Islamic Fiqh > Oaths and vows > Vows (nudhur) > The pillars and types of the vow (nudhur)
Contents
Updated on 27 September 2026 at 3:52 AM
The vow (nudhur) is the servant's commitment to perform an act of devotion to Allah. The sheets on this page cover the conditions of the one making the vow, its formula, then its types: the absolute vow, the vow of obedience in its three forms, the vow of a permissible thing, a disliked thing and a personal obligation, the vow of obstinacy and anger, the vow of disobedience, the vow of the two festivals, the vow beyond one's capacity, and the rule on eating from the vowed offering.
Each view is reported as the source attributes it, school by school and scholar by scholar, with the verses, the cited hadiths (including the grade flagged by the sheet) and the book references at the end of each point.
The majority of jurists, Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis, require the nadhir (the one making the vow) to be willing and deliberate: if he is coerced, his vow is invalid and nothing is owed to him on account of it (Mawahib al-Jalil 4/458, at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/346, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/92, ash-Sharh al-Kabir with Hashiyat ad-Dasuqi 2/454, Tahbir al-Mukhtasar 2/421, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/745, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/96, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/253, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/5-6, al-Insaf 11/117, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/346, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/438, Manar as-Sabil 3/439). The Hanafis do not make deliberation a condition of validity: the vow of a coerced person or a jester is valid (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/81-82). It is also valid from a drunkard on the correct view among the Shafi'is (Rawdat at-Talibin 2/745, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/96, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/253, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/5-6).
Third condition: being Muslim. The Malikis: the disbeliever who made a vow in a state of disbelief is not bound to fulfill it after his conversion, but fulfilling it is recommended for him (Mawahib al-Jalil 4/458, at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/346, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/92, ash-Sharh al-Kabir 2/454, Tahbir al-Mukhtasar 2/421). The Hanafis and the Shafi'is (the school's view): Islam is a condition in the nadhir, the vow of a disbeliever is invalid because he lacks the religious capacity for devotion or for binding himself to it, and it is not owed to him after his conversion; the vowed object being an act of devotion is a condition of validity according to the Hanafis, and the act of a disbeliever cannot be described as devotion (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/82, al-Bayan 4/474, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/745, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/96, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/253, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/5-6). The Hanbalis, and one Shafi'i view, hold it valid even when it concerns a devotion, and it becomes binding upon his conversion; proof is the hadith of Umar (al-Bayan 4/474, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/745, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/96, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/253, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/5-6, al-Insaf 11/117, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/346, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/437, ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/614):
Nafi' reported from 'Abdullah ibn 'Umar that 'Umar ibn al-Khattab said: Messenger of Allah, I vowed in the pre-Islamic period a retreat of one night in the Sacred Mosque. The Prophet said to him: fulfill your vow. He kept the retreat one night.
reported by al-Bukhari (1937) and Muslim (1656)
The generality of jurists stated that a valid vow requires a formula that expresses commitment. The Hanafis: the pillar of the vow is the formula designating it, among which:
The Malikis: the vow attaches to any expression containing a commitment regarding a recommended act, such as: "if Allah heals my sick, or my absent one returns, or I escape such an affair, then I will fast two days, or pray such a prayer, or give such wealth in alms". The formula is not restricted to "Allah makes this binding on me": the vow attaches to any binding word, and the exact wording of a vow is not required on the correct view of the school; if he says "Allah makes it binding on me to perform such a devotion" without using the word of the vow, it binds him. According to another opinion, the wording of the vow itself must be used: "Allah makes the vow of this binding on me" (Hashiyat ad-Dasuqi on ash-Sharh al-Kabir 2/456, Mawahib al-Jalil 4/462, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/93, Hashiyat as-Sawi on ash-Sharh al-Saghir 4/263, 265, Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/309).
The Shafi'is: the formula requires a word that conveys commitment, such as "I have vowed to Allah", "vowed to you", "He makes this binding on me"; the same applies to "I have devoted myself" and "I devote myself" if an illiterate person uses such language. an-Nawawi adds that the most complete formula of the vow is: "if Allah heals my sick, may Allah make this binding on me"; if he says "He makes this binding on me" without saying "to Allah", the school, followed by the author and the majority, is validity; according to a second opinion there are two positions: the correct one is validity, the other requires mentioning Allah explicitly (Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/254, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/7-8, al-Majmu' 8/343).
The Hanbalis: the formula of the vow is "Allah makes it binding on me to do this"; if he says "I have the vow of this", it binds him too because he used the word of the vow; and "if Allah heals me I will fast a month", "I have vowed to Allah", "Allah makes it binding on me" and whatever carries that meaning produce the vow: no specific formula is required to the point that the vow would only attach to it; it attaches to whatever expresses its meaning, like the sale (al-Mughni 10/88, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/346).
The majority of jurists, Malikis (correct view), Shafi'is (school) and Hanbalis, require spoken expression: neither intention alone nor inner speech suffices; if he intends it in his heart without uttering it, the vow does not attach, like the oath, for it is a commitment that attaches only through speech (Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/93, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/745, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/254, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/7-8, al-Ashbah wa-n-Nazair 1/33, al-Mughni 10/88, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/346, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/437, Matalib Uli an-Nuha 6/421). The Malikis according to one opinion and the Shafi'is (earlier position) hold that speech is not required: the intention of the vow or inner speech suffices, even without utterance (Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/93, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/745).
