two characteristics, the Malikis teach that he sells for his provisions the dwelling sellable upon the bankrupt and everything sellable upon the bankrupt: livestock, clothes, beasts of burden, servant, weapons, a mushaf and books of knowledge, even if he needs them. If he leaves the sustenance of his child, his wife and his dependents to people's charity, those who eat from it, hajj becomes obligatory upon him, unless he fears for himself or his children: the obligation then falls away. Al-Dasuqi, may Allah have mercy on him, summarizes: hajj is obligatory upon him even if he, his family and his children have only what takes him there, with no regard for what his own and his family's and children's situation will become; the thesis rests on hajj being obligatory immediately; on the view of deferral, devoting the child's and parents' sustenance to hajj poses no difficulty, like the wife's sustenance, which is preferred on the view of deferral, and hajj takes precedence over it on the view of immediacy (Hashiyat al-Dasuqi on the Sharh al-Kabir 2/206; Mawahib al-Jalil 2/501; al-Fawakih al-Dawani 1/351). When he therefore owns provisions and means of transport in excess of all the foregoing, the condition is fulfilled and hajj is obligatory upon him; otherwise, if any of the mentioned elements lapses, hajj is not due upon him. Branches follow from it.
First branch: one whose dwelling is spacious beyond his need and sellable, such that selling the surplus portion would fund the hajj: the sale is obligatory upon him according to the Malikis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis; the Hanafis do not require selling the surplus portion unless selling is preferable. But if he owns a dwelling he neither lives in nor rents out, and goods he does not practice as trade, their sale is obligatory upon him by agreement: such wealth is then surplus to his need like any other fortune, he is capable and hajj is due upon him. Ibn Qudama, may Allah have mercy on him, expounds: one who owns real estate he needs for his own or his family's dwelling, or its rent for his own upkeep or his family's, or merchandise whose profit fails if reduced so that it no longer suffices them, or livestock they need: hajj is not obligatory upon him; if he owns of all that a surplus over his need, its sale is required of him for hajj; a spacious dwelling beyond his need and sellable obliges the sale; books he needs do not oblige their sale for hajj, but books he does not need, or two copies of one work where one suffices him, the unneeded are sold; if he has a claim on a wealthy man who would give him enough for hajj, the claim obliges him, for he is capable; on an insolvent man, or if the claim cannot be collected, nothing obliges him (al-Mughni 4/307).
Second branch: al-Karkhi reports from the Hanafis that Abu Yusuf said: one who owns no dwelling, no servant, no food for his dependents, but possesses dirhams sufficient to reach him to hajj, must not spend them on anything else; if he does, he sins, for he is capable by owning the dirhams: he has no excuse for neglecting it, and suffers no loss by not buying a dwelling and servant, unlike their sale, which causes him loss. Ibn Abidin, may Allah have mercy on him, specifies: this is so if it is the time of his town's people's departure, as stated explicitly in al-Lubab; before that time he may buy with them whatever he wishes, for the obligation has not yet come about (Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/508; Badai' al-Sana'i' 3/46).
Third branch: one who acquired merchandise for trade: must he convert the value of his trade goods for hajj? The Hanafis, the Hanbalis and the Shafi'is in the sounder view teach that, for the obligation of hajj, a capital for his craft must remain, in excess of the expense of hajj, so that he does not join the destitute; the capital varies with people: it means what enables him to earn his own and his family's sufficiency, no more, for there is no limit. Ibn Qudama repeats: merchandise whose profit fails if reduced, or needed livestock: hajj does not oblige him; a surplus over his need obliges its sale for hajj (al-Mughni 4/307). The Malikis and the Shafi'is in the sounder view teach the opposite: converting his trade wealth for the expense of hajj is required of him, even if nothing of his trading capital remains.
Imam al-Nawawi, may Allah have mercy on him, poses the case: he owns merchandise by which he earns his own and his dependents' sufficiency, a trade asset whose yearly yield suffices him and his dependents, and nothing else to perform hajj with; if he travels with it, he and his dependents are covered going and returning, with no surplus left: is hajj due upon him? Two famous views: it is not, the view of Ibn Surayj validated by the qadi Abu al-Tayyib, al-Ruyani and al-Shashi, for al-Shafi'i said the bankrupt is left what he trades with, so that his livelihood is not cut off and he does not need people: if the Sharia allows his merchandise to be left to him from the creditors' right, its allowance for hajj is more fitting still; or else hajj is due upon him, which is the correct view, for he possesses the provisions and the mount, the two essential pillars of the obligation of hajj. Sheikh Abu Hamid objects: had we not held the obligation, we would have to say that one who cannot trade with less than a thousand dinars owes no hajj while owning them, and no one says that. Our companions reply: the difference between dwelling and servant is that they are needed at present, whereas what is at issue here is a reserve; al-Mahamili and the companions specify that al-Shafi'i's statement in the chapter on bankruptcy means the wealth is left to him with the creditors' consent, not without it. This position we validate is the correct view among the mass of the school's companions; the author of al-Hawi rules: this is the madhhab, and I do not know the source of what is related from Ibn Surayj, nor do I find it in any of his books (al-Majmu' 1/73-74). Al-Khatib al-Shirbini, may Allah have mercy on him, adds: one who owns income-producing assets from which he draws his upkeep must sell them and devote the proceeds to hajj, per what was mentioned in the sounder view, just as he must devote what was mentioned of his debt (Mughni al-Muhtaj 2/229; Nihayat al-Muhtaj 3/246; al-Iqna' 1/252; Hawashi al-Shirwani 4/20; Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/508; al-Mughni 4/308; Hashiyat al-Dasuqi on the Sharh al-Kabir 2/206).
