Islamic Fiqh > Judgment and testimony > Testimony (chahada) > Fifth condition: being alert and retaining what is witnessed
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Updated on 26 September 2026 at 7:12 PM
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The jurists of the four schools, Hanafis, Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis, specify that the witness must be alert and retain what he attests: the testimony of the heedless or of one known for frequent mistakes and forgetfulness is not accepted, for no confidence can be placed in his word: his testimony may stem from error or inattention, he may testify against one other than the person concerned, about something other than what he saw, or for someone other than the one who called upon him. The Hanafis require that he be alert, retain what he hears and master what he conveys (Ahkam al-Qur'an, 2/234 ; Hashiyat Ibn 'Abidin, 7/93).
The Malikis require that he not be heedless: the heedless man's testimony is accepted only for an unambiguous act, such as "I saw this one kill that one, gouge out his eyes or cut off his hands," or "I heard this one divorce his wife or insult so-and-so." Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam specifies that an otherwise virtuous man may be weak, his heedlessness making confusion possible: his testimony is accepted only if the matter attested is clear and unambiguous. The heedless differs from the dull: the former possesses a faculty, an alert capacity he does not use; the latter possesses none at all (At-Taj wal-Iklil, 5/111 ; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 7/179 ; Al-Sharh al-Kabir with ad-Dasuqi's gloss, 6/64 ; Tahbir al-Mukhtasar, 5/112-113).
The Shafi'is require that he have good retention and not be heedless, for lack of confidence in his word, unless he details the cause, such as an acknowledgment, with its time and place: his testimony is then accepted. Slight error does not harm, for no one escapes it; the one dominated by error and forgetfulness is rejected, and the one whose error equals his retention is like the one dominated by error. It is recommended to question in detail the witness in whom the judge perceives a weakness, like most common folk, even if upright; if he does not give details, his condition must be examined (An-Najm al-Wahhaj, 10/324 ; Mughni al-Muhtaj, 6/387 ; Nihayat al-Muhtaj, 8/358).
The Hanbalis likewise require that he retain and be alert: the testimony of the heedless or of one known for frequent errors and forgetfulness is not accepted, for the same reasons; but it is accepted from the one whose error and lapse are rare, for no one escapes error once and forgetfulness (Al-Mughni, 10/168 ; Kashshaf al-Qina', 6/529 ; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 6/658 ; Manar al-Sabil, 3/499).
The people of knowledge are unanimous in requiring the witness's uprightness, based on "And take for witness two just persons from among you" (Surah At-Talaq, 2) and "from among such witnesses as you approve" (Surah Al-Baqarah, 282), approval being directed toward the upright and excluded from the sinner. The suspension of the sinner's testimony rests on this verse:
"O you who believe! If a fasiq comes to you with a report, verify it, lest you harm a people out of ignorance and become, over what you have done, regretful"
Surah Al-Hujurat, 6
The "report" denotes information, and every testimony is information, though not every information is testimony. And Allah says: "Is the believer then like the fasiq? They are not equal" (Surah As-Sajdah, 18): denying equality, by requiring the upright's acceptance, requires the sinner's rejection.
The testimony of a treacherous man or woman, or of a gambler against his brother, is not permissible.Reported by 'Amr ibn Shu'ayb from his father and his grandfather, from the Prophet (peace be upon him) ; hasan hadith: Abu Dawud (3601), Ibn Majah (2366), Ahmad (2/208), ad-Daraqutni (4/244)
A great number of scholars report consensus on requiring uprightness and rejecting the sinner's testimony: Imam Ibn Battal says the scholars are unanimous on this rejection (Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari, 7/179); al-Mawardi that there is no disagreement, by the text (Al-Hawi al-Kabir, 17/272); and Ibn Rushd that the Muslims agree to require it, based on the two verses just cited.
