Islamic Fiqh > Judgment and testimony > Admission (iqrar): pillars, conditions and effects > Admission: pillars and conditions
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Updated on 26 September 2026 at 7:12 PM
An acknowledgment (iqrar) only produces its effect if its author meets a set of conditions, among them sobriety, the absence of coercion, the absence of prodigality, and not being terminally ill when acknowledging in favor of an heir. The schools of law present these conditions along with their points of consensus and disagreement. This page gathers the encyclopedia entries devoted to conditions two through five of the acknowledgment, as well as their practical extensions. Classical references are cited in parentheses with volume and page numbers.
The Hanbalis said: if the person acknowledging is permitted to trade, his acknowledgment is valid only within what he has been permitted. Ahmad said, according to the transmission of Muhanna, concerning the orphan: if he is permitted to trade while he understands selling and buying, his selling and buying are permissible; and if he acknowledges having taken a portion of his property, that is valid within what his guardian permitted him.
Abu Bakr and Ibn Abi Musa said: his acknowledgment is valid only in what he was permitted to trade in, namely minor matters (al-Mughni 5/87, al-Insaf 10/188, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/574, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/718, Munar al-Sabil 3/532).
The second condition is to be sober and not drunk. The jurists agreed that whoever loses his sound mind due to a permissible or excusable cause is like a madman: his acknowledgment is not heard. Ibn Qudama said: this without any disagreement (al-Mughni 5/87).
The jurists, however, disagreed about the man made drunk by an unlawful act who makes an acknowledgment while drunk: is his acknowledgment valid and enforced against him, or not? The Malikis and the Hanbalis within the school held that the acknowledgment of the drunkard is not valid, because he lacks sound reason, so that his acknowledgment is invalid like that of the madman whose madness stems from an unlawful act; and because the drunkard cannot be trusted regarding the accuracy of what he says, the suspicion not being absent from what he reports, so that the meaning of acknowledgment warranting the acceptance of his statement is lacking. Such is the argument of the Hanbalis (al-Mughni 5/87, al-Mabda' 10/297, al-Insaf 12/132 and 133, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/574 and 575, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/718).
The Malikis also said: because the drunkard, although legally bound, is placed under interdiction regarding his property. Just as his acknowledgment does not bind him, none of his other contracts binds him, neither sale, nor lease, nor gift, nor charity, nor mortmain, unlike his bodily offences, which do bind him (al-Sharh al-Kabir with the gloss of al-Dasuqi 5/85, the gloss of al-Sawi on al-Sharh al-Saghir 8/104).
The Hanafis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis according to one transmission held that sobriety is not a condition, so that the acknowledgment of a man made drunk by an unlawful act is valid. Among the Shafi'is, his statements are executed in what concerns him and to his charge, even if he acknowledges a right due to Allah or to a human being: he is held to it (the commentary on Sahih Muslim 11/200, al-Najm al-Wahhaj 5/80, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 6/574).
The Hanafis said: the drunkard is held accountable for the financial rights of creatures, unlike the rights of Allah the Most High: his acknowledgment of them is not valid. What is not exclusively reserved to Allah the Most High remains valid through his acknowledgment, such as the punishment of false accusation of unchastity (qadhf), because it contains a right of the creature; in that case the drunkard is treated like the sober person, by way of punishment, as in the rest of his dealings.
In summary: his acknowledgment concerning the legal punishments is not valid, except the punishment of qadhf, and his acknowledgment of a cause of retaliation (qisas) and of the other rights, whether they concern property, divorce, manumission or otherwise, is valid, because they admit no retraction. This is why, if he confesses a theft and is not punished because of his drunkenness, the property is taken from him and he becomes liable for it. As for his apostasy, it is not valid, because disbelief pertains to conviction, which is not realized in drunkenness: such is the ruling. As for what lies between him and Allah the Most High: if in reality he intended to utter it while understanding its meaning, he disbelieves; otherwise he does not (Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 7/223, al-Bahr al-Ra'iq 5/30, Durrar al-Hukkam 5/324, al-Durr al-Mukhtar 5/622).
