Islamic Fiqh > Oaths and vows > Vows (nudhur) > The conditions of the one making the vow
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Updated on 25 September 2026 at 3:23 PM
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The majority of jurists, the Malikis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis, hold that the one making the vow must act of his own free will: if he is coerced into making the vow, it is not valid on his part and its fulfilment is not required of him (Mawahib al-Jalil 4/458, at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/346, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/92, al-Sharh al-Kabir with the hashiya of ad-Dasuqi 2/454, Tahbir al-Mukhtasar 2/421, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/745, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/96, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/253, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/5-6, al-Insaf 11/117, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/346, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/438, Manar as-Sabil 3/439).
The Hanafis, for their part, hold that free consent is not a condition for the validity of the vow: it is therefore valid from one who acts under coercion and from one who speaks in jest (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 81-82). According to the relied-upon view among the Shafi'is, the vow is valid from a person in a state of intoxication (Rawdat at-Talibin 2/745, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/96, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/253, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/5-6).
The jurists differ on the vow of the disbeliever: is it valid on his part or not?
According to the Malikis, if a disbeliever makes a vow while in a state of disbelief, he is not required to fulfil it after entering Islam, but it is recommended for him to fulfil it once he has become a Muslim (Mawahib al-Jalil 4/458, at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/346, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/92, al-Sharh al-Kabir with the hashiya of ad-Dasuqi 2/454, Tahbir al-Mukhtasar 2/421).
According to the Hanafis, and the Shafi'is according to the prevailing view of the school, Islam is a required condition of the one making the vow: the vow is therefore not valid from a disbeliever, since he lacks the capacity for an act of devotion or for committing himself to one, and he is not required to fulfil his vow after converting. Indeed, according to the Hanafis, the vowed matter being an act of devotion is a condition for the validity of the vow, and the act of a disbeliever cannot be described as an act of devotion (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/82, al-Bayan 4/474, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/745, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/96, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/253, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/5-6).
According to the Hanbalis, and one view among the Shafi'is, the vow of a disbeliever is valid, even if it concerns an act of worship, and he must fulfil it after converting, based on what Nafi' reported from Ibn Umar, from Umar ibn al-Khattab, may Allah be pleased with him (al-Bayan 4/474, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/745, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/96, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/253, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/5-6, al-Insaf 11/117, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/346, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/437, ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/614):
"O Messenger of Allah, I made a vow in pre-Islamic times to observe a spiritual retreat of one night in the Sacred Mosque." The Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) replied to him: "Fulfil your vow." And he observed a retreat of one night.
Reported by al-Bukhari (1937) and Muslim (1656)
The jurists as a whole state that the validity of the vow requires a formula indicating commitment.
The Hanafis say: "The pillar of the vow is the formula that indicates it, namely the saying: 'Such and such is due to Allah, exalted is His majesty, upon me', or 'such and such is incumbent upon me', or 'this is an offering', or 'an act of charity', or 'my wealth is charity', or 'all that I own is charity', and similar expressions" (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/81).
The Malikis say: "The vow becomes binding through any wording carrying a commitment to a recommended act, such as: 'If Allah heals my sick one, if my absent one returns, or if I escape from such and such an affliction, then I shall fast 2 days, or pray such and such, or give such and such in charity.' The formula is not limited to 'I owe to Allah' or 'such and such is incumbent upon me': any binding wording takes effect. According to the relied-upon view of the school, it is not required to use the very word 'vow': if he says 'I owe it to Allah to perform such and such an act of devotion' without using that word, it is incumbent upon him."
According to another Maliki view: "He must necessarily use the word 'vow', saying: 'I owe to Allah the vow of such and such a thing'" (hashiya of ad-Dasuqi on al-Sharh al-Kabir 2/456, Mawahib al-Jalil 4/462, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/93, hashiya of as-Sawi on al-Sharh as-Saghir 4/263 and 265, Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/309).
