Islamic Fiqh > Hajj and umra > The pillars and obligations of hajj > If the sick man recovers after commissioning someone
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Updated on 25 September 2026 at 3:23 PM
This part belongs to the full section: All sections of this part.
Among the proofs that the hajj in the preceding hadith was not an obligation upon the woman's father: her explicit declaration "he cannot"; one who cannot is not obligated: an explicit negation of the obligation and the prescription; what is absolutely negated at the start of the hadith cannot be established at its end by conjecture, even if the statement "Allah's debt is more worthy of being repaid" suggests it. That statement carries no consensus on its face: the slave's debt is still more worthy of repayment, and one begins with it by consensus, because of human need and Allah the Most High's self-sufficiency: so said Ibn al-Arabi. Abu Umar ibn Abd al-Barr reports that the hadith of the Khath'ami woman is, with Malik and his companions, specific to her (Tafsir al-Qurtubi 4/150-152; see al-Tamhid 9/129-137; Sharh al-Zurqani 2/390; Mawahib al-Jalil 2/498-499; al-Sharh al-Kabir 2/204; Badai' al-Sana'i' 2/287; al-Ikhtiyar 1/182; Fath al-Qadir 2/415-419; Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/658; al-Ishraf 216; al-Majmu' 7/69; Sharh Sahih Muslim 9/98; Mughni al-Muhtaj 2/234; Sharh al-Umda 2/135; al-Mughni 4/318; al-Furu' 3/183; Nihayat al-Awtar 5/10; al-Ifsah 1/451). Questions branch from it.
First question: the sick man commissions someone to perform for him, then recovers: is another hajj due from him for himself? The Hanafis, the Shafi'is and Ibn al-Mundhir teach that the delegation does not discharge him and another hajj is due from him for himself: incapacity until death is a condition, this case being a substitute for despair of recovery; once cured, it appears he was not in despair and the original remains due upon him, like the divorced woman counting months who then sees blood: that waiting period does not suffice her. The Hanbalis and Ishaq ibn Rahawayh teach that, once he has performed the pilgrimage for himself, his recovery entails no other hajj: he did what he was commanded and left the liability, as if he had not recovered. Ibn Qudama, may Allah have mercy on him, expounds: or we say he discharged the hajj of Islam by the command of the Law, so no second hajj is due upon him, as if he had performed himself; for the other thesis leads to imposing 2 obligatory pilgrimages, and Allah, may He be exalted, imposed only one upon him; to their statement "he was not in despair of recovery", we reply that were he not, delegation would not have been permitted to him, despair being a condition of the delegation's validity; as for the divorced woman counting months, the return of her menses is not conceivable there: the blood she sees is not menses and does not invalidate her count; hence, if he recovers before the delegate finishes his hajj, it should not discharge him, for he was capable of the original before the substitute was completed, like the young girl, like the woman whose menses ceased and returns before the months-count is complete, or the dry ablution performer (tayammum) who sees water during his prayer; it is possible, on the other hand, that the delegation discharges him, like the tamattu' pilgrim who begins the fast then can pay the sacrifice, or the one liable to an expiation who becomes able of the original after beginning the substitute; and if he recovers before the delegate's ihram, it discharges him in no case (al-Mughni 4/321-322; Umdat al-Qari 9/126; Sharh Ibn Battal 4/528; Badai' al-Sana'i' 3/287; al-Majmu' 7/69).