The jurists agreed on the invalidity of the acknowledgment of the coerced person, because it is a statement extracted from him unjustly. The Prophet said:
"Pardon has been granted to my community for error, forgetfulness and what they are forced to do."A sound hadith
The imam Ibn Qudama said: the acknowledgment of the coerced person is not valid. If a man is beaten so that he confesses fornication, no legal punishment falls upon him and fornication is not established against him; and we know of no disagreement among the scholars that no punishment results from the acknowledgment of a coerced person. It was reported from Omar: "A man is not trustworthy regarding himself when you starve him, beat him or imprison him", narrated by Sa'id. Ibn Shihab (al-Zuhri) said about a man who confessed after being flogged: no punishment falls upon him.
Indeed, an acknowledgment establishes nothing against its author except in the presence of a motive pushing him to truthfulness and the absence of suspicion regarding him, for a person of sound mind is not suspected of intending harm to himself. When there is coercion, the predominant assumption is that he intended, by his acknowledgment, to repel the harm of coercion. The presumption of truthfulness then vanishes, and his statement is not accepted (al-Mughni 9/63 and 5/87; see also Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 7/223, al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 3/273, al-Sharh al-Kabir with the gloss of al-Dasuqi 5/85, the gloss of al-Sawi on al-Sharh al-Saghir 8/104, al-Najm al-Wahhaj 5/80, al-Mabda' 10/297, Munar al-Sabil 3/531).
It makes no difference whether the coercion bears on an acknowledgment concerning a right of Allah the Most High or a right of a human being. Except that the Hanbalis said: if he acknowledges something other than what he was coerced for, like one who is coerced to acknowledge on behalf of a man and acknowledges on behalf of another, or is coerced regarding one category of property and acknowledges another, or is coerced to acknowledge the divorce of one woman and acknowledges the divorce of another, or acknowledges the manumission of a slave, his acknowledgment is valid, because he acknowledged what he was not coerced for, and it stands as if he had done so spontaneously. Likewise, if he is coerced to pay a sum of money and sells a part of his property in order to pay it, his sale is valid, because he was not coerced into selling.
Whoever acknowledges a right and then claims he was coerced is not believed without evidence (bayyina), whether he acknowledged before the ruler or elsewhere, because the default is the absence of coercion, unless there is an indication of coercion, such as chains, imprisonment or mistreatment. His statement is then accepted together with his oath, because that state attests to the coercion.
If he claims that his mind was impaired at the time of his acknowledgment, his statement is not accepted without evidence, because the default is soundness of mind until the contrary is established. Even if witnesses testify to his acknowledgment, the validity of the testimony does not require them to state spontaneously the soundness of his mind, because the apparent state is soundness and the validity of the testimony (al-Mughni 5/88, al-Mabda' 10/297, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/575, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/719, Matalib Uli al-Nuha 6/658).
The majority of jurists, namely the Malikis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis according to one opinion, along with the two companions of the Hanafi school (Abu Yusuf and Muhammad ibn al-Hasan), stated explicitly that the absence of prodigality is a condition for the validity of an acknowledgment concerning property. If the person acknowledging is prodigal and acknowledges property, his acknowledgment is not valid, and the same applies to all his financial dealings, because he is under interdiction.
The imam Abu Hanifa differed on this point: he holds that no interdiction strikes the prodigal who has attained full reason even if prodigality then occurs, and that all his dealings are valid, because he does not uphold any interdiction upon him at all (al-Mabsut 18/145 and 148, Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 7/222, Majma' al-Damanat 2/766, Ghamz 'Uyun al-Basa'ir, commentary on al-Ashbah wa-l-Naza'ir 3/173, al-Sharh al-Kabir with the gloss of al-Dasuqi 5/85, al-Bayan 13/419).