The Shafi'is say: "The formula requires a term indicating commitment, such as 'I have made a vow to Allah', 'to you', 'I owe you such and such' or 'for this', and likewise 'I have taken upon myself' and 'I have formed a vow' for one whose ordinary language is that,
The hadith of Imran ibn al-Husayn rests on the chain of Zuhayr ibn Muhammad from his father: this father is unknown, none but his son reported from him, and Zuhayr himself has rejected narrations to his credit; Muslim nevertheless reported it through the route of Uqba ibn Amir. The Malikis customarily support Malik's position in this question with what was reported: the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) saw a man standing in the sun and asked: "What is the matter with this one?" They said: "He has vowed not to speak, not to shelter in the shade, not to sit down, and to fast." The Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) then said: "Instruct him to speak, to sit down and to complete his fast."
They said: he therefore commanded him to carry out what was obedience to Allah and to abandon what was disobedience. Yet it is not apparent that remaining silent is a disobedience, and Allah Himself reported that this was the vow of Maryam. Likewise, standing in the sun does not appear to be in itself a disobedience, except as regards the fatigue it inflicts upon oneself; and if one wished to see a disobedience there, it would be by analogy and not by text: the basic rule is that it belongs to the permissible acts (Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/309-310).
The absolute or unspecified vow consists in saying, for example: "I owe a vow to Allah", or: "If Allah heals my sick one, a vow will be incumbent upon me", without naming anything specific and without having the intention of anything fixed by a time or a place. According to the vast majority of jurists, this vow is valid and binding.
Imam Ibn Rushd, may Allah have mercy on him, says: "They agreed that the absolute vow concerning acts of devotion is binding, apart from what is related from some companions of ash-Shafi'i that the absolute vow is not valid. What they agreed upon is that the absolute vow is binding if it is made in a spirit of contentment, not of obstinacy, and if the word 'vow' is expressed in it, not otherwise; whether the vow explicitly names the thing vowed or not. Likewise, they unanimously agreed that the vow formulated as a condition is binding when it concerns an act of devotion" (Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/309).
The jurists differ, however, on what then becomes incumbent upon the votary: is the expiation of an oath due, or does he have the choice between the expiation of an oath and performing any act of devotion, or is nothing at all incumbent upon him?
The majority of jurists, the Hanafis, the Malikis and the Hanbalis, hold that one who makes an absolute vow, or a vow suspended upon a condition, without naming anything and without the intention of anything fixed by a time or a place, owes the expiation of an oath: immediately for the absolute vow, and for the suspended vow, once the condition occurs. This is based on what Uqba ibn Amir reported:
The expiation of the vow, when nothing has been specified, is the expiation of an oath.
Weak hadith, reported by Abu Dawud (3323) and at-Tirmidhi (1528)
And from Ibn Abbas, the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said:
Whoever makes a vow without specifying it: its expiation is that of an oath. Whoever makes a vow consisting of a disobedience: its expiation is that of an oath. Whoever makes a vow beyond his capacity: its expiation is that of an oath. And whoever makes a vow he is able to fulfil: let him fulfil it.
Weak hadith, reported by Abu Dawud (3322)
Moreover, he has left his vow without an outlet: it can neither be left without effect, since no specific act is designated as vowed, nor be adjudicated in favour of one of the categories of acts, for that would be giving preponderance without proof. The just solution was therefore the expiation of an oath. The proof is what Muslim reported: the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: "The expiation of the vow is the expiation of the oath" (Muslim 1645), meaning the vow that has no outlet and cannot be construed as one that has an outlet, because of the obligation attached to that specific thing.
Such was the view of Ibn Mas'ud, Jabir and Aisha, with no opponent known to them in their era: it is therefore a consensus (Tabyin al-Haqa'iq 3/110, al-Binaya 6/130-131, al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/19, Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari 6/161-162, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/57, Tahbir al-Mukhtasar 2/366, al-Mughni 10/68, al-Kafi 4/418, Sharh al-Zarkashi 3/350-351, al-Mubdi' 9/326, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/348, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/439, ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/614, Matalib Uli an-Nuha 6/422, Manar as-Sabil 3/440).
