Islamic Fiqh > Judgment and testimony > Testimony (chahada) > The legitimacy of testimony
Contents
Updated on 25 September 2026 at 3:23 PM
This part belongs to the full section: All sections of this part.
This section is part of the full chapter: All sections of this chapter.
Testimony is legislated by the Book, the Sunnah, consensus and reason.
As for the Book: the word of Allah the Most High:
« And take as witnesses 2 witnesses from among your men. »
Surah al-Baqarah, 282
To the end of the verse. And His word:
« And take as witnesses 2 just persons from among you. »
Surah at-Talaq, 2
And His word:
« And take witnesses when you trade with one another. »
Surah al-Baqarah, 282
And other verses besides.
As for the Sunnah: from Abd ar-Rahman ibn Abi Amra al-Ansari, from Zayd ibn Khalid al-Juhani, the Prophet, may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, said:
« Shall I not tell you who is the best of witnesses? It is the one who brings his testimony before he is even asked for it. »reported by Muslim 1719
Imam an-Nawawi said: this hadith admits 2 interpretations. The most correct and most famous is the interpretation of Malik and the Shafi'is: it applies to one who holds testimony establishing a right for a person who does not know that he is a witness; he comes to him and informs him that he is a witness on his behalf. The second: it applies to the testimony of public accountability (hisbah), which concerns matters outside the private rights of human beings; hisbah testimony is accepted in divorce, manumission, endowment (waqf), general bequests, legal punishments (hudud) and the like. Whoever learns of something of this type must raise it to the judge, inform him of it and testify, for Allah the Most High says: « And establish the testimony for Allah ». Likewise in the first case: one who holds testimony for a person who is unaware of it must inform him of it, for it is a trust deposited with him. A third interpretation has been related: that the hadith is a figure of exaggeration regarding delivering testimony after it is requested, not before, as it is said of the generous one that he gives before being asked, meaning he gives promptly upon the request, without delay. The scholars said: this hadith does not contradict the other hadith censuring the one who brings testimony before being asked, in the saying of the Prophet, may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him: « They testify without being asked to testify »; and the scholars gave it several interpretations: the most correct, according to our companions (the Shafi'is), is that it applies to one who holds testimony for a person who knows of it, and who comes to testify before the testimony is requested of him; the second applies to the false witness, who testifies to what has no basis without being asked; the third applies to one who sets himself up as a witness while not qualified for testimony; the fourth applies to one who testifies without restraint that certain people are bound for Paradise or the Fire, and this interpretation is weak, and Allah knows best (Sharh an-Nawawi ala Sahih Muslim 12/17).
Ibn Abbas said:
« The Prophet, may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, was asked about testimony. He said: Do you see the sun? The man said: Yes. He said: Bear witness to something equally manifest, or refrain. »reported by al-Uqayli in ad-Duafa 380, Ibn Adi in al-Kamil 2/361, Abu Ishaq al-Muzakki in al-Fawaid al-Muntakhaba 1/110, al-Hakim 4/98 and 99, and al-Bayhaqi 10/156
From Abu Wa'il: Abdullah ibn Mas'ud, may Allah be pleased with him, said:
Whoever swears an oath by which he wrongfully acquires wealth, being deceitful in it, will meet Allah while He is angry with him. Abdullah said: Allah revealed in confirmation of that: « Those who purchase a small price, the covenant of Allah and their oaths », and he read until: « for them is a painful punishment ». Then al-Ash'ath ibn Qays came out to us and said: What is Abu Abd ar-Rahman telling you? We related the account to him, and he said: He has spoken the truth: it was indeed concerning me, by Allah, that this revelation came down. There was a dispute between a man and myself concerning a well; we brought our dispute to the Messenger of Allah, may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him. The Messenger of Allah, may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, said: « Your 2 witnesses, or his oath. » I said: Then he will surely swear and care not. The Messenger of Allah, may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, said: « Whoever swears an oath by which he wrongfully acquires wealth, being deceitful in it, will meet Allah while He is angry with him. » Allah revealed in confirmation of that, and he then recited this verse: « Those who purchase a small price, the covenant of Allah and their oaths », until « and for them is a painful punishment » (Surah Al Imran, 77).reported by al-Bukhari 2380 and Muslim 138
And the evidence for the legitimacy of testimony is the saying of the Prophet, may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him: « Your 2 witnesses, or his oath »; for he gave him the choice between testimony and the oath.