The Hanbalis within the school said: if the prodigal acknowledges property, his acknowledgment is valid, but it does not bind him during his interdiction; rather he is pursued on its basis afterwards, because he is legally bound and acknowledged what does not bind him at present and then binds him after the lifting of the interdiction, like the slave who acknowledges a debt, the pledgee regarding the pledge and the bankrupt regarding property. But if the guardian knows the truth of what the prodigal acknowledged, such as a debt of bodily injury and the like, payment is due from him.
According to another opinion, when the prodigal acknowledges property, such as a debt, or something that entails it, such as an injury by accident or quasi-intentional, the destruction of property, its usurpation or its theft, his acknowledgment is not accepted. He is under interdiction for his heedlessness, so that his acknowledgment concerning property is invalid like that of the child and the madman. And if we accepted his acknowledgment concerning his property, the meaning of interdiction would vanish: he would dispose of his property, then acknowledge, and the person acknowledged to would take the property; moreover he acknowledged what he is forbidden to dispose of, like the acknowledgment of the pledgee regarding the pledge and of the bankrupt regarding property.
Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him) said: it is possible that his acknowledgment is not valid and is not accepted in judgment in any case, and that is the school of al-Shafi'i, because he is under interdiction for lack of discernment, so the judgment of his acknowledgment does not bind him after the lifting of the interdiction, like the child and the madman. The prevention of the effect of his acknowledgment at present was indeed established only to preserve his property and repel harm from him; if it took effect after the lifting of the interdiction, it would only defer the harm to his most complete state. He differs in this from the one under interdiction due to the right of another, whose prevention consists in attaching the right of another to his property: the prevention vanishes with the vanishing of the right over his property, and the consequence of his acknowledgment becomes established.
In our case, the judgment was voided because of a defect in the acknowledgment, so it did not become established as a cause. With the vanishing of the interdiction, the cause does not complete itself, and the judgment is not established despite the defect in the cause, just as it was not established before the lifting of the interdiction. The interdiction struck for the right of another did not prevent those subject to it from disposing within their liabilities: it is therefore possible for their acknowledgment within their liabilities to be valid in a way that does not harm others, by binding them after the vanishing of the right of another. The interdiction here strikes the man for his heedlessness, due to the weakness of his mind and his poor dealings, and the harm cannot be repelled except by the total invalidation of his acknowledgment, like the child and the madman.
As for the validity of his acknowledgment between him and Allah the Most High: if the truth of what he acknowledged is known, such as a debt arising from a bodily injury or a debt he owed before the interdiction, payment is due from him, because he knows that a right rests upon him, as if he had acknowledged it without interdiction. If the corruption of his acknowledgment is known, for example if it is known that he acknowledged a debt while no debt rests upon him, or an injury he did not cause, or that he acknowledged what does not bind him, such as having destroyed the property of someone who had handed it to him as a loan or a sale, payment is not due from him, because he knows that no debt rests upon him; nothing binds him, as if he had acknowledged nothing.
When the guardian of the prodigal permits him to sell and buy, the question involves two opinions. According to the first, it is valid: it is an exchange contract by which he becomes owner with permission, like marriage; and because he is of sound mind while under interdiction, his dealing with permission is valid like that of the child. Yet this establishes that the interdiction upon the child is stronger than that upon him, and that his dealing nevertheless becomes valid with permission, which is all the more reason here. And if we prevented his dealing despite the permission, we would have no way of knowing his discernment and testing him.
According to the second opinion, it is not valid: the interdiction strikes him for his squandering and his poor dealings. When he is permitted, he is permitted in what holds no benefit, so it is not valid, as if one permitted the sale of what is worth ten for five. The ruling on the dealing of the guardian of the prodigal is the ruling on the dealing of the guardian of the child and the madman, because his guardianship over the prodigal aims at his heedlessness: he most resembles the guardian of the child (al-Mughni 4/171 and 172, al-Insaf 5/334 and 338, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/528 and 530, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 3/487 and 489, Matalib Uli al-Nuha 3/415 and 417).