According to the Shafi'is, if he says: "A vow is incumbent upon me", the vow is valid and he has the choice between an act of devotion (such as glorifications, a prayer of 2 rak'ahs or fasting one day) and the expiation of an oath. Al-Buwayti's text implies for its part that the vow is not valid and that nothing is incumbent upon him. But if it belongs to the vow of devotion, such as saying: "If Allah heals my sick one, a vow will be incumbent upon me", or saying outright: "I owe a vow to Allah", an act of devotion is incumbent upon him, and the choice of that act belongs to him, as al-Bulqini indicated (Rawdat at-Talibin 2/747, Asna al-Matalib 1/576, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/255-256, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/11).
Imam Ibn Rushd, may Allah have mercy on him, says: "They differed on what is due in the absolute vow, where the votary designates nothing apart from his saying: 'I owe a vow to Allah.' Many scholars said: only the expiation of an oath is due. Others said: the expiation of zihar applies to it. Still others: the minimum that deserves the name of an act of devotion, namely fasting one day or praying 2 rak'ahs. If the majority held that the expiation of an oath is due in this case, it is because of what is established by the hadith of Uqba ibn Amir: the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: 'The expiation of the vow is the expiation of an oath', reported by Muslim.
As for those who held fasting one day or praying 2 rak'ahs, they followed those who consider that the sufficient act is the minimum that deserves the name: now praying 2 rak'ahs or fasting one day is the minimum that deserves the name of a vow. And the one who said that the expiation of zihar applies to it departs from analogy and from transmitted report" (Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/311).
The vow of incitement is the one uttered in the manner of an oath, to urge the doing of something or to prevent it, without intending by it the vow or the act of devotion, such as saying: "If I speak to so-and-so, if I enter this house, or if I do not leave the town, then I owe Allah a month of fasting, a prayer, a pilgrimage or the freeing of a slave." If he then speaks to that person, enters the house or does not leave the town, the jurists differ on what is incumbent upon him: must he honour what he committed himself to, does he have the choice between honouring his commitment and the expiation of an oath, or is only the expiation of an oath incumbent upon him, once the suspending condition occurs?
According to one view among the Shafi'is, the relied-upon view of the Hanbali school, Imam Abu Hanifah according to one narration from him, Muhammad ibn al-Hasan as will come, and Ibn al-Qasim among the Malikis, the votary here has the choice between honouring what he vowed, such as emancipation, pilgrimage or charity, in consideration of vows and paying nothing, and the expiation of an oath, in consideration of oaths. His vow, in this case, is a vow of incitement uttered in the manner of an oath: he may therefore choose between honouring his commitment and turning away from it towards the expiation of an oath, because Muslim reported that the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said:
The expiation of the vow is the expiation of the oath.
Reported by Muslim (1645)
And because of the hadith of Imran ibn al-Husayn: "I heard the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) say:
There is no vow in anger, and its expiation is that of an oath.
Weak hadith, reported by an-Nasa'i (3842) and Ahmad (19901)
And based on what Aisha reported: "Whoever swore to walk, or to offer a sacrificial offering, or who dedicated his wealth to the cause of Allah, to the poor, or to the door of the Ka'bah: its expiation is that of an oath." Malik reported it in al-Muwatta (1023) with the following wording: "Aisha, Mother of the Believers, may Allah be pleased with her, was asked about a man who had said: 'My wealth belongs to the door of the Ka'bah'; Aisha replied: he expiates it as an oath is expiated."
This vow resembles the oath in that the votary intended to prevent himself from doing something or to compel himself to do it; it resembles the vow in that he imposed upon his liability an act of devotion. It is not possible to combine the 2 nor to suspend both: he was therefore given the choice between the 2 obligations, and this is the meaning of his saying (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him): "The expiation of the vow is the expiation of the oath."
