Islamic Fiqh > Penalties (hudud) > Maharaba: brigandage and public insecurity > Who is the muharib and who is fought among the non-Muslims
Contents
Updated on 27 September 2026 at 3:52 AM
The muharib, or qati at-tariq (the highway brigand), is one who comes out against people with a force that overwhelms them, to kill, take and frighten. The sheets below fix the conditions of his status, his punishment, the proof, the fall of the punishment through repentance, the restitution of goods; then they deal with the categories of non-Muslims who are fought and the cause of that fighting: their disbelief or their banditry.
The jurists of the four schools agree that maturity and sanity are two conditions of the banditry punishment: the limit is not executed upon the insane nor the young, even an adolescent, for the limit is a punishment presupposing a crime, and the act of the young and the insane is no crime; they guarantee the wealth and the life as if they had destroyed them in any other state (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 7/91; al-Mughni 9/131). If a boy, an insane person, or a forbidden relative of the victim is found among the brigands, Abu Hanifa and Zufar judge that the limit falls from all: the crime is one and shared, and the relative has an apparent excuse in his kinsman's wealth, as the theft limit falls from him; the killing then reverts to the heirs, who slay or pardon. Abu Yusuf specifies: if the boy or the insane seizes first, no limit upon all; if the adults seize first, the limit is executed upon them alone, for they are the heads and the others the following. The majority of jurists, Ibn Qudama among them, judge that the limit does not fall from the rest because of one's excuse: it is an excuse proper to one alone, as if several shared a woman: the limit falls only upon the one excused of it; upon the boy and the insane there is no limit, but the wealth is guaranteed from their wealths and the blood-money on their wealths, and no radd' pertains to them (al-Mughni 9/131; Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 7/91).
Manliness was debated. The Hanafis: if a woman is among the brigands and kills and takes while the men do nothing, Abu Yusuf slays the men with the muharibs' ruling and executes no limit upon her; Muhammad, and a transmission from Abu Hanifa, slay her if she killed and hold her liable if she took, without slaying the men but beating and detaining them; Abu Hanifa again lifts the limit from all, for the killing joins the obligated and the unobligated, like the mistaken and the deliberate. Al-Kasani reports that, in the apparent transmissions, manliness is a condition: even if the woman leads the fighting and takes without the men, she is not executed in the famous transmission. Al-Tahawi on the contrary judges women and men equal in banditry, for this limit, like the others, is executed upon both sexes, whether its realization is the killing, like stoning, or the taking, like cutting the hand. The famous transmission's reason: the pillar of banditry, coming out upon passers-by domination, is not, as a rule, realized by women, because of the softness of their hearts and the weakness of their nature; hence they are not slain in the land of war, unlike theft, which hides, and which sex does not bar (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 7/91; Kashshaf al-Qina 6/190). But the majority of jurists, the Hanafis in one view, the Malikis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis, do not condition manliness: the woman brigand has the brigand's ruling, and each is the other's radd', man or woman (al-Mughni 9/131; Mughni al-Muhtaj 5/494).
The third condition is adherence to Islam's rulings: does banditry obtain only from a Muslim, or also from a protected one? The question is left open in the sheets; the majority views rule that the woman and the dhimmi, being capable of responsibility, bear the limits like the man.
Weapons next: the Hanafis and the Hanbalis in the madhhab make them a condition: without weapons they are not muharibs, for they cannot bar whoever approaches them; the staff, the stone and the wood count among weapons. The Malikis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis in another view do not require the known weapon: those who come out with staffs and stones are brigands; coercion suffices; one who comes out without a weapon but takes by force is a muharib; one who can overcome by the stick and blows is so as well (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 7/90-91; al-Mughni 9/125; Hashiyat ad-Dasuqi 6/356).