Second question: the blind man who finds provisions, a mount and a guide: is hajj due upon him from his wealth, or from his own person? Abu Hanifa, may Allah have mercy on him, in the version of the original text, teaches that no hajj is due from his person even if he finds provisions, a mount and a guide; hajj is due only upon his wealth if he possesses it: the blind man cannot perform hajj by himself, for he cannot find the road alone and cannot, alone, do what the road makes indispensable: mounting, dismounting and the rest; he is therefore not capable of performing by himself, but only through another's capability, whose act depends on his free choice; one capable only through another's choice is not capable in absolute terms, for the chooser's act depends on his choice, so istita'a is not established at all; hence hajj is not obligatory upon the very old man who cannot hold on to the mount, even if someone else steadies him: the case is alike. The Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, defined istita'a by provisions and mount only because they number among the causes leading to hajj, not to restrict istita'a to them: see that if a sea lies between him and Mecca with no ship on hand, or an enemy blocks access to the House, no hajj is due upon him despite the existence of provisions and mount; it is thus established that specifying provisions and the mount is not a restriction of the condition to them, but an indication of the causes of possibility: everything among the causes of possibility falls within the meaning of istita'a; and imposing hajj upon the blind man involves manifest constraint and severe hardship, while Allah said:
"He has laid upon you no hardship in the religion."
Surah al-Hajj, 78
The majority of jurists, namely the Malikis, the Shafi'is, the Hanbalis, the 2 companions of the Hanafis, and Abu Hanifa in al-Hasan's version, teach that hajj is due upon the blind man from his own person if he finds provisions and a mount, and a guide who covers the expense of his travel in his service without severe hardship; according to what is reported: asked about istita'a, the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, said: "It is the provisions and the mount" (weak hadith, cited earlier): he defined istita'a by provisions and mount, and the blind man possesses this istita'a, so hajj is due upon him; for the blind man owes hajj from his own person, he cannot find the road alone but is guided by the guide, so hajj is due upon him; with the guide present, the blind man is like the sighted; al-Mawardi compared him to the one ignorant of the road and the acts of hajj and to the deaf man: hajj is due upon them by agreement, as the Friday prayer is due upon them if they find a guide. Al-Nawawi, may Allah have mercy on him, reports from al-Rafi'i: the guide is, in the case of the blind man, what the mahram is in the case of the woman; as for the obligation of hiring him, 2 views, the sounder being obligation, which the majority's wording invites; Allah, may He be exalted, knows best (al-Majmu' 7/54; see Badai' al-Sana'i' 3/42-44; Sharh Fath al-Qadir 2/415; Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/658; Mawahib al-Jalil 2/498; al-Qawanin al-fiqhiyya, p. 86; al-Sharh al-Kabir 2/205; Minhaj al-Talibin 1/39; Mughni al-Muhtaj 1/468; Nihayat al-Muhtaj 3/251; Kashshaf al-Qina' 2/457; al-Ifsah 1/452).
Safety of the road comprises safety of person and property at the time of the people's departure for hajj: istita'a is not established without it, even if the road is frightening outside that period. The jurists differ: is safety of the road a condition of obligation or a condition of performance? The Malikis, the Shafi'is, Abu Hanifa in Ibn Shuja's version (the soundest among the Hanafis) and Imam Ahmad in one version teach that it belongs to the conditions of obligation: Allah the Most High required istita'a for the obligation of hajj, and there is no istita'a without safety of the road, just as there is none without provisions and mount; the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, defined istita'a by provisions and mount sufficiently, so that the explicitly mentioned may serve as proof for what resembles it in meaning: the possibility of reaching the House. Al-Kasani, may Allah have mercy on him, observes: see that just as he did not mention safety of the road, he did not mention soundness of the limbs nor the removal of the other sensible obstacles, which are conditions of obligation; yet the one prevented from reaching the House has neither provisions nor mount with him: the condition of provisions and mount is therefore, by necessity, a condition of safety of the road (Badai' al-Sana'i' 3/47).
