Islamic Fiqh > Judgment and testimony > Testimony (chahada) > The duty to testify and its impediments
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Updated on 26 September 2026 at 7:12 PM
Islam makes testimony a religious and legal obligation, to the point that the judge may compel the witness to appear and give evidence. This chapter deals first with the payment taken for bearing and delivering testimony, then with the impediments to testimony: direct kinship between parents and children, the case of brothers and other relatives, intimate friendship, and enmity. The positions of the four Sunni schools are set out with their scriptural proofs and classical references.
The Sharia recommends saying "he took" rather than "he stole": saying "he took" entails financial liability, while saying "he stole" entails amputation; concealment is recommended in what entails amputation, whereas testimony becomes due in what entails liability; and saying "he took" revives the right of the one from whom property was stolen (al-Ikhtiyar 2/167, al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 6/140, 141, al-Lubab 2/446, Mukhtasar al-Waqi'a 2/270, al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyya p. 205, al-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/326, Mughni al-Muhtaj p. 389, al-Insaf 12/3, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/515, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/638, Matalib Uli al-Nuha 6/594, Manar al-Sabil 3/489, 490).
The Hanbalis, in one of their opinions, hold that bearing testimony in the rights of Allah (exalted be He) is a collective obligation (fard kifaya) (al-Insaf 12/3).
The majority of jurists state explicitly that it is not permissible to take payment for delivering testimony nor for bearing it, so long as no harm befalls the witness through the delivery and the bearing; but if he suffers harm and the charge becomes obligatory upon him, he may take the fee of a mount, and likewise, according to some, an allowance (nafaqa).
The Hanafis said: the witness may not demand payment for his testimony from the beneficiary; if the witness demands payment, his testimony is not accepted (Durrar al-Hukkam, commentary on the Majallat al-Ahkam, 4/301).
The Malikis said: when the witness is at a distance of two barid or less (the barid being the distance covered by the mail courier in a day) and the delivery is obligatory upon him, if he obtains anything from the beneficiary in return for delivering his testimony, this constitutes a bribe (rashwa) that damages his integrity; for he has taken payment for performing an obligation upon him, like one who takes payment for the prayer, which is not permitted.
But if he does not refuse to testify and the beneficiary gives him something without any demand, or if he has no mount and walking to the place of delivery is hard for him, he is not open to censure; and he may, the second time, benefit from the beneficiary's providing a mount to ride to the place of delivery, for the delivery has then ceased to be obligatory upon him, and this does not damage his testimony.
If the witness is, between him and the place of delivery, at the qasr distance (that which permits shortening the prayer while traveling), he is then not required to travel to it: he testifies before the judge of his own town, who writes to that other judge; and the witness may then benefit from the beneficiary's providing a mount to ride to the place of delivery, as well as an allowance for himself and his household for the duration of his going and returning, without limitation, for he takes in return for something that is not obligatory upon him (Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 7/213, 214, al-Sharh al-Kabir ma'a Hashiyat al-Dasuqi 6/115, Tahrir al-Mukhtasar 5/162).
Among the Shafi'is, the basic rule is that if bearing or delivering the testimony becomes an individual obligation upon him, he may not take payment for it, for it is an obligation that falls upon him, like the prayer. If the charge is not obligatory upon him, there are two opinions.
The imam al-Khatib al-Shirbini (may Allah have mercy on him) said: the witness may not take a stipend for bearing testimony, neither from the ruler nor from any of the subjects; as for taking it from the public treasury (bayt al-mal), he is like the judge, whose details were given earlier. Ibn al-Maqqari said: he may not take it in any way; others said: he may take it without distinction; and in any case he may take payment from the beneficiary for the bearing, even if the charge becomes obligatory upon him when he is summoned; if he bears it where he is, he has no payment.
He may not take payment for the delivery, even if the charge is not obligatory upon him: it is an obligation upon him, so he deserves no compensation, and it is brief speech for which no payment is due. This differs from the bearing, for taking payment for the delivery breeds strong suspicion, whereas its time is short and no substantial benefit is lost through it, unlike the time of the bearing, unless the witness is summoned from a great distance and undergoes great hardship: then he is entitled to travel expenses and the fee of a mount, even if he does not ride it.