The absolute or vague vow is when the nadhir says "Allah makes a vow binding on me", or "if Allah heals my sick, He makes a vow binding on me", without naming what is binding and without a determined intention regarding a specific object in time or place; the majority of jurists hold it valid and binding. Ibn Rushd: they agreed on the binding force of the absolute vow in devotion, except what is related from some companions of al-Shafi'i who said it was not valid; they agreed on its binding force when made contentedly, not obstinately, with the explicit wording of the vow, whether or not the object is named; and they also agreed on the binding force of the vow whose outcome is that of a condition, when it concerns a devotion (Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/309-310). The Malikis support Malik's position with the hadith of the Prophet about the man standing in the sun:
The Messenger of Allah saw a man standing in the sun. He asked: what is the matter with this man? They said: he vowed not to speak, not to seek shade, not to sit and to fast. The Messenger of Allah said: order him to speak, to sit and to complete his fast. He was ordered to complete what was obedience to Allah and to abandon what was disobedience.
reported by al-Bukhari (6326)
The sheet notes with Ibn Rushd that abstaining from speech is not clearly a disobedience, that the Qur'an reports the vow of Maryam, and that standing in the sun is a disobedience only through self-torment; if disobedience applies, it is by analogy, not by text, the origin being permissibility (Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/309-310).
As for what is owed in the absolute vow, the Hanafis, Malikis and Hanbalis (majority of jurists) say: whoever makes an absolute or suspended vow without naming an object or a determined intention owes the expiation of the oath, immediately in the absolute case, and upon the occurrence of the condition in the suspended case; proof is the hadith of 'Uqbah ibn 'Amir:
The Messenger of Allah said: the expiation of the vow, when nothing is named, is the expiation of the oath.
weak chain, reported by Abu Dawud (3323) and at-Tirmidhi (1528)
And the hadith of Ibn 'Abbas:
The Messenger of Allah said: whoever makes a vow without naming the object, its expiation is the expiation of the oath; whoever makes a vow of disobedience, its expiation is the expiation of the oath; whoever makes a vow beyond his capacity, its expiation is the expiation of the oath; and whoever makes a vow within his capacity, let him fulfill it.
weak chain, reported by Abu Dawud (3322)
And the hadith of Muslim: "the expiation of the vow is the expiation of the oath" (1645), understood of the vow with no outcome, which cannot be referred to what has an outcome so as to impose a specific object; he gave his vow neither outcome nor object, which would be a preference without basis; Ibn Mas'ud, Jabir and A'ishah said this, with no opponent known in their time, which amounts to consensus (at-Tibyin 3/110, al-Binaya 6/130-131, al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/19, Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari 6/161-162, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/57, Tahbir al-Mukhtasar 2/366, al-Mughni 10/68, al-Kafi 4/418, Sharh az-Zarkashi 3/350-351, al-Mubdi' 9/326, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/348, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/439, ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/614, Matalib Uli an-Nuha 6/422, Manar as-Sabil 3/440). The Shafi'is: "He makes a vow binding on me" is valid, and he chooses between any act of devotion (glorifications, two rak'ahs, fasting a day) and the expiation of the oath. The text of al-Buwayti suggests that this vow is not valid and that nothing is owed; if made as a vow of recompense, "if Allah heals my sick, He makes a vow binding on me", or from the outset "Allah makes a vow binding on me", a devotion binds him, designated as al-Bulqini said (Rawdat at-Talibin 2/747, Asna al-Matalib 1/576, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/255-256, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/11).
The first type is the vow of recompense: he binds himself to an act of obedience in return for a blessing received or a hardship averted: "if Allah heals me, or grants me a child, wealth or knowledge, or heals my sick, or frees me from prison, then Allah makes binding on me the fast of a month, manumission, prayer or pilgrimage", among what has a foundation of legal obligation. When the condition occurs, fulfilling what was vowed becomes binding by consensus of the people of knowledge; they support it with the Book, the Sunnah and consensus (al-Mughni 10/68, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/745). From the Book, the verse:
Among them are those who made a covenant with Allah: if He gives us of His bounty, we will surely give alms and be among the righteous. Yet when He gave them of His bounty, they were stingy with it and turned away in aversion. So He caused hypocrisy to follow in their hearts until the day they meet Him, for breaking what they promised Allah and for their lying.
Surah at-Tawba 75-77
Allah blamed them for failing to fulfill their vows and punished them. From the Sunnah, the hadith of the woman who sailed to sea and vowed to fast a month if Allah saved her; He saved her, she did not fast until she died, and her daughter came to the Messenger of Allah who ordered fasting on her behalf (sahih chain, Abu Dawud 3308). From consensus, Ibn Qudamah: its fulfillment is binding by consensus of the people of knowledge (al-Mughni 10/68, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/745). Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya: "if he says: if Allah heals my sick, He makes binding on me the freeing of a slave, or my servant is free, this binds him by agreement" (Majmu' al-Fatawa 23/137-138).