As for consensus: Imam al-Imrani, may Allah have mercy on him, said: there is no disagreement among the community that ruling is attached to testimony (al-Bayan 13/268). Imam ad-Damiri, may Allah have mercy on him, said: and there is no disagreement among the Muslims concerning it (an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/283). Imam Ibn Qudamah, may Allah have mercy on him, said: and the basis of testimonies is the Book, the Sunnah and consensus (al-Mughni 10/154). Imam az-Zarkashi, may Allah have mercy on him, said: and there is no dispute over the legitimacy of testimony and of having witnesses attest (Sharh az-Zarkashi 3/389).
As for reason: the need for testimony is pressing because of the mutual denial that occurs among people; recourse to it is therefore required to revive people's rights, preserve contracts from denial, and safeguard wealth for its owners.
Shurayh said: « Judgment is an ember: push it away from yourself with 2 sticks, meaning the 2 witnesses; the litigant is a disease and the witnesses are the cure: so pour the cure over the disease » (al-Mughni 10/154, al-Ikhtiyar 2/166 and an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/283).
Wickedness is of 2 types: wickedness relating to actions and wickedness relating to belief.
The people of knowledge agreed, as stated earlier, that the witness is required to be upright. If he is wicked for committing a major sin, or persisting in a minor sin, or for playing backgammon or chess for money, or committing anything else that is forbidden, his testimony is not accepted. Ibn Qudamah said: wickedness is of 2 kinds: one from the standpoint of actions, and we know of no disagreement over rejecting the testimony of this kind of wicked person (al-Mughni 10/168; see the earlier sources).
The jurists have spoken at length, in every school, on what counts as forbidden things. The controlling principle here is: whoever commits a major sin and does not repent of it, or persists in a minor sin, whether word or deed, has his testimony rejected.
The jurists differed on wickedness relating to belief, that of the people of whims among the innovators: is their testimony accepted or not?
The Malikis and the Hanbalis held that the testimony of the people of whims is not accepted at all.
The Malikis said: the testimony of an innovator is not accepted, such as that of the Kharijite or the Qadarite, even if it arises from an interpretation in which he erred: there is no difference between the one who misinterprets and the ignorant one who merely follows another therein, and ignorance is no excuse (Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari 8/588 and 589, at-Taj wa al-Iklil 5/108, al-Sharh al-Kabir with the commentary of ad-Dasuqi 6/614 and Tahbir al-Mukhtasar 5/110).
The Hanbalis said: the testimony of one wicked in belief, namely the people of innovation, is not accepted, even if he believes it to be a true religion; their testimony is rejected because this is one of the 2 types of wickedness, on account of which testimony is rejected like the other type; and because the innovator is a wicked person whose testimony is rejected by virtue of the verse. The meaning is: if he blindly follows the view that the Quran is created, or that Allah the Most High will not be seen in the hereafter, or Rafd (Rafidism), or Jahmism, and the like such as anthropomorphism or the creation of the servant's deeds, he becomes wicked; and the accomplished proselytizer among them is declared a disbeliever. Al-Majd said: the correct view is that for every innovation in which we declare the proselytizer a disbeliever, we declare the blind follower in it wicked, such as one who says the Quran is created, or that our utterances of it are created, or that Allah's knowledge is created, or that His names are created, or that He will not be seen in the hereafter, or who insults the Companions out of religiosity, or who holds that faith is mere belief, and the like: whoever is learned in one of these innovations, calling to it and disputing for it, is ruled a disbeliever; Ahmad expressly stated this in several places (al-Mughni 10/168, Kashshaf al-Qina 6/531 and Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/663).
Al-Muwaffaq (Ibn Qudamah) chose the view that their accomplished proselytizer is not declared a disbeliever, in keeping with Ahmad's address to al-Mutasim: O Commander of the Faithful (al-Mughni 10/168).
