Islamic Fiqh > Penalties (hudud) > The jizya and the dhimmis: regime, rights and truces > The tithe on the trade of non-Muslims
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Updated on 27 September 2026 at 3:52 AM
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The trade tithe is what is levied on the trading wealth of the covenant people when they move it from town to town inside the territory of Islam. It is taken from the non-Muslims' trade upon their entry into the territory of Islam, in general terms (al-Hidayah 1/107, al-Fawa'id ad-Dawani 1/393-394, Mughni al-Muhtaj 4/247, Ahkam ahl adh-dhimma 1/167, al-Mughni 8/522, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/138).
The jurists established its legality through the Sunna, consensus and reason. As for the Sunna: "Tithes strike only the Jews and the Christians; there is no tithe on the Muslims" (Abu Dawud 3046, at-Tirmidhi 634, Ahmad in his Musnad 3/474; weak hadith). Anas ibn Sirin reports: "Anas ibn Malik sent me to the tithe collectors. I said: you send me to the collectors among all your agents? He said: are you not content with that on which Umar ibn al-Khattab placed me? He ordered me to take from the Muslims a quarter of the tithe and from the covenant people half the tithe" (al-Bayhaqi in as-Sunnan al-Kubra 9/209, authentic chain). The hadith establishes that no wealth is taken from the Muslim outside zakat, and that the trade tithe is taken from the Jews and the Christians as the jizya is taken from them.
As for consensus: Umar sent tithe collectors before a gathering of Companions without anyone disapproving: consensus by silence. Ash-Shawkani writes that Umar's act, though insufficient alone, being followed by the people in its totality, constitutes a silent consensus (Nayl al-Awtar 8/221). Ibn Qudama adds: these accounts spread without being disapproved, which counts as consensus, and the successors acted upon it after him (al-Mughni 12/685). Ibn Muflih writes that they spread, were applied and were not disapproved: that counts as consensus (al-Mubdi' 3/426, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/138). As for reason: the merchant who moves his goods from town to town needs security and protection against thieves and highwaymen.
The kharaj is either an assignment kharaj, fixed on the land according to its area and crop, or a sharing kharaj, levied on the land's produce, like the fifth or the sixth (Ibn Abidin 3/256, Jawahir al-Iklil 1/260, al-Qalyubi 4/224). The types of kharaj land:
As-Sarakhsi writes: if we deal with them as they deal with us, that is closer to the aim of security and continuity of exchanges (al-Mabsut 2/199, Hashiyat ash-Shalbi 1/285). The jurists established the legality of the tithe on the trade of non-Muslims entering the territory of Islam, with this detail:
First: the temporary protected persons. Ibn al-Qayyim writes that the temporary protected person is one who enters the Muslims' territories without settling there: they are of four categories: messengers, merchants, those seeking protection until Islam and the Quran are presented to them, and those coming for a need, a visit or other (Ahkam ahl adh-dhimma 1/336). Whoever enters with merchandise: the Hanafis hold that the tithe of his wealth is taken if it reaches the threshold, unless the share they take from us is known: the equivalent is then taken from their merchants, as retaliation; if it is known they take everything, we take not everything but leave them what brings them to safety, preserving the safe-conduct; and if it is known they take nothing from us, nothing is taken from them, so that they do not persist in that practice: we are more worthy of generosity. No tithe is taken from the wealth of a child of war, unless they take the wealth of our children (ad-Durr al-Mukhtar with Ibn Abidin 2/314, Sharh Fath al-Qadir 2/228).
The Malikis hold that the man of war entering with merchandise under a safe-conduct for something he gives owes that thing, even beyond the tithe, and nothing beyond is taken, unless no share is fixed: the tithe is then taken, unless the imam judges to take less: the well-known view (al-Fawa'id ad-Dawani 1/339). The Shafi'is hold that if they enter with a safe-conduct and the imam stipulates from them the tithe, more or less, he takes it; without stipulation, the safe-conduct bearing on their blood, nothing is taken from their wealth, save by stipulation or willingly, whether they take the tithe from our merchants in their lands or the fifth (al-Umm 4/205). The Hanbalis hold that the man of war entering the territory of Islam under a safe-conduct and trading owes the tithe of his merchandise in one take, whether great or small, man or woman, and whether or not they take the tithe of the Muslims' wealth in their lands: Umar took the tithe from the people of war, it spread without disapproval, and the rightly guided caliphs acted upon it in every era without reproach.