All of this was set out in the book of interdiction, where the difference was explained between the acknowledgment concerning oneself before the judgment of interdiction and after it. As for the prodigal who acknowledges a legal punishment or retaliation, the scholars are unanimously agreed that he is held by his acknowledgment in that respect.
Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him) said: the one under interdiction for poverty or prodigality, if he acknowledges something that entails a legal punishment or retaliation, such as fornication, theft, drinking wine, qadhf, intentional killing or the amputation of the hand and the like, that acknowledgment is accepted and its judgment binds him immediately; we know of no disagreement on this.
Ibn al-Mundhir (may Allah have mercy on him) said: all those whose transmission we preserve among the scholars agree that the acknowledgment of the interdicted person concerning himself is permissible if it bears on fornication, theft, drinking wine, qadhf or killing, and that the legal punishments are established against him. This is the view of al-Shafi'i, Abu Thawr and the people of reasoned opinion, and I know of no disagreement contrary to it from them (al-Ishraf 6/234, al-Ijma' 538).
Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him) said: that is because he is not suspected regarding himself, and the interdiction attached only to his property, so his acknowledgment concerning himself is accepted in what does not touch property. If he divorces his wife, his divorce takes effect according to the view of most of the scholars, because divorce is not a dealing in property and does not follow its rule: it is therefore not prevented, like the acknowledgment of a legal punishment or retaliation. The proof that it does not follow the rule of property is that it is valid from the slave without the permission of his master, while he is prevented from disposing of property and acquires nothing by inheritance. And because he is legally bound, he divorced his wife by choice and his divorce took effect, as with the slave and the mukatab (al-Mughni 4/304).
The person stricken with terminal illness, when he makes an acknowledgment, falls into one of two cases: he acknowledges in favor of a non-heir or in favor of an heir. The first case is the acknowledgment of the sick person in favor of a non-heir concerning property.
The scholars agreed that when the person stricken with terminal illness acknowledges in favor of a non-heir, even all of his property, his acknowledgment is valid, because he is not suspected in an acknowledgment in favor of a non-heir: it is therefore accepted like the acknowledgment in health. Ibn al-Mundhir (may Allah have mercy on him) said: all those whose transmission we preserve among the scholars agree on the permissibility of the acknowledgment of the sick person, during his illness, of a debt in favor of someone other than the heir, provided that no debt rests upon him in health.
They disagreed about the sick person who acknowledges a debt in favor of a non-heir while a debt rests upon him from his health and he mentions it. One group said: one begins with the debt of health; this is the view of al-Nakha'i, followed by the people of reasoned opinion: the debt established in health takes precedence, whether it was established by his acknowledgment or by the testimony of witnesses. They said: once it is paid, those holding an acknowledgment made during the illness share proportionally.
Another group said: the two debts are equal, the debt of health and the one he acknowledges during the illness, when the acknowledgment is in favor of someone other than the heir. This is the view of al-Shafi'i (may Allah have mercy on him) and Abu Thawr. Abu Ubayd said it and mentioned that it is the view of the people of Medina, and it was reported from al-Hasan.
Among those who deemed permissible the acknowledgment of the sick person of a debt in favor of a non-heir are Sufyan al-Thawri, Ahmad and Ishaq, and such is also our transmission (al-Awsat 8/133 and 134, al-Ijma' 344).
Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him) said: the acknowledgment of a debt during his terminal illness is like the acknowledgment in health when it is in favor of someone other than the heir. Such is the apparent meaning of the school and the view of most of the scholars. Ibn al-Mundhir said: all those whose transmission we preserve agree on the permissibility of the acknowledgment of the sick person, during his illness, in favor of someone other than the heir.