The second type is binding oneself to obedience without condition: he says from the outset "Allah makes binding on me the fast of a month, an alms, a pilgrimage, an 'umrah or a prayer", or any devotion of this kind: its fulfillment binds the majority of the people of knowledge, Hanafis, Malikis, Shafi'is (correct view) and Hanbalis, and it is the view of most scholars; proof:
Whoever vows to obey Allah, let him obey Him.
reported by al-Bukhari (6700)
He bound himself to a devotion without aiming at obstinacy or anger, like the one who vows a sacrificial animal (al-Ikhtiyar 4/91, al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/35, al-Ma'una 1/430, at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/348, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/93, Sharh az-Zarqani 3/163, ash-Sharh al-Kabir 2/456-457, Tahbir al-Mukhtasar 2/422, Hashiyat as-Sawi on ash-Sharh al-Saghir 4/268-270, al-Hawi al-Kabir 15/466-467, al-Bayan 4/475, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/746, al-Mughni 10/68, al-Kafi 4/417, Sharh az-Zarkashi 3/350-351, al-Mubdi' 9/326, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/348, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/439, ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/615, Matalib Uli an-Nuha 6/422, Manar as-Sabil 3/440). One Shafi'i opinion holds it a vow that does not attach: nothing is binding but fulfilling it is recommended; their argument: a human right binds through speech only with compensation (exchange contracts), not without it like a gift, and Allah's right is the same; the vow among the Arabs being a promise with a condition, the usage of the language remains operative (al-Hawi al-Kabir 15/466-467, al-Bayan 4/475, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/746, al-Mughni 10/68, al-Kafi 4/417, Sharh az-Zarkashi 3/350-351, al-Mubdi' 9/326, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/348, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/439, ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/615, Matalib Uli an-Nuha 6/422, Manar as-Sabil 3/440).
The third type is the vow of a devotion that has no foundation in obligation, such as the retreat (i'tikaf) and visiting the sick. The majority of jurists, Malikis, Shafi'is (correct view), Hanbalis and most of the people of knowledge, hold it valid even without a foundation in obligation; proof is the hadith: "whoever vows to obey Allah, let him obey Him" (al-Bukhari 6700), the Qur'anic blame of those who fail their vows (Surah at-Tawba 75-77), the hadith of Umar on the retreat cited above, and the fact that a devotion binds him on the mode of the vow, as a sacrificial animal would; likewise the 'umrah, whose vow is valid although it is not obligatory according to the Hanafis (al-Ma'una 1/430, at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/348, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/93, Sharh az-Zarqani 3/163, ash-Sharh al-Kabir 2/456-457, Tahbir al-Mukhtasar 2/422, Hashiyat as-Sawi 4/268, 270, al-Bayan 4/474, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/746, 753, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/99, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/256, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/11-12, al-Mughni 10/68, al-Insaf 11/117, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/348, Manar as-Sabil 3/442).
The jurists differ on the vow of a permissible thing, such as eating or not eating a food, walking or not walking, drinking or not drinking, having relations or abstaining, divorcing in a permissible manner: is the vow valid, does it offer a choice between the act and the expiation, or does it entail neither obligation nor expiation?
The Hanbalis (school): whoever vows a permissible thing, such as wearing a garment, riding an animal or divorcing in a permissible manner, chooses between fulfilling it and the expiation of the oath; proof:
No vow except in what is sought by it for the Face of Allah.
hasan chain, reported by Abu Dawud (2192) and Ahmad (6732)
If he does not fulfill it, the expiation is owed to him according to the hadith of A'ishah: "no vow in disobedience, and its expiation is the expiation of the oath" (sahih chain: Abu Dawud 3290, at-Tirmidhi 1524, Ibn Majah 2121): if the expiation is owed in disobedience, it is more so in the permissible. If he fulfills it, the vow releases him, per Abu Dawud (3312, sahih chain): a woman said: Messenger of Allah, I vowed to beat the tambourine before you; he replied: fulfill your vow. If the vow includes several objects, a single expiation releases him, as with the oath (al-Mughni 10/70, al-Kafi 4/419, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/349, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/440, Manar as-Sabil 3/440).
The majority of jurists, Hanafis, Malikis and Shafi'is, and Ahmad according to one opinion, hold that vowing what is neither obedience nor devotion entails nothing: "Allah makes it binding on me to enter Basra or not to enter it, to eat this delicacy or not to touch it, to wear new clothes or not to wear them": nothing in the act or its omission is obedience to Allah or devotion to Him, he made the act and its omission equivalent. Proof is the hadith of Abu Isra'il cited above: the Prophet ordered him to complete the fast, which was devotion, and forbade him the permissible act, without commanding any expiation; then the hadith of the woman who vowed to walk: "Allah is certainly in no need of her walking, order her to ride" (hasan sahih chain: at-Tirmidhi 1536), and that of the man carried between his two sons: "Allah is certainly in no need of the torment of this man, order him to ride" (al-Bukhari 1766, Muslim 1642), with no command of expiation: this vow does not compel the act, like the vow of the impossible, so it does not compel the expiation either (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/82, al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/30, Ahkam al-Qur'an of Ibn al-'Arabi 1/352 and 2/12, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/91, ash-Sharh al-Kabir with Hashiyat ad-Dasuqi 2/457, Hashiyat as-Sawi 4/286, al-Hawi al-Kabir 15/467, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/753, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/102-103, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/258, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/31-32, al-Mughni 10/70, al-Kafi 4/419, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/349, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/440, Manar as-Sabil 3/440).