The Hanafis ground the sale of wine and pork among dhimmis on the fact that wine and the pig are valued wealth in their right, like vinegar and the sheep among the Muslims. Umar ibn al-Khattab wrote to his tithe collectors in Syria: "Let them sell them and levy the tithe on their prices"; had the sale not been permitted them, he would not have ordered them to oversee the sale (al-Bada'i' 5/143, al-Mabsut 11/102).
The guarantee of destruction: if a Muslim's wine and pig are destroyed, no guarantee is due, by unanimous agreement: they hold no value in the Muslims' right. Likewise the destruction of the covenant people's goods, according to the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis: what is not guaranteed in the Muslim's right is not guaranteed in another's (Mughni al-Muhtaj 2/285, al-Mughni with ash-Sharh al-Kabir 7/111-113). The Hanafis, by contrast, explicitly establish the guarantee for destroying the dhimmi's wine and pig: they are valued wealth in his right; the Malikis say the like, on condition the dhimmi does not display them (al-Bada'i' 5/16, 113; az-Zarqani 'ala Khalil 3/146).
Ibn Qudama writes: "Whoever destroys wine or a pig belonging to a dhimmi answers for nothing, and it is forbidden to attack what they do not display." He summarizes: no guarantee is due for wine and the pig, whether the destroyer is Muslim or dhimmi, and the owner Muslim or dhimmi: Ahmad said so explicitly in Abu al-Harith's narration: the man who pours out an intoxicant for a Muslim or a dhimmi answers for nothing; ash-Shafi'i says the like (al-Mughni with ash-Sharh al-Kabir 7/111-113). Abu Hanifa and Malik hold the guarantee if the destruction targets a dhimmi's property. Abu Hanifa specifies: if the owner is Muslim, the guarantee is at value; if dhimmi, at the identical item: the covenant of protection protects property whose value it recognizes as it protects the person; it protected the dhimmi's wine, the Muslim being prevented from destroying it, so he must compensate; it is wealth they dispose of, Umar having written to his agent that the covenant people passed with wine before the collector: "Let them sell it and levy the tenth of its price"; and what is wealth for them is guaranteed like their other wealth.
The holders of no guarantee answer: Jabir reports that the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "Allah and His messenger have forbidden the sale of wine, the dead animal, the pig and the idols" (narrated by al-Bukhari and Muslim). What is forbidden to sell, not for its own inviolability, has no value, like the dead animal; what is not guaranteed in the Muslim's right is not in the dhimmi's, like the apostate slave; wine is not valued wealth, like the dead animal, and its worthlessness for the Muslim holds for the dhimmi: the prohibition targets both, and what establishes for one establishes for the other. Protection is not conceded: as soon as he displays it, pouring it out becomes permitted; and even protected, its compensation is not owed: the women and children of the people of war are protected without being valued. As for Umar's hadith, it is interpreted as a will not to attack them, the tithe of the price being levied because, were they to sell and pay one another, we judge ownership for them without dissolving it.
Ibn Qudama concludes on the temporary protected persons: what consensus could be stronger than this? And no tithe is taken below ten dinars; al-Muwaffaq adds that the imam may waive the tithe if he sees an interest in it (al-Mughni 12/689, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/138, Ahkam ahl adh-dhimma 1/131).
Second: the covenant people, that is, the non-Muslims, Christians, Jews and Magians, residing in the territory of Islam by virtue of the covenant. The jurists diverged when the dhimmi moves with his merchandise to a town other than his residence, like the Syrian heading to Egypt, Iraq or the Hijaz. The Hanafis hold that the dhimmi who trades owes half the tithe on his merchandise, annually, as the Muslim pays the zakat of his trade, a quarter of the tithe a year: Muslim and dhimmi are equal, save the amount. What the dhimmi pays is a jizya of his wealth, as the kharaj of his land is called jizya: the jizya divides into wealth jizya, land jizya and head jizya, and collecting one does not remove the others, save for Banu Taghlib (Ibn Abidin 2/313, al-Bahr ar-Ra'iq 2/250, al-Bada'i' 2/38). Al-Kasani specifies that half the tithe is taken from him on the zakat conditions, in place of the jizya and the kharaj, without his head jizya of that year falling, save for the Christians of Banu Taghlib: Umar had treated them in exchange for a doubled alms, so that the tithe taken from them makes the jizya fall (al-Bada'i' 2/38).