Our companions reported another transmission according to which his acknowledgment is not accepted, because it is an acknowledgment in terminal illness resembling the acknowledgment in favor of an heir. Abu al-Khattab said: there is another transmission according to which his acknowledgment is not accepted beyond the third, because he is prevented from donating it to a non-heir as he is prevented from donating it to an heir. His acknowledgment of what he cannot donate is therefore not valid, unlike the third and what is below it.
Our argument is that it is an acknowledgment free of suspicion, therefore accepted like the acknowledgment in health. This is established by the fact that the state of illness is closer to precaution toward oneself, to clearing one's liability and to seeking truthfulness, so that it is more deserving of acceptance. It differs in this from the acknowledgment in favor of an heir, which is suspect, as we shall mention.
Section: if he acknowledges in favor of a non-heir a debt during his illness, while a debt rests upon him established by evidence or by acknowledgment in health, and the property suffices for both, they are equal. If it does not suffice for their payment, the apparent meaning of the words of al-Khiraqi is that they are equal, and that is the choice of al-Tamimi. Malik, al-Shafi'i and Abu Thawr said it, and Abu Ubayd mentioned that it is the view of most of the people of Medina, because they are two rights whose payment falls upon the principal of the estate, neither being distinguished by evidence: they are therefore equal as if both were established by evidence.
Abu al-Khattab said: the creditors of the period of health are not subject to proportional sharing. Al-Qadi said: it is the analogy of the school, based on the explicit text of Ahmad concerning the bankrupt: when he acknowledges while a debt rests upon him by evidence, he begins with the debt established by evidence. Al-Nakha'i, al-Thawri and the people of reasoned opinion said it, because he acknowledged after the right had attached to his estate: he must therefore not make the one acknowledged to share with the one whose debt is established by evidence, like the creditor of the bankrupt to whom he acknowledged after his interdiction.
The proof of the attachment of the right to his property lies in the fact that he is prevented from donation and from acknowledgment in favor of an heir, being under interdiction; his gifts and donations therefore do not take effect, and he does not make the one acknowledged to before the interdiction share, nor the one whose debt is established by evidence, like the one to whom the bankrupt acknowledged. If he acknowledges to both during the illness, they are equal and the first of the two is not given precedence, because they are equal in state and then resemble the two creditors of health (al-Mughni 5/123 and 124; see also Tabyin al-Haqa'iq 5/23 and 24, al-'Inaya 12/28).
Except that the Malikis said: the acknowledgment in favor of a non-heir is permissible, unless it is for an obsequious close friend: the acknowledgment in his favor is then not valid, because of the appearance of an indication in his intent to benefit them, or of that transaction reaching some of his heirs through his friend (Tabsirat al-Hukkam 2/106).
In the second case, the sick person acknowledges in favor of an heir in a state of terminal illness. The scholars disagreed about this acknowledgment: is it void, by closing the door to pretexts and by rejecting the acknowledgment that meets the right of inheritance in what is suspect, because it constitutes testimony concerning oneself in what their right is attached to, and is therefore rejected like testimony concerning another; or is it accepted and valid, out of good opinion of the person acknowledging, especially at the end of life?
The majority of jurists, namely the Hanafis, the Malikis and the Shafi'is according to one opinion, along with the Hanbalis, held that his acknowledgment in favor of the heir is not accepted unless ratified by the remaining heirs, based on what was reported from our master Omar and his son our master Abdallah (may Allah be pleased with them both): "When the sick person acknowledges in favor of his heir, it is not accepted, and when he acknowledges in favor of a non-heir, it is accepted". No contrary transmission was reported from anyone other than them, which amounts to a consensus.
This acknowledgment is indeed suspect, because it is possible that he preferred some heirs over others out of natural inclination or to repay a kindness that invites generosity. Yet he cannot achieve that by way of donation or testamentary bequest, so he wanted to execute his aim under the form of acknowledgment, while no actual debt rests upon the heir. His acknowledgment is thus suspect and rejected.