If he combines a permissible thing and a recommended one, fulfilling the lawful part is binding, and the ruling of the permissible part remains as if it were alone, per the hadith of Abu Isra'il (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/82, al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/30, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/753, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/102-103, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/258, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/31-32). The Hanafis and the Shafi'is according to one path further require the vowed devotion to be sought as such and to include an obligation within its kind, like fasting, prayer, pilgrimage, manumission and alms; what has no obligation within its kind, such as glorifications, visiting the sick, the funeral procession, ablution, bathing, entering the mosque, touching the Qur'an, the call to prayer and building frontier fortresses and mosques, is not valid as a vow although it is a devotion: it is not a sought devotion, the servant's commitment having value only in that Allah Himself requires it (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/82-83, al-Ikhtiyar 4/89-90, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/746, 753).
The jurists differ on the vow of a disliked thing (makruh), such as praying after dawn or after 'asr, eating garlic or onion, divorcing one's wife: does it attach or not? The Hanafis, the Malikis, the Shafi'is (correct view) and the Hanbalis according to one path say it does not attach and nothing is binding; proof: "no vow except in what is sought by it for the Face of Allah" (Abu Dawud 2192, Ahmad 6732), that seeking not being present; and the hadith of Abu Isra'il: the Prophet ordered him to complete the fast and forbade him acts whose persistence is disliked and which may become unlawful, without commanding any expiation; had it attached, he would have commanded the expiation (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/82, al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/30, al-Fawa'id ad-Dawani 1/415, ash-Sharh al-Kabir with Hashiyat ad-Dasuqi 2/456-457, Hashiyat as-Sawi 4/286, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/259, Sharh az-Zarkashi 3/353, al-Mubdi' 9/328, al-Insaf 11/121).
The Hanafis require the vowed devotion to be sought and of an obligatory kind; however, if he vows a devotion of obligatory kind at a disliked time, such as two rak'ahs at the disliked time, performing them at that time is allowed, and it is better to pray them outside it (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/82, at-Tibyin 1/86, al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/30). The Shafi'is according to one path and the Hanbalis (school) hold that the vow of the makruh attaches and remains valid despite the dislike. The Hanbalis add: if he vows a makruh, divorce or otherwise, eating garlic or onion, leaving a sunnah, it is recommended for him to pay the expiation of the oath to exit the commitment and not do it, for leaving the makruh is better than doing it; if he does it, no expiation, for he fulfilled his vow (Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/349, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/440, ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/615, Manar as-Sabil 3/441). Mughni al-Muhtaj finally reports from the Hanafis the example of the vow of two consecutive days of fasting of which one was fasted and the other forgotten: it is interpreted as the fast of one day in the week, and there is no longer any dislike; an interpretation that is sometimes binding, reached only by the slow-witted or the obstinate (Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/264, al-Fatawa al-Fiqhiyya al-Kubra 4/271-272).
The Malikis say that vowing the makruh and the permissible is unlawful, for he glorified what the Law did not glorify through "Allah makes it binding on me"; likewise: "if I speak to Zayd, I will pray two rak'ahs after 'asr or dawn, or I will recite at night aloud or quietly against the usage". Not included in the makruh: the vow of fasting the fourth day of the sacrifice, the vow of entering ihram before the months of pilgrimage, and the vow of a laborious prayer or fast: these vows are bindingly fulfilled, for their dislike is not intrinsic. On the contrary, the vow of two rak'ahs after 'asr or after dawn rises does not bind, lest the one who vowed perform them at sunrise or sunset. Included in the fulfilleable makruh is the vow of a repeated day, such as every Thursday (Sharh Ibn Naji at-Tanukhi on the text of the Risala 1/415, al-Fawa'id ad-Dawani 1/415, ash-Sharh al-Kabir with Hashiyat ad-Dasuqi 2/456-457, Hashiyat as-Sawi 4/286). The sheet reports from al-Khatib ash-Shirbini a note: on the vow of perpetual fasting, apart from the two festivals and the days of the sacrifice, in one who fears harm or the loss of a right, an-Nawawi wrote in al-Majmu': it attaches and its fulfillment is binding without disagreement; az-Zarkashi replies that the author's words convey non-attachment, as ar-Rafi'i hinted, the vow being a means of drawing near and the makruh not being one: this is the chosen view; ash-Shirbini holds this meaning evident, the permissible not attaching, so the makruh a fortiori; but if he fears neither loss of right nor harm, the vow attaches. The sheet then sets out the rules of the vowed perpetual fast: excluded from it are Ramadan in performance and in makeup, the two festivals, the days of the sacrifice, menstruation, postpartum bleeding and an expiation preceding the vow; if it comes after, he fasts in its place and compensates the vow, then makes up the missed Ramadan; if Ramadan was missed without excuse, the vow's compensation is making up by fasting what breaks the fast for the rest of the year; a legitimate excuse, travel or illness, exempts from compensation, a leisure trip does not; the guardian cannot impose fasting on the living in his place, on the chosen view; if the husband lawfully prevents his wife from this vowed fast, it falls without compensation, otherwise it remains with compensation if she does not fast, and if she fasts after permission without his right, she compensates. Branches follow: the vow of fasting the day of doubt does not attach, nor prayer at disliked times outside the sanctuary of Mecca, even if the vowed act is valid there; the vow of tayammum does not attach, it occurring only through necessity, but tayammum for a recommended bath is valid; the vow of ablution is valid and referred to lawful renewal, meaning having prayed with the first ablution; the vow of ablution for every prayer binds; the vow of fasting Ramadan while traveling attaches if it causes no harm; the vow of standing in the obligatory prayer during illness does not attach if it harms, and standing in the supererogatory without harm attaches; if he vows the fast on condition of not breaking it even when ill, it does not bind him in illness, for what the vow imposes does not exceed what the Law imposes; and if he vows not to flee from a band of disbelievers while able to withstand them, the vow attaches, otherwise not (Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/259). Finally, according to some later scholars the vow of fasting Friday alone attaches, but that holds only on the validity of the vow of the makruh, not on the well-known view of the school (reported from al-Majmu').
