How the imamate is concluded

The imamate is concluded through two main channels: the pact sworn by the people who loosen and bind, and the testamentary designation by the previous imam. The jurists further recognize a de facto third channel: the establishment of the dominant man who seizes power by force.

This sheet presents the three channels in the order of the leaves: designation by the previous imam, seizure of power by force and predominance, and what each entails.

Designation by the previous imam

The jurists of the four schools and most of the scholars agree to enforce the designation of the imam who recommends for the imamate a man fit for it, and consensus has been reported on this. Abu Mansur al-Baghdadi writes: if the imam designates a fit man, the community owes him the execution of his recommendation, as Abu Bakr designated 'Umar, and the companions followed (Usul ad-din of Abu Mansur al-Baghdadi p. 285). Al-Mawardi writes that concluding the imamate through the predecessor's designation is a matter of consensus on its lawfulness and of agreement on its validity, resting on two acts of the Muslims that they never disavowed: Abu Bakr designated 'Umar and the Muslims established his imamate through that designation, and 'Umar designated the men of the consultation, the community accepting their entry, they being the notables of the age, in belief in the designation's validity, the rest of the companions having stood aside. 'Ali said to al-'Abbas, who blamed him for entering it: "It was a great matter of Islam, and I did not see myself leave it." The designation thus becomes a consensus within the conclusion of the imamate. When the imam wishes to designate, he must exert his reasoning for the most rightful and the fittest to the conditions; if he must settle on one man, the case is weighed: if it is neither his son nor his father, he may alone conclude the allegiance and entrust him the designation without consulting the people of decision. They then differ on whether the appearance of their consent is a condition of his allegiance binding the community: some scholars of Basra make their consent a condition, the right concerning them, while the sahih view is that his allegiance is concluded and their consent is not weighed, 'Umar's allegiance not having depended on the companions' consent, the imam being the most entitled to the imamate, his choice standing (al-Ahkam as-sultaniyya p. 30-32).

If he designates his son or his father, three doctrines govern his concluding alone: the first requires consulting the people of decision, their view standing as testimony, for his designation of his son or father runs like testimony and his establishment over the community like judgment, while he can neither witness nor judge for his father or son, suspicion arising from natural inclination. The second permits concluding alone for son and father alike, for he is the emir of the community, the authority of his office outweighing the rule of kinship, suspicion having no path against his trustworthiness; his act stands as his designation of a stranger, the people of decision's consent being treated as set out before. The third permits designating his father but not his son, for nature prompts favoring the son more than the father, acquisitions usually passing to the son. Designating a brother or a close kinsman runs like designating strangers (al-Ahkam as-sultaniyya p. 30-32). Al-Juwayni writes: the root of testamentary designation is established with certainty by the consensus of the bearers of the law: when Abu Bakr designated 'Umar ibn al-Khattab for the imamate after him, no companion of the Prophet disapproved, and all the scholars of religion have held testamentary designation a channel for establishing the imamate of the one designated, none denying its principle (Ghiyath al-umam p. 295). Qadi Iyad reports the companions' consensus on enforcing Abu Bakr's designation of 'Umar (Ikm al-mu'lim 6/221). Ibn Qudama writes: the man for whom the Muslims agree on his imamate and allegiance, his imamate is established and his aid obligatory; so too the one whose imamate stands through the designation of the Prophet or of a prior imam: Abu Bakr through the companions' consensus, 'Umar through Abu Bakr's designation which they accepted by agreement (al-Mughni 9/5).

An-Nawawi writes: the scholars agree that the caliphate is concluded by testamentary designation, and by the pact of the people who loosen and bind when the caliph designates no one; they agree too that the caliph may make the matter a consultation within a group, as 'Umar did with the six (Charh Muslim 12/205). Ibn Khaldun reports the community's consensus on the lawfulness of this conclusion: it took place through Abu Bakr's designation of 'Umar before the companions, who validated it and made 'Umar's obedience binding on themselves; likewise 'Umar designated the six remaining of the ten and authorized them to choose for the Muslims, the choice being delegated until it settled on Abd ar-Rahman ibn 'Awf, who consulted the Muslims, found them agreed on 'Uthman and on 'Ali, and preferred 'Uthman for his undertaking to follow the two first caliphs in all that matters, without depending on his own reasoning; 'Uthman's affair thus concluded, obedience owed him, the companions present at both allegiances and none disapproving, which establishes their agreement on the validity of that designation. The imam is not suspected in this matter when he designates his father or son, since he is charged with their interest during his life, all the more its responsibility after his death, against those who suspect him for the son or the father, or for the son alone (Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldun p. 210).