Likewise, when he is stricken with terminal illness, the right of the heirs attaches to his property; he therefore cannot dispose of it, not even of the third, although it is his exclusive property, free of the right of another. His acknowledgment in favor of some of them constitutes an annulment of the right of the rest and is not valid with regard to them.
The testamentary bequest is indeed not permitted in favor of an heir, and the acknowledgment is stronger: if the acknowledgment were permitted, the invalidity of the bequest would be circumvented, for he would incline toward the acknowledgment choosing preference. It is even stronger than the bequest, because the bequest consumes only the third, while the acknowledgment consumes the whole of the property. The invalidation of the acknowledgment is therefore the invalidation of the bequest by the first route (Mukhtasar Ikhtilaf al-'Ulama' 4/210, Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 7/224, al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 3/308 and 309, al-Durr al-Mukhtar 5/610, al-Mudawwana al-Kubra 13/213, Tahdhib al-Mudawwana 2/222, the Risala of al-Qayrawani p. 137, Ibn Batal's commentary on Sahih al-Bukhari 8/157, al-Kafi p. 457, al-Mughni 5/124, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/577, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/721, Munar al-Sabil 3/532).
The Malikis said: the sick person's acknowledgment of having received a debt is permissible, except regarding an heir or someone suspected of fraudulent collusion toward him. Likewise, the wife may not acknowledge having received the deferred mahr from her husband during her illness, and the sick person may not acknowledge a debt in favor of some of his heirs.
If he acknowledges in favor of his wife, during his illness, a debt or the mahr: if no attachment toward her is known of him, and he has children by another, that is permissible. If an attachment toward her is known of him, while there was tension with his child by another, and she perhaps has by him a child still small, his acknowledgment is not permissible.
It was asked: are the other heirs in the same situation when attachment or estrangement toward them exists? He answered: no. Malik held that only for the wife, because he is not suspected, when he has no child by her and no known attachment toward her, of fleeing to her with his property at the expense of his child. His heirs being his brothers or his children, the acknowledgment in favor of some of them is not permissible.
If he leaves behind a daughter and 'asaba heirs inheriting from him by kinship or clientage, and he acknowledges property in their favor, that is permissible: he is not suspected of fleeing to the 'asaba at the expense of the daughter. The root of all this is the arising of suspicion: when he is not suspected of fleeing to one at the expense of the one who inherits with him, his acknowledgment is permissible. Such is the origin of this question.
It is related in al-Mudawwana al-Kubra concerning the acknowledgment of the sick person in favor of an heir of a debt: I said: what if he acknowledges in favor of an heir a debt during the illness from which he dies, is that permissible according to the view of Malik? Malik said: that is not permissible, except with evidence. It was said to him: and the man who acknowledges in favor of his wife, during his illness, the mahr due upon him or a debt? He said: this is examined: if no inclination or attachment toward her is known of him, and he has children by another, that is permissible.
If an attachment toward her and affection are known of him, while tension existed between him and his child, and she perhaps has the small child, Malik said: I do not deem that permissible. I said: and the heirs, are they in the same situation that you described to me regarding the woman, some having attachment toward him and another being known for the hatred he bore him? He said: I heard nothing from Malik about that, and I deem it permissible.
Malik held that only for the woman and said: he is not suspected, when he has no child by her and no known inclination of affection, of acknowledging his property at the expense of his child. As for the child or the brothers, all of them, if they are his heirs, I do not deem that permissible.
And if he leaves his daughter and leaves 'asaba heirs inheriting from him by clientage or kinship, and acknowledges property in their favor, he is not suspected of acknowledging in favor of the 'asaba at the expense of his daughter. Ibn al-Qasim said: the root of what I heard from Malik ibn Anas is that he meant by that the suspicion: when no suspicion arises from an acknowledgment settled in favor of one at the expense of the one who inherits with him, he is not suspected and it is permissible. That suffices you for all of that (al-Mudawwana al-Kubra 13/213, Tahdhib al-Mudawwana 2/222, the Risala of al-Qayrawani p. 137, Ibn Batal's commentary on Sahih al-Bukhari 8/157, al-Kafi p. 457).