The divergence concerns the definition of uprightness. The majority make it a quality beyond Islam: fulfilling the obligations of the Law and recommended acts, abstaining from the forbidden and the disliked. Abu Hanifah deems outward Islam sufficient, with no known blemish. The cause of the divergence is their hesitation over the meaning of uprightness as the opposite of sin. All agree that the sinner's testimony is not accepted by the verse of Al-Hujurat, and no one differs over the fact that his testimony is accepted again once his repentance is known, unless his sin arose from the accusation of fornication (qadhf): Abu Hanifah rejects his testimony even after repentance, the majority accepts it. The divergence lies in whether the exception in "never accept their testimony: they are the sinners, except those who repent after that" (Surah An-Nur, 4-5) refers to the nearest one mentioned or to the whole sentence, except what consensus specified: repentance does not remove the punishment (Bidayat al-Mujtahid, 2/346).
Ibn Qudamah adds that there is no disagreement on this requirement: uprightness is required in all testimonies, here all the more with added precaution, so that neither the sinner's testimony nor that of the man of unknown state, whose uprightness is unknown since he may be a sinner, is accepted (Al-Mughni, 9/65). He further reports their consensus: the witnesses must be Muslims, upright outwardly and inwardly, whether the accused is a Muslim or a dhimmi (Al-Mughni, 10/155). The shaykh of Islam Ibn Taymiyyah specifies that the jurists agree: if a witness known for a kind of sin harmful to testimony testifies before the judge, his testimony must not be accepted, and a man may declare him untrustworthy for that without having seen him (Majmu' al-Fatawa, 28/371). He adds that the sinner's testimony is rejected by the Quranic text and the agreement of the Muslims; some permit the better of the sinners, then the better, in necessity when no upright person is found; as for accepting the sinner's testimony, no Muslim ever said it (Mukhtasar al-Fatawa al-Misriyyah, p. 604). The rejection of the testimony of one known for lying is agreed upon among the jurists, and the upright man, in every time, place and group, is measured by each: in every people, the witness is the one among them who is upright, even if his uprightness would be of another kind elsewhere.
Ibn Taymiyyah concludes: thus judgment between people remains possible; otherwise, if it were required of each group that only those who fulfill the obligations and shun the forbidden, like the Companions, testify among them, all testimonies, or nearly all, would fall into disuse. In necessity it is possible to accept the testimony of those known for truthfulness though they do not observe the punishments: imprisonment, the affairs of Bedouins, the inhabitants of a village without an upright man; this has foundations, among them the covenant people's testimony, and that of children and women concerning what men do not see, the conditions in the Quran bearing on the reception and not the delivery of testimony (Al-Fatawa al-Kubra, 4/641-642).
For the generality of jurists, uprightness is religious rectitude: performing the obligations, avoiding major sins, not persisting in minor sins, and abstaining from grave offenses against honor, that is, base and blameworthy acts or words. It does not require purifying obedience of every disobedience: that is impossible; upright is the one whose obedience prevails and dominates, who avoids major sins and is careful to avoid minor ones. The Hanafis explain the upright as the one who avoids major sins and does not persist in minor ones, whose rectitude exceeds his corruption and his correctness his error: his testimony is accepted as soon as his good deeds outweigh his bad ones, provided he avoids major sins, even if struck by a disobedience; everyone besides the prophets commits lapses, and were testimony valid only for the sinless, it would be unachievable in this world: latitude was therefore granted and the predominant considered. Such is the definition of uprightness taken into account: avoiding all major sins, then considering the predominant; whoever multiplies disobediences sees his testimony affected, and the one whose disobedience is rare has his testimony accepted, for requiring avoidance of everything would close the door of testimony, kept open for the preservation of rights. In sum: whoever commits a major sin or persists in a minor sin loses his uprightness (Al-Jawharah al-Nayyirah, 6/145 and 6/169).
The Malikis define it as religious adherence to avoiding lying and major sins, guarding against minor ones, fulfilling the trust and dealing well, without innovation. Here too it does not require obedience free of disobedience, which is within reach only of the saints and the truthful (Jami' al-Ummahat, 469 ; Mawahib al-Jalil, 8/134 ; At-Taj wal-Iklil, 5/107 ; Al-Sharh al-Kabir with ad-Dasuqi's gloss, 6/61-62 ; Tahbir al-Mukhtasar, 5/110).