This view was reported from Umar, Aisha, Ibn Abbas, Ibn Umar, Hafsa and Umm Salama, may Allah be pleased with them (al-Hawi al-Kabir 10/362, al-Bayan 4/475-476, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/746-747, Sharh Sahih Muslim 11/104, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/96-97, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/254-255, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/8-9, al-Mughni 9/399 and 10/67, al-Kafi 4/417, Sharh al-Zarkashi 3/350-351, al-Mubdi' 9/326, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/348, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/439, ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/615, Matalib Uli an-Nuha 6/422, Manar as-Sabil 3/440, at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/346, al-Sharh al-Kabir with the hashiya of ad-Dasuqi 2/455).
According to one view among the Shafi'is and one narration among the Hanbalis, the expiation of the oath is exclusively required of him in the vow of incitement: nothing else suffices, even if he performs what he had sworn upon. For Muslim reported that the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: "The expiation of the vow is the expiation of the oath" (Muslim 1645); now there is assuredly no expiation in the vow of devotion, so the vow meant is necessarily the vow of incitement. And because of the hadith of Imran ibn al-Husayn: "I heard the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) say: There is no vow in anger, and its expiation is that of an oath" (weak hadith, reported by an-Nasa'i 3842 and Ahmad 19901).
This view is further supported by what Abu Dawud reported in his Sunan from Sa'id ibn al-Musayyab: 2 Ansari brothers had an inheritance between them; one asked the other for the division, and he said: "If you return to ask me about the division, all my wealth belongs to the door of the Ka'bah." Umar said to him: "The Ka'bah has no need of your wealth: expiate your oath and speak to your brother", for he had heard the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) say:
No oath is sworn against you, nor any vow, in disobedience to the Lord, in severing the ties of kinship, nor concerning what you do not possess.
Reported by Abu Dawud (3272) and Ibn Hibban in his Sahih (4355)
According to the Malikis, one view among the Shafi'is and the Hanafis according to the manifest narration, as will come, the vow of incitement and anger must be fulfilled like the vow of devotion. Such is the one who says in his anger: "If I enter Zayd's house, such and such is incumbent upon me", intending to prevent himself from something and to punish himself: he must fulfil it like a vow of devotion. For the difference in the situation in which he concluded the vow does not cause the vowed matter to lapse in favour of another, any more than in the vow of devotion; and because it is an act of devotion he imposed upon himself in the form of a vow: once its condition occurs, it is not permitted to cancel it, as with pilgrimage.
Al-Mawwaq, may Allah have mercy on him, said: "Even if he is angry." Ibn Rushd said: "The vow made in anger is binding by agreement, like his oath made in that state."
Ibn Bashir said: "We have already stated that, according to us, the commitment to all acts of obedience is binding, whether taken in contentment or in obstinacy; this is the known view. The masters reported that they settled upon this statement of Ibn al-Qasim: 'I noted that whatever belongs to this kind, out of obstinacy and hardship, the expiation of an oath suffices for it, and this is one of the views of ash-Shafi'i.' The masters we met inclined towards this view and counted this vow among the vows of disobedience, whose fulfilment is not required." End of quote.
This meaning was already mentioned in the chapter of fasting on the authority of the shaykh of shaykhs Ibn Lubb: its expiation would be that of an oath, a view Ibn Abd al-Barr endorsed, saying: "The one who swears to obey, in obstinacy and anger, is far removed from intending worship." It is reported of Malik, faced with a man who had said to his she-camel "you are a sacrificial camel": "Did you intend to restrain her?" He said: yes. He said: "Nothing is incumbent upon you." Ibn Rushd clarified: "Because he did not intend an act of devotion" (at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/346-347, al-Ma'una 1/430, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/92, Sharh az-Zarqani on Mukhtasar Khalil 3/162, al-Sharh al-Kabir with the hashiya of ad-Dasuqi 2/455).
As for the Hanafis, ad-Durr al-Mukhtar reads: "The suspended vow involves a distinction: if he suspended it upon a condition he desires, such as 'if my absent one returns' or 'my sick one is healed', it is to be fulfilled obligatorily if the condition occurs; and if he suspended it upon one he does not desire, such as 'if I fornicate with such a woman', for example, and then breaks his oath, he fulfils his vow or expiates his oath, according to the school; for in form it is a vow and in meaning an oath: he is therefore given the choice by necessity."