Fourth branch: one upon whom hajj is obligatory wants to marry and owns wealth sufficient for only one of the two. First case: he is in the state of balanced desire: hajj takes precedence over marriage according to the majority, for marriage is voluntary and does not take precedence over the obligatory hajj; this when he owns the sustenance of the months of hajj; if he owns it outside that period, he may spend it as he wishes; the Shafi'is state explicitly, in the sound view, that hajj is due upon him and remains in his liability, but that he may devote this wealth to marriage, which is preferable, the hajj remaining upon him: this on the view of the deferral of the obligation (Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/508; Majma' al-Anhar 1/383; Hashiyat al-Dasuqi on the Sharh al-Kabir 2/206; al-Majmu' 7/72; Tuhfat al-Habib 3/188; Sharh al-Umda 2/152-156; al-Mughni 4/308; al-Fatawa al-Kubra 4/258; al-Furu' 3/231; al-Sayl al-Jarrar 2/160). Second case: he is in the state of his soul's anguish and fears fornication for himself: marriage takes precedence over hajj by agreement, for abandoning it involves two evils: neglecting the obligation and falling into fornication. Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya, may Allah have mercy on him, reports in the Sharh al-Umda the narration of Ahmad ibn Sa'id: if a man owns wealth, if he marries with it nothing remains to him; if he performs hajj he fears for himself; when he cannot patiently forgo marriage, he marries and leaves the hajj; thus transmitted Abu Dawud and others, and upon this are most of our companions: if he fears impotence, marriage takes precedence, for it is obligatory upon him and he cannot do without it, like sustenance. Ibn Qudama concludes: if he needs marriage and fears impotence for himself, he marries first, for it is obligatory upon him and he cannot do without it, like his sustenance; if he does not fear, hajj takes precedence, marriage being voluntary and not preceding the obligatory hajj; if he performs hajj neglecting these rights that fall to him, his pilgrimage is valid, for they attach to his liability and do not prevent the validity of his act (al-Mughni 4/308).
Ibn Abd al-Barr, may Allah have mercy on him, adds: one who has not performed the hajj of Islam and wants to marry while fearing for himself may marry and perform hajj when he finds the means: this is entirely the view of al-Thawri; and Ibn al-Qasim reports from Malik: the single man who has acquired wealth should perform hajj before marrying (al-Tamhid 9/136). Ibn Abidin finally notes: not among the basic needs is what recent custom has instituted under the name of hediyya, gifts to relatives and friends: one may not excuse oneself from hajj by inability to offer them, as al-Imadi noted in his Manasik, confirmed by Sheikh Isma'il; some attributed it to the Manasik of the verifier Ibn Amir al-Hajj, and Sayyid Abu al-Su'ud to the Manasik of al-Kirmani (Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/508).
Bodily soundness, free of illnesses and defects that prevent hajj, is a condition of the obligation of hajj: one who meets all the other conditions of obligation but is incapable owing to a desperate obstacle, a chronic ailment or an illness whose removal is not hoped for, or who can only stay on the mount with unbearable hardship, or the aged man in his decline and his like, is not bound to discharge the obligatory hajj himself, by agreement. The schools differ only where he owns wealth: must he commission someone to perform on his behalf, or not? This after their agreement that one capable of performing the obligatory hajj himself may not delegate it.
Ibn al-Mundhir, may Allah have mercy on him, reports: the people of knowledge are unanimous that for one upon whom the hajj of Islam weighs while he is capable of performing it, someone else performing it for him does not discharge him; the vowed hajj is like the hajj of Islam as regards delegation in case of incapacity, or of prevention despite capability, for it is an obligatory hajj (al-Ijma' 208; al-Mughni 4/123). The Shafi'is, the Hanbalis and the two companions of the Hanafis teach that such a man must commission someone to perform on his behalf, on the basis of the hadith of Ibn Abbas, may Allah be pleased with them both:
A woman of Khath'am said: O Messenger of Allah, the obligation Allah has laid upon His servants of pilgrimage has overtaken my father, a very old man who cannot keep his seat on a mount: shall I perform the pilgrimage for him? He said: Yes. This took place during the farewell pilgrimage.Bukhari 1756; Muslim 1334
She said: O Messenger of Allah, my father is a very old man upon whom rests Allah's obligation of pilgrimage, and he cannot keep himself upright on the back of his camel. The Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, said: Perform it for him, then.Muslim 1335
Add to these the hadith of Abu Razin al-Uqayli, may Allah be pleased with him: he came to the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, and said: "My father is an old man incapable of the pilgrimage, the umra and travel." He said: "Perform the pilgrimage for your father and do the umra for him" (authentic hadith; Abu Dawud 1810; at-Tirmidhi 930; an-Nasa'i 2621; Ibn Majah 2906); the hadith reported from Ali, may Allah be pleased with him: a young girl of Khath'am questioned the Messenger of Allah, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, during the farewell pilgrimage: "My father is an aged man sunk in senility, and Allah's obligation of pilgrimage has overtaken him: does my performing it for him suffice?" He said: "Yes, perform it for your father" (hasan hadith; at-Tirmidhi 885; Ahmad 1/75); and the hadith of Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr, may Allah be pleased with them both: a man of Khath'am came to the Messenger of Allah, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, and said: "My father was overtaken by Islam as an old man who cannot mount a beast, and the pilgrimage is prescribed upon him: shall I perform it for him?" He said: "Are you his eldest son?" He said: "Yes." He said: "If your father had a debt and you repaid it on his behalf, would that suffice him?" He said: "Yes." He said: "Perform the pilgrimage for him, then" (Ahmad 4/5; al-Darimi in his Sunan 1839, its chain sound according to al-Hafiz; Nihayat al-Awtar 5/10). The rule: it is a worship whose invalidation entails an expiation, so that another may stand in the doer's place, as with fasting, where the incapable one feeds, unlike prayer (al-Mughni 4/318).