The Shafi'is define it as avoiding every major sin, avoiding persistence in one minor sin or several of one kind or various kinds, and possessing the sense of honor: conducting oneself by acts like those of one's peers, not base in one's time and place, custom varying in this for the most part (An-Najm al-Wahhaj, 10/287-289 ; Mughni al-Muhtaj, 6/371 ; Ad-Dibaj, 4/491-497).
The Hanbalis define it as the evenness of a person's states in religion and the moderation of his words and acts, with two points of assessment. The first is rectitude in religion, in two respects: performing the obligations, prayer, the supererogatory sunnahs, zakah, fasting and pilgrimage, testimony not being accepted from one who constantly neglects the supererogatories; and avoiding the forbidden: committing no major sin nor indulging in a minor one. The major sin is the one carrying a punishment in this world, such as fornication and wine, or a threat in the hereafter, such as consuming the orphan's property, usury (riba), false testimony and disobeying parents; the minor sin is the lesser forbidden thing. The second point is the exercise of the human sense of honor: practicing what custom beautifies, good character, generosity, spending for honor and good neighborliness, and shunning what custom deems base and shameful (Al-Mughni, 10/169-170 ; Kashshaf al-Qina', 6/529-531 ; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 6/661-667 ; Manar al-Sabil, 3/501-502).
Sin is of two kinds: by deeds and by belief. The first is agreed upon: the witness must be upright; if he is a sinner through a major sin committed, through persistence in a minor sin, through gambling at dice or chess for money, or any other unlawful act, his testimony is rejected. Ibn Qudamah states that there is no known disagreement on rejecting the sinner's testimony for deeds (Al-Mughni, 10/168, and the preceding sources). Each school discusses at length what is unlawful; the criterion is that whoever commits a major sin without repenting, or persists in a minor sin of word or deed, is rejected as a witness.
The second is sin by belief, the question of accepting the testimony of the people of innovation. The Malikis and Hanbalis reject absolutely the testimony of the people of desires. The Malikis specify that the innovator's testimony, Khariji or Qadari, is not accepted, even for an erroneous interpretation, with no distinction between the interpreter and the ignorant imitator, ignorance being no excuse (Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari, 8/588-589 ; At-Taj wal-Iklil, 5/108 ; Al-Sharh al-Kabir with ad-Dasuqi's gloss, 6/614 ; Tahbir al-Mukhtasar, 5/110).
The Hanbalis reject the testimony of the sinner by belief, that is, the innovators, even if he believed he held the true religion: his testimony is rejected, for it is one of the two kinds of sin; the innovator being a sinner, the verse applies. Whoever imitates in affirming the createdness of the Quran, the denial of the vision of Allah in the hereafter, the Rafidah, the Jahmiyyah, anthropomorphism or the creation of the servant's deeds is a sinner, and their leading propagandist is declared a disbeliever. Al-Majd holds that the correct position is to declare the propagator of every innovation a disbeliever and to count the imitator a sinner, whether he affirms the createdness of the Quran, of our words, of Allah's knowledge or of His names, denies the vision in the hereafter, insults the Companions by way of religion, or reduces faith to mere belief; whoever is learned in such an innovation, calls to it and disputes for it is judged a disbeliever, Ahmad having specified this in several places. Al-Muwaffaq (Ibn Qudamah) chooses not to declare their learned propagandist a disbeliever, following Ahmad's word to al-Mu'tasim: "O Commander of the Believers" (Al-Mughni, 10/168 ; Kashshaf al-Qina', 6/531 ; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 6/663).
