Islamic Fiqh > Penalties (hudud) > The jizya and the dhimmis: regime, rights and truces > The rights and duties of the dhimmis
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Updated on 27 September 2026 at 3:52 AM
The covenant of protection grants the dhimmis firmly established rights: freedom to believe and worship away from public view, secure residence and movement within the territory of Islam. Jurists also fixed the conditions for concluding the covenant: who holds the authority to conclude it, who benefits from it, and how protection can arise from the facts themselves.
This page sets out these rules school by school, with their Quranic proofs, hadiths and legal foundations.
Third right: not attacking them in their belief and worship. The covenant of protection implies that Muslims do not assail the covenant people in their convictions and the practice of their worship, so long as they do not display its rites. The covenant is indeed the disbelievers' affirmation of their own disbelief, in exchange for paying the jizya and committing to the rules of the religion. And if it is hoped that the dhimmi will enter Islam through mixing with the Muslims and discovering the merits of the religion, this happens through invitation, not coercion: Allah said:
There is no compulsion in religion.
Surah al-Baqarah 256
The Prophet's letter (peace be upon him) to the people of Najran contains: "To the people of Najran and its followers: the protection of Allah and the covenant of Muhammad, the messenger of Allah, cover their property, their religion, their markets and all that they possess" (al-Bayhaqi, Dala'il an-Nubuwwah 5/389; the chain contains unknown transmitters). Jurists agree on this foundation.
Some detail remains, with disagreement over certain branches. Conducting their worship: the principle toward the covenant people is to leave them to what they profess: they remain on their disbelief and their convictions, and on the practices they count as matters of their religion, such as striking the bell lightly inside their temples, and reading the Torah and the Gospel among themselves. They are not prevented from the sins they consider lawful, such as drinking wine, raising pigs and selling them, or eating and drinking in the daytime of Ramadan, provided this stays among themselves, or if they find themselves alone in a village. The condition governing all of this: not displaying it openly among the Muslims, otherwise they are prevented and punished. This is the agreed doctrine of the schools, as the terms imposed on the covenant people reported from Abd ar-Rahman ibn Ghunm attest: "We will strike the bell only with a light stroke inside our churches, we will not display the cross outside, we will not raise our voices in prayer or reading inside our churches, and we will display neither cross nor book in the Muslims' markets," and the rest of the text (a hasan hadith, already cited).
Second right: residence and movement. The covenant people have the right to dwell in the territory of Islam, secure in their persons and property, as long as nothing appears from them that would break their pledge: they paid the jizya only so that their property would be like ours and their blood like ours, and the Muslims remain bound by their terms. Their property, while the covenant stands and no breaching act appears, is inviolable like that of the Muslims (al-Mughni 12/569).
The jurists nevertheless agree to forbid the dhimmi's residence and settlement in Mecca and Medina, with disagreement and detail concerning other cities. The proof is the word of Allah:
O you who believe, the polytheists are only impurity: let them not approach the Sacred Mosque after this year of theirs.
Surah at-Tawbah 28
and the hadiths: "Two religions cannot share the land of the Arabs" (Abu Ubayd, al-Amwal p. 128), and: "I will expel the Jews and the Christians from the Arabian peninsula until only Muslims remain there" (Muslim 1767) (Ibn Abidin 3/275, Jawahir al-Iklil 1/267, al-Mawardi p. 167, al-Mughni 12/703, Ahkam ahl adh-dhimma 1/141 and after).
In the other cities and villages of the territory of Islam, the covenant people may dwell among the Muslims or apart. It is not permitted, however, to raise their buildings above those of the Muslims with the intention of dominance; and if their dwelling, in the town amid the Muslims, causes overcrowding, they may be directed to a district on the outskirts should the public interest appear (Ibn Abidin 3/275-276, al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah 145-168, al-Mughni 12/701, Jawahir al-Iklil 1/267, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/136).
As for movement: the covenant people enjoy it throughout the territory of Islam, wherever they wish, for trade and the rest. Entering Mecca, Medina and the land of the Hijaz is different: the scholars diverged. The Shafi'is and the Hanbalis, together with a Maliki position, forbid the disbelievers access to the Sanctuary absolutely, on the generality of the verse quoted. If a disbeliever wishes to enter the Sanctuary, he is prevented: if he has money or merchandise, someone is sent out to buy from him without letting him in; if he is a messenger to an imam present at the Sanctuary, someone is sent to hear his message and convey it; if he insists on meeting the imam and an interest requires it, the imam comes out to him without authorizing his entry. If a polytheist wishes to enter the Sanctuary in order to convert there, he is prevented until he converts first (Ahkam al-Qur'an of Ibn al-Arabi 2/469, Tafsir al-Qurtubi 8/104, Sharh Ibn Batal 2/18, al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah p. 188, al-Mughni 12/703, al-Kafi 4/363).
The Shafi'is and the Hanbalis add: if he enters the Sanctuary without permission, he is punished without his blood being made lawful; if he enters with permission, he is not punished, but the one who permitted him is reproached.
Al-Mawardi writes that no dhimmi or treaty-protected person may enter the Sanctuary, whether resident or passing through: this is ash-Shafi'i's school and that of most jurists. Abu Hanifa permits their entry so long as they do not settle there. The verse is an explicit text preventing what lies beyond its scope: the polytheist who enters is punished should the circumstances require, and expelled in safety; a polytheist who dies there cannot be buried there, he is buried outside the Sanctuary, and if buried there he is moved, unless the body has already decayed. As for the other mosques, entry may be granted them so long as it does not aim at profaning them by eating or sleeping, in which case they are prevented.