As for Imam Abu Hanifa, may Allah have mercy on him, he holds this view for one who was capable while sound and then became incapable, not for one who never owned wealth until he lost the ability to perform himself. Ibn Abidin specifies: the locus of the obligation to perform for the incapable one who was capable then lost capability is at Imam Abu Hanifa's position; according to the two (Abu Yusuf and Muhammad), performing for him is due upon him if he has wealth, without requiring that hajj be obligatory upon him, and that is the correct position. In sum: one who was capable while sound then became incapable must commission someone by agreement; one who never owned wealth until he lost the ability to perform himself remains a matter of disagreement; the basis being that bodily soundness is a condition of obligation with Abu Hanifa and a condition of performance with the two, after having presented first the divergence over validation, the Imam's statement being the madhhab (Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/658).
The Malikis, for their part, teach that such a man has no hajj at all: Allah the Most High says "whoever finds the means to it", and this one is not capable; it is a worship into which delegation does not enter with capability, still less with incapacity, like fasting and prayer. Imam al-Qurtubi, may Allah have mercy on him, reports from Malik: the one whose organ has been amputated (ma'zub) falls entirely from the obligation of hajj, whether or not he can pay someone to perform on his behalf; no obligation of hajj is due upon him; even if hajj had become obligatory upon him and he then became impotent and aged, the obligation of hajj falls away, and no one may perform for him during his lifetime; if he bequeaths that it be performed for him after his death, it is performed for him from the third, as a voluntary act. Malik argued with the words of Allah the Most High:
"And man shall have nothing but what he strives for."
Surah an-Najm, 39
Allah announces that man has only his own striving: whoever claims that another's striving is credited to him contradicts the apparent sense of the verse; and by His words "whoever finds the means to it", for this one is not capable: hajj is the obligated person's own turning toward the House with his own person; it is a worship into which delegation does not enter with incapacity, like prayer. Our scholars answer: the purpose of the hadith of the Khath'ami woman is not to impose obligation, but to urge devotion to parents, to weigh their welfare in this world and in religion, and to secure their benefit by nature and by law; seeing in the woman manifest emotion, willing obedience, a sincere desire to be good to her father and an eager longing to bring him good and reward, fearing he would miss the blessing of hajj, he granted her request, as he did for the other woman who said: "My mother vowed to perform the pilgrimage and died before performing it: shall I perform it for her?" He said: "Yes, perform it for her. Had your mother had a debt, would you have repaid it?" She said: "Yes" (Bukhari 1754). The statement shows it belongs to voluntary acts and devotion to the dead: the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, likened the act of hajj to a debt, and there is consensus that if the deceased dies indebted, repayment is not obligatory upon his heir from his own wealth; if he does it voluntarily, the debt is discharged.
Among the proofs that the hajj in the preceding hadith was not an obligation upon the woman's father: her explicit declaration "he cannot"; one who cannot is not obligated: an explicit negation of the obligation and the prescription; what is absolutely negated at the start of the hadith cannot be established at its end by conjecture, even if the statement "Allah's debt is more worthy of being repaid" suggests it. That statement carries no consensus on its face: the slave's debt is still more worthy of repayment, and one begins with it by consensus, because of human need and Allah the Most High's self-sufficiency: so said Ibn al-Arabi. Abu Umar ibn Abd al-Barr reports that the hadith of the Khath'ami woman is, with Malik and his companions, specific to her (Tafsir al-Qurtubi 4/150-152; see al-Tamhid 9/129-137; Sharh al-Zurqani 2/390; Mawahib al-Jalil 2/498-499; al-Sharh al-Kabir 2/204; Badai' al-Sana'i' 2/287; al-Ikhtiyar 1/182; Fath al-Qadir 2/415-419; Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/658; al-Ishraf 216; al-Majmu' 7/69; Sharh Sahih Muslim 9/98; Mughni al-Muhtaj 2/234; Sharh al-Umda 2/135; al-Mughni 4/318; al-Furu' 3/183; Nihayat al-Awtar 5/10; al-Ifsah 1/451). Questions branch from it.