Distance from settled life: the Hanafis in the apparent transmission and the Hanbalis in one view require it: banditry takes place in our land's desert, at a journey's distance or more, outside villages and towns. Al-Khirqi explains it: the limit is called the highwaymen's limit, and highway robbery is only in the desert; in town relief ordinarily arrives, the aggressor's edge is blunted and he becomes a pilferer, and the pilferer is no brigand. The Malikis instead require a situation in which relief is impossible: one who takes wealth in a situation where relief can arrive is no muharib but an usurper, were he a sultan, for the scholars, holders of loosing and binding, condemn him and fight him; every lord who strips the Muslims' wealths and threatens their livelihoods without their being able to cry for relief is a muharib. The Shafi'i madhhab is close: it requires distance from the place of relief, through distance of power and its helpers, or through its weakness. If a troop surrounds a town, attacks a village, or if one quarter falls upon another with no relief possible, they are brigands; else plunderers. A band entering a house by night and barring the cry despite the power's strength: the soundest view deems them brigands; others: thieves; others: pilferers. But the Hanbalis in the madhhab, and Abu Yusuf, do not condition the desert: whoever comes out to take wealth by force is a brigand, in the desert, the town or the sea, by the generality of "those who wage war against Allah and His messenger and strive to spread corruption upon earth" (Surah al-Ma'ida 33) (al-Mughni 9/124-125; al-Kafi 4/170; Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 5/395; al-Lubab 2/335). The Hanafi fatwa, on Abu Yusuf, is that coming out by night in the town, armed or not, and by day armed, bears the brigands' ruling, to repel the evil of the tyrannical corrupters (ad-Dur al-Mukhtar 4/113).
Openness: the majority of jurists, the four schools, require that the brigands act openly and take by coercion and force: in hiding, they are thieves; snatching and fleeing, plunderers with no limit, bound like the rest to vendetta and guarantee; one or two falling upon the tail of a caravan, taking and fleeing, are no muharibs, for they rest on no strength; falling upon a small number and subduing it, they are, for they count on their strength against it (Sharh Fath al-Qadir 5/354-355; al-Mughni 9/125; Manar as-Sabil 3/347).
Number lastly: the majority of jurists, the Hanafis, Malikis and Shafi'is, declare that no number is required: one man alone, if he has the preponderant strength that overcomes the group and attacks lives and wealths openly, is a highway brigand (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 7/90; at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 5/363; Rawdat at-Talibin 6/597).
The jurists of Islam agree that the banditry punishment is one of Allah's limits, which the ruler may neither abrogate nor pardon, save repentance before being able to reach them, by: "the recompense of those who wage war against Allah and His messenger and strive to spread corruption upon earth is that they be slain, or crucified, or their hands and feet cut off on opposite sides, or banished from the land" (Surah al-Ma'ida 33-34). The jurists debated: does the word offer the imam a choice, or does it fix a variation, each punishment answering a definite crime? The majority of jurists, Abu Yusuf, Muhammad, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis, say variation. Four cases follow: one who kills and takes is slain and crucified, even if the heir pardons the killing, for it is Allah's right; crucifixion continues until it is known, then he is taken down and handed to his people; one who kills without taking is slain without crucifixion, regardless of the heirs' pardon; one who takes a value reaching the limit without killing has his right hand and left foot cut; and one who frightens the road without killing or taking: the Hanafis banish him, detain him until repentance and discipline him; the Shafi'is leave the imam to punish him by detention or other discipline, with no fixed term, until his repentance appears; the Hanbalis banish him, or discipline him with what deters them, or detain him outside their town (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 7/93-94; al-Mughni 9/125; al-Hawi al-Kabir 13/353-355; al-Bidayah wa-n-Nihayah 2/332).
The proof of the variation: the report of Ibn Abbas carried by al-Shafi'i on the brigands: "if they slew and took, they are slain and crucified; if they slew without taking, slain without crucifixion; if they took without slaying, hands and feet cut on opposite sides; if they frightened the road without taking, banished from the earth"; weak though its chain, it is proof by its sense. The report of Abu Barza al-Aslami: people intending Islam were despoiled by the Prophet's companions, and Jibril descended with the limit: one who kills and takes is slain and crucified; one who kills without taking is slain; one who takes without killing has hand and foot cut on opposite sides; the "or" of the word is thus variation, not choice nor doubt. The hadith: "the blood of the Muslim who testifies that there is no god but Allah is not lawful save in three cases: the married adulterer, a life for a life, and one who forsakes his religion and separates from the community":
The blood of a Muslim who testifies that there is no god but Allah and that I am the Messenger of Allah is not lawful save in three cases: the married adulterer, a life for a life, and one who forsakes his religion and separates from the community.