The Hanafis and the Shafi'is held that the testimony of the people of whims among the people of innovation is accepted if they avoid lying, except the Khattabiyya among the Rafidites: they believe on oath anyone who swears before them that so-and-so owes him such and such, and they testify to it, believing him truthful in his claim. They are ascribed to Ibn al-Khattab, a man in Kufa who held that Ali is the greater deity and Jafar as-Sadiq the lesser deity; the governor Isa ibn Musa killed and crucified him.
The basis of the view accepting their testimony is that this disagreement did not take them out of Islam: it resembles disagreement over the secondary branches; and their wickedness does not indicate lying, because they adopted it out of religiosity and conviction that it is the truth, and did not commit it knowing it to be forbidden, unlike the wickedness of actions (Ikhtilaf al-Ulama 1/286 and 287, Mukhtasar Ikhtilaf al-Ulama 3/334 and 335, Ahkam al-Quran 2/234, al-Mabsut 16/132 and 133, al-Hidaya 3/123, al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/168, al-Lubab 2/458, the commentary of Ibn Abidin 7/108, al-Hawi al-Kabir 17/168 and 176, al-Bayan 13/280 and 281, al-Ifsah 2/421, Sharh Sahih Muslim 7/160, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/322 and 323, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/386).
Imam al-Shafi'i, may Allah have mercy on him, said: the people, in interpreting the Quran and the hadiths, or some of them, went into matters on which they differed and parted ways most sharply; some of them declared lawful, against others, things whose account would be long. Part of this dates far back, from the time of the predecessors and after them to this day. Yet we know of none of the predecessors of this community whose example is followed, nor of the Successors after them, who rejected anyone's testimony on account of interpretation, even while deeming him mistaken and astray, and even seeing him declare lawful what was forbidden to him; and none rejected anyone's testimony for an interpretation that had a tenable basis, even if it went as far as declaring blood and wealth lawful, nor rejected the excessive in speech. That is because we found that blood is the gravest thing by which Allah the Most High is disobeyed after idolatry, and we found interpreters declaring it lawful on various grounds, while their peers exhorted them away from it and opposed them in it, without rejecting their testimony on account of the disagreement they saw in them. So the testimony of whoever declares something lawful through interpretation, in word or otherwise, stands and is not rejected for an error in his interpretation, for his opponent may likewise deem him to be the one in error. Except one of them who is known for declaring lawful false testimony against a man, because he deems his blood or wealth lawful: his testimony is rejected for falsehood; or one of them who declares lawful, or approves, testifying for a man he trusts, to the point of swearing on his behalf about his right and testifying for him categorically without having been present or heard anything: his testimony is rejected because he declares false testimony lawful; or one of them who treats the one who differs with him with open enmity: his testimony is rejected on grounds of enmity. Whichever of these it is, among them or among others not ascribed to sectarian whim, I reject his testimony; and whoever is safe from that, I validate his testimony.
And the testimony of one who deems lying to be association with Allah, or disobedience to Him that incurs the Fire, is more deserving of acceptance than the testimony of one who belittles its sin. Likewise if they are among those who insult a group on the ground of interpretation in their insults, not on the ground of enmity: if we validate their testimony despite their declaring blood lawful, their testimony regarding insults against men is all the more not to be rejected, for there is interpretation in both cases, and insult is lighter than killing (al-Umm 6/205 and 206).
Imam Ibn al-Qayyim, may Allah have mercy on him, said: the one wicked in belief, if he is scrupulous in his religion, his testimony is accepted even if we rule him wicked, like the people of innovation and whims whom we do not declare disbelievers: the Rafidites, the Kharijites, the Mutazilites and their like; such is the express position of the imams.
Al-Shafi'i said: I accept the testimony of the people of whims against one another, except the Khattabiyya: they make a religious duty of testifying for their partisans against their opponents.
There is no doubt that the testimony of one who believes in disbelief for sin and counts lying as a sin is more worthy of acceptance than that of one who does not; the early and later generations never ceased accepting these people's testimony and their reports.
What the imams, such as Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal and his like, forbade was accepting the report of the proselytizer who proclaims his innovation and his testimony; and they forbade praying behind him, as a shunning and a rebuke of him, so that the harm of his innovation may be turned away from the Muslims; for accepting his testimony and his report, praying behind him, appointing him judge and executing his rulings constitute approval of his innovation, acknowledgment of it, and exposure to accepting it from him.