First question: the sick man commissions someone to perform for him, then recovers: is another hajj due from him for himself? The Hanafis, the Shafi'is and Ibn al-Mundhir teach that the delegation does not discharge him and another hajj is due from him for himself: incapacity until death is a condition, this case being a substitute for despair of recovery; once cured, it appears he was not in despair and the original remains due upon him, like the divorced woman counting months who then sees blood: that waiting period does not suffice her. The Hanbalis and Ishaq ibn Rahawayh teach that, once he has performed the pilgrimage for himself, his recovery entails no other hajj: he did what he was commanded and left the liability, as if he had not recovered. Ibn Qudama, may Allah have mercy on him, expounds: or we say he discharged the hajj of Islam by the command of the Law, so no second hajj is due upon him, as if he had performed himself; for the other thesis leads to imposing two obligatory pilgrimages, and Allah, may He be exalted, imposed only one upon him; to their statement "he was not in despair of recovery", we reply that were he not, delegation would not have been permitted to him, despair being a condition of the delegation's validity; as for the divorced woman counting months, the return of her menses is not conceivable there: the blood she sees is not menses and does not invalidate her count; hence, if he recovers before the delegate finishes his hajj, it should not discharge him, for he was capable of the original before the substitute was completed, like the young girl, like the woman whose menses ceased and returns before the months-count is complete, or the dry ablution performer (tayammum) who sees water during his prayer; it is possible, on the other hand, that the delegation discharges him, like the tamattu' pilgrim who begins the fast then can pay the sacrifice, or the one liable to an expiation who becomes able of the original after beginning the substitute; and if he recovers before the delegate's ihram, it discharges him in no case (al-Mughni 4/321-322; Umdat al-Qari 9/126; Sharh Ibn Battal 4/528; Badai' al-Sana'i' 3/287; al-Majmu' 7/69).
Second question: the blind man who finds provisions, a mount and a guide: is hajj due upon him from his wealth, or from his own person? Abu Hanifa, may Allah have mercy on him, in the version of the original text, teaches that no hajj is due from his person even if he finds provisions, a mount and a guide; hajj is due only upon his wealth if he possesses it: the blind man cannot perform hajj by himself, for he cannot find the road alone and cannot, alone, do what the road makes indispensable: mounting, dismounting and the rest; he is therefore not capable of performing by himself, but only through another's capability, whose act depends on his free choice; one capable only through another's choice is not capable in absolute terms, for the chooser's act depends on his choice, so istita'a is not established at all; hence hajj is not obligatory upon the very old man who cannot hold on to the mount, even if someone else steadies him: the case is alike. The Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, defined istita'a by provisions and mount only because they number among the causes leading to hajj, not to restrict istita'a to them: see that if a sea lies between him and Mecca with no ship on hand, or an enemy blocks access to the House, no hajj is due upon him despite the existence of provisions and mount; it is thus established that specifying provisions and the mount is not a restriction of the condition to them, but an indication of the causes of possibility: everything among the causes of possibility falls within the meaning of istita'a; and imposing hajj upon the blind man involves manifest constraint and severe hardship, while Allah said:
"He has laid upon you no hardship in the religion."
Surah al-Hajj, 78
The majority of jurists, namely the Malikis, the Shafi'is, the Hanbalis, the two companions of the Hanafis, and Abu Hanifa in al-Hasan's version, teach that hajj is due upon the blind man from his own person if he finds provisions and a mount, and a guide who covers the expense of his travel in his service without severe hardship; according to what is reported: asked about istita'a, the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, said: "It is the provisions and the mount" (weak hadith, cited earlier): he defined istita'a by provisions and mount, and the blind man possesses this istita'a, so hajj is due upon him; for the blind man owes hajj from his own person, he cannot find the road alone but is guided by the guide, so hajj is due upon him; with the guide present, the blind man is like the sighted; al-Mawardi compared him to the one ignorant of the road and the acts of hajj and to the deaf man: hajj is due upon them by agreement, as the Friday prayer is due upon them if they find a guide. Al-Nawawi, may Allah have mercy on him, reports from al-Rafi'i: the guide is, in the case of the blind man, what the mahram is in the case of the woman; as for the obligation of hiring him, two views, the sounder being obligation, which the majority's wording invites; Allah, may He be exalted, knows best (al-Majmu' 7/54; see Badai' al-Sana'i' 3/42-44; Sharh Fath al-Qadir 2/415; Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/658; Mawahib al-Jalil 2/498; al-Qawanin al-fiqhiyya, p. 86; al-Sharh al-Kabir 2/205; Minhaj al-Talibin 1/39; Mughni al-Muhtaj 1/468; Nihayat al-Muhtaj 3/251; Kashshaf al-Qina' 2/457; al-Ifsah 1/452).
Safety of the road comprises safety of person and property at the time of the people's departure for hajj: istita'a is not established without it, even if the road is frightening outside that period. The jurists differ: is safety of the road a condition of obligation or a condition of performance? The Malikis, the Shafi'is, Abu Hanifa in Ibn Shuja's version (the soundest among the Hanafis) and Imam Ahmad in one version teach that it belongs to the conditions of obligation: Allah the Most High required istita'a for the obligation of hajj, and there is no istita'a without safety of the road, just as there is none without provisions and mount; the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, defined istita'a by provisions and mount sufficiently, so that the explicitly mentioned may serve as proof for what resembles it in meaning: the possibility of reaching the House. Al-Kasani, may Allah have mercy on him, observes: see that just as he did not mention safety of the road, he did not mention soundness of the limbs nor the removal of the other sensible obstacles, which are conditions of obligation; yet the one prevented from reaching the House has neither provisions nor mount with him: the condition of provisions and mount is therefore, by necessity, a condition of safety of the road (Badai' al-Sana'i' 3/47).