The generality of the jurists of the four schools stated that the vow of a personal obligation, such as the prescribed prayer, the fast of Ramadan or the obligatory pilgrimage, does not attach: these obligations are due by the requirement of the Law, and there is no sense in binding oneself to them, the vow being a commitment and the commitment to what is already obligatory having no effect; no expiation is owed according to the majority, Hanafis, Malikis and Shafi'is (correct view), and the Hanbalis (school) (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/90, al-Bahr ar-Ra'iq 4/331, Hashiyat Ibn Abidin on ad-Durr al-Mukhtar 3/732, Hashiyat al-'Adawi 2/35, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/93, ash-Sharh al-Kabir with Hashiyat ad-Dasuqi 2/457, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/751, al-Mughni 10/70, al-Kafi 4/421, Sharh az-Zarkashi 3/254, al-Mubdi' 9/326).
All jurists agree that the vowed disobedience is not lawful; the disagreement concerns the expiation of the oath. The Hanafis and the Hanbalis (school): it is owed if he does not perform the act; proof is the hadith of A'ishah:
The Messenger of Allah said: no vow in disobedience, and its expiation is the expiation of the oath.
sahih chain, reported by Abu Dawud (3290), at-Tirmidhi (1524) and Ibn Majah (2121)
For the vow holds the status of the oath and it is a right of Allah whose binding force depends on his word, like the oath; and the Prophet said to Abu Isra'il, who had vowed to stand in the sun without sitting, without shade and without speaking: "order him to speak, to sit, to seek shade and to complete his fast" (al-Bukhari 6326), without commanding any expiation, the vow being a commitment to obedience and this one a commitment to disobedience, thus a vow that does not attach and entails nothing, like the unconcluded oath; yet zhihar is a disobedience for which Allah nonetheless commanded the expiation. And the hadith of 'Imran ibn Husayn:
'Imran ibn Husayn reported that he heard the Messenger of Allah say: the vow is of two kinds: the one concerning obedience to Allah belongs to Allah and its fulfillment is due; the one concerning disobedience to Allah belongs to the devil, no fulfillment is due and its expiation is that of the oath.
sahih chain, reported by an-Nasa'i (3845)
And the hadith of 'Uqbah about his sister, and the words "let her expiate her oath", and the words of Ibn 'Abbas to the woman who had vowed to sacrifice her son: "expiate your oath"; whoever swears to a disobedience owes the expiation, likewise whoever vows it (Fatawa as-Saghdi 1/195, al-Mabsut 8/142, Sharh Mukhtasar at-Tahawi of al-Jassas 8/447, al-Mughni 10/69, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/349-350, ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/615, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/440, Manar as-Sabil 3/441). The Malikis, the Shafi'is and Ahmad according to one path: whoever vows a disobedience, "Allah makes it binding on me to drink wine, fornicate, steal, kill or strike so-and-so", seeks Allah's forgiveness, without expiation; proof: "whoever vows to disobey Allah, let him not disobey Him" (al-Bukhari 6700), and: "no fulfillment for a vow of disobedience, nor for what the servant does not possess", and "no vow in the disobedience of Allah" (Muslim 1641), with no mention of expiation, though it would have been mentioned had it been due (Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari 6/163, at-Tamhid 2/64, al-Istidhkar 5/185, 187, al-Bayan wa-t-Tahsil 3/129, al-Hawi al-Kabir 15/501, al-Bayan 4/472, Sharh Sahih Muslim 11/101, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/750-751, al-Mughni 10/69). Ibn Rushd summarizes: Malik, al-Shafi'i and the majority of scholars say nothing is binding; Abu Hanifah, Sufyan and the Kufans: it is binding, the binding element being the expiation of the oath, not the act of disobedience. The disagreement stems from two hadiths in opposite directions: that of A'ishah ("whoever vows to obey Allah, let him obey Him, and whoever vows to disobey Him, let him not disobey Him"), which binds nothing, and those of 'Imran and Abu Hurayrah, which bind the expiation; whoever combines them binds only the expiation. Abu 'Umar Ibn 'Abd al-Barr: the people of hadith weakened the hadith of 'Imran and that of Abu Hurayrah, the latter turning on Sulayman ibn Arqam, an abandoned reporter.