One who resides in the town may take the payment if he needs it, and he may spend on other purposes whatever the beneficiary gives him beyond the expenses and the fee; likewise, one who gives a poor man something to clothe himself: the poor man may spend it on something other than clothing. If, however, the witness walks from one town to another while able to ride, manly generosity (muru'a) may be breached and his refusal of payment made apparent: such is his standing, as al-Isnawi said. Al-Adhra'i said: this is not restricted to two towns; it may occur within a single town, and it would then count as a breach of generosity, unless need calls for it or he does it out of humility (Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/412).
The Hanbalis said: it is forbidden to take payment or a fee (ju'l) for bearing or delivering testimony, even if the charge is not obligatory upon him; for the collective obligation, once performed by some, becomes an obligation upon him; and no fee may be taken for it, as with the funeral prayer.
But if the witness is unable to walk or is harmed by it, he may take the fee of a mount from the beneficiary, like the witness in taking payment and fees as a collector of zakat, a guide, a translator, a mufti, an executor of the legal punishment, an executor of qisas (retaliation), a keeper of the treasury's wealth, a market inspector (muhtasib), or the caliph (Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/515, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/637, 638, Matalib Uli al-Nuha 6/593, Manar al-Sabil 3/491).
Before this second impediment, the text completes the question of the spouses' testimony: among the Shafi'is, the husband's testimony against his wife stands, except to accuse her of zina (unlawful intercourse), for it then amounts to an allegation of betrayal concerning himself, like the depositor testifying against the depositary of betrayal in the deposit, and because he is an adverse party in what he testifies, as if he testified that she sinned against him. According to another opinion among them, the husband's testimony in her favor is accepted, but not the reverse (al-Hawi al-Kabir 17/167, al-Muhadhdhab 2/330, al-Bayan 13/314, Rawdat al-Talibin 7/389, al-Kafi 4/529, al-Mubdi' 10/244, al-Insaf 12/68).
The testimony of parents for their children and of children for their parents involves two cases.
First case: testimony in their favor. The majority of jurists (the Hanafis, the Malikis, the Shafi'is in the madhhab, and the Hanbalis in the madhhab) hold that the testimony of a parent for his child is not accepted, nor for his grandchild even further down, whether the descendants of sons or of daughters; nor is the testimony of a child for his father or mother accepted, nor for his grandfather or grandmother on either the father's or the mother's side, however far up, whether fathers and mothers and their own fathers and mothers.
It is narrated from Aisha, in a form attributed to the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him):
"The testimony of a treacherous man or a treacherous woman is not accepted, nor that of one subjected to a legal punishment (hadd), man or woman, nor that of the resentful one (ghamir) for his brother, nor that of one whose testimony has been rejected, nor of one who curries favor with his own household, nor of the suspect in matters of loyalty or kinship."Reported by al-Tirmidhi (2298), a weak hadith
The "suspect" means the person under suspicion: each of the parents and the children is under suspicion with respect to the other, for he is inclined toward him by nature. Hence the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said:
"Fatima is a part of me: whatever disturbs her disturbs me."Reported by al-Bukhari (5230) and Muslim (2449)
His suspicion regarding his child is like the enemy's suspicion regarding his enemy; and the hadith is more specific than the verses, which are therefore restricted by it.
Moreover, the child's person is like the parent's person, and the child's wealth like his wealth: hence the Prophet (peace be upon him) said to Abu Ma'shar al-Darimi:
"You and your wealth belong to your father."Authentic hadith, cited earlier in the encyclopedia
And he said:
"The best food a man eats is from his own earning, and his child is from his earning."Authentic hadith, cited earlier in the encyclopedia
For this reason the father is set free on the child's account if the child acquires him as a slave, and he is owed maintenance by the child when he is in need; the verse cited restricts this as we have mentioned.
It is likewise known from people's nature that a father loves to bring benefit to his child, to secure advantage for him and ward off harm, and prefers this to himself, to the point that he may call him to testify falsely and expose him to every blameworthy thing, so as to bring him the benefit he seeks or deliver him from the harm he wishes to avert. Allah (exalted be He) pointed to this in His saying:
"Your wealth and your children are but a trial."