The Hanbalis in the madhhab, and Abu Hanifa in one version, teach that safety of the road is a condition of performance, not of the origin of obligation: the Messenger of Allah, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, defined istita'a by provisions and mount without mentioning safety of the road, and this man possesses them; it is an excuse that prevents performance itself without preventing obligation, like impotence; and the ability to perform is not a condition in the obligation of acts of worship, as shown by the purified menstruant, the child come of age, the insane recovered, while nothing of the prayer's time remains in which it could be performed; yet istita'a is defined by provisions and mount, whose loss prevents everything, unlike safety of the road: the two differ. The benefit of the divergence appears in the obligation of the bequest when one fears missing it: whoever holds safety to be a condition of performance says the bequest becomes obligatory upon fear: one who met all the conditions of hajj while the road was threatening and dies before safety must bequeath hajj; if he dies after safety, the bequest is due upon him by agreement. Whoever holds it a condition of obligation says the bequest is not obligatory, for hajj was not due upon him and did not become a debt in his liability, so the bequest is not required of him (Badai' al-Sana'i' 3/46-47; Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/509; al-Mabsut 4/163; al-Hidaya 1/130; Sharh Fath al-Qadir 2/418; al-Ikhtiyar 1/151; al-Bahr al-Ra'iq 2/338; al-Sharh al-Kabir 2/204; Mawahib al-Jalil 2/491; Mughni al-Muhtaj 2/229; al-Majmu' 7/50; al-Mughni 4/302-303; al-Mubdi' 3/97).
The possibility of travel means that the conditions of hajj are complete in the obligated person and the time wide enough to set out for hajj. The jurists differ: is this possibility a condition of the origin of obligation or a condition of performance? The Hanafis, the Malikis in the sounder view, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis in one view (al-Mirdawi rules it the sound one of the school) teach that the possibility of travel is a condition of the origin of obligation: it is required that, provisions and mount at hand, time remain to travel to hajj by the customary route; if he would have to cover more than one stage (marhala) each day, or on some days, hajj is not due upon him. Their proofs: Allah the Most High imposed hajj only upon the capable, and this one is not capable, the act of hajj becoming impossible for him: a condition, then, like provisions and mount; the possibility of travel is an adjunct of istita'a, which is a condition of the obligation of hajj; and it stands in place of the entry into the time of obligation, like the entry of the prayer's time without which it is not due: this varies with lands, the time of obligation being reckoned for each at his town's people's departure, the restriction to the months of hajj in the verse being relative to the people of Umm al-Qura and those around them.
The Malikis in the contrary view, and Imam Ahmad in the second narration (that of the majority of his companions), teach that the possibility of travel is a condition of the necessity of performance: the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, was asked what makes hajj obligatory, and said: "Provisions and a mount" (weak hadith, cited earlier); yet this man owns provisions and mount; it is an excuse that prevents performance itself without preventing obligation, like impotence; and the ability to perform is not a condition in the obligation of acts of worship, as shown by the purified menstruant, the child come of age, the insane recovered, while nothing of the prayer's time remains in which it could be performed; istita'a being defined by provisions and mount, one must abide by its definition; the difference being that the loss of the possibility of travel prevents performance without preventing the making up (qada), whereas the loss of provisions and mount prevents everything: the two differ. The benefit of the divergence appears in hajj performed on his behalf after his death: whoever makes it a condition of performance says that if he dies before the condition exists, hajj is performed for him after his death, that is, the bequest is obligatory upon him; and if he was prevented from affording it before its existence, the hajj remains in his liability. Whoever makes it a condition of obligation says no bequest of hajj is due for him after his death, for hajj did not remain due upon him and did not become a debt in his liability, so the bequest is not required of him (Badai' al-Sana'i' 3/46; Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/512; Mawahib al-Jalil 2/491; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 2/284; al-Dhakhira 3/179; Rawdat al-Talibin 3/12; al-Majmu' 7/58; al-Insaf 3/407-408; al-Mughni 4/32; al-Maslik al-Mutaqassit, p. 34; al-Furu' 3/233).
The subject of research here: the ruling on one who obtained bodily and financial istita'a without obtaining the permit of hajj, whether because the number of pilgrims is capped by a set quota and a set age, or because he was not among those on whom the draw for obtaining the hajj visa fell, or because his istita'a only came about after the issuing of permits had stopped owing to his delay. Is he counted incapable? If he dies without having performed hajj for lack of obtaining a permit, is he excused, so that nothing is performed for him from his estate, or is he excused in his own person while hajj is performed from his estate? The question of permits is a recent question of this age, and the speech of the early generations contains nothing pointing to it; they only indicated what resembles it: the two preceding characteristics of safety of the road and possibility of travel, which it resembles; without doubt one who obtains no permit will find neither an open road nor travel made possible, and will be prevented from hajj.