Harb said: Ahmad said: the testimony of the Qadarite, the Rafidite and whoever calls to an innovation and disputes for it is not valid.
Al-Maymuni said: Abu Abdullah (Ahmad) said concerning the Rafidites: may Allah curse them; their testimony is not accepted, and no regard for them.
Ishaq ibn Mansur said: I said to Ahmad: Ibn Abi Layla accepted the testimony of every innovator so long as he was upright among them and did not declare false testimony lawful. Ahmad said: the testimony of the Jahmites, the Rafidites, the Qadarites and the women who openly display their sins does not please me.
Al-Maymuni said: I heard Abu Abdullah say: whoever is such that I fear disbelief for him, like the Rafidites and the Jahmites: his testimony is not accepted, and no regard for them.
In the narration of Yaqub ibn Bakhtan: if the judge is a Jahmite, we do not testify before him.
Ahmad ibn al-Hasan at-Tirmidhi said: I came to Abu Abdullah (Ahmad), and he said: How is your judge? His life has indeed been drawn out for him. I said to him: the people hold testimonies with me; I have traveled through the lands; I do not feel safe, if I testify before him, from being disgraced. He said: do not testify before him. I said: he will question me, the one who holds a testimony with me. He said: you are entitled not to testify before him.
Whoever disbelieves through his doctrine, such as one who denies the temporal origination of the world, the resurrection of bodies, the Lord's knowledge, the Most High, of all existent things, and that He acts by His will and His choice: his testimony is not accepted, for he is not upon Islam. As for the people of innovation who agree with the people of Islam but differ on some fundamentals, like the Rafidites, the Qadarites, the Jahmites, the extremists of the Murji'a and their like, these fall into categories.
The first: the ignorant blind follower who has no discernment: he is neither declared a disbeliever nor ruled wicked, and his testimony is not rejected when he was not able to learn guidance; his status is that of the weak among men, women and children who can find no device and are not guided to a way: these, it may be that Allah will pardon them, and Allah was ever Pardoning, Forgiving.
The second: the one able to ask, seek guidance and know the truth, but who leaves it, occupied with his worldly life, his position, his pleasure and his livelihood: he is negligent, deserving of the threat, sinful for neglecting the duty of mindfulness of Allah incumbent on him according to his capacity; his status is that of his like among those who neglect certain obligations. If what is in him of innovation and whim outweighs what is in him of Sunnah and guidance, his testimony is rejected; and if what is in him of Sunnah and guidance outweighs it, his testimony is accepted.
Third category: the one who asks, seeks, and to whom guidance becomes clear, but who leaves it out of conformity and partisanship, or hatred or enmity toward its people: the least of his case is that he be wicked, and declaring him a disbeliever is a matter of independent reasoning and detail. If he is a proclaiming proselytizer, his testimony, his fatwas and his rulings are rejected when there is capacity for that; no testimony, fatwa or ruling of his is accepted except in case of necessity, as when such people prevail and dominate, and the judges, muftis and witnesses are from among them: rejecting their testimony and rulings then would breed much corruption, and it is not possible; they are therefore accepted out of necessity.
Malik, may Allah have mercy on him, expressly stated that the testimony of the people of innovation, such as the Qadarites, the Rafidites and their like, is not accepted, even if they pray our prayer and face our qiblah.
Al-Lakhmi said: that is because of their wickedness; he said: even if it arose from an interpretation in which they erred.
If such is their rejection of the Qadarite's testimony, whose error arises only from an interpretation of the Quran like the Kharijites, what then of the Jahmites, whom many of the predecessors excluded from the 72 sects (at-Turuq al-Hukmiyya, p. 253 and 256)?
Imam Ibn al-Qayyim, may Allah have mercy on him, said: on this basis, if the people are all wicked except a rare few, the testimony of some of them against others is accepted, and judgment is passed on the testimony of the most excellent of the wicked, then the next most excellent: this is the correct view upon which practice rests, even if many jurists deny it with their tongues; just as practice rests on the validity of the wicked person's guardianship and the enforcement of his rulings even if they deny it with their tongues; and likewise practice rests on the validity of the wicked person being a marriage guardian and an executor over wealth.