The Malikis hold the tithe from the dhimmi for that movement: they were covenanted for trade and the growth of their wealth within the horizons where they settled; seeking growth beyond, another charge than the covenanted jizya binds them. And half the tithe is taken from them on the food they bring to Mecca or Medina, for the needs of the Two Sanctuaries' inhabitants and of what is attached to them (al-Mudawwanah 1/332, al-Kafi 1/480, Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/543, Bilghat al-Masalik 2/207). The Shafi'is hold that nothing is due from them besides the jizya if they trade outside the Hijaz, unless the imam stipulates with the jizya something of their trade. If they enter the Hijaz: if they carry food or what the inhabitants need, they are let in with nothing; if it is merchandise without need, like perfume, they are not let in, unless a compensation is stipulated according to the imam's assessment; Umar stipulated the tithe on certain goods like velvet, and half the tithe on wheat and barley for the covenant people entering the Hijaz (Rawdat at-Talibin 10/320, Mughni al-Muhtaj 4/247, Ahkam ahl adh-dhimma 1/129, Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/543). The Hanbalis hold that whoever of the covenant people passes to another town than his owes half the tithe in the year. Ibn Qudama writes that this spread from Umar with an authentic narration, and cites the hadith already quoted of the tithes on the Jews and Christians (weak: Abu Dawud 3046, at-Tirmidhi 634, Ahmad 3/474), the account of Anas ibn Sirin (al-Bayhaqi 9/209; Abu Ubayd, al-Amwal 1/640; Ahmad by an authentic chain reported by Ibn al-Qayyim 1/128): that account took place in Iraq. Abu Ubayd reports from Lahi' ibn Humayd that Umar sent Uthman ibn Hunayf to Kufa, who fixed on the covenant people's moving wealth one dirham per twenty. And already quoted is the account of Ziyad ibn Hudayr: Umar ordered taking the tithe from the Christians of Banu Taghlib and half the tithe from the other People of the Book.
The Hanafis, the Shafi'is and the position of Ibn Nafi' and Ibn al-Qasim among the Malikis: none opposed it, al-Kasani seeing in it a consensus (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 2/39, al-Hidayah 1/106, al-Ikhtiyar 1/123). The Malikis hold the full tithe on the dhimmi's wealth, except the food brought to Medina or Mecca: half the tithe. Proof: Malik reports from as-Sa'ib ibn Yazid: "I was a boy working with Abd Allah ibn Utbah ibn Mas'ud at the market of Medina in Umar's time: we took the tithe from the Nabateans." The Malikis diverged on what counts as food: wheat and oil were said; the established view in the school is all food or its like, such as grains and condiments. The Shafi'is, with Ibn Nafi' and Ibn al-Qasim among the Malikis, hold that the tithe stipulated on the covenant people rests on the imam's assessment (al-Muwatta with the Sharh az-Zarqani 2/143, Bilghat as-Salik 2/206, Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/543, al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyyah 1/67, Mughni al-Muhtaj 4/247, Ahkam ahl adh-dhimma 1/138).
Second, the amount due on the man of war's trade: the Hanafis hold that the like of what the people of war take from Muslim merchants is taken from him: if they take the tithe, the tithe is taken from their merchants; if half, likewise. Proof: Umar ibn al-Khattab said to Abu Musa al-Ash'ari: "How do they take from you when you enter among them?" They said: the tithe. He said: "Take the like from them." This draws them to mingle with the territory of Islam, where they will see the merits of Islam and be drawn to it; absent knowledge of the amount, the tithe is taken (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 2/38, Ibn Abidin 2/314, Mukhtasar Ikhtilaf al-Ulama 1/466, Ahkam ahl adh-dhimma 1/138). The Malikis make no difference between the merchants of the people of war and those of the covenant: the tithe, save food and its like for Mecca and Medina, where it is half; but they permit, for the merchants of the people of war, taking more than the tithe if stipulated upon them (Bilghat as-Salik 2/206, al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyyah 1/67, Ahkam ahl adh-dhimma 1/138). The Shafi'is, on the soundest view, hold the man of war's tithe left to the imam's judgment according to the general interest: he may stipulate the tithe, more or less, or nothing at all should he bring goods the Muslims need (al-Mudawwanah 1/241, Rawdat at-Talibin 10/319, Mughni al-Muhtaj 4/247).