reported by al-Bukhari (6878) and Muslim (4468)
It excludes the killing of one who did not kill among the brigands; the foot's cutting then follows the taking. It is added: the difference of punishments presupposes the difference of causes; choice would punish the lesser criminal with the heaviest punishment and the greater criminal with the lightest, against "the recompense of an evil is its like" (Surah ash-Shura 40); and the community agrees that brigands who kill and take are not punished with exile alone. The analogy of choice-words with different causes is the address to Dhul-Qarnayn: "either you punish them, or you treat them with kindness" (Surah al-Kahf 86): it is no choice, but the statement of each one's ruling (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 7/93-94; al-Bidayah wa-n-Nihayah 2/332). Abu Hanifa, however, judges for one who kills and takes a choice among three: cutting hands and feet, then slaying and crucifying; or slaying alone; or crucifying alone, each act destroying and deterring. The Malikis make the "or" a choice among the four punishments, the imam consulting the people of science by the brigand's gravity; unless he has killed: then his slaying is binding, whether he slew a free Muslim man, or even a disbeliever or a slave, with or without crucifixion, without cutting or exile, and the heir has no pardon before he comes repentant; else the imam chooses among death, crucifixion, cutting or exile, with imprisonment and flogging at his judgment. The woman is neither crucified nor exiled: her limit is death or cutting. The imam examines lastly the profile: the war strategist undergoes death, the violent one cutting, the passing one the whip and exile; the punishment belongs to the imam alone (at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 5/364-365; al-Sharh al-Kabir 6/361-363).
The banditry limit is established, with the majority of jurists, by the testimony of two just men. The Malikis add: if the muharib is famous and his banditry state notorious, two men who know him and say "this is indeed so-and-so, famed for banditry" suffice, and the imam executes upon their testimony though they saw no killing, taking nor robbery (at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 5/366; al-Sharh al-Kabir 6/365). The jurists debated the testimony of two caravan fellows: the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis refuse it, for those two are parties to the case and may testify for themselves. Al-Mawardi sets the rule: if the accused confess freely, the confession holds; if they deny without proof, they swear; one's confession is not heard against the other, for the brigand is impious; two witnesses saying "they cut the road upon us" are not heard: they have become parties and enemies; but if they testify "they cut the road upon so-and-so", their testimony is received, and the judge does not ask them whether they were with the victim (al-Hawi al-Kabir 13/372-373; al-Umm 6/153). Ibn Qudama confirms: two just men testifying that he cut the road upon them are not heard, for they become his adversaries; upon so-and-so, they are heard without question (al-Mughni 9/134). The Malikis, on the contrary, accept the caravan fellows' testimony on the muharibs, if just, for there is no other way against them (al-Sharh al-Kabir 6/365).
The people of science agree: the muharibs lose Allah's right if they repent before they can be reached: "save those who repent before you can overpower them: know that Allah is forgiving, merciful" (Surah al-Ma'ida 34); repentance is the turning back, the regret and the resolve not to return. One who took wealth returns it to its owner with the resolve; one who killed and took escapes the limit, but the imam hands him to the heirs for retribution. One who neither killed nor took: his repentance is regret and resolve, his coming to the imam of his own accord declaring his return; detention falls, for it aimed at repentance (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 7/96; al-Mughni 9/129-130). Ibn Hubayra notes the agreement on Allah's rights falling, and that Abu Ishaq reports from al-Shafi'i two views on amputation: it falls like the rest, or it remains alone. The humans' rights remain: lives, wounds and wealths, save pardon (al-Ifsah 2/289). Repentance after overpowering drops nothing: the verse conditioned the exemption on beforehand; before overpowering the return appears sincere, after it appears fear of the punishment; and the pardon before encourages the brigands to return, while after it the imam needs it no more since they can no longer spread corruption (al-Mughni 9/129-130). Al-Qurtubi states the same rule: the word excepted those who repent before being overpowered, and announced forgiveness; retribution and the humans' rights do not fall; the repentant and reformed drinker, fornicator and thief, before being brought to the imam, are not punished; if brought and they say "we have repented", they are not let go, like the muharib once overcome (Tafsir al-Qurtubi 6/158). Al-Amrani adds: after overpowering, nothing of banditry's limits falls; before it, fall what belongs to banditry alone: cutting, death and crucifixion; the humans' rights, save insult, guarantee of wealths and retribution, never fall, muharib or not (al-Bayan 12/510-511). Ibn Taymiyya summarizes: all the scholars I know agree that the brigand and the thief brought to the holder of authority and then repenting, the limit does not fall; it is executed even if they repent; if their repentance is sincere, it serves them as expiation, and their committing the crime is part of repentance, like returning rights to their owners (Majmu' al-Fatawa 28/300). Ibn Rushd opens four questions: the repentance's acceptance; the repentant's quality; the repentance's form, in three views: leaving one's state without coming to the imam; casting the weapons and coming of oneself, Ibn al-Qasim's view; or coming to the imam, Ibn al-Majishun's view, which requires the return to appear to the neighbors; and the quality of the repenting muharib, in three views: that he be of those joining the land of war; and the repentance is realized, per the most widespread view, before overpowering (al-Bidayah wa-n-Nihayah 2/342-343).