First view: the possibility of travel, the openness of the road and its safety are conditions of the origin of obligation: just as hajj is not due upon one who finds no provisions or mount, it is not due upon one not authorized to travel nor obtaining the permit of hajj, for lack of an open road and of access to the House made possible: he is not capable; istita'a is among the conditions of hajj, and there is no istita'a without an open road, without obtaining the visa and the permit of hajj; the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, defined istita'a by provisions and mount sufficiently, so that the explicitly mentioned may serve as proof for what resembles it in meaning: the possibility of reaching the House. This is the view of the Malikis, the Shafi'is, Abu Hanifa in Ibn Shuja's version (the soundest among the Hanafis) and Ahmad in one version. Second view: safety and openness of the road are conditions of performance, not of the origin of obligation: the Messenger of Allah, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, defined istita'a by provisions and mount without mentioning safety of the road, and this man possesses them; it is an excuse that prevents performance itself without preventing obligation, like impotence; and the ability to perform is not a condition in the obligation of acts of worship, as shown by the purified menstruant, the child come of age, the insane recovered, while nothing of the prayer's time remains in which it could be performed; istita'a being defined by provisions and mount, whose loss prevents everything: the two differ. This is the view of Abu Hanifa in one version and Ahmad in the second (the madhhab of the Hanbalis).
The benefit of the divergence appears in the obligation of the bequest when one fears missing it: whoever makes it a condition of obligation says the bequest is not obligatory, for hajj was not due upon him and did not become a debt in his liability, so the bequest is not required of him; whoever makes it a condition of performance says the bequest becomes due upon fear: one who met the conditions of hajj while the road was threatening and dies before safety must bequeath hajj; if he dies after safety of the road, the bequest is due upon him by agreement. But the correct position is the first view: the possibility of travel and obtaining the visa and the permit of hajj belong to the conditions of obligation, not to the conditions of the necessity of performance; for the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, did not mention in the hadith the soundness of the limbs, which is yet a condition of obligation; his mention of provisions and mount departs on the genre of the most frequent, so that no implied meaning is drawn from it; and their statement that the ability to perform is not a condition in the obligation of acts of worship, as shown by the purified menstruant, the child come of age, the insane recovered, while nothing of the prayer's time remains in which it could be performed, is contested: the obligation of a worship in the liability before the ability to perform it, as with prayer, holds only where the obligation was stated absolutely; hajj, for its part, has its obligation restricted to one "who finds the means to it": its obligation, in performance as in making up, is impossible for the non-capable; one who obtains no permit or visa is not capable in reality; Allah charges no soul beyond its capacity, and obtaining the permit and visa is not within the power of the one denied them; Allah, may He be exalted, knows best.
Second question: delegation by one who obtained no permit. One prevented by the capping of the pilgrims' quota, by the age limit beyond which hajj is no longer granted, or by other regulations: we know from the foregoing that if he dies, nothing is due from his estate on the correct view, but that hajj there is recommended, the permit of hajj being a condition of obligation and not of the necessity of performance. There remains to know whether one deprived of the permit by an obstacle whose removal is hoped for may commission someone to perform on his behalf from his town or elsewhere. The correct position: every obstacle whose removal is hoped for, as with an illness whose recovery is hoped for, forbids one upon whom hajj is obligatory to delegate another, as will come, Allah willing, in the conditions of hajj on behalf of another; so it is here.
What characterizes women among the conditions of istita'a consists of two conditions without which hajj does not become obligatory upon her, in addition to the characteristics of the condition of istita'a mentioned: the husband or the mahram, and the absence of the waiting period ('idda). First condition: the husband or the trustworthy mahram. The jurists differ over requiring the husband or mahram in the woman's travel for hajj when the distance falls within the qasr journey: is it required, or may the woman travel with a trustworthy company while the mahram is present, or even travel with a trustworthy company in the mahram's absence?
The Hanafis and the Hanbalis in the madhhab teach that the mahram's presence with the woman belongs to the conditions of hajj: without husband or mahram, no hajj is obligatory upon her. Their proofs: first the Prophet's statement, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him:
No pilgrimage for a woman without a mahram with her.Authentic hadith; Daraqutni 2/322
The statement is explicit on the ruling; moreover, the woman undertakes a journey within the abode of Islam, inconceivable without a mahram, as with voluntary hajj. Then the Prophet's statement, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him:
No man must be alone with a woman, and no woman may travel without a mahram with her. A man stood up and said: O Messenger of Allah, I enlisted for such and such expedition, and my wife has set out on pilgrimage. He said: Go, and perform the pilgrimage with your wife.Bukhari 2844; Muslim 1341
Abu Bakr al-Jassas, may Allah have mercy on him, shows that this statement organizes the woman intending hajj from three angles: the questioner understood it thus, since he asked about his wife who intended hajj, and the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, did not deny it to him, proof that the meaning is general in hajj and the rest of journeys; his words "perform the pilgrimage with your wife" inform of the travel intended in "no woman travels without a mahram with her"; and his order to leave the expedition for the hajj with his wife: had the woman's hajj been permitted without mahram or husband, he would not have ordered him to leave the expedition, which is an obligation, for her voluntary act. The statement also proves that the woman's hajj was an obligation and not a voluntary act: otherwise he would not have ordered him to leave an obligation for the woman's voluntary act; and from another angle, the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, did not ask him whether the woman's hajj was obligatory or voluntary: proof of the two rulings' equality in forbidding her departure without a mahram; it is thus established that the mahram's presence with the woman is among the conditions of istita'a (Ahkam al-Qur'an 2/308-309). It is also that, without husband or mahram, she is not safe: women are flesh laid upon exposed bones, preserved by nothing but what wards it off. The Hanafis go so far as to say: if she finds no mahram, she waits until she reaches a time when she becomes incapable of hajj, then commissions someone to perform for her. Ibn Abidin specifies: among the obstacles whose removal is hoped for is the absence of a findable mahram: she waits for old age, blindness or chronic illness, then commissions a performer; before that it is not permitted to her, in presumption of a mahram's existence; if the mahram's absence persists until her death, it is permitted to her, like the sick man who commissions a man and whose illness lasts until death, per al-Bahr and others (Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/659).