Preliminary question: goods that do not keep for a year, like vegetables and fruits, owe no tithe even if their value reaches the threshold, the collector taking on the very object itself. The two companions Abu Yusuf and Muhammad, with the majority of jurists, impose no such condition: the tithe is due on everything prepared for trade, whether it keeps or not, like vegetables and fruits: such wealth needs protection like other trading wealth, and what counts in trading wealth is its value, not its object (al-Bada'i' 2/38, Minh al-Jalil 3/218, ash-Sharh as-Saghir 2/205, al-Umm 4/281, al-Mughni 12/690).
The threshold: the Hanafis and the Hanbalis on the school's sound opinion condition the tithe on taxed trading wealth upon the threshold, since the tithe is instituted by the Law and the threshold was considered in it. The threshold's amount diverges: the Hanafis and Ahmad in one narration hold twenty gold dinars or two hundred silver dirhams, for what is taken from the dhimmi is double what is taken from the Muslim as zakat, on the zakat conditions, whose trading wealth threshold is twenty dinars or two hundred dirhams; as for the man of war, what lies below two hundred is little, and he needs it to reach safety. Proof: Umar said to Abu Musa al-Ash'ari: "Take from them as they take from the Muslim merchants; take from the covenant people half the tithe and from the Muslims a quarter of the tithe: one dirham per forty, and nothing below two hundred" (al-Kharaj of Yahya ibn Adam p. 169, no 638; Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 2/38; Ahkam ahl adh-dhimma 1/129, 133, 138; al-Mughni 12/690). The Hanbalis, on the school's sound opinion, hold a threshold of ten gold dinars or one hundred silver dirhams, whether the merchant is a man of war or a dhimmi: what is taken from it is wealth reaching half a dinar, which counts as the threshold of twenty for the Muslim (al-Insaf 4/246, al-Mughni 12/686). Ahmad holds in one narration twenty dinars for the dhimmi merchant and ten dinars for the man of war (al-Mughni 12/686). Abu al-Husayn al-Hanbali holds ten dinars for the dhimmi and five dinars for the man of war, what is taken from it reaching half a dinar, counting as the Muslim's threshold (al-Insaf 4/246).
A preliminary point: al-Khiraqi writes that attacking what they do not display is forbidden: everything they hold lawful in their religion, without harm to the Muslims, such as disbelief, drinking wine, forbidden-kin marriages, must not be attacked so long as they do not display it: we committed to leaving them on their creed in our land, and we committed not to attack them; what they display must be disapproved: if it is wine, pouring it out becomes permitted; if they display a cross or a drum, breaking it becomes permitted; if they display their disbelief, they are disciplined, and they are prevented from displaying what is forbidden to the Muslims (al-Mughni with ash-Sharh al-Kabir 7/111-113, Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 6/2936, Ibn Abidin 5/292, Tabyin al-Haqa'iq 5/234, Majma' ad-Damanat 317-318, al-Bahr ar-Ra'iq 1/142, al-Hattab 5/280, Hashiyat al-'Adawi 2/433, Nihayat al-Muhtaj 5/168, Hashiyat al-Qalyubi 3/30, Rawdat at-Talibin 4/109, al-Fatawa al-Fiqhiyyah al-Kubra 2/433, Hashiyat ar-Ramli 2/344).
It is not permitted to let the dhimmi buy the mushaf or a notebook of hadiths, according to the majority of jurists, the Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis: it might lead to its desecration (Jawahir al-Iklil 2/3, al-Umm 4/212, al-Mughni 12/717). Ibn Qudama adds that he may not buy mushaf, hadith or fiqh; should he do so, the purchase is void, for it entails desecration; Ahmad disliked selling them garments on which the remembrance of Allah is written. Muhanna asked Ahmad whether he dislikes the Muslim teaching the Quran to a young Magian slave: "If he converts, yes; otherwise, I dislike the Quran being placed anywhere but its place." He was asked about teaching him the prayer upon the Prophet: "Yes." Al-Fadl ibn Ziyad reports asking Ahmad whether the mushaf may be pawned with the covenant people: "No: the Prophet forbade traveling with the Quran toward the enemy's land, lest the enemy seize it" (al-Mughni 12/717). In the Hanafi books no prevention was found, save that Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf prevent the dhimmi from touching the mushaf, Muhammad permitting it with washing for that purpose (Ibn Abidin 1/119). Ibn al-Qayyim summarizes the safeguarding of the Quran: its being preserved by one who is not of its people is prevented. Umar had stipulated to the covenant people of Syria not to teach the Quran to their children: to protect the Quran from one who does not believe in it and is not fit to preserve it.