The people of science agree: one who committed one of Allah's limits, fornication, sodomy, theft, wine, then repented after he could be reached, no limit falls from him. Ibn Hubayra writes: the scholars agree that repentance does not lift the limit once reach is had and the imam may not pardon (Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari 8/442). Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim confirm the agreement (Majmu' al-Fatawa 2/300; I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in 3/131). The debate bears on repentance before reach. The Hanafis: only the theft limit falls, for adversity is there a condition, the victim alone wronged, and adversity ends with complete repentance and restitution; the other limits remain. Ali wrote to his Basra agent concerning Haritha b. Zayd, gone brigand then repentant before he could be reached: "approach him only with good" (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 7/96). The Malikis: no hadd falls by repentance, for the Prophet executed the limit upon Ma'iz and the Ghamidi woman after their repented confessions: "she made a repentance which, divided among seventy of Medina's people, would have sufficed them" (Muslim 1696, 1695); falling by repentance is thus proper to the muharibs alone. Al-Qurtubi makes an exception for the repentant and reformed drinker, fornicator and thief before being brought (Tafsir al-Qurtubi 5/91). The Shafi'is in the most apparent view, and the Hanbalis in one view: the limit does not fall, by "the fornicating woman and the fornicator, flog each of them a hundred stripes" (Surah an-Nur 2), "the thief, male and female, cut off their hands" (Surah al-Ma'ida 38) and "whoever drank wine, flog him", with no distinction of repentance (al-Mughni 9/130-131). In the opposite view, which al-Amrani prefers and Ibn Qudama reports as the first narration: the limits fall by repentance before reach, by "save those who repent before you overpower them" and "whoever repents after his wrong and mends, Allah accepts his repentance" (Surah al-Ma'ida 39), "if they repent and mend, turn away from them" (Surah an-Nisa 16) and "repentance erases all that precedes"; and the account of the man who came to the Prophet declaring his limit and was sent away after prayer: "Allah has already forgiven you" (al-Bukhari 6437, Muslim 2764). If the limits befell him within banditry, they fall by repentance alone; outside banditry they require the mending of the deed, for the muharib sins openly and his return is apparent, while the other may repent from caution; a verification period is observed, without fixing it at a year, which would bound without text (al-Mughni 9/130-131). Ibn al-Qayyim rules a middle: the limit is a purifier as repentance is a purifier; Ma'iz and the Ghamidi woman chose purification by the limit, and the Prophet led them to it, while preferring for them purification by repentance: "why did you not leave him to repent and Allah accept his repentance?"; the imam is free to leave or execute, a middle way between those who bar execution after repentance and those who ascribe it no effect; the sunna points only to this middle way (I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in 2/97-98). The cutting for taking wealth within banditry: Abu Ishaq deems it not proper to banditry, for it presupposes the limit; Ali's two fathers, Abu Ali Ibn Abi Hurayra and Abu Ali at-Tabari, deem it proper to banditry, the word having suspended it upon war (Surah al-Ma'ida 33); on Abu Ishaq's view its fall by repentance is debated; on theirs it falls by one view (al-Bayan 12/511-513; al-Mughni 9/130-131).