The Hanafis and the Hanbalis differ, however: is the mahram's presence a condition of obligation or a condition of performance? Two views among both: whoever makes it a condition of obligation says no bequest of hajj is due from her after her death; whoever makes it a condition of performance says the bequest is due upon her, death coming after the obligation, her impediment having borne only on the delay, her hajj-specific conditions being complete, the mahram serving only her protection, like the openness of the road and the possibility of travel. They also differ over the mahram's expenses: do they weigh upon her wealth or not? The Hanafis in the sound view and the Hanbalis teach that the mahram's expenses in hajj weigh upon her: the mahram or the husband is among the necessities of her hajj like the provisions and mount, and this husband or mahram cannot be compelled to contribute from his own wealth; she therefore owes it to him, as she owes the provisions and mount for herself: her istita'a thus considers her owning provisions and mount for herself and for her mahram. The qadi, in his commentary on the Mukhtasar al-Tahawi, reports that it is not due from her: a narration reported from Muhammad and the view of Abu Hafs al-Bukhari, for what is obligatory upon her is her hajj, not another's performing for her. Al-Kasani, may Allah have mercy on him, explains the sense: this belongs to the conditions of the obligation of hajj upon her, and man is not bound to secure a condition of obligation: if the condition exists, hajj becomes due, otherwise not; see that the poor man is not bound to secure provisions and mount, so hajj does not become obligatory upon him; hence they said of the woman with no husband or mahram that she is not bound to marry a man who would perform hajj with her: the same case (Badai' al-Sana'i' 3/47-48; Sharh Fath al-Qadir 2/422; Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/511; al-Bahr al-Ra'iq 2/339; al-Mabsut 4/163; al-Jawhara al-Nira 2/77; al-Fatawa al-Hindiyya 1/219; al-Mughni 4/334; al-Insaf 3/415; al-Ifsah 1/446).
The Malikis, the Shafi'is, Imam Ahmad in one version, al-Hasan, al-Nakha'i, Ishaq and Ibn al-Mundhir teach that the mahram's presence is not a condition in the obligatory hajj. Imam Malik says: she performs the pilgrimage in the company of women. Al-Shafi'i says: she may perform hajj with trustworthy women. Al-Nawawi, may Allah have mercy on him, reports from al-Shafi'i and his companions: hajj is not obligatory upon the woman unless she feels safe for herself through a husband, a mahram by kinship or beyond kinship, or trustworthy women; whichever of the three exists, hajj becomes due without disagreement; if none of the three exists, no hajj is due upon her in the school, whether she finds a single woman or not. A third view requires that she set out for hajj alone when the road is traveled, just as it is due upon her, by agreement, to leave alone the abode of war for the abode of Islam should she embrace Islam there: this is the choice of the compiler (al-Shirazi) and a group; the madhhab of the majority remains the foregoing, the well-known of al-Shafi'i's texts (al-Majmu' 7/86). Their proofs: Allah's words "whoever finds the means to it", the address to the people encompassing males and females by agreement: with provisions and mount she is capable, and with trustworthy women corruption is kept safe, so the obligatory hajj becomes due upon her; and the hadith of Adi ibn Hatim, may Allah be pleased with him:
I was with the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, when a man came complaining of hunger, then another complaining of highway robbery. He said: O Adi, have you seen al-Hira? I said: I have not seen it, but I have been told of it. He said: If your life is prolonged, you will see the traveling woman set out from al-Hira and circle the Kaaba fearing none but Allah. Adi said: I saw the traveling woman set out from al-Hira and circle the Kaaba, fearing none but Allah.Bukhari 3400
al-Hira, a city near Kufa; the "traveling woman" means the woman. The report belongs to the context of praise and of raising Islam's banners: it is therefore read as permission. Ibn Battal, may Allah have mercy on him, reports: Malik and al-Shafi'i say the woman sets out for the obligatory hajj with a group of women in a safe company, without a mahram; the mass of scholars allows it, and Ibn Umar performed the pilgrimage with women of his neighbors. Abu Hanifa and his companions say the woman does not perform hajj without a mahram: this is Ahmad's view, who reads the prohibition generally for every journey, while Malik and the majority of jurists read it specifically: the meaning of the prohibition bears on journeys not obligatory upon her, by virtue of the generality of Allah's words "the pilgrimage of the House" (Surah Al Imran, 97) into which the woman entered, the obligatory hajj being due upon her; the woman may not be barred from obligations, as she is not barred from prayer and fasting: see that she must emigrate from the abode of disbelief to the abode of Islam without a mahram if she embraces Islam there, and so it is with every obligation for which she must set out; it is thus established that the Prophet's prohibition, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, of the woman's traveling without a mahram bears on the journey not obligatory upon her; Allah, may He be exalted, knows best (Ibn Battal's Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari 4/532-533). Al-Hafiz Ibn Hajar, may Allah have mercy on him, adds: among the proofs of the permission for the woman to travel with trustworthy women when the road is safe are the first hadiths of the chapter: "Umar gave permission to the Prophet's wives, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, in a last pilgrimage he performed, and sent with them Uthman ibn Affan and Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf" (Bukhari 1860): Umar, Uthman, Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf and the Prophet's wives, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, agreed upon this, and no other Companion censured them for it; those of the Mothers of the Believers who refused did so for a particular reason, not because travel depended on the mahram; perhaps this is the fine point of Bukhari's citing the two hadiths one after the other, none differing that all women are alike in this (Fath al-Bari 4/90-91).