The Hanafis and Shafi'is accept the testimony of the people of desires, innovators included, if they avoid lying, except the Khattabiyyah among the Rafidah: they testify in favor of whoever swears before them, out of sectarian loyalty. They take their name from Ibn al-Khattab, a man of Kufa who believed 'Ali to be the greatest god and Ja'far as-Sadiq the lesser god; the prince 'Isa ibn Musa killed him and crucified him. The reason for acceptance is that this divergence does not expel them from Islam, resembling divergences in branches; their sin does not prove their lying since they proceed by religion and conviction of truth, without knowingly committing what is forbidden, unlike sin by deeds (Ikhtilaf al-'Ulama, 1/286-287 ; Mukhtasar Ikhtilaf al-'Ulama, 3/334-335 ; Ahkam al-Qur'an, 2/234 ; Al-Mabsut, 16/132-133 ; Al-Hidayah, 3/123 ; Al-Jawharah al-Nayyirah, 6/168 ; Al-Lubab, 2/458 ; Hashiyat Ibn 'Abidin, 7/108 ; Al-Hawi al-Kabir, 17/168 and 17/176 ; Al-Bayan, 13/280-281 ; Al-Ifsah, 2/421 ; Sharh Sahih Muslim, 7/160 ; An-Najm al-Wahhaj, 10/322-323 ; Mughni al-Muhtaj, 6/386).
Imam ash-Shafi'i observes that people diverged through interpretations of the Quran and the hadiths from the era of the early generations to this day, diverging so sharply that some deemed the blood of others lawful, a subject too long to relate; yet he knew no early authority of this community to be followed, nor successor, who rejected anyone's testimony for an interpretation, however erroneous and misguided, despite its permitting blood and property, blood being that by which Allah is most disobeyed after polytheism, some interpreters permitting it through ways their peers condemned without for that rejecting their testimony. He concludes: everyone who permits something through interpretation, in word or otherwise, sees his testimony run its course without being rejected for the error of interpretation, for the error may befall the one who contradicts him; except the one known for permitting false testimony against a man, deeming it lawful in blood or property: his testimony is rejected for false testimony; the one who swears for a man he trusts, testifying categorically without attending or hearing: rejected for having made false testimony lawful; and the one who bears enmity toward the dissenting man: rejected for enmity. Whoever escapes all this, among them or others not attached to desires, his testimony is validated. And the testimony of the one who counts lying as polytheism or a disobedience doomed to the Fire is more acceptable than the one who lightens it; likewise for those who insult people by interpretation and not by enmity: if we accept the testimony of people who permit bloodshed, the insulting of men is all the more acceptable, insult being lighter than killing (Al-Umm, 6/205-206).
Imam Ibn al-Qayyim reports: the sinner by his belief, if he is measured in his religion, has his testimony accepted even though we judge him a sinner, like the innovators and people of desires whom we do not declare disbelievers: the Rafidah, Khawarij and Mu'tazilah; this is the explicit text of the imams. Ash-Shafi'i used to say: "I accept the testimony of the people of desires among themselves, except the Khattabiyyah, who testify by way of religion for their coreligionists against their opponents." There is no doubt that the testimony of the one who counts lying as a sin leading to the Fire is more acceptable than the one who does not; and the early and later generations never ceased accepting their testimony and their transmission. The imams, like Ahmad ibn Hanbal, only barred accepting the transmission of the public propagator of innovation, his testimony and prayer behind him, by way of shunning and deterrence, so that the harm of his innovation ceases for the Muslims: accepting his testimony and transmission, praying behind him, seeking his judgments, is approving his innovation and letting it pass.
Harb reports that Ahmad used to say: the testimony of the Qadaris and Rafidah, and of whoever calls to an innovation and disputes for it, is not permissible. Al-Maymuni reports that Abu Abdillah (Ahmad) said of the Rafidah: "May Allah curse them: their testimony is not accepted, and they have no honor." Ishaq ibn Mansur reports having told Ahmad that Ibn Abi Layla accepted the testimony of any upright innovator among them, not permitting false testimony; Ahmad replied: "The testimony of the Jahmiyyah, the Rafidah, the Qadaris and the public propagandists does not please me." Al-Maymuni heard him say: "The one for whose disbelief I fear, like the Rafidah and the Jahmiyyah, his testimony is not accepted and he has no honor." In Ya'qub ibn Bakhtan's version: if the judge is a Jahmi, we do not testify before him. Ahmad ibn al-Hasan at-Tirmidhi relates that on coming to Abu Abdillah, the latter asked him about his judge, whose life had been extended; he answered that people had testimonies to give and that he dared not testify before him for fear of being disgraced, and Ahmad advised him: "Do not testify before him."