The Hanbalis in the madhhab, and Abu Hanifa in one version, teach that safety of the road is a condition of performance, not of the origin of obligation: the Messenger of Allah, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, defined istita'a by provisions and mount without mentioning safety of the road, and this man possesses them; it is an excuse that prevents performance itself without preventing obligation, like impotence; and the ability to perform is not a condition in the obligation of acts of worship, as shown by the purified menstruant, the child come of age, the insane recovered, while nothing of the prayer's time remains in which it could be performed; yet istita'a is defined by provisions and mount, whose loss prevents everything, unlike safety of the road: the 2 differ. The benefit of the divergence appears in the obligation of the bequest when one fears missing it: whoever holds safety to be a condition of performance says the bequest becomes obligatory upon fear: one who met all the conditions of hajj while the road was threatening and dies before safety must bequeath hajj; if he dies after safety, the bequest is due upon him by agreement. Whoever holds it a condition of obligation says the bequest is not obligatory, for hajj was not due upon him and did not become a debt in his liability, so the bequest is not required of him (Badai' al-Sana'i' 3/46-47; Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/509; al-Mabsut 4/163; al-Hidaya 1/130; Sharh Fath al-Qadir 2/418; al-Ikhtiyar 1/151; al-Bahr al-Ra'iq 2/338; al-Sharh al-Kabir 2/204; Mawahib al-Jalil 2/491; Mughni al-Muhtaj 2/229; al-Majmu' 7/50; al-Mughni 4/302-303; al-Mubdi' 3/97).
The possibility of travel means that the conditions of hajj are complete in the obligated person and the time wide enough to set out for hajj. The jurists differ: is this possibility a condition of the origin of obligation or a condition of performance? The Hanafis, the Malikis in the sounder view, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis in one view (al-Mirdawi rules it the sound one of the school) teach that the possibility of travel is a condition of the origin of obligation: it is required that, provisions and mount at hand, time remain to travel to hajj by the customary route; if he would have to cover more than one stage (marhala) each day, or on some days, hajj is not due upon him. Their proofs: Allah the Most High imposed hajj only upon the capable, and this one is not capable, the act of hajj becoming impossible for him: a condition, then, like provisions and mount; the possibility of travel is an adjunct of istita'a, which is a condition of the obligation of hajj; and it stands in place of the entry into the time of obligation, like the entry of the prayer's time without which it is not due: this varies with lands, the time of obligation being reckoned for each at his town's people's departure, the restriction to the months of hajj in the verse being relative to the people of Umm al-Qura and those around them.
The Malikis in the contrary view, and Imam Ahmad in the second narration (that of the majority of his companions), teach that the possibility of travel is a condition of the necessity of performance: the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, was asked what makes hajj obligatory, and said: "Provisions and a mount" (weak hadith, cited earlier); yet this man owns provisions and mount; it is an excuse that prevents performance itself without preventing obligation, like impotence; and the ability to perform is not a condition in the obligation of acts of worship, as shown by the purified menstruant, the child come of age, the insane recovered, while nothing of the prayer's time remains in which it could be performed; istita'a being defined by provisions and mount, one must abide by its definition; the difference being that the loss of the possibility of travel prevents performance without preventing the making up (qada), whereas the loss of provisions and mount prevents everything: the 2 differ. The benefit of the divergence appears in hajj performed on his behalf after his death: whoever makes it a condition of performance says that if he dies before the condition exists, hajj is performed for him after his death, that is, the bequest is obligatory upon him; and if he was prevented from affording it before its existence, the hajj remains in his liability. Whoever makes it a condition of obligation says no bequest of hajj is due for him after his death, for hajj did not remain due upon him and did not become a debt in his liability, so the bequest is not required of him (Badai' al-Sana'i' 3/46; Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/512; Mawahib al-Jalil 2/491; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 2/284; al-Dhakhira 3/179; Rawdat al-Talibin 3/12; al-Majmu' 7/58; al-Insaf 3/407-408; al-Mughni 4/32; al-Maslik al-Mutaqassit, p. 34; al-Furu' 3/233).
The subject of research here: the ruling on one who obtained bodily and financial istita'a without obtaining the permit of hajj, whether because the number of pilgrims is capped by a set quota and a set age, or because he was not among those on whom the draw for obtaining the hajj visa fell, or because his istita'a only came about after the issuing of permits had stopped owing to his delay. Is he counted incapable? If he dies without having performed hajj for lack of obtaining a permit, is he excused, so that nothing is performed for him from his estate, or is he excused in his own person while hajj is performed from his estate? The question of permits is a recent question of this age, and the speech of the early generations contains nothing pointing to it; they only indicated what resembles it: the 2 preceding characteristics of safety of the road and possibility of travel, which it resembles; without doubt one who obtains no permit will find neither an open road nor travel made possible, and will be prevented from hajj.