Surah Al-Anfal, 28
And he said (peace be upon him): "Fatima is a part of me: whatever disturbs her disturbs me." Once this is established, the suspicion against him is established, and his testimony becomes like his testimony for himself (Tuhfat al-Fuqaha 2/362, Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 6/272, al-Hidaya 3/122, al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 6/159, al-Lubab 2/454, al-Fatawa al-Hindiyya 3/469, al-Ishraf ala Nukat Masa'il al-Khilaf 5/69, 71, al-Ifsah 2/420, al-Muhadhdhab 2/330, al-Bayan 13/311, 313, Rawdat al-Talibin 7/388, al-Mughni 10/186, al-Zarkashi's commentary 3/404, 405, al-Mubdi' 10/244, al-Insaf 12/68, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/541, 542, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/674, Manar al-Sabil 3/507).
Another opinion: the imam Ahmad (in one narration), al-Muzani, Abu Thawr and Ibn al-Mundhir, reporting the view of Umar, Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz, Dawud and Ishaq, hold that the testimony of parents for their children and of children for their parents is accepted, because of Allah's saying:
"... call to witness two witnesses from among your men ..."
Surah Al-Baqara, 282
The verse is general and makes no exception: they are like everyone else in integrity, so they are like everyone else in testimony; and he is a just man whose testimony is accepted elsewhere, so it is accepted here like that of a stranger.
A second narration from Ahmad (may Allah have mercy on him): the son's testimony for his father is accepted, but not the father's for the son; for the son's wealth is in effect his father's, who may appropriate it whenever he wishes, so his testimony for him is like a testimony for himself, or he draws benefit for himself through it. The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "You and your wealth belong to your father"; and he said: "The best food a man eats is from his own earning, and your children are among your best earnings, so eat of their wealth." None of this is found in the case of the son's testimony for his father.
A third narration: the testimony of each of the two for the other is accepted in what involves no suspicion, such as marriage, divorce, qisas and wealth he does not need; for neither of them benefits from what is established for the other in these matters, so no suspicion attaches to him (al-Muhadhdhab 2/330, al-Bayan 13/311, 313, Rawdat al-Talibin 7/388, al-Mughni 10/186, al-Zarkashi's commentary 3/404, 405, al-Mubdi' 10/244, al-Insaf 12/68).
The imam Ibn al-Arabi the Maliki (may Allah have mercy on him) said: the choice with me is that the original Sharia does not permit the testimony of a parent for a child nor of a child for a parent, because of the fleshly tie between them. The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "Fatima is but a part of me: whatever disturbs her disturbs me, and whatever hurts her hurts me." A man's testimony for himself is not permitted.
The earlier generations said there was leniency in this matter, and no one ever reported that a judgment was executed on the testimony of a child for a parent or of a parent for a child. The meaning of the leniency is only that they did not openly reject it nor warn against it, for the people's welfare; when corruption spread, the warning came and the scholars pointed to the principle, so that whoever was heedless or negligent thought the earlier ones allowed it, which never was the case. The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "The best food a man eats is from his own earning, and his child is from his earning."
Allah made the child a part of his father in Islam and a follower of him in faith: he is a Muslim through his father's Islam by consensus, and through his mother's Islam with divergence; his wealth belongs to his father, alive and dead; so it is in the foundations of the Sharia, and no exposition lies beyond this (Ahkam al-Qur'an 1/638).
Some Shafi'is said: the son's testimony against his father is not accepted in qisas nor in the punishment for slander (qadhf), for the father is not killed for his killing nor punished for his slander, so it does not bind him. The first opinion, however, is what we have stated, for the son is suspected in his father's favor and not against him: his testimony against him is all the more truthful, like his confession concerning him (al-Mughni 10/186, 187).
The imam al-Amrani (may Allah have mercy on him) said: the parent's testimony against his child is accepted in everything, for no suspicion attaches to him in that; and the child's testimony against the parent is accepted outside the legal punishments and qisas. As for whether it is accepted against him in the punishments and qisas, there are two opinions among our companions.
The testimony of a brother for his brother and of the other relatives: the people of knowledge are agreed upon accepting the testimony of a brother for his brother if he is just, and likewise that of all the other relatives, such as the paternal uncle, the cousin and their like, because of Allah's saying (exalted be He):
"... call to witness two witnesses from among your men ..."
Surah Al-Baqara, 282
and His saying:
"... take as witnesses two just men from among you ..."
Surah At-Talaq, 2
without distinction. It is reported from Umar and Ibn Umar that a brother's testimony for his brother in matters of lineage is accepted, and no one is known to have differed with them; for if the brother owned his brother as a slave, the latter would not be set free on his account, and so his testimony for him is accepted, like that of the cousin.