The majority of jurists, the Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis, hold that the covenant of protection with the non-Muslim is concluded by the imam or his deputy, and is invalid from anyone else. This rests on the imam's power of assessment and on what he sees of the interest; the covenant of protection is moreover a perpetual contract: it cannot escape the imam's attention. Ibn Qudama writes: "The covenant of protection and the truce are valid only from the imam or his deputy," and this is ash-Shafi'i's view, with no disagreement known to us; if someone else concludes it within the bounds of what the imam would not have exceeded, the imam must ratify its conclusion (al-Mughni 12/667) (al-Kharshi 3/143, al-Qalyubi 4/228, Mughni al-Muhtaj 4/243, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/116, al-Insaf 4/211).
The Hanafis, by contrast, permit it to every Muslim: the covenant of protection stands, after Islam, in the place of what Islam calls for, like the invitation to embrace Islam; it is exchanged for the jizya, and the interest in it is realized; it is a duty when they request it, and its conclusion lifts that duty from the imam and from the Muslims in general (al-'Inayah 7/468-472, Tabyin al-Haqa'iq 3/248).
As for the persons to whom the covenant extends: the jurists agree to grant it to the People of the Book and the Magians, as they agree to deny it to the apostate. Beyond this they diverge. The Shafi'is and, in their well-known position, the Hanbalis hold that it extends only to the People of the Book and the Magians: the verse "Slay the polytheists wherever you find them" (Surah at-Tawbah 5) is general, then the People of the Book were drawn out of that generality by the jizya verse, and the Magians by the Prophet's directive (peace be upon him): "Treat them like the People of the Book"; every other disbeliever remains under the generality (al-Qalyubi 4/229, al-Mughni 12/661, al-Kafi 4/347, ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/16, al-Umm 4/240, Ahkam al-Qur'an of Ibn al-Arabi 2/889). The Hanafis, with a Maliki narration and a narration from Ahmad, permit the covenant to all disbelievers except the Arab idol worshipers: the covenant aims at the hope of their Islam through contact with the Muslims and discovery of the religion's merits, which cannot occur with the Arab polytheists, since the Quran came down in their tongue and they carried the message: no slightest excuse remains for them to refuse faith in Allah and His messenger, and the sword becomes the sole caller that presses them toward Islam; this is why the Prophet (peace be upon him) did not accept the jizya from them (al-Bada'i' 7/111, Jawahir al-Iklil 1/266, al-Hattab 3/380, al-Mughni 12/661).
Before turning to the indications, recall that certain rights bind the dhimmis without even being stipulated: not to insult the Prophet (peace be upon him) with lies or slurs; not to disparage the religion of Islam; not to commit fornication with a Muslim woman, nor under the name of marriage; not to stir fitnah to turn a Muslim from his religion nor attack his property; not to aid the people of war nor shelter a spy. Al-Mawardi writes: "These are binding rights imposed on them without stipulation; they are only stipulated to inform them and to weigh the pledge upon them, and committing them after the stipulation constitutes a breach of the covenant" (al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah p. 225; see also Mughni al-Muhtaj 4/243, Nihayat al-Arab 8/175). Abu Ya'la says the like; the other schools do not mention them because they fall under the general condition of commitment to the rules of Islam.
Second path of conclusion: protection arising from indications of fact. The principle is that the non-Muslim who has not obtained the covenant cannot establish permanent residence in the territory of Islam: he can only stay for a time under a temporary safe-conduct; he is called the temporary protected person (al-musta'min). The majority of jurists, Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis, hold that the temporary protected person's stay in the territory of Islam does not reach a year: if he dwells there a full year or more, the jizya is imposed on him and he becomes a dhimmi. The length of the non-Muslim's stay is indeed an indication of his contentment with permanent residence and his acceptance of the covenant people's conditions (al-Bada'i' 7/110, al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah p. 146, al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah of Abu Ya'la p. 225).
The Hanafi jurists detailed the question: when the man of war enters the territory of Islam under a safe-conduct, the imam should approach him and set him a known term, according to his own judgment, saying to him: if you exceed this term, I will count you among the covenant people. If he exceeds it, he becomes a dhimmi, and the jizya is collected once a year has run from the day the imam spoke to him thus. If the imam sets him no term, most Hanafis hold he becomes a dhimmi after a year of residence; others hold he is ordered to leave, and if he remains a year after that warning, the jizya is imposed on him: the year then counts from the imam's warning; should he pass years without the imam summoning him to leave, he keeps the right to return to the land of war and does not become a dhimmi. No Maliki text was found on the duration of the safe-conduct or the transformation of the temporary protected person into a dhimmi (Sharh Fath al-Qadir 6/23, al-Bahr ar-Ra'iq 5/109, Kitab al-Kharaj of Abu Yusuf p. 189, Majma' al-Anhar 2/452).
The core of these rules is the principle of reciprocity, valid to this day: the non-Muslim residing in the land of Islam lived under the state's protection, which answered for his safety, while the temporary visitor moved about under a time-limited safe-conduct. The jurists stress that these rights were binding, not negotiable case by case, and that violating them opened the mechanisms of the law. The underlying logic remains that of a contract: clear obligations on both sides, and effective protection in exchange for the commitment made.