First view: the possibility of travel, the openness of the road and its safety are conditions of the origin of obligation: just as hajj is not due upon one who finds no provisions or mount, it is not due upon one not authorized to travel nor obtaining the permit of hajj, for lack of an open road and of access to the House made possible: he is not capable; istita'a is among the conditions of hajj, and there is no istita'a without an open road, without obtaining the visa and the permit of hajj; the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, defined istita'a by provisions and mount sufficiently, so that the explicitly mentioned may serve as proof for what resembles it in meaning: the possibility of reaching the House. This is the view of the Malikis, the Shafi'is, Abu Hanifa in Ibn Shuja's version (the soundest among the Hanafis) and Ahmad in one version. Second view: safety and openness of the road are conditions of performance, not of the origin of obligation: the Messenger of Allah, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, defined istita'a by provisions and mount without mentioning safety of the road, and this man possesses them; it is an excuse that prevents performance itself without preventing obligation, like impotence; and the ability to perform is not a condition in the obligation of acts of worship, as shown by the purified menstruant, the child come of age, the insane recovered, while nothing of the prayer's time remains in which it could be performed; istita'a being defined by provisions and mount, whose loss prevents everything: the 2 differ. This is the view of Abu Hanifa in one version and Ahmad in the second (the madhhab of the Hanbalis).
The benefit of the divergence appears in the obligation of the bequest when one fears missing it: whoever makes it a condition of obligation says the bequest is not obligatory, for hajj was not due upon him and did not become a debt in his liability, so the bequest is not required of him; whoever makes it a condition of performance says the bequest becomes due upon fear: one who met the conditions of hajj while the road was threatening and dies before safety must bequeath hajj; if he dies after safety of the road, the bequest is due upon him by agreement. But the correct position is the first view: the possibility of travel and obtaining the visa and the permit of hajj belong to the conditions of obligation, not to the conditions of the necessity of performance; for the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, did not mention in the hadith the soundness of the limbs, which is yet a condition of obligation; his mention of provisions and mount departs on the genre of the most frequent, so that no implied meaning is drawn from it; and their statement that the ability to perform is not a condition in the obligation of acts of worship, as shown by the purified menstruant, the child come of age, the insane recovered, while nothing of the prayer's time remains in which it could be performed, is contested: the obligation of a worship in the liability before the ability to perform it, as with prayer, holds only where the obligation was stated absolutely; hajj, for its part, has its obligation restricted to one "who finds the means to it": its obligation, in performance as in making up, is impossible for the non-capable; one who obtains no permit or visa is not capable in reality; Allah charges no soul beyond its capacity, and obtaining the permit and visa is not within the power of the one denied them; Allah, may He be exalted, knows best.
Second question: delegation by one who obtained no permit. One prevented by the capping of the pilgrims' quota, by the age limit beyond which hajj is no longer granted, or by other regulations: we know from the foregoing that if he dies, nothing is due from his estate on the correct view, but that hajj there is recommended, the permit of hajj being a condition of obligation and not of the necessity of performance. There remains to know whether one deprived of the permit by an obstacle whose removal is hoped for may commission someone to perform on his behalf from his town or elsewhere. The correct position: every obstacle whose removal is hoped for, as with an illness whose recovery is hoped for, forbids one upon whom hajj is obligatory to delegate another, as will come, Allah willing, in the conditions of hajj on behalf of another; so it is here.
What characterizes women among the conditions of istita'a consists of 2 conditions without which hajj does not become obligatory upon her, in addition to the characteristics of the condition of istita'a mentioned: the husband or the mahram, and the absence of the waiting period ('idda). First condition: the husband or the trustworthy mahram. The jurists differ over requiring the husband or mahram in the woman's travel for hajj when the distance falls within the qasr journey: is it required, or may the woman travel with a trustworthy company while the mahram is present, or even travel with a trustworthy company in the mahram's absence?