And it is astonishing from one who strips him of that, and returns the guardianship to a wicked person like him or more wicked than him. For the upright person to whom guardianship would pass cannot be found, and the wicked close kin is distinguished by the care of kinship; and the executor is by the testator's choice and preference over others: a wicked person designated by the testator, or distinguished by kinship, is more worthy than a wicked person with none of that; especially since, if the truthfulness of the wicked person preponderates in the mind, his testimony is accepted and judgment is passed by it. Allah, glorified be He, did not command rejecting the wicked person's report: it is therefore not permissible to reject it categorically; rather one verifies it until it becomes clear whether he is truthful or a liar: if truthful, his word is accepted and acted upon, and his wickedness is upon him; if a liar, his report is rejected and no attention is paid to it.
Rejecting the wicked person's report and testimony has 2 bases: first, lack of trust in him, for his little regard for his religion and the deficiency of awe of Allah in his heart lead him to deliberate lying; second, shunning him for his proclaiming and displaying his wickedness; accepting his testimony nullifies this legally intended purpose.
When the truthfulness of the wicked person's tongue is known, and he is among the most truthful of people even if his wickedness is not lying, there is no ground for rejecting his testimony. The Prophet, may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, hired a guide to show him the way to Madinah while he was a polytheist upon the religion of his people; but since he trusted his word, he trusted him, handed him his mount and accepted his guidance.
Asbagh ibn al-Faraj said: when the wicked person testifies before the judge, he is required to suspend the case; and this may be supported by the word of Allah the Most High: « If a wicked person brings you news, verify it » (Surah al-Hujurat, 6).
The crux of the question is that acceptance and rejection of testimony turn upon the preponderance or absence of the presumption of truthfulness.
And the correct, decisively established view is that uprightness is divisible: a man may be upright in one thing and wicked in another; when it becomes clear to the judge that he is upright in what he testifies to, he accepts his testimony, and his wickedness elsewhere does not harm him.
Whoever knows the conditions of uprightness and knows the state of the people, the correct view in this question becomes clear to him, and Allah knows best (at-Turuq al-Hukmiyya, p. 256 and 258).
Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah, may Allah have mercy on him, said: rejecting the testimony of one known for lying is agreed upon among the jurists. And he said: the upright person, in every time, place and group, is according to its context; the witness among every people is whoever is upright among them, even if, were he among others, his uprightness would be of another kind. By this, judgment between people is possible; otherwise, if it were required, for the witnesses of every group, that none testify against them but one who stands firm in fulfilling the obligations and abandoning the forbidden, as the Companions were, all testimonies, or most of them, would be voided. It is tenable that the testimony of those known for truthfulness be accepted, even if they do not adhere to the legal punishments, in case of necessity: such as prison, the incidents of the Bedouins, and the people of the village among whom is not found...
The jurists differed on the ruling of accepting the testimony of the People of the Book against one another: is it valid or not?
The majority of the jurists, the Malikis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis in the position of the school, held that the testimony of the People of the Book against one another is not valid, because of the word of Allah the Most High:
« And take as witnesses 2 just persons from among you. »
Surah at-Talaq, 2
This verse forbids accepting their testimony on 2 counts: first, they are not upright; second, they are not of us. And Allah the Most High said:
« O you who believe, if a wicked person brings you news, verify it. »
Surah al-Hujurat, 6
The disbeliever is wicked: verification of his report is therefore required, and testimony is weightier than report: the verse therefore requires withholding regarding his testimony. And because of the word of Allah the Most High:
« And Allah will never grant the disbelievers a way over the believers. »
Surah an-Nisa, 141
Allah the Most High denied that the disbelievers have any way over the believers; accepting their testimony against one another establishes a way for the disbelievers over the believers, for the judge would be obliged to rule by their testimony, which is denied. And because uprightness is a condition of accepting testimony, and wickedness is a bar, while disbelief is the head of wickedness: it is all the more a bar to acceptance.