Imam Ibn Abidin, may Allah have mercy on him, said: "His words: 'the suspended vow, etc.': know that the books of the manifest narration indicate that the suspended vow must be fulfilled absolutely, whether the condition is one whose occurrence is desired, such as 'if Allah heals my sick one', or not, such as 'if I speak to Zayd or enter the house, then such and such'; this is what the Shafi'is call the vow of incitement. The distinction mentioned here was narrated from Abu Hanifah, who returned to it 7 days before his death; and in al-Hidaya it is the view of Muhammad, and it is the correct one. End.
The authors of the reference epitomes such as al-Mukhtar, al-Majma', Mukhtasar an-Naqaya and al-Multaqa followed it, and it is the school of ash-Shafi'i. It is stated in al-Fath that this is what is narrated in an-Nawadir and that it is the choice of the verifiers. The author of al-Bahr was mistaken: he believed this had no basis in the narration, that the version of an-Nawadir gave the choice absolutely in both cases, and that the Khulasa said: it is according to this that legal answers are given. Now you know that what is narrated in an-Nawadir is the distinction mentioned, and it is stated in an-Nahr that what the Khulasa contains concerns suspension upon a condition not desired: the generalisation is therefore rejected. End.
The upshot is that the question contains only 2 views: the first, that of the manifest narration, is the absence of any choice at all; the second is the distinction mentioned. As for the third view supposed by the author of al-Bahr, absolute choice, which he believed to be the answer given in consultations, it has no basis, as the erudite ash-Shurunbulali clarified in his epistle entitled Tuhfat at-Tahrir. Understand, then.
His words: 'for in form it is a vow, etc.': because he intended by it to prevent the occurrence of the condition, he inclines to whichever of the 2 aspects he wishes, unlike one who suspends his vow upon a condition whose occurrence he desires, for the meaning of the oath, namely the intention to prevent, is absent from it: his intention is to manifest his desire for what was set as a condition (Durar al-Hukkam). His words: 'he is given the choice by necessity' answer the statement of Sadr ash-Shari'a. I say: if the condition is unlawful, such as 'if I fornicate', there should be no choice, for choice is a leniency, and the unlawful does not entail leniency.
It is answered in ad-Durar: what makes the leniency applicable is not the unlawful, but the existence of a proof of leniency; for since the wording is a vow in one respect and an oath in another, the demands of both aspects had to be applied without annulling either: the choice, which entails the leniency, was therefore necessary. Reflect upon this (hashiya of Ibn Abidin on ad-Durr al-Mukhtar 3/738-739; see also Sharh Fath al-Qadir 5/93-94 and Durar al-Hukkam 5/186).
Imam Ibn al-Humam, may Allah have mercy on him, said: "If he suspends the vow upon a condition and the condition occurs, he must fulfil the vow itself, by virtue of the absoluteness of the hadith we reported from al-Bukhari and others: he commanded that without distinguishing between an immediate and a suspended vow; and because the vow suspended upon a condition is, for him, like an immediate one: it is as if he said, at the moment of the condition, 'such and such is incumbent upon me for Allah'.
It is narrated from Abu Hanifah, may Allah have mercy on him, that he retracted this, that is, the obligation of the specific vowed act itself when it is suspended upon a condition: in other words, there is a choice between performing it specifically and the expiation of an oath, and this is the view of Muhammad. If he says: 'If I do such and such, a pilgrimage is incumbent upon me' or 'a year of fasting', he may, if he wishes, perform the pilgrimage or fast a year, and if he wishes, expiate; if he is poor, he chooses between fasting a year and fasting 3 days.