When the dhimmi breaks the covenant, he is like the apostate in all rulings, according to the Hanafis: his death is judged for having joined the land of war; his dhimmi wife left in the territory of Islam is dissolved from the marriage, his estate is divided; if he repents and returns, his repentance is accepted and his covenant restored; if captured after the Muslims prevail, he may be enslaved, unlike the apostate (Ibn Abidin 3/277, al-Bunayah 5/842). The Malikis and the Shafi'is detailed the ruling according to the causes of breach. The Malikis hold: death for insulting a prophet in what does not require exit from Islam; the coercion of a free Muslim woman into fornication, or deceiving her by Islam then marrying her while non-Muslim and refusing Islam afterwards; for spying on the Muslims' privacies, the imam chooses between killing and enslavement. Whoever joins the land of war then is captured may be enslaved; if he left because of an injustice suffered, he is not, and he is sent back to his jizya. As for highway robbery, theft and the like, his ruling is that of the Muslims: the legal penalty is applied to him, and that does not belong to breaking the covenant (Jawahir al-Iklil 1/269, ash-Sharh al-Kabir 2/205, Minh al-Jalil 3/225, Ahkam ahl adh-dhimma 2/214). Raising the voice with their book, riding saddled mounts, abandoning the ghivar, displaying their belief in 'Issa and other acts harmless to the Muslims call only for discipline, not death. If the breach appears among some of them: if the others disapprove and show their dissent, the breach remains individual; if their approval appears, it is collective: the sign of their faithfulness to the covenant is their disapproval of the breaker.
The Shafi'is hold that whoever's covenant is broken by fighting is killed; broken otherwise, as in fornication with a Muslim woman, marriage with her, directing the people of war to the Muslims' privacies, seducing a Muslim from his religion, reviling Islam, the Quran or the Prophet (peace be upon him), the most apparent view is that no safe passage is granted him: the imam chooses between death, enslavement, pardon or ransom (al-Umm 4/188, Rawdat at-Talibin 10/339, Minhaj at-Talibin 1/140, Mughni al-Muhtaj 4/258-259). The Hanbalis, in the widespread narration, do not distinguish the causes of breach: the imam chooses among four options, death, enslavement, ransom and pardon, like the captive of war, for he is a disbeliever carried off in our territory without covenant or contract, resembling the war brigand; his death for breach of covenant becomes forbidden should he convert (Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/144, al-Mughni 8/459, 529). The covenant of their descendants and their women is not broken by their breach, according to the majority of jurists, Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis: breach can only come from adult men, the ruling being specific to them; one understands from the Malikis' speech that their descendants may be enslaved (Ibn Abidin 3/277, Jawahir al-Iklil 1/269, Rawdat at-Talibin 10/339, Mughni al-Muhtaj 4/259, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/144). An-Nawawi adds that if the breaker converts before the imam chooses, his companions hold he may not be enslaved, unlike the captive; and does the protection of the women and children follow the breach? Two paths, the sounder being that it does not, absent breaching treachery from them: no captivity, and they remain affirmed in our territory; if they ask to join the land of war, the women are granted, not the children; the claimant holding custody is granted, otherwise not. Al-Mardawi writes that his women's and children's covenant is not broken by his breach: this is the school, whether they joined the land of war or not (al-Insaf 4/256).