Whoever disbelieves through his school, denying the world's origination, the resurrection of bodies, Allah's knowledge of all things and His acting by His will, has his testimony rejected: he is not upon Islam. As for the innovators who agree with the Muslims but differ on some foundations, the Rafidah, Qadaris, Jahmiyyah and extremists among the Murji'ah, they fall into categories. The ignorant imitator without insight is declared neither disbeliever nor sinner, and his testimony is not rejected if he is incapable of learning guidance: he has the status of the weak among men, women and children without means or way, and Allah may well pardon them. The one capable of asking, seeking guidance and knowing the truth, but who abandons it out of concern for the lower world, prestige, pleasure and livelihood, is negligent, deserving the threat, sinful for neglecting piety according to his capacity: he has the status of his peers who neglect part of the obligations; if innovation and passion prevail in him over the Sunnah and guidance, his testimony is rejected, and if the Sunnah and guidance prevail, it is accepted.
The third category asks, seeks, guidance becomes clear to him, yet he abandons it out of imitation, partisanship, hatred or enmity toward its adherents: at minimum he is a sinner, and his disbelief is a matter of interpretive effort and detail. If he is a public propagandist, his testimony, fatwas and rulings are rejected as soon as there is capacity, and neither testimony, nor fatwa, nor ruling is accepted from him, except in necessity, such as their predominance and the fact that judges, muftis and witnesses are of them: rejecting their testimonies and rulings then would cause great harm and would be impossible, hence their acceptance out of necessity.
Malik specified that the testimony of the innovators, Qadaris and Rafidah, is not accepted even if they pray our prayer and face our qiblah. Al-Lakhmi gives the reason: their sin, even if by an erroneous interpretation. If such is their position on the Qadaris, whose error is only an interpretation of the Quran like the Khawarij, what then of the Jahmiyyah, whom many of the early generations ranked among the seventy-two sects (At-Turuq al-Hukmiyyah, p. 253-256)?
Imam Ibn al-Qayyim draws from this: when the people are sinners almost all, save a rare handful, their mutual testimony is accepted, and judgment is rendered by the better of the sinners, then the better: this is the correct position upon which there is practice, even though many jurists deny it verbally, just as there is practice on the validity of the sinner's guardianship and the enforceability of his judgments while denying it verbally, as on his validity as marriage guardian and executor of a will. Strange is the one who strips him of this to return guardianship to a sinner like him or worse: the upright man to whom guardianship would pass may be impossible to find, whereas the near sinner is distinguished by kinship and the executor by the testator's choice; a sinner appointed by the testator or distinguished by kinship is preferable to a sinner without that. And if the sinner's truthfulness preponderates in conjecture, his testimony is accepted and judgment rendered by it: Allah did not command rejecting the sinner's report absolutely, but verifying it, to know whether it is truthful or false; if truthful, his word is accepted and acted upon, his sin remaining charged to him; if false, his report is rejected and disregarded. The rejection of the sinner's report and testimony has two bases: lack of confidence in him, his scant regard for his religion and the diminished awe of Allah in his heart possibly driving him to deliberate lying; and his shunning due to the public declaration of his sin. Accepting his testimony would annul this purpose. If the truthfulness of the sinner's word is established, he being among the most truthful and his sin lying elsewhere than in lying, no ground remains for rejecting it: the Prophet (peace be upon him) hired the services of a guide who was a polytheist by his people's religion to lead him on the road to Medina; trusting his word, he secured him, entrusted him his mount and accepted his guidance.