The Shafi'is within the school held that the acknowledgment of the person stricken with terminal illness in favor of an heir is valid, because whoever has a valid acknowledgment in favor of a non-heir has a valid acknowledgment in favor of the heir, like the healthy person, and conversely the prodigal; and because whoever has a valid acknowledgment in health has a valid acknowledgment in illness, like the one acknowledging in favor of a non-heir; and because whoever has a valid acknowledgment concerning an heir has a valid acknowledgment in favor of an heir, like the one acknowledging the mahr of marriage. The sick person's acknowledgment concerning an heir is moreover broader than his acknowledgment in favor of an heir, because the acknowledgment concerning an heir encompasses lineage, guardianship and property: his acknowledgment of property in favor of an heir is thus more deserving of permissibility than his acknowledgment concerning an heir.
As for the answer to their argument that the person acknowledging is suspect, it is this: if that meaning required the invalidity of his acknowledgment as it requires the rejection of a claim, what he acknowledges in health and in illness would then be equal in invalidation, just as his claim for himself is equal in health and in illness in being rejected, whereas the sick person is further from suspicion than the healthy one. That is because this is a state in which man avoids disobediences and purifies obedience. This is why Abu Bakr (may Allah be pleased with him) said it in the testament he addressed to Omar: such is what Abu Bakr, the caliph of the Messenger of Allah, bequeathed at the end of his term in this world and the beginning of his term in the hereafter, in that state in which the disbeliever comes to faith and the profligate to fear.
The scholars are moreover unanimously agreed that if a man bequeaths to his heir and acknowledges a debt to him in health, then retracts, his retraction of the bequest is permissible, while his retraction of the acknowledgment is not accepted (al-Hawi al-Kabir 7/38 and 31, al-Muhadhdhab 2/344, al-Bayan 13/420 and 422, al-Najm al-Wahhaj 5/85 and 86, Mughni al-Muhtaj 3/229 and 230, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 6/581 and 582).
Ibn al-Qayyim (may Allah have mercy on him) said: the acknowledgment of the sick person in favor of his heir of a debt is void according to the majority, because of the suspicion. If a debt rests upon him and he wants his liability cleared before death, while he knows that his acknowledgment in favor of the heir is void, what then is the stratagem for clearing his liability and for the creditor to reach his property? Here are the options:
Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him) said: if he acknowledges in favor of his wife a mahr like hers or less, that is valid according to the view of all of them, and we know of no dissenter except al-Sha'bi, who said: his acknowledgment in her favor is not permissible, because it is an acknowledgment in favor of an heir.
Our argument is that it is an acknowledgment concerning something whose cause has occurred and whose existence is known, with no clearing of liability known: it therefore resembles the case of one upon whom a debt is established by evidence and who acknowledges not having paid it. Likewise, if he buys something from his heir and acknowledges to him the equivalent price, the statement belongs to the person acknowledged to, who asserts that he did not receive the price.
If he acknowledges in favor of his wife a debt other than the mahr, that is not accepted. If he acknowledges in her favor, then divorces her, then retracts, she marries another, and he dies during his illness, his acknowledgment in her favor is not accepted. Muhammad ibn al-Hasan said: it is accepted, because she has returned to a state in which he is not suspect, resembling the sick person who acknowledges and then recovers.
Our argument is that it is an acknowledgment in favor of an heir in a state of terminal illness, and the fact that he afterwards divorced her and separated from her changes nothing once he recovers from his illness, for it is then no longer a terminal illness (al-Mughni 5/124 and 125).
Al-Hadadi (may Allah have mercy on him) said: if he acknowledges in favor of his wife, during his illness, a mahr like hers or less, he is believed; he is not believed for what exceeds the mahr of a woman like her (al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 3/309).