The Malikis and Ibn Hamid of the Hanbalis do not condition the tithe on the threshold: it is due on the taxed trading wealth of the passing dhimmi or man of war, little as much. Proof: Abu Ubayd reports by his chain from Anas ibn Sirin: "Anas ibn Malik sent for me; I delayed; he sent again. He said: I thought that were I to order you to bite on a stone to please me, you would; I chose for you a work you detest: I write for you Umar's sunna. He wrote: taken from the Muslims one dirham per forty, from the covenant people one dirham per twenty, and from the one without covenant one dirham per ten" (al-Bayhaqi 9/209, Abu Ubayd, al-Amwal 1/640, Ahmad by an authentic chain reported by Ibn al-Qayyim 1/128). It is also argued that the tithe is a right upon the dhimmi or the man of war, due little as much, like the owner's share in the land dealt with him; and the tithe taken is fay, in the image of the covenant people's jizya (Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/543, Bilghat as-Salik 2/206, al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyyah 1/67, al-Mughni 12/686, Ahkam ahl adh-dhimma 1/133, 138).
Debt: the Hanafis and the Hanbalis condition the merchant dhimmi's tithe upon his wealth not being occupied by an established debt, since it is a right in which threshold and year are considered: the debt impedes, like zakat.
The covenant of protection ends with the dhimmi's conversion to Islam: the covenant is a means toward Islam, and the goal is reached. It is broken when the dhimmi joins the land of war or when they prevail over a territory from which they fight us: they have become combatants, and the covenant is void of its benefit, which is repelling the evil of war. The schools agree on this (al-Hidayah with al-Fath 5/303, Jawahir al-Iklil 1/267, Mughni al-Muhtaj 4/258-259, al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah of Abu Ya'la p. 143-144). The majority of jurists, Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis, hold the covenant likewise broken by refusing the jizya, which contradicts what the covenant requires (Jawahir al-Iklil 1/269, Mughni al-Muhtaj 4/258, al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah of Abu Ya'la p. 145, Ahkam ahl adh-dhimma 2/209, al-Awsat 11/331, al-Khilasah al-Fiqhiyyah 476-477). Ash-Shafi'i writes: "The covenant's breach occurs only through preventing the jizya or refusing judgment after acknowledging it; should he say: I pay the jizya but I do not accept the judgment, he is let go and not fought in his land, being told: you had safety through paying the jizya and acknowledging it, and we granted you a term to leave the territory of Islam; then, when he leaves and reaches safety, he is killed if within our power" (al-Umm 4/188). Al-Mardawi adds that refusing the jizya or commitment to the religion's rules breaks the covenant without disagreement (al-Insaf 4/252, Ahkam ahl adh-dhimma 2/209, al-Mubdi' 3/433). The Hanafis, for their part, hold that refusing to pay the jizya does not break the covenant: the aim of fighting is commitment to the jizya, not its actual payment, the commitment remaining; and the refusal may stem from the excuse of financial incapacity: the covenant is not broken by doubt (al-Bada'i' 7/113, Fath al-Qadir on al-Hidayah 5/302-303, Ahkam ahl adh-dhimma 2/214).
Other causes were counted: some jurists make them breaching absolutely, others with conditions. The Malikis hold breach, the man and his wealth becoming fay, for: fighting the Muslims in general with intent of rebellion; preventing the jizya, safety having been granted only in exchange for its payment; rebelling against the religion's rules through displayed contempt; coercing a free Muslim woman into fornication, or committing it with her; deceiving a free Muslim woman by claiming Islam, marrying her and consummating the marriage; spying on the Muslims' privacies; insulting a prophet whose prophethood is unanimously affirmed among us, even if the Jews deny it, like Dawud and Sulayman; the disputed insult, like al-Khidr and Luqman, does not break the covenant but calls only for discipline: in other words, the insult bears on what we did not leave them in their disbelief over, not on what they confess, such as saying that 'Issa is the son of Allah, that Allah is the third of three, or that Muhammad was sent only to the Arabs: the covenant is not broken. Death is obligatory, by burning alive or dead, for the insult over what we did not leave them in, should he not convert; coercing the free Muslim woman and deceiving her leave the choice to the imam, like preventing the jizya and fighting the Muslims (Jawahir al-Iklil 1/269, ash-Sharh al-Kabir 2/205, ash-Sharh as-Saghir 2/203, Minh al-Jalil 3/225, Ahkam ahl adh-dhimma 2/214, al-Khilasah al-Fiqhiyyah 476-477). The Shafi'is hold that fornication with a Muslim woman, marriage with her, directing the people of war, seducing a Muslim, reviling Islam, the Quran or the Prophet (peace be upon him) break the covenant if the breach was stipulated for them, otherwise not, the condition contradicting the matter in the first case and not the second (al-Umm 4/188, Rawdat at-Talibin 10/339, Minhaj at-Talibin 1/140, Mughni al-Muhtaj 4/258-259). Ash-Shafi'i also writes that when the jizya is taken from a people, should some of them commit highway robbery, fight a Muslim and beat him, commit injustice against a Muslim or a protected person, fornicate or display corruption, the legal penalty or discipline is applied, without that breaking the covenant or making the blood lawful: breach occurs only through preventing the jizya or refusing judgment after acknowledgment (al-Umm 4/188).