The first view, the obligation of fulfilling it in its very substance, is the one mentioned in the manifest narration; the choice is narrated from Abu Hanifah in an-Nawadir. It is reported from Abd al-Aziz ibn Khalid at-Tirmidhi: "I set out for pilgrimage; when I entered Kufa, I read to Abu Hanifah the book of vows and expiations. When I reached this question, he said: 'Stop, for I intend to retract.' When I returned from the pilgrimage, Abu Hanifah had passed away. Al-Walid ibn Aban informed me that he had retracted 7 days before his death, and he said: he has the choice. It was according to this that Ismail az-Zahid gave legal answers. Al-Walwaliji said: 'The masters of Balkh and Bukhara give answers according to this, and it is the choice of Shams al-A'imma; he said: because of the prevalence of the case in our time.'"
The evidence of the manifest narration lies in the texts: the noble verse and the hadiths. The evidence of the narration of an-Nawadir is what is in the Sahih of Muslim, the hadith of Uqba ibn Amir: the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: "The expiation of the vow is the expiation of the oath"; now this implies that the vow lapses absolutely through expiation. The 2 texts therefore conflict: the absolute fulfilment of the specific act is applied to the immediate vow, and its lapse through expiation to the suspended vow.
This poses no difficulty, for the suspended vow is non-existent at the present moment: the vow in it is non-existent, it becomes like the oath in that its cause of obligation, the breach, is absent at the moment of speech; it therefore attaches to it, unlike the immediate vow, which is a vow established in its time and to which the hadith of fulfilment applies. The author and the verifiers held that the condition for which expiation suffices is the condition whose occurrence is not desired, such as entering the house or speaking to so-and-so: if he does not desire its occurrence, it is known that he does not desire the existence of the vow, since he set it to prevent that condition.
Indeed, suspending a vow upon something whose occurrence is assuredly not desired aims to prevent oneself from it. Man does not wish to impose acts of worship upon himself permanently, even if they attract reward, for fear that it burden him and expose him to punishment; hence it is authentically reported of him (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) that he forbade vows and said: "They bring no good" (authentic hadith, previously cited), according to the hadith.
As for the condition whose occurrence he desires, such as saying: "If Allah heals my sick one, if my absent one returns or my enemy dies, I owe Allah a month of fasting", if the condition occurs, nothing suffices but the performance of the specific vowed act; for if he desires its occurrence, he desires the existence of the vow, and the vow then falls under the meaning of the immediate one and comes under its ruling: the obligation to fulfil it.
Thus the text requiring fulfilment covers the immediate vow and the suspended vow whose occurrence is desired, and the text admitting expiation covers the suspended vow whose occurrence is not desired, the one a group of jurists calls the "vow of incitement". Ahmad's school follows this distinction retained by the author.
Ibn al-Jawzi, in at-Tahqiq, justified resting, for this particular vow, upon the hadith of Muslim although it is absolute; this is explained only by what we have said, and this formulation is preferable to what has been advanced. For when the condition is not desired, the vow falls under the meaning of the oath: the oath is concluded to prevent, and expiation suffices for it, unlike the desired condition. It was objected to this formulation that the oath serves to compel as much as to prevent, and that its meaning is therefore not specific to what is not desired: the distinction would then be arbitrary (Sharh Fath al-Qadir 5/92-95, al-Mabsut 5/135-136, al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/35-36).
The shaykh of Islam Ibn Taymiyyah, may Allah have mercy on him, said: "As for swearing by a vow, which is the vow of incitement and anger, such as saying: 'If I do such and such, the pilgrimage is incumbent upon me', or 'my wealth is charity', or 'fasting is incumbent upon me', intending thereby to prevent himself from the act, or saying: 'If I do not do such and such, the pilgrimage is incumbent upon me' and the like, the view of most people of knowledge, among the people of Mecca, Medina, Basra and Kufa, is that the expiation of an oath suffices him. It is the view of the jurists of hadith such as ash-Shafi'i, Ahmad, Ishaq, Abu Ubayd and others; it is one of the 2 narrations from Abu Hanifah, and the later one.
They then differed: most of them said he has the choice between fulfilling his vow and the expiation of an oath; this is the view of ash-Shafi'i and the well-known view from Ahmad. Others said: rather the expiation is required of him specifically, as is required of him in the oath by Allah; this is the other narration from Ahmad and the view of some companions of ash-Shafi'i. Malik, Abu Hanifah in the other narration, and a group said: rather the fulfilment of this vow is required.