A number of the people of knowledge transmitted consensus (ijma) on this. The imam al-Tirmidhi (may Allah have mercy on him) said: they did not differ over a brother's testimony for his brother being permissible, and likewise the testimony of every relative for his relative (Sunan al-Tirmidhi 4/546). The imam Ibn al-Mundhir (may Allah have mercy on him) said: they agreed that a brother's testimony for his brother, if he is just, is permissible (al-Ijma' 263).
The imam Ibn Rushd (may Allah have mercy on him) said: among what they agreed upon in lifting suspicion is a brother's testimony for his brother, so long as it does not avert disgrace from himself, as Malik said, and so long as he is not wholly devoted to his brother, receiving his kindness and support (Bidayat al-Mujtahid 2/347).
The imam Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him) said, in one issue: "A brother's testimony for his brother is permissible." And Ibn al-Mundhir said: the people of knowledge agreed that a brother's testimony for his brother is permissible; this is reported from Ibn al-Zubayr, and it is the view of Shurayh, Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz, al-Sha'bi, al-Nakha'i, al-Thawri, Malik, al-Shafi'i, Abu Ubayd, Ishaq, Abu Thawr and the people of opinion.
It is reported from Ibn al-Mundhir, from al-Thawri, that the testimony of every close kinsman within the forbidden degrees is not accepted. And from Malik, that a brother's testimony for his brother is not accepted if he is wholly devoted to him in his support and kindness, for he is under suspicion in his favor.
Ibn al-Mundhir said: Malik said: a brother's testimony for his brother in matters of lineage is not permissible, but it is permissible in rights.
Our proof: the generality of the verses, and the fact that he is a just man, not under suspicion, so his testimony for him is accepted like that of a stranger; and the analogy with parent and child does not hold, for between them there is a fleshly tie and strong kinship, unlike the brother.
This issue follows: the testimony of the paternal uncle and his son, the maternal uncle and his son, and all the other relatives is more deserving still of being permitted; for if a brother's testimony, despite his closeness, is permitted, it points to the testimony of one more distant by way of the stronger case (al-Mughni 10/188).
The qadi Abd al-Wahhab (may Allah have mercy on him) said: a brother's testimony for his brother is accepted except in what renders him suspect in his favor, such as averting disgrace from him or the like, contrary to those who rejected it; for between the two brothers there is no right strong enough in its suspicion to require rejecting the testimony, so his testimony is permitted like the paternal uncle's, both being relatives who do not inherit alongside the father (al-Ishraf ala Nukat Masa'il al-Khilaf 5/74, no. 1827).
The jurists agreed that when the friend is not intimate with his friend, testimony is permitted for him and against him, by the generality of the proofs. But they differed over the testimony of the intimate friend, bound to his friend by kindness and support: is it accepted or not?
The majority of jurists (the Hanafis, the Shafi'is, the Hanbalis and most of the people of knowledge) hold that it is accepted, with no difference between the intimate friend and the ordinary friend, because of Allah's saying: "... two witnesses from among your men ..." (Surah Al-Baqara, 282) and His saying: "... two just men from among you ..." (Surah At-Talaq, 2), without distinction; and because neither of them sets the other free if he owns him as a slave, his testimony for him is diminished, as if there were no bond nor intimacy between them (al-Bahr al-Ra'iq 7/85, al-Hawi al-Kabir 17/162, 163, al-Bayan 13/314, 315).
Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "The testimony of one of the two friends for his companion is accepted in the view of most of the scholars, except Malik, who said: the testimony of the intimate friend is not accepted, for he thereby secures a benefit for himself; he is thus among them, so his testimony is not accepted, like the enemy's testimony against his enemy." Our answer: the generality of the proofs of testimony; and this view would invalidate the creditor's testimony for the debtor before interdiction, although the creditor may at times be paid his debt thereby, drawing a greater benefit than what is hoped between two friends.
As for enmity, its cause is blameworthy, and in testifying against his enemy one soothes his anger against him: it is thus the opposite of friendship.
The Malikis said: the intimate friend, the one delighted by what delights you and grieved by what grieves you: his testimony for his friend is not accepted, on condition that he be outstanding in integrity and not part of his household, eating with them and dwelling with them as one of them, because of the narration attributed to the Prophet:
"The testimony of an adversary or of a suspect is not accepted."A weak hadith, cited earlier in the encyclopedia
And because the suspicion between the two is established by custom: it is known that when friendship and affection exist between a man and another, so that he supports him and maintains ties with him, he loves by analogy to draw benefit to him and ward off harm from him. So we say: it is a prevailing suspicion in custom, fixed in the natures, that of loving benefit and warding off harm, like the testimony of father and son.