The jurists of the four schools declare: when the muharibs took a wealth and the limit was executed upon them, if the wealth exists it is returned to its owner, who takes it back wherever he finds it, in the muharib's hand or in the hand of one to whom he alienated it by sale or gift. The divergence bears on destroyed or vanished wealth: the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis require the guarantee, upon the taker alone and not the radd', for guarantee is no limit and does not attach to the mere helper; if the muharibs repent before reach, retribution and guarantee attach to the direct taker alone (al-Hawi al-Kabir 13/342-343; al-Mughni 9/131-132). The Hanafis: if the wealth changed into increase or decrease, or perished, no guarantee, for guarantee and cutting do not combine over destroyed goods; Abu Hanifa alone guarantees upon consumption (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 7/84-85, 97). The Malikis guarantee without reserve: the muharibs guarantee the wealth taken, remaining or gone, repentant or not; each is guarantor of what he took and what his companion took, for they are like mutual sureties, each liable to be seized of the whole to strengthen some by others; the excess paid is reclaimed; the same with thieves, usurpers and baghis; the muharib is followed in what he took, conditioned on his having power with banditry until the limit's execution; if he came repentant before reach, he is followed without condition (at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 5/365-366; al-Sharh al-Kabir 6/363).
Lawful fighting targets three categories of disbelievers. The People of the Book and the majus: the scholars know no divergence on the lawfulness of the jizya against them. Umar paused over the majus' case until Abd ar-Rahman b. Awf testified that the Prophet took it from the majus of Hajar; and Malik and al-Shafi'i report his words: "I know not how to deal with them", and Abd ar-Rahman's answer: "apply to them the way of the People of the Book", a weak hadith reported by Malik (al-Muwatta 616) and al-Shafi'i. Ibn Rushd and Ibn al-Qayyim note the consensus on the jizya of the People of the Book and the majus (Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/540; Ahkam ahl adh-Dhimma 1/18).
The third category, without Book or likeness of Book, idolaters and associators, divided: is the jizya accepted from them? The Hanafis: from the associators of Arabia, Islam or the sword, for the Prophet grew up among them and the Quran came down in their tongue, the miracle being more manifest for them; the jizya is accepted from the idolaters of the non-Arab nations, for their enslavement is licit and the jizya stands for their levy; if they are vanquished before the levy, they, their women and their children are spoils. Ibn al-Humam defends this specification: the order of fighting is general, but the Quran allowed leaving it for the People of the Book's jizya, and the hadith that of the majus; what remains is subject to the origin (Sharh Fath al-Qadir 6/48-49). Among the Malikis, four views: the jizya accepted from the People of the Book, Arab or not; Ibn al-Qasim, the madhhab's view: accepted from all nations consenting; Ibn al-Majishun: refused; Ibn Wahb: refused from the majus of Arabia, accepted from the rest. Ibn al-Arabi explains the general-acceptance view by the Quranic specification of the People of the Book, and the hadith of Burayda extends it:
When the Messenger of Allah appointed an amir over an army, he enjoined him piety and kindness toward the Muslims with him, then said: go forth in the name of Allah, in the way of Allah; fight whoever disbelieves in Allah; go forth, but do not betray, do not treacherously deceive, do not mutilate and do not kill a child... when you meet your enemy the associator, invite him to three ways; if he answers one, accept it from him and withhold your hand; then invite him to Islam; if he answers, accept it and withhold your hand; then propose that he migrate: if he migrates, he has what the emigrants have and upon him what is upon them; if he refuses to migrate, he is like the Muslim bedouins, bound by Allah's orders, with no share in spoils or fay save if he strives with the Muslims; if he refuses, ask him the jizya; if he answers, accept it and withhold your hand; if he refuses, seek Allah's help and fight him.