The people of knowledge agree that fasting the day of breaking the fast or of the sacrifice is unlawful, whether as a vow or voluntarily. Ibn Batal: the scholars are unanimous that no one may fast these two days, neither the one making up nor the one vowing; whoever vows one of these fasts has vowed a disobedience, falling under the Prophet's words: "whoever vows to disobey Allah, let him not disobey Him"; the disagreement concerns making them up for whoever vowed the fast of a specific day that coincided with them (Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari 6/165). Ibn 'Abd al-Barr confirms the unanimity, including for the tamattu' pilgrim who finds no offering, and details: according to one opinion of al-Shafi'i, Zufar and a group, and Ibn Kinana (a companion of Malik), no makeup is owed; according to Abu Hanifah, Abu Yusuf, Muhammad and the Hanbalis, he makes them up. Malik's opinion is reported in three paths: he makes them up; he makes them up unless he does not intend to; he makes them up only if he intended to fast them. The first path is reported by Ibn Wahb, the other two by Ibn al-Qasim: Malik said of one who vowed to fast Dhu-l-Hijjah: he breaks the fast on the day of the sacrifice and two days after, and makes up the remaining days of tashriq; and of one who vowed the fast of a specific year: he breaks on the day of breaking the fast and the days of the sacrifice, without makeup unless he intended to fast them (at-Tamhid 13/26-27, al-Istidhkar 3/332, see Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/82, Manar as-Sabil 3/441). Al-Hasan ibn Yahya, al-Awza'i and a late Shafi'i opinion: he makes them up, unless he has no intention of making up or fasting.
The vow of the impossible does not attach and entails nothing: for example vowing yesterday's fast or a retreat for a past month; or the woman who vows to fast the days of her menstruation, or to fast by night, fasting having no place at night and menstruation legally opposing it, purity from menses and bleeding being a condition for the legal fast to exist. Such a vow neither attaches nor binds, since neither its attachment nor its fulfillment is conceivable; if he swears to its performance, no expiation is owed, the vow being even closer to that. According to a possible reading among the Hanbalis, it entails the expiation, like the oath of the straying one, the vow being an oath and what brings the vow about bringing the expiation with it, except fulfillment when the vowed object is a devotion and the act possible (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/82, al-Bahr ar-Ra'iq 2/317, Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 3/373, al-Mughni 10/70, al-Kafi 4/421, al-Mubdi' 9/326).
Whoever vows what he cannot perform, or becomes unable after having been able: the Hanafis say fulfillment in person is due only within capacity; under impediment it is due by equivalent, the equivalent standing in for the origin like earth in the absence of water, and feeding in the absence of peers; the old man who vows the fast has a valid vow and owes the compensation, being incapable of the fast in person; likewise the vow of slaughtering the child is valid according to Abu Hanifah and Muhammad and slaughtering the sheep is due, the equivalent of the son being the sheep (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/91). Yusuf al-Malati nevertheless reports in al-Mu'tasar: if the vow is valid and he becomes unable through weakness, the expiation is owed to him, as the one who breaks his oath is commanded, per: "the expiation of the vow is the expiation of the oath"; and the hadiths of 'Uqbah's sister: she vowed to walk barefoot and bareheaded to the Ka'bah; the Prophet ordered her to ride, cover her head and fast three days: the expiation for what was disobedience, and the offering for abandoning the walk, which is obedience (al-Mu'tasar min al-Mukhtasar min Mushkil al-Athar 1/262). The Malikis: whoever imposes on himself by vow what he cannot perform, it is unlawful for him; the sheet finds no view with them on a supervening impediment (Mawahib al-Jalil 4/463). al-Shafi'i: whoever vows what he cannot do in any manner, the vow falls, for he cannot perform it just as he cannot perform its like (al-Umm 7/68). The Shafi'is: whoever vows a pilgrimage or an 'umrah must perform it in person if able; otherwise he deputizes someone, even for a fee, as in the obligatory pilgrimage; hastening its fulfillment at the first opportunity is recommended, hurrying toward the purity of his commitment; if he becomes able, delays and dies, it is performed for him from his wealth, for his negligence after gaining ability; if he dies before ability, nothing is owed to him. If he vowed the pilgrimage walking, the walk is due if he is able, for he made it a condition of the devotion, like one who vows a continuous fast; otherwise he rides. The hadith of 'Uqbah: "she will walk if she can, and ride if she cannot" (al-Bukhari 1866, Muslim 1644). If he vows prayer, fast or retreat at a specific time and is prevented, the makeup is due without expiation for the delay; if he vows an alms and becomes insolvent, the vow is suspended while he remains so, and due upon ease; if he vows the pilgrimage for a specific year and illness prevents him before ihram, no makeup; likewise if he had mange at the time of the vow or develops it without finding the means to pay until the year ends; if illness strikes after ihram, the majority hold the makeup obligatory; the proof of making up the fast and prayer without the pilgrimage: what the vow imposes is like what the Law imposes, prayer and fasting being due despite incapacity, while the pilgrimage is due only with capacity (an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/117, 119, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/269, 271, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/51, 53, ad-Dibaj 4/425-426). The Hanbalis: whoever vows an obedience beyond his capacity or becomes unable owes the expiation of the oath; proof are the hadiths of 'Uqbah cited above (al-Bukhari 1767, Muslim 1644), "let her expiate her oath" (Abu Dawud 3295, weak chain), "let her fast three days" (Abu Dawud 3293, at-Tirmidhi 1594, an-Nasa'i 3815, Ibn Majah 2134, Ahmad 