And because of what Abu Hurayrah reported, attributed to the Prophet:
« The testimony of one religious community against another is not valid, except the testimony of the Muslims: it is valid against all communities. »a weak hadith: reported by al-Bayhaqi 20404
And because the Muslim wicked person is more complete than the disbeliever upright in his religion: the acts of worship of the wicked person are valid, and he merits inheritance, which is not valid from the disbeliever, nor does he merit the inheritance of a Muslim; since wickedness bars acceptance of testimony, disbelief is all the more a bar.
From this argument 2 analogies are distilled: first, whoever's testimony is not accepted against a Muslim, his testimony is not accepted against a non-Muslim, like the wicked person; second, whoever's testimony is rejected for wickedness is rejected for disbelief, like testimony against the Muslim. And because lying bars acceptance of testimony, and lying about Allah the Most High is graver than lying about His servants: since the testimony of one among the Muslims who lied about people is rejected, the disbeliever who lies about Allah is all the more worthy of having his testimony rejected. Allah the Most High described their lying:
« They distort the words from their places. »
Surah al-Ma'idah, 5
« And they utter lies against Allah while they know. »
Surah Al Imran, 75
From this argument 2 analogies are distilled: first, whoever is branded with lying has his testimony rejected, like the Muslim; second, if lying causes the Muslim's testimony to be rejected, it all the more causes the disbeliever's to be rejected, like lying about people.
And because the deficiency of disbelief is graver than the deficiency of servitude, on 2 counts: first, the deficiency of disbelief bars the validity of acts of worship, which the deficiency of servitude does not; second, the deficiency of disbelief bars acceptance of report, which the deficiency of servitude does not. Since it is established, by our agreement and Abu Hanifah's, that the deficiency of servitude bars acceptance of testimony, the deficiency of disbelief bars its acceptance all the more. It is in view of these meanings that Abu Hanifah forbade accepting the testimony of idol worshippers, in consideration of the deficiency of disbelief; the same applies to the People of the Book.
From this argument 2 analogies are distilled: first, it is a testimony barred by servitude: disbelief must therefore bar it, by analogy with the idolater's testimony; second, it is a testimony barred by the idolater's disbelief: the disbelief of the scriptuary must therefore bar it, like testimony against the Muslim (al-Mudawwana al-Kubra 13/157, al-Sharh al-Kabir with the commentary of ad-Dasuqi 6/60, Tahbir al-Mukhtasar 5/109, al-Umm 6/141 and 142, al-Hawi al-Kabir 17/61, al-Bayan 13/277 and 278, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/283 and 284, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/370, al-Mughni 10/181 and 182, Sharh az-Zarkashi 3/110, Kashshaf al-Qina 6/528, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/659, Matalib Uli an-Nuha 6/610 and Manar as-Sabil 3/499 and 500).
The Hanafis and Imam Ahmad in one narration from him, and it is the choice of Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim, held that the testimony of dhimmis against one another is accepted if they are upright in their religion, even if their communities differ: the Jews, the Christians and the Magians subjected to the poll tax (jizyah) and granted the pact of protection; their testimony is not accepted against Muslims, because of the word of Allah the Most High:
« O you who believe, when death approaches one of you at the time of making a bequest, let there be 2 witnesses, 2 just men from among you, or 2 others from besides you, if you are traveling and death's affliction befalls you. »
Surah al-Ma'idah, 106
This verse contains the proof of the permissibility of dhimmi testimony against one another, for it entailed the permissibility of their testimony against Muslims, which is even more strongly permissible among dhimmis. The verse thus established the permissibility of their testimony against dhimmis in bequests during travel; and when its permissibility against Muslims was abrogated by the word of Allah the Most High:
« O you who believe, when you contract a debt for a fixed term, write it down. »
Surah al-Baqarah, 282
up to His word:
« And take as witnesses 2 witnesses from among your men. »
Surah al-Baqarah, 282
there remained thereby the permissibility of dhimmi testimony against them; His word « or 2 others from besides you » (Surah al-Ma'idah, 106) was abrogated by that, while the probative force of its indication regarding its permissibility against dhimmis in bequests during travel remained. And since its ruling remains regarding its permissibility against dhimmis for bequests during travel, and regarding its prohibition against Muslims, that entails its permissibility against them for all rights.