The Hanafis and the Hanbalis in the madhhab teach that the mahram's presence with the woman belongs to the conditions of hajj: without husband or mahram, no hajj is obligatory upon her. Their proofs: first the Prophet's statement, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him:
No pilgrimage for a woman without a mahram with her.Authentic hadith; Daraqutni 2/322
The statement is explicit on the ruling; moreover, the woman undertakes a journey within the abode of Islam, inconceivable without a mahram, as with voluntary hajj. Then the Prophet's statement, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him:
No man must be alone with a woman, and no woman may travel without a mahram with her. A man stood up and said: O Messenger of Allah, I enlisted for such and such expedition, and my wife has set out on pilgrimage. He said: Go, and perform the pilgrimage with your wife.Bukhari 2844; Muslim 1341
Abu Bakr al-Jassas, may Allah have mercy on him, shows that this statement organizes the woman intending hajj from 3 angles: the questioner understood it thus, since he asked about his wife who intended hajj, and the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, did not deny it to him, proof that the meaning is general in hajj and the rest of journeys; his words "perform the pilgrimage with your wife" inform of the travel intended in "no woman travels without a mahram with her"; and his order to leave the expedition for the hajj with his wife: had the woman's hajj been permitted without mahram or husband, he would not have ordered him to leave the expedition, which is an obligation, for her voluntary act. The statement also proves that the woman's hajj was an obligation and not a voluntary act: otherwise he would not have ordered him to leave an obligation for the woman's voluntary act; and from another angle, the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, did not ask him whether the woman's hajj was obligatory or voluntary: proof of the 2 rulings' equality in forbidding her departure without a mahram; it is thus established that the mahram's presence with the woman is among the conditions of istita'a (Ahkam al-Qur'an 2/308-309). It is also that, without husband or mahram, she is not safe: women are flesh laid upon exposed bones, preserved by nothing but what wards it off. The Hanafis go so far as to say: if she finds no mahram, she waits until she reaches a time when she becomes incapable of hajj, then commissions someone to perform for her. Ibn Abidin specifies: among the obstacles whose removal is hoped for is the absence of a findable mahram: she waits for old age, blindness or chronic illness, then commissions a performer; before that it is not permitted to her, in presumption of a mahram's existence; if the mahram's absence persists until her death, it is permitted to her, like the sick man who commissions a man and whose illness lasts until death, per al-Bahr and others (Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/659).
The Hanafis and the Hanbalis differ, however: is the mahram's presence a condition of obligation or a condition of performance? Two views among both: whoever makes it a condition of obligation says no bequest of hajj is due from her after her death; whoever makes it a condition of performance says the bequest is due upon her, death coming after the obligation, her impediment having borne only on the delay, her hajj-specific conditions being complete, the mahram serving only her protection, like the openness of the road and the possibility of travel. They also differ over the mahram's expenses: do they weigh upon her wealth or not? The Hanafis in the sound view and the Hanbalis teach that the mahram's expenses in hajj weigh upon her: the mahram or the husband is among the necessities of her hajj like the provisions and mount, and this husband or mahram cannot be compelled to contribute from his own wealth; she therefore owes it to him, as she owes the provisions and mount for herself: her istita'a thus considers her owning provisions and mount for herself and for her mahram. The qadi, in his commentary on the Mukhtasar al-Tahawi, reports that it is not due from her: a narration reported from Muhammad and the view of Abu Hafs al-Bukhari, for what is obligatory upon her is her hajj, not another's performing for her. Al-Kasani, may Allah have mercy on him, explains the sense: this belongs to the conditions of the obligation of hajj upon her, and man is not bound to secure a condition of obligation: if the condition exists, hajj becomes due, otherwise not; see that the poor man is not bound to secure provisions and mount, so hajj does not become obligatory upon him; hence they said of the woman with no husband or mahram that she is not bound to marry a man who would perform hajj with her: the same case (Badai' al-Sana'i' 3/47-48; Sharh Fath al-Qadir 2/422; Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/511; al-Bahr al-Ra'iq 2/339; al-Mabsut 4/163; al-Jawhara al-Nira 2/77; al-Fatawa al-Hindiyya 1/219; al-Mughni 4/334; al-Insaf 3/415; al-Ifsah 1/446).