Asbagh ibn al-Faraj said: when the sinner testifies before the judge, suspension is required in the case, and one may argue from "If a fasiq comes to you with a report" (Surah Al-Hujurat, 6). The crux of the matter is that the acceptance and rejection of testimony depend on the preponderance of the conjecture of truthfulness or not. The correct position, upon which there is definitiveness, is that uprightness admits of degrees: a man may be upright in one thing and a sinner in another; when the judge ascertains that he is upright in what he attests, his testimony is accepted, his sin elsewhere doing him no harm. Whoever knows the conditions of uprightness and the states of people discerns the correct position (At-Turuq al-Hukmiyyah, p. 256-258).
The shaykh of Islam Ibn Taymiyyah takes up again: the rejection of the testimony of one known for lying is agreed upon among the jurists; the upright man, in every time, place and group, is measured by each: in every people the witness is the one among them who is upright, even if elsewhere he would be of another kind; thus judgment between people remains possible. In necessity it is possible to accept the testimony of those known for truthfulness though they do not observe the punishments: imprisonment, the affairs of Bedouins, the inhabitants of a village without an upright man; this has foundations, among them the covenant people's testimony, and that of children and women concerning what men do not see, the conditions in the Quran bearing on reception and not delivery (Al-Fatawa al-Kubra, 4/641-642). The Malikis add: when the upright man so described cannot be found or is hard to find, as in our time, necessity dispenses with the one whose lying is not known; it is said: one compensates by increasing the number (Hashiyat ad-Dasuqi on Al-Sharh al-Kabir, 6/62 ; Hashiyat as-Sawi on Ash-Sharh as-Saghir, 9/329).
The jurists require the witness to be speaking, and they differ on the mute's testimony when it is understood: accepted or not? The majority, the Hanafis, the Shafi'is in the soundest view and the Hanbalis, judge his testimony invalid even if his sign is understood: his gesture stands in place of expression only in case of necessity, in marriage and divorce, which are drawn only from himself; here no necessity requires his testimony, valid without him through speech, hence not permitted through his sign like that of a speaking person. Confirmation: testimony requires certainty, which is why the mere nod of a speaking person does not suffice, and a sign does not produce that certainty; the mute's sign was adopted only in his personal rulings by necessity. This is why he cannot be a judge: the judge's ruling is executed only if it exists written under his seal, and a witness does not testify upon seeing his own writing; all the less is judgment rendered upon another's writing. The Hanbalis alone add: his testimony is accepted if he writes it with his hand, not by sign, writing indicating the words. Arguing from the Prophet's sign (peace be upon him) is invalid: he was capable of speech, and his sign was acted upon in prayer; were a speaking person to testify by gesture and signs, it would be invalid by consensus: testimony differs from the other rulings (Mukhtasar Ikhtilaf al-'Ulama, 3/369 ; Al-Mabsut, 16/130 ; Bada'i' al-Sana'i', 6/268 ; Al-Muhadhdhab, 2/324 ; Rawdat at-Talibin, 7/397 ; Mughni al-Muhtaj, 6/371 ; Al-Ifsah, 2/416 ; Al-Mughni, 10/185-186 ; Al-Kafi, 4/521 ; Kashshaf al-Qina', 6/528 ; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 6/658 ; Manar al-Sabil, 3/449).
The Malikis, and the Shafi'is in the opposite view, judge the mute's testimony valid once his sign is understood, equivalent to speech: testimony is knowledge that the witness conveys to the judge; once understood through an intelligible means like any other, it is accepted, as the speaking person conveys it by voice. It is a meaning that requires speech to be grasped; speech being impossible, the sign replaces it as soon as understanding occurs, as with acknowledgment and divorce, where the sign stands for speech in his personal rulings: repudiation, marriage, zhihar and ila', and likewise for his testimony. The Prophet (peace be upon him) made a sign, while seated in prayer, to people standing to sit down, and they sat down (Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari, 7/459 ; Al-Ishraf 'ala nakti masa'il al-khilaf, 5/64-65, no. 1823 ; At-Taj wal-Iklil, 5/111 ; Al-Sharh al-Kabir with ad-Dasuqi's gloss, 6/64 ; Tahbir al-Mukhtasar, 5/112 ; Al-Muhadhdhab, 2/324 ; Rawdat at-Talibin, 7/397).