The Hanbalis hold, in the school: should he assault a Muslim by killing, slander, fornication, robbery, spying or sheltering a spy, or speak ill of Allah, His Book or His messenger, seduce a Muslim from his religion or contract a Muslim woman under the name of marriage, two narrations: the first, the school, breaks his covenant absolutely, save slander, stipulated or not, and it is also a Shafi'i path; the second, the covenant is not broken save by stipulation, but the legal penalty due is applied to him, the lawful retaliation due is taken from him, and he is disciplined for the rest of what stops his like; as for slander, the school holds it does not break the covenant (al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah of Abu Ya'la p. 143-145, al-Mughni 12/712, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/143, al-Insaf 4/252-253, Ahkam ahl adh-dhimma 2/205, 209, al-Mubdi' 3/433). The qadi explains in at-Ta'liq that breach through these acts without stipulation is demonstrated thus: the imam requires restraining harm, and these acts are harmful, so the covenant breaks through them as if stipulated in the contract of safety. The covenant of protection is a contract of safety: it breaks through contrariety, without condition, like the truce.
Ibn al-Qayyim reports other proofs: the verse of Surah at-Tawbah permits refraining from fighting them only in humiliation and payment of the jizya; payment begins with the offer or the commitment up to the handover and the taking; should they not commit, or commit then refuse to hand over, they are not payers: the humiliation therefore cannot be understood as limited to the very moment of the taking. Whoever insults Allah and His messenger publicly, coerces our free women into fornication, burns our mosques and houses, raises the cross above our heads, holds no humiliation with him: fighting him is obligatory by the verse's text, until he is humbled. Should one ask whence the permitted killing comes: first, whoever among the disbelievers falls under the command of fighting is killed if we are able; second, the command to fight to that end prevents concluding with them a covenant without it, and such a covenant would be invalid; third, the origin is the lawfulness of their blood, held back by two ropes: Allah's rope, the command to abstain, and the people's rope, the pact; here neither exists: Allah's rope demands abstention only in humiliation, and the people's rope binds the imam and the Muslims only to abstaining from what harms the Muslims and wounds Islam (Ahkam ahl adh-dhimma 2/215-216).
The Hanafis, for their part, state explicitly that if the dhimmi insults the Prophet (peace be upon him) without declaring it, his covenant is not broken: it is an increase of disbelief, and the covenant remains with the original disbelief, hence with the increase; should he declare it, he is killed, even a woman; should he kill a Muslim or fornicate with a Muslim woman, his covenant is not broken either: the punishment for killing and fornication is applied to him, for these are disobediences less grave than disbelief, and the covenant remained with disbelief, hence all the more with disobedience. Al-Kasani specifies: refusing the jizya does not break the covenant, the refusal possibly stemming from incapacity; the undeclared insult of the Prophet (peace be upon him) does not break it, the covenant remaining with the original disbelief; likewise killing a Muslim or fornication with a Muslim woman: disobediences less grave than disbelief, the covenant having remained with it. Ibn al-Qayyim objects that the Hanafis interpret the killing ordered by the Prophet in such crimes as a judgment by interest, which they call "political killing", the imam being able to punish with death crimes aggravated by repetition and in which death was instituted in their kind; this is why most of them judged the death of whoever multiplies the insult of the Prophet (peace be upon him), even should he convert afterwards: that judgment is problematic on their own principles (Ahkam ahl adh-dhimma 2/214-215, al-Bada'i' 7/113).
Retain the guiding thread: in this historical system, the non-Muslim was a full subject, judged by clear rules and protected by the state, with distinct fiscal charges, the tithe on trade, and the covenant broken only by qualified facts. For today's reader, these pages document classical legal thought; contemporary Muslim societies govern these matters through the positive law of each country, and the principles that remain transversal are the safety of persons, the binding force of contracts and loyalty to the commitment made.