Seizure of power by force and predominance

Most of the jurists of the four schools state that the caliphate and the imamate of the Muslims are established through the seizure of power by the man who prevails. The Malikis write that the imamate stands through his predominance over the people, for the man whose authority imposes itself must be obeyed, and no condition of the imamate is then required of him, the rule being to ward off evils and bear the lighter of two harms (Hashiyat ad-Dasuqi 6/276, Hashiyat as-Sawi 10/202, Manh al-Jalil 9/196). The Shafi'is write that the imamate stands through the seizure of power by the prevailing man who gathers the required conditions, over the territories by force and predominance after the imam's death, that the Muslims' affairs be ordered. If he seizes a living community: if it prevails, the dominant man's imamate stands; if it had an imam by allegiance or designation, the dominant man's imamate does not conclude. Through seizure, the imamate of an impious and an ignorant man stands, with the rest of the conditions met, on the sounder view, even though he sins in seizing it; on the opposite view his imamate does not conclude, the conditions lacking. The imamate of the prevailing disbeliever does not conclude, on the word of Allah (Rawdat at-talibin 6/467, an-Najm al-wahhaj 9/68, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/416):

That is so that Allah may never give the disbelievers a way over the believers.

Surah an-Nisa 141

Al-Mawardi writes: the scholars differ over the establishment of the dominant man's imamate and the conclusion of his authority without pact or choice. Some Iraqi jurists admit his authority and imamate, the community being charged to obey him even if the people of decision concluded no pact, the purpose of choice being to single out the one appointed, and this man has singled himself out by that very quality. Most of the jurists and theologians hold that his imamate concludes only by consent and choice, but the people of decision are obliged to conclude the pact for him, the imamate being a contract concluded only with a contracting party, like judgeship, which does not stand on merit alone without appointment (al-Ahkam as-sultaniyya p. 28). The Hanbalis write: if a man revolts against the imam, overpowers him and subdues the people with his sword until they acknowledge him, submit to his obedience and follow him, he becomes an imam whom it is forbidden to fight and against whom revolt is forbidden: so Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan revolted against Ibn az-Zubayr, killed him, took the land and its people until they swore to him willingly or unwillingly, and he became an imam against whom revolt is forbidden, on account of the dividing of the Muslims, the shedding of their blood and the loss of their property that revolt brings. The rebel falls under the generality of the Prophet's words: "Whoever revolts against my community while it is united, strike his neck with the sword, whoever he is." Whoever revolts as a rebel against the one whose imamate stands by any of these channels must be fought (al-Mughni 9/5, Charh az-Zarkashi 3/78, al-Mughni al-Muhta' 10/10-11, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/202). Abu Ya'la al-Farra' writes that the imamate concludes in two ways: the choice of the people who loosen and bind, and the designation of the prior imam. The choice requires their whole number: Ahmad says in Ishaq ibn Ibrahim's version that the imam is the one on whom the view of all the people who loosen and bind converges, each saying: this is the imam; the apparent text requires their assembly. It is also reported from Ahmad what establishes the imamate through coercion and predominance without a pact: in 'Abdus ibn Malik al-'Attar's version, "whoever overcomes them with the sword until he becomes caliph and is called commander of the believers, no believer in Allah and the Last Day may spend a night without holding him an imam, righteous or wicked"; and in Abu al-Harith's version, on the imam against whom a claimant to power rises with partisans on both sides: "the Friday prayer is with the one who prevails", arguing from Ibn 'Umar, who led the Medinans' prayer in the time of the Drama saying: we are with whoever prevails (al-Mughni 9/5).

Practical note

These pages describe the classical theory of the rise to power in Islam, its three channels and the rules of obedience that follow, studied here as legal doctrine and a lesson in history. No contemporary institution applies them, and a Muslim lives under the laws of his country. The essential to retain: the weight the doctrine places on continuity of government and on avoiding civil war, the primacy of the pact and of consultation, and the constrained recognition of the accomplished fact as the lesser evil once peace is restored.