And because the suspicion arising from friendship, in the description we have given, stands opposite the suspicion arising from enmity: since enmity weighs in rejecting testimony, so does friendship (al-Ishraf ala Nukat Masa'il al-Khilaf 5/75, no. 1828, Ahkam al-Qur'an 1/638, al-Qurtubi's tafsir 12/316, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 7/180, al-Sharh al-Kabir ma'a Hashiyat al-Dasuqi 6/66).
This is the view of Ibn Aqil among the Hanbalis. Al-Mardawi (may Allah have mercy on him) said: his saying "the testimony of a friend for his friend is accepted": this is the madhhab, and upon it are the companions (al-Insaf 12/70).
However, Ibn Aqil said: the testimony of a friend is rejected where the friendship is confirmed, as is the lover's testimony for his beloved, for passion derails the mind (al-Insaf 12/70).
Enmity is of two kinds.
The first kind: religious enmity. The jurists of the four schools agreed that religious enmity, such as the enmity of the Muslims toward the disbelievers, the enmity of the people of truth toward the people of falsehood and innovation, or the hatred the sinner feels for his own sin, does not prevent the acceptance of testimony; for religion prevents him from committing what is forbidden in his religion.
The second kind: worldly enmity. The majority of jurists, the later Hanafis, the Malikis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis, state explicitly that an enemy's testimony against his enemy is not accepted, even if his testimony is acceptable against others; for he is under suspicion regarding his enemy, and it cannot be guaranteed that his enmity will not carry him to harm him through his testimony, because of the Prophet's saying (peace be upon him):
"The testimony of a treacherous man or a treacherous woman, or of a resentful man against his brother, is not permitted."Reported by Abu Dawud (3600, 3601), Ibn Majah (2366) and Ahmad (6899), a hasan hadith
The "resentful one" (ghamir) means the enemy: the text is explicit. And because it is a testimony joined to suspicion, it is not accepted, like the parent's testimony for the child.
Worldly enmity is forbidden: whoever engages in it cannot be guaranteed against lying, lest it become a means of attaining his goal against his enemy through false testimony. The suspicion between the two is predominant in their natures, so it weighs in rejecting the testimony, like the suspicion between father and son.
Accordingly, the testimony of the slandered one against his slanderer, of the one despoiled against the usurper, of the one robbed against the thief, of the slain man's guardian against the killer, of the husband against his wife if she committed zina in his bed, and the like of these, is not accepted.
The enmity for which testimony is rejected is that which reaches the point where he wishes the loss of the other's blessings, rejoices at his misfortune and grieves at his joy. This may be mutual, or it may be on one side only, in which case only that one's testimony against the other is rejected.
If enmity prevents testimony against the enemy, it does not prevent testimony for him: he is under suspicion in the testimony against him, not in the testimony for him, for what prompted the enmity is not a defect that invalidates testimony (al-Mabsut 16/133, al-Ishraf ala Nukat Masa'il al-Khilaf 5/76, Ahkam al-Qur'an 1/387, 388, Bidayat al-Mujtahid 2/347, al-Hawi al-Kabir 17/161, 162, Sharh al-Sunna 10/128, al-Muhadhdhab 2/330, al-Bayan 13/310, 311, Rawdat al-Talibin 7/389, al-Ifsah 2/420, al-Mughni 10/182, al-Kafi 4/531, I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in 3/144, Manar al-Sabil 3/509).
The imam Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him) said, in one issue: "The testimony of an adversary, of one testifying for himself, or of one warding off harm from himself, is not accepted." The adversary is of two types.
As for enmity in religion, such as a Muslim testifying against a disbeliever, or one who adheres to the Sunna against an innovator, his testimony is not rejected; for integrity comes through religion, and religion prevents him from committing what is forbidden in his religion.
Abu Hanifa said: enmity does not prevent testimony, for it does not impair integrity; it therefore does not prevent testimony, like friendship.