17386, weak chains), the hadith of A'ishah (sahih chain), and the hadith of Ibn 'Abbas (Abu Dawud 3322, weak): "whoever makes a vow beyond his capacity, its expiation is the expiation of the oath". If he expiates and the vowed object is not fasting, nothing further is due; if it is fasting, Ahmad is reported in two paths: the school, feeding a poor person for each day, fasting having a legal equivalent like Ramadan; the other path, nothing further is due, for the expiation of the oath suffices; Ibn Qudamah objects to the analogy with Ramadan: Ramadan is compensated at death and its fast is more emphatic, and the vowed object is compared to the vowed object rather than to the legally rooted obligation, an expiation having already sufficed for the vowed one (Abu Dawud 3322). Finally, if he is prevented by an illness whose recovery is hoped for, he waits; no expiation nor anything else, the time not having elapsed, like the sick person in Ramadan; if the impediment becomes permanent, he moves to the expiation and the compensation per the reported disagreement; if the fixed time passed under a passing, hoped-for impediment, two paths are reported from Abu al-Khattab: the expiation is due for failing his commitment, like one who vowed to walk to the Sacred House and was prevented, or nothing is due, for he performed a fast that releases without negligence; and if he is prevented from an act other than fasting, such as prayer, only the expiation is due, the Law having provided no equivalent; the sheet finally notes: if he only contradicted his vow, nothing is added, and if prevented by an obstacle, his ruling is that of fasting, per the details given.
The vow of obstinacy is the one that exits like the oath: it aims to push toward an act or to deter from it, without aiming at devotion or reward, such as "if I speak to so-and-so, or enter the house, or fail to leave the country, then Allah makes binding on me the fast of a month, a prayer, a pilgrimage or the freeing of a slave". The majority hold the expiation of the oath per the hadith of 'Uqbah ibn 'Amir: "the expiation of the vow is the expiation of the oath" (Muslim 1645); some restrict it to the minimum bearing the name of devotion: fasting a day or praying two rak'ahs; those who require the expiation of zhihar depart from analogy and text (Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/311).
As for what is due, three views. The Shafi'is according to one opinion, the Hanbalis (school), Abu Hanifah according to one path, Muhammad ibn al-Hasan and Ibn al-Qasim (of the Malikis): he chooses between fulfilling what he vowed (freeing, pilgrimaging, giving alms) and the expiation of the oath, his vow here being a vow of obstinacy exiting like the oath; per the hadith of Muslim cited, and the hadith of 'Imran (weak): "no vow in anger, and its expiation is the expiation of the oath" (an-Nasa'i 3842, Ahmad 19901), and the hadith of A'ishah reported by Malik in al-Muwatta (1023): "whoever swears to walk, to offer, or places his wealth in the path of Allah, or with the poor, or with the curtains of the Ka'bah, his expiation is that of the oath"; it resembles the oath in aiming to prevent or impose, and the vow in imposing a devotion, and since neither combination nor suspension is possible, he is given the choice, the meaning of: "the expiation of the vow is the expiation of the oath". This opinion is reported from Umar, A'ishah, Ibn 'Abbas, Ibn 'Umar, Hafsah and Umm Salamah (al-Hawi al-Kabir 10/362, al-Bayan 4/475-476, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/746-747, Sharh Sahih Muslim 11/104, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/96-97, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/254-255, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/8-9, al-Mughni 9/399 and 10/67, al-Kafi 4/417, Sharh az-Zarkashi 3/350-351, al-Mubdi' 9/326, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/348, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/439, ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/615, Matalib Uli an-Nuha 6/422, Manar as-Sabil 3/440, at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/346, ash-Sharh al-Kabir with Hashiyat ad-Dasuqi 2/455). The Shafi'is according to one opinion and the Hanbalis according to one path: only the expiation of the oath is due, even if he does what he had sworn not to do, per the same hadiths, no other vow of obstinacy being aimed at; they support this with the report by Abu Dawud (3272) and Ibn Hibban in his Sahih (4355): two brothers of the Ansar disputed an inheritance; one said to the other: if you come back to ask for your share again, all my wealth is for the curtains of the Ka'bah; Umar said to him: the Ka'bah has no need of your wealth, expiate your oath and speak to your brother; I heard the Messenger of Allah say: "no oath nor vow in disobedience to the Lord, nor in severing the ties of kinship, nor in what one does not possess". The Malikis, the Shafi'is according to one opinion and the Hanafis (the apparent of the texts): fulfillment is due, like the vow of recompense: "if I enter Zayd's house, He makes this binding on me", aiming to punish himself; the change of state at the time of the vow does not remove the vowed object, and it is a devotion imposed on the mode of the vow, whose condition does not abolish the obligation, like the pilgrimage. al-Mawwaq: "even in anger"; Ibn Rushd: "the vow of anger is binding by agreement, like its oath"; Ibn Bishr: "every commitment of obedience binds in our view, contentedly or obstinately, this is the well-known one; the elders reported the saying of Ibn al-Qasim: what falls under obstinacy and constraint is released by the expiation of the oath, which is an opinion of al-Shafi'i; several of our shaykhs leaned this way and held it a vow of disobedience with no obligation of fulfillment" (at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/346-347, al-Ma'una 1/430, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/92, Sharh az-Zarqani 3/162, ash-Sharh al-Kabir with Hashiyat ad-Dasuqi 2/455). And Malik said to one who said to his mount "you are a sacrificial she-camel" while spurring it: did you intend that? yes; then nothing against you; Ibn Rushd: because he did not seek devotion.