The Malikis, the Shafi'is, Imam Ahmad in one version, al-Hasan, al-Nakha'i, Ishaq and Ibn al-Mundhir teach that the mahram's presence is not a condition in the obligatory hajj. Imam Malik says: she performs the pilgrimage in the company of women. Al-Shafi'i says: she may perform hajj with trustworthy women. Al-Nawawi, may Allah have mercy on him, reports from al-Shafi'i and his companions: hajj is not obligatory upon the woman unless she feels safe for herself through a husband, a mahram by kinship or beyond kinship, or trustworthy women; whichever of the 3 exists, hajj becomes due without disagreement; if none of the 3 exists, no hajj is due upon her in the school, whether she finds a single woman or not. A third view requires that she set out for hajj alone when the road is traveled, just as it is due upon her, by agreement, to leave alone the abode of war for the abode of Islam should she embrace Islam there: this is the choice of the compiler (al-Shirazi) and a group; the madhhab of the majority remains the foregoing, the well-known of al-Shafi'i's texts (al-Majmu' 7/86). Their proofs: Allah's words "whoever finds the means to it", the address to the people encompassing males and females by agreement: with provisions and mount she is capable, and with trustworthy women corruption is kept safe, so the obligatory hajj becomes due upon her; and the hadith of Adi ibn Hatim, may Allah be pleased with him:
I was with the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, when a man came complaining of hunger, then another complaining of highway robbery. He said: O Adi, have you seen al-Hira? I said: I have not seen it, but I have been told of it. He said: If your life is prolonged, you will see the traveling woman set out from al-Hira and circle the Kaaba fearing none but Allah. Adi said: I saw the traveling woman set out from al-Hira and circle the Kaaba, fearing none but Allah.Bukhari 3400
al-Hira, a city near Kufa; the "traveling woman" means the woman. The report belongs to the context of praise and of raising Islam's banners: it is therefore read as permission. Ibn Battal, may Allah have mercy on him, reports: Malik and al-Shafi'i say the woman sets out for the obligatory hajj with a group of women in a safe company, without a mahram; the mass of scholars allows it, and Ibn Umar performed the pilgrimage with women of his neighbors. Abu Hanifa and his companions say the woman does not perform hajj without a mahram: this is Ahmad's view, who reads the prohibition generally for every journey, while Malik and the majority of jurists read it specifically: the meaning of the prohibition bears on journeys not obligatory upon her, by virtue of the generality of Allah's words "the pilgrimage of the House" (Surah Al Imran, 97) into which the woman entered, the obligatory hajj being due upon her; the woman may not be barred from obligations, as she is not barred from prayer and fasting: see that she must emigrate from the abode of disbelief to the abode of Islam without a mahram if she embraces Islam there, and so it is with every obligation for which she must set out; it is thus established that the Prophet's prohibition, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, of the woman's traveling without a mahram bears on the journey not obligatory upon her; Allah, may He be exalted, knows best (Ibn Battal's Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari 4/532-533). Al-Hafiz Ibn Hajar, may Allah have mercy on him, adds: among the proofs of the permission for the woman to travel with trustworthy women when the road is safe are the first hadiths of the chapter: "Umar gave permission to the Prophet's wives, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, in a last pilgrimage he performed, and sent with them Uthman ibn Affan and Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf" (Bukhari 1860): Umar, Uthman, Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf and the Prophet's wives, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, agreed upon this, and no other Companion censured them for it; those of the Mothers of the Believers who refused did so for a particular reason, not because travel depended on the mahram; perhaps this is the fine point of Bukhari's citing the 2 hadiths one after the other, none differing that all women are alike in this (Fath al-Bari 4/90-91).