The Malikis add: the woman may set out for hajj with a trustworthy company when husband or mahram is absent, refuses or is incapable, on condition that she herself be safe; if husband or mahram refuses to travel with her without a fee, the fee is due upon her, and travel with the safe company then becomes unlawful to her. Al-Dasuqi, may Allah have mercy on him, specifies: the fee is due her only if she is not neglectful of him on the apparent, though the apparent of their statement renders it due absolutely (Hashiyat al-Dasuqi 2/210). With the Shafi'is, she chooses between the company of her husband or a mahram, or a trustworthy company, except that she owes the mahram's fee if he goes with her only in exchange for it. This divergence concerns the obligatory hajj; as for voluntary hajj, the woman may travel for it only with a husband or a mahram, by agreement, and traveling without them is unlawful to her, a sin upon her; al-Nawawi reported a view allowing the woman's travel for voluntary hajj without a mahram and judged it weak (al-Majmu' 7/86-87; see al-Istidhkar 4/411-413; al-Kafi 1/611; al-Dhakhira 3/180; al-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/521; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 2/287; al-Muwatta 1/425; Hashiyat al-Dasuqi on the Sharh al-Kabir 2/210; Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/438; al-Ishraf, p. 216-217; al-Hawi al-Kabir 2/363; Mughni al-Muhtaj 2/233; al-Mughni 4/334; al-Insaf 3/415; al-Ifsah 1/446).
As for voluntary hajj, the husband may bar her from it by consensus. Ibn al-Mundhir, may Allah have mercy on him, reports: all whose views we preserve among the people of knowledge are unanimous on the man's right to bar his wife from setting out on voluntary hajj (al-Ijma' 135); for the husband's right is obligatory, and she may not forfeit it by what is not (al-Mughni 4/340; al-Dhakhira 3/180; Sharh Ibn Battal 2/533; al-Jawhar al-Naqi 5/224; Mawahib al-Jalil 2/474; al-Sharh al-Kabir 2/350; al-Majmu' 8/249; al-Umm 2/117; Nihayat al-Muhtaj 2/383; al-Ashbah wa-l-Naza'ir 1/138; al-Fatawa al-Kubra 4/464).
The jurists are, on the whole, agreed that it is required that the woman not be in a waiting period of divorce or death during the time in which travel for hajj is possible: Allah the Most High forbade the women in 'idda to go out, in His words:
"Fear Allah, your Lord: do not send them out of their houses, and let them not go out."
Surah at-Talaq, 1
It is also that hajj may be performed at another time, whereas the 'idda must be observed in this very time alone: combining the two matters is therefore preferable. The Hanafis generalized the condition to every woman in 'idda, whether from an irrevocable or revocable divorce, a death or an annulment of marriage; such is also the Malikis' view: the woman in 'idda of divorce or death must remain in the house of the waiting period; if she enters ihram while in 'idda, her pilgrimage is valid, but with the sin, by virtue of the verse that generalizes the women in 'idda for divorce as for death.
The Hanbalis, for their part, give detail: the woman does not set out for hajj during the death 'idda, but she may set out for it during the 'idda of irrevocable divorce; for residence in the house is obligatory during the death 'idda and takes precedence over hajj, which may be missed, whereas it is not so in irrevocable divorce; and during the 'idda of the revocably divorced woman, she stands as she does in seeking marriage: she is a wife. Likewise with the Shafi'is: they state explicitly that the husband may bar the revocably divorced woman for the sake of the 'idda, since he may, on the sound view, bar her from the obligatory hajj itself (Mughni al-Muhtaj 2/342; al-Mughni 4/340; Badai' al-Sana'i' 3/50; Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/512; Mawahib al-Jalil 2/526; al-Malik al-Mutaqassit, p. 39). The Hanafis finally differ: is absence of 'idda a condition of obligation or a condition of performance? Ibn Amir al-Hajj makes it a condition of performance, which Ibn Abidin judges the more apparent; with the majority it is a condition of obligation (Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/512).