It is related that ash-Shafi'i was asked about this question in Egypt and gave a ruling of expiation; the questioner said to him: "O Abu Abdallah, is this your view?" He replied: "It is the view of someone better than me: Ata ibn Abi Rabah." It is also related that the son of Abd ar-Rahman ibn al-Qasim broke such an oath; his father gave him the ruling of the expiation of an oath according to the view of Layth ibn Sa'd and said: "If you repeat it, I shall answer you according to the view of Malik", namely the fulfilment. This is why the companions of Malik derive the cases of this oath from the vow, by virtue of the general texts requiring fulfilment of the vow, and because it is a valid ruling suspended upon a condition, which therefore applies once its condition is established, like other rulings.
The first view is the correct one. The proof of it, together with what we shall mention, Allah willing, of the indications of the Book and the Sunna, is what Imam Ahmad and others relied upon. Abu Bakr al-Athram reports in his Masail: "I heard Abu Abdallah asked about a man who had said: 'my wealth belongs to the door of the Ka'bah'; he said: expiation of an oath, and he supported this with the hadith of Aisha. I heard Abu Abdallah asked about a man who swears to walk to the House of Allah, or to give all his wealth in charity, and similar oaths; he said: if he breaks it, there is expiation; however, I do not press him to break it as long as he has not broken it.
"It was said to him: would you do it? It was said to Abu Abdallah: so if he breaks it, he expiates? He said: yes. It was said to him: is it not the expiation of an oath? He said: yes." Al-Athram further reports: "I heard Abu Abdallah speak of the account of Layla bint al-Ajma': she had sworn such and such, and every slave she owned would be free, and all her wealth would be an offering; he gave the ruling of the expiation of an oath and supported it with the hadith of Ibn Umar and Ibn Abbas when they were consulted about one who swore to free a bondmaid and similar oaths; he said: as for the bondmaid, she is to be freed."
Al-Athram reports: al-Fadl ibn Dukayn reported to us, from Hassan, from Ibn Abi Najih, from Ata, from Aisha: "Whoever says: 'my wealth for the inheritance of the Ka'bah', 'all my wealth is an offering', or 'all my wealth for the poor', let him expiate his oath."
He further reports: Arim ibn al-Fadl reported to us, from Marar ibn Sulayman, from his father, from Bakr ibn Abdallah, that Abu Rafi' reported to him: "My patroness Layla bint al-Ajma' said: every slave she owns is free, all her wealth is an offering, and she is a Jewess, she is a Christian, if you do not divorce your wife or separate the man from his wife. I therefore went to Zaynab bint Umm Salama: when a learned woman was mentioned in Medina, Zaynab was mentioned. I went to her and she came with me to her. Layla said: 'In the house are Harut and Marut.'
"She said: 'O Zaynab, may Allah grant me in ransom for you, she has said: every slave she owns is free, all her wealth is an offering, and she is a Jewess, she is a Christian.' She replied: 'A Jewess and a Christian! Leave the man with his wife.' I then went to Hafsa, Mother of the Believers, who sent for her and she came to her. Layla said: 'O Mother of the Believers, may Allah grant me in ransom for you, she has said: every slave she owns is free, all her wealth is an offering, and she is a Jewess, she is a Christian.' She replied: 'A Jewess and a Christian! Leave the man with his wife.'
"I finally went to Abdallah ibn Umar, who came with me to her; he stood at the door, greeted and said: 'Are you of stone, or of iron, or of what are you made? Zaynab gave you her ruling and the Mother of the Believers gave you her ruling, and you accepted neither of the 2.' She said: 'O Abu Abd ar-Rahman, may Allah grant me in ransom for you, she has said: every slave she owns is free, all her wealth is an offering, and she is a Jewess, she is a Christian.' He said: 'A Jewess and a Christian! Expiate your oath and leave the man with his wife.'"