The Malikis add: the woman may set out for hajj with a trustworthy company when husband or mahram is absent, refuses or is incapable, on condition that she herself be safe; if husband or mahram refuses to travel with her without a fee, the fee is due upon her, and travel with the safe company then becomes unlawful to her. Al-Dasuqi, may Allah have mercy on him, specifies: the fee is due her only if she is not neglectful of him on the apparent, though the apparent of their statement renders it due absolutely (Hashiyat al-Dasuqi 2/210). With the Shafi'is, she chooses between the company of her husband or a mahram, or a trustworthy company, except that she owes the mahram's fee if he goes with her only in exchange for it. This divergence concerns the obligatory hajj; as for voluntary hajj, the woman may travel for it only with a husband or a mahram, by agreement, and traveling without them is unlawful to her, a sin upon her; al-Nawawi reported a view allowing the woman's travel for voluntary hajj without a mahram and judged it weak (al-Majmu' 7/86-87; see al-Istidhkar 4/411-413; al-Kafi 1/611; al-Dhakhira 3/180; al-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/521; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 2/287; al-Muwatta 1/425; Hashiyat al-Dasuqi on the Sharh al-Kabir 2/210; Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/438; al-Ishraf, p. 216-217; al-Hawi al-Kabir 2/363; Mughni al-Muhtaj 2/233; al-Mughni 4/334; al-Insaf 3/415; al-Ifsah 1/446).
As for voluntary hajj, the husband may bar her from it by consensus. Ibn al-Mundhir, may Allah have mercy on him, reports: all whose views we preserve among the people of knowledge are unanimous on the man's right to bar his wife from setting out on voluntary hajj (al-Ijma' 135); for the husband's right is obligatory, and she may not forfeit it by what is not (al-Mughni 4/340; al-Dhakhira 3/180; Sharh Ibn Battal 2/533; al-Jawhar al-Naqi 5/224; Mawahib al-Jalil 2/474; al-Sharh al-Kabir 2/350; al-Majmu' 8/249; al-Umm 2/117; Nihayat al-Muhtaj 2/383; al-Ashbah wa-l-Naza'ir 1/138; al-Fatawa al-Kubra 4/464).
The jurists are, on the whole, agreed that it is required that the woman not be in a waiting period of divorce or death during the time in which travel for hajj is possible: Allah the Most High forbade the women in 'idda to go out, in His words:
"Fear Allah, your Lord: do not send them out of their houses, and let them not go out."
Surah at-Talaq, 1
It is also that hajj may be performed at another time, whereas the 'idda must be observed in this very time alone: combining the 2 matters is therefore preferable. The Hanafis generalized the condition to every woman in 'idda, whether from an irrevocable or revocable divorce, a death or an annulment of marriage; such is also the Malikis' view: the woman in 'idda of divorce or death must remain in the house of the waiting period; if she enters ihram while in 'idda, her pilgrimage is valid, but with the sin, by virtue of the verse that generalizes the women in 'idda for divorce as for death.
The Hanbalis, for their part, give detail: the woman does not set out for hajj during the death 'idda, but she may set out for it during the 'idda of irrevocable divorce; for residence in the house is obligatory during the death 'idda and takes precedence over hajj, which may be missed, whereas it is not so in irrevocable divorce; and during the 'idda of the revocably divorced woman, she stands as she does in seeking marriage: she is a wife. Likewise with the Shafi'is: they state explicitly that the husband may bar the revocably divorced woman for the sake of the 'idda, since he may, on the sound view, bar her from the obligatory hajj itself (Mughni al-Muhtaj 2/342; al-Mughni 4/340; Badai' al-Sana'i' 3/50; Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/512; Mawahib al-Jalil 2/526; al-Malik al-Mutaqassit, p. 39). The Hanafis finally differ: is absence of 'idda a condition of obligation or a condition of performance? Ibn Amir al-Hajj makes it a condition of performance, which Ibn Abidin judges the more apparent; with the majority it is a condition of obligation (Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 2/512).