reported by Muslim (1731)
The Shafi'is: the jizya is not taken from one with neither Book nor likeness of Book, by "fight those who believe not in Allah nor in the Last Day, of those given the Book, until they pay the jizya from their hand and are abased" (Surah at-Tawba 29): the People of the Book are specified in it; it is due also from one of them who changes his religion, for he keeps the inviolability of his fathers, and from the majus (al-Muhadhdhab 2/250; al-Hawi al-Kabir 14/153). The Hanbalis: the jizya is accepted only from a Jew, a Christian or a majus; from the rest, Islam only, else death. Ibn Qudama notes that Ibn Hanbal would have admitted all the disbelievers save Arabia's idolaters, the Burayda hadith being general (al-Mughni 12/661). Ibn Rushd lays the disagreement's root: the confrontation of the general, "fight them until there is no sedition" (Surah al-Anfal 39) and the hadith of fighting until the witness of oneness, with the particular of the Burayda hadith sent to Arabia's associators before the conquest; whoever makes the later general prevail refuses the jizya outside the People of the Book; whoever leans on the particular accepts it from all; and Ibn al-Qayyim rules: the jizya is taken from every disbeliever, the hadith specifies none, the Prophet's expeditions fought mostly Arabia's idolaters, and the account of the Hajar majus and the delay of the year of Tawba remove the argument of silence (Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/519-520; Ahkam ahl adh-Dhimma 1/21-22).
The majority of the people of science hold that the cause of fighting the disbelievers is their disbelief alone, not their war against us: we may begin the fighting though they did not begin. Abu Bakr al-Jassas writes: we know no jurist who forbids fighting the associator who has given up fighting us (Ahkam al-Qur'an 3/191). As-Sarakhsi in proof: one whose life is profaned among the people of war, women and children, bears no guarantee if slain, and that has no cause but disbelief: "fight them until there is no sedition", that is, the sedition of disbelief (al-Mabsut 26/132). Al-Kamal Ibn al-Humam: the fighting of disbelievers who have not embraced Islam nor paid the jizya is obligatory though they do not begin, for the proofs did not bind the obligation to their aggression; the verse "if they fight you, slay them" is abrogated, as the legislation's stages show: forbearance, invitation by exhortation, defensive permission, then initial fighting in the sacred months, then initial fighting absolutely: "slay the associators wherever you find them" (Surah at-Tawba 5), "fight them until there is no sedition" (Surah al-Anfal 39) and "fight those who believe not" (Surah at-Tawba 29); the Prophet besieged Ta'if ten days from Dhu al-Hijja to Safar (Sharh Fath al-Qadir 5/441-442). Al-Babarti sums the same stages; az-Zubaydi adds: were fighting dependent on their aggression it would be pure defense, a sense found among Muslims too, whereas the associators' fighting is of another kind (al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/66). Al-Kasani writes: every man of the fighting camp may be slain, whether he fights or not; and whoever is not of the fighting camp, his life is not lawful save if he fights in reality or in meaning, by view, obedience and incitement (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 7/101). Al-Qurtubi, on "fight them until there is no sedition and the religion is Allah's", says: an order to fight every associator everywhere per the abrogation view; and per the other, an order of absolute fighting without the condition of aggression; the aim is disbelief's absence, as Ibn Abbas, Qatada, ar-Rabi and as-Suddi explain: the sedition is associationism and the harm following it; "if they desist", that is, from disbelief, by Islam or the jizya (Tafsir al-Qurtubi 2/352-353). Al-Mawardi adds that the Muslim may slay, among the vanquished fighting associators, muharib or not (al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyya 43). Ibn Taymiyya recalls the stages: the Prophet and his companions pardoned the associators and the People of the Book and bore harm, by "you will hear much harm from those given the Book before you and from the associators, if you are patient and God-fearing" (Surah Al Imran 186) and "pardon and overlook until Allah comes with His command" (Surah al-Baqara 109); then Badr came, and the command was given. Ibn al-Qayyim fixes the degrees: ten years of warning without fighting or jizya, then permission of migration, permission of defensive fighting, the order to fight those who attack, then the order to fight the associators until the religion is wholly Allah's; then fighting was imposed against all the associators; al-Shawkani concludes: the associator, whether he made war or not, is profaned of blood so long as he is an associator (Zad al-Ma'ad 3/159, 3/71; as-Sayl al-Jarrar 4/369).
In practice, the muharib status is appraised by the force that bars relief, openness and coercion, not by number nor weapon alone; the punishment follows the verse's ordered variation; the proof requires two just strangers to the case; repentance before being reached lifts Allah's right but not the humans' rights; and the goods taken return to their owners, with the Malikis' guarantee even if destroyed.