The answer: the hadith narrated by Amr ibn Shu'ayb, from his father, from his grandfather: the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) said:
"The testimony of a treacherous man or a treacherous woman, of an adulterer or an adulteress, or of a resentful man against his brother, is not permitted."Reported by Abu Dawud
The "resentful one" means the one who harbors hatred. Enmity breeds suspicion, so it prevents testimony like close kinship; and it differs from friendship: in a friend's false testimony for his friend, he procures benefit for another at the cost of his own harm and sells his hereafter for the worldly life of another; in an enemy's testimony against his enemy, benefit for oneself is sought through taking revenge on one's enemy.
If it is said: why did you accept the Muslims' testimony against the disbelievers despite the enmity? We say: the enmity here is religious, and religion neither calls for false testimony nor requires that one abandon his religion by virtue of his religion itself (al-Mughni 10/182).
Abu Hanifa, in the text explicitly attributed to him, holds that an enemy's testimony against his enemy is accepted. But the later Hanafis said: it is not accepted when it arises from a worldly matter, and it is accepted when it arises from a religious matter.
The imam al-Mawsili (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "Nor the enemy's testimony if the enmity arises from worldly matters", for lying cannot be guaranteed against him; "and it is accepted if it arises from religion", for he does not lie for his religion, unlike the people of whims (al-Ikhtiyar 2/178).
The imam Ibn Nujaym (may Allah have mercy on him) said: his saying "and the enemy's, if the enmity is worldly" means that the enemy's testimony for worldly reasons is not accepted, for enmity over worldly things is forbidden, and whoever engages in it cannot be guaranteed against lying. The restriction to its being worldly is a precaution against the case where it is religious, for that does not prevent: it rather attests the perfection of his religion and his integrity. Enmity may indeed be obligatory, when one sees in the other a wrong established by proof and he is not deterred by forbidding him, as shown by the acceptance of the Muslim's testimony against the disbeliever despite the religious enmity between them, of the slain man's guardian against the killer, of the wounded man against the one who wounded him, and of the husband against his wife of zina; Ibn Wahban mentioned this.
In Khizanat al-Muftin: "The enemy is he who rejoices at another's sorrow and grieves at his joy"; it is also said: he is known by custom.
An example of worldly enmity: the slandered one testifying against the slanderer, and the one barred from the road against the one who barred him. As for including the husband here, there is a discussion: they explicitly stated that his testimony against her of zina is accepted unless he slandered her first; the absolute rejection is al-Shafi'i's view. In some fatwas: "the friend's testimony for his friend is accepted."
Know then that what is explicitly stated in most of the books of our companions, and what is well known on the tongues of our jurists, is the distinction mentioned by the author of the base text. It is transmitted in al-Quniyya that enmity over worldly matters does not prevent testimony so long as one does not commit sin because of it, draw a benefit from it, or avert harm from oneself by it; this is the sound position and that upon which reliance is placed, whereas what is found in al-Waqi'at and elsewhere is the choice of the later scholars, and the explicitly narrated position is contrary to it.
In Kanz al-Ru'us: "An enemy's testimony against his enemy is not accepted, for he is under suspicion." And Abu Hanifa said: "It is accepted if he is just." Our master said: this is the sound position and that upon which reliance is placed, for if he is just, his testimony is accepted even if worldly enmity exists between them.
Ibn Wahban chose it, and Ibn al-Shihna did not follow him up on it; but the hadith bears witness to the position of the later scholars, as narrated by Abu Dawud in a form attributed to the Prophet: "The testimony of a treacherous man or a treacherous woman, of an adulterer or an adulteress, or of a resentful man against his brother, is not permitted", the resentful one being he who harbors hatred. It may be understood as referring to the case where he is not just, for hatred is defiance (fisq), as indicated by the prohibition of it (al-Bahr al-Ra'iq 7/85, 86).
Al-Haskafi said: "The enemy: his testimony against his enemy is not accepted if the enmity is worldly" (al-Durr al-Mukhtar 5/356).
The imam Ibn Abidin (may Allah have mercy on him) said: there remains here a fruitful verification: al-Quniyya mentions that worldly enmity does not prevent the acceptance of testimony so long as one does not commit sin through it, that this is the sound position and that upon which reliance is placed, and that what is found in al-Muhit and al-Waqi'at, namely that an enemy's testimony against his enemy is not accepted, is the choice of the later scholars, the explicitly narrated position being contrary to it, and that this is al-Shafi'i's madhhab. Abu Hanifa said: it is accepted if he is just. In al-Mabsut: if the enmity is worldly, it entails his defiance, and his testimony is not accepted. In sum, two reliable opinions exist in this issue.