Jabir ibn Abdullah, may Allah be pleased with him, reported:
« The Messenger of Allah, may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, validated the testimony of the People of the Book against one another. »a weak hadith: reported by Ibn Majah 2374
Abu Dawud reported, by his chain, from Jabir:
« The Jews brought before the Prophet, may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, a man and a woman of theirs who had committed fornication. He said: Bring me the 2 most knowledgeable men among you. They brought him the 2 sons of Suriyah, and he adjured them: How do you find the case of these 2 in the Torah? They said: We find in the Torah that, if 4 (witnesses) testify that they saw his male organ in her private part like the kohl stick in the kohl pot, they are stoned. He said: What then prevents you from stoning them? They said: Our authority has perished, and we dislike killing. The Messenger of Allah, may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, then called for the witnesses: 4 came and testified that they had seen his male organ in her private part like the kohl stick in the kohl pot; the Prophet, may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, then ordered them stoned. »an authentic hadith: reported by Abu Dawud 4452
This proves the acceptance of dhimmi testimony against one another, for the 2 fornicators did not confess, and the Muslims did not testify against them, since they had not witnessed their fornication; and the Prophet, may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, in this account, called for the witnesses: 4 came and testified that they had seen his male organ in her private part like the kohl stick in the kohl pot.
In some transmissions of this hadith: 4 of them came; and in others: he said to the Jews: « Bring me 4 of you. »
And because, having accepted the pact of protection, they have what the Muslims have and bear what the Muslims bear; the Muslim testifies for the Muslim: likewise the dhimmi for the dhimmi. Its apparent sense entails that the dhimmi testifies against the Muslim like the Muslim, except that this became particularized out of the generality of the text.
And because pressing need requires safeguarding the rights of dhimmis, and that safeguard is not achieved unless some of them testify for others; there is no doubt that the need to safeguard their rights is pressing, for they only accepted the pact of protection so that their blood be like our blood and their wealth like our wealth.
The proof that the safeguard is not achieved except by mutual testimony is that these transactions abound among them, and the Muslims do not attend their contractual dealings to bear their contingencies; were there no mutual testimony, their rights would be lost in the face of denial and repudiation: need therefore called for protection through testimony.
And because disbelief is not incompatible with guardianship: the disbeliever exercises guardianship over his young children and over the marriage of his daughters; he is all the more not to be barred from testimony, whose conditions are lighter than those of guardianship. And because whoever is upright in his religion has his testimony accepted, like the Muslims.
And because it is a wickedness on the ground of interpretation, it therefore does not bar acceptance of testimony, like the people of rebellion.
It is reported from Umar and Ali, may Allah be pleased with them both, regarding 2 dhimmis in a debt, that they said: « They are handed over to the people of their religion, that judgment be made between them. » That is a necessity of the permissibility of some of them judging between others, and the predecessors, may Allah have mercy on them, were in consensus on this, to the point that Yahya ibn Aktham, may Allah have mercy on him, said: « I pursued the statements of the predecessors and found none of them who did not permit dhimmi testimony against one another; I only saw from Rabiah 2 statements on it. »
The meaning is that the disbeliever belongs to guardianship, so he belongs to testimony, like the Muslim.