Al-Athram reports: Abdallah ibn Rajah reported to us, from Imran, from Qatada, from Zurara ibn Abi Awfa: a woman asked Ibn Abbas about another who had made her cloak, if she wore it, an offering. Ibn Abbas asked: "In anger or in contentment?" They said: in anger. He said: "Allah, blessed and exalted, is not drawn near to through anger: let her expiate her oath."
He further reports: Ibn at-Tabban reported to me, from Abu Bakr ibn Ayyash, from al-Ala ibn al-Musayyab, from Yala ibn an-Numan and Ikrima, from Ibn Abbas, asked about a man who had dedicated his wealth to the poor: "Keep your wealth, spend it on your family, settle your debt with it, and expiate your oath."
Al-Athram reports from Ahmad: Abd ar-Razzaq reported to us, from Ibn Jurayj: Ata was asked about a man who had said: "a 1000 camels are incumbent upon me"; he said: "it is an oath." And about a man who had said: "a 1000 pilgrimages are incumbent upon me"; he said: "it is an oath." And about a man who had said: "my wealth is an offering"; he said: "it is an oath." And about a man who had said: "my wealth is for the poor"; he said: "it is an oath."
Ahmad said: Abd ar-Razzaq reported to us, from Marar, from Qatada, from al-Hasan and Jabir ibn Zayd, concerning the man who says: "If I do not do such and such, I shall be in a state of ihram for pilgrimage"; they both said: "Ihram applies only to one who has intended the pilgrimage: it is an oath, which he expiates." Ahmad further said: Abd ar-Razzaq reported to us, from Marar, from Ibn Tawus, from his father: "It is an oath, which he expiates."
Harb al-Kirmani said: al-Musayyib ibn Wadih reported to us, from Yusuf ibn Abi as-Safar, from al-Awzai, from Ata ibn Abi Rabah: "I asked Ibn Abbas about the man who swears to walk to the Sacred House of Allah; he said: walking applies only to one who resolved it; as for one who swore in anger, the expiation of an oath is due from him."
Moreover, it is the meaning of the speech that counts, not its wording. The one who swears this oath does not intend an act of devotion towards Allah: he intends to urge an action or to prevent it, which is the very meaning of the oath, for the one who swears intends to urge an action or prevent it. If he then attaches that action to Allah, exalted be He, expiation suffices him: all the more so when he attaches to Him the obligation of an act of worship or the prohibition of a permissible thing.
For if he attaches it to Allah and then breaches, the cause of his breach is that he has torn his pledge to Allah by failing to keep his promise; whereas if he attaches to Him the obligation of an act or its prohibition, the cause of his breach is the abandonment of an obligation or the commission of a forbidden act. Now the breach whose cause is a defect in monotheism is graver than the one whose cause is a disobedience among disobediences. If Allah legislated expiation to repair and mend the damage that breach caused to monotheism, it is even more fitting that He legislate the repair of the damage caused to obedience.
We further say that what renders binding the formula of the oath is like what renders binding the formula of suspension. The vow is a species of oath, and every vow is an oath: the votary's saying 'I owe it to Allah to do' is equivalent to his saying 'I swear by Allah to surely do it'; these 2 sayings commit the performance of the action by attaching it to Allah. The proof of this is the saying of the Prophet: "The vow is an oath." His saying 'if I do such and such, the pilgrimage is due to Allah from me' is equivalent to 'if I do such and such, by Allah I shall surely perform the pilgrimage'.
It follows that if he swears to surely do a righteous act, he must do it and may not expiate, for his swearing to do it is a vow to do it. It also follows that if he vows to surely commit a disobedience or a permissible act, he has sworn to commit it, as if he said: 'by Allah, I shall surely do such and such'; and if he swore by Allah to commit a disobedience or a permissible act, the expiation of an oath would be due from him: likewise if he said: 'I owe it to Allah to do such and such.' Among the jurists, some of ours and others, are those who distinguish between the 2 questions" (Majmu' al-Fatawa 35, 253, 258).