The clarification of the operative cause lies in the word of Allah the Most High:
« And those who disbelieved: some of them are protectors of others. »
Surah al-Anfal, 73
What is meant is guardianship, not allegiance, for it is conjoined to the word of Allah the Most High: « You have no authority over them at all » (Surah al-Anfal, 72). The proof of it is that marriages are valid among them, and there is no marriage without a guardian; and if the Muslim sues for the minor daughter of a scriptuary and he marries her to him, the marriage is valid. And because the disbeliever belongs to guardianship over himself and his property absolutely: he therefore belongs to guardianship over another when the condition of extending his guardianship to another exists; and testimony is a type of guardianship: if capacity for guardianship is established, capacity for testimony is established. Moreover, what counts is the preponderance of truthfulness, which lies in his refraining from what he deems forbidden in his religion; the disbeliever refrains from that: his testimony is therefore accepted. And the name of uprightness and acceptance is established for the disbeliever in transactions through the qualification of trustworthiness; Allah the Most High so described him in His word:
« Among the People of the Book is he who, if you entrust him with a treasure, returns it to you. »
Surah Al Imran, 75
One may not say: they professed disbelief out of obstinacy, as Allah the Most High said: « And they denied them wrongfully and arrogantly while their souls were convinced of them » (Surah an-Naml, 14); for that concerned the rabbis who were at the time of the Messenger of Allah, may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, and who conspired to conceal the sending of the Messenger of Allah, may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, and his prophethood: such ones have no testimony according to us. As for others than them, they believe in their disbelief, for they hold that the truth is what they are upon; Allah the Most High said: « And among them are unlettered ones who know not the Book except wishes » (Surah al-Baqarah, 78), and He said: « and indeed a party of them conceals the truth » (Surah al-Baqarah, 146). Through this verification it becomes clear that their wickedness is a wickedness of belief, and it has been explained that this does not make the suspicion of lying in testimony stick. Their testimony is not accepted against Muslims because of the severance of their guardianship from the Muslims; and the testimony of the slave and the child is not accepted because of the absence of capacity and guardianship: thereby it becomes clear that the effect of servitude outweighs the effect of disbelief in the ruling of guardianship. Moreover, they are hostile to the Muslims for an invalid cause, which leads them to seek dominance over the Muslims: hence their testimony is not accepted against the Muslims; as for the apostate, he has guardianship over no one.
As-Sarakhsi, may Allah have mercy on him, said: among our companions, may Allah have mercy on them, are those who say: there is a necessity in accepting mutual testimony; and because the Muslims scarcely attend the transactions of dhimmis, especially marriages and bequests, were mutual testimony not valid therein, it would lead to the annulment of their rights; and we have been commanded to respect their rights and to repel the wrong of some of them from others: for this necessity we accepted mutual testimony, just as we accepted the testimony of women in what men cannot witness; and this necessity is not realized in their testimony against Muslims, nor in their testimony upon a Muslim's testimony or upon the judgment of a Muslim judge (al-Mabsut 16/135 and 136, Ahkam al-Quran 4/163, Bada'i as-Sana'i 6/280 and 281, al-Hidaya 3/124, Sharh Fath al-Qadir 7/416, al-Ikhtiyar 2/179, al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/168, al-Lubab 2/458, al-Inaya 10/454, al-Mughni 10/181, al-Muharrar fi al-fiqh 2/281 and al-Mubdi 10/217).
Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah, may Allah have mercy on him, said: those who permitted dhimmi mutual testimony argued from this verse in Surah al-Ma'idah, namely His word: « O you who believe, testimony between you at the time of death, when making a bequest: 2 just men from among you, or 2 others from besides you » (Surah al-Ma'idah, 106), to the end of the verse. Then the one who took the apparent sense of this verse among the people of Kufa said: this verse proves the acceptance of dhimmi testimony against Muslims, and there is in that an indication and proof of accepting mutual testimony, a fortiori; and the abrogation of the apparent sense does not entail the abrogation of the higher purport and the indication. This verse is the proof, in the texts of Imam Ahmad and other hadith imams who agree with the predecessors, for acting by this verse and by the hadith that accords with it: it is the more tenable and stronger view. His school is the acceptance of dhimmi testimony against Muslims in bequests during travel, for it is a place of necessity; if their testimony is permissible for others, it is more strongly permissible among themselves.
Hence, in testimony out of necessity, what is not permissible elsewhere becomes permissible: thus the testimony of women is accepted in what men cannot witness, to the point that Ahmad expressly stated the acceptance of the testimony of 2 women in the legal punishments occurring in their private gatherings, such as bathhouses, courtyards and the like. The disbelievers whom the Muslims do not mix with are all the more worthy of having mutual testimony accepted, when we judge between them, and Allah commanded us to judge between them; and the Prophet, may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, stoned the 2 Jewish fornicators without hearing their confession, nor any Muslim's testimony against them; without acceptance of mutual testimony that would not have been valid; and Allah knows best (Majmu al-Fatawa 15/299 and Zad al-Ma'ad 5/36).