Among the Hanafis, ad-Durr al-Mukhtar: the suspended vow is differentiated: suspended on a sought condition ("if my absent one returns", "if my sick one is healed"), fulfillment is due when it occurs; suspended on what he wants to avert ("if I fornicate"), he fulfills it or expiates his oath, for this vow is in wording a vow and in meaning an oath, and the choice binds by necessity. Ibn Abidin explains: the apparent of the texts reports the absolute obligation of fulfillment, whether the condition is sought or not; Abu Hanifah's path is the differentiation, his retraction seven days before his death being reported, and it is the view of Muhammad held correct in al-Hidaya, followed by the authors of the mutun (al-Mukhtar, al-Majma', Mukhtasar an-Niqaya, al-Multaqa), which is also the school of al-Shafi'i; the Sahib al-Bahr thought the differentiation baseless and the path of the Nawadhir to be absolute choice, but the author replies that the Nawadhir report the differentiation, and an-Nahr notes that al-Khulasa's words concern the condition not sought, the absolute being excluded (Hashiyat Ibn Abidin on ad-Durr al-Mukhtar 3/738-739, see Sharh Fath al-Qadir 5/93-94, Durrar al-Hukkam 5/186). Ibn al-Humam: if he suspends the vow on a condition and it occurs, the fulfillment of the vow itself is due, the hadith being unrestricted, without distinguishing the immediate from the suspended, the condition-suspended being like the immediate; and per Abu Hanifah (an-Nawadhir) he chooses between fulfilling and expiating: "if he says: if I do this, He makes a pilgrimage or the fast of a year binding on me, he may pilgrimage or fast if he wishes, or expiate; if poor, he chooses between the fast of a year and that of three days". The apparent of the texts is obligation; the choice is Abu Hanifah's in an-Nawadhir, reported also from 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Khalid at-Tirmidhi who relates that Abu Hanifah revised his book of vows and expiations seven days before his death and opted for choice, Isma'il az-Zahid ruling thus, and the shaykhs of Balkh and Bukhara, and Shams al-A'immah as well, given the turmoils of the time (Sharh Fath al-Qadir 5/92-95, al-Mabsut 5/135-136, al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/35-36). Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya summarizes: the vow of obstinacy and anger, "if I do this, He makes the pilgrimage binding on me, or my wealth is alms, or the fast", aiming to forbid himself the act, or "if I do not do this, He makes the pilgrimage binding on me": the school of most of the people of knowledge is that the expiation of the oath suffices, the view of the jurists of hadith: al-Shafi'i, Ahmad, Ishaq, Abu 'Ubayd; it is one of the two paths from Abu Hanifah, the later one. Among them, most: choice between fulfilling and expiating (al-Shafi'i's opinion and Ahmad's well-known one); some: the expiation alone, like the oath (Ahmad's other path, the view of some companions of al-Shafi'i); Malik, Abu Hanifah in the other path and a group: fulfillment is due; it is reported that al-Shafi'i, consulted in Egypt, ruled the expiation and then referred to 'Ata' ibn Abi Rabah, and that 'Abd ar-Rahman ibn al-Qasim ruled the expiation per al-Layth then promised Malik's view upon his return; the companions of Malik attach the questions of this oath to the vow given the generality of fulfilling the vow ("whoever vows to obey Allah, let him obey Him"), it being a permitted judgment suspended on a condition, binding upon its occurrence like other judgments. Ibn Taymiyya holds the first view, supported by the Book and the Sunnah, and develops the argument of meaning: regard in speech goes to its meaning, not its letter; this swearer seeks no devotion but exhortation or deterrence, and that is the meaning of the oath; the vow is a kind of oath and every vow is an oath: "Allah makes it binding on me to do" equals "I swear by Allah to do", per the Prophet's words: "the vow is an oath" (Majmu' al-Fatawa 35/253-258). al-Athram reports from Ahmad the following cases: whoever swears "my wealth is for the curtains of the Ka'bah" owes the expiation of the oath, per the hadith of A'ishah; whoever swears to walk to the House of Allah or to give alms from his property: if he breaks it, the expiation, without counting it broken before he does; and the case of Layla bint al-'Ajma', who swore "all my slaves are free and all my wealth is an offering" should she not separate her husband from his other wife, being Jewish then Christian: Zaynab bint Umm Salamah, Hafsah and 'Abdullah ibn 'Umar were consulted, all said: expiate your oath and leave the couple; Ibn 'Abbas said to a woman who made her garment an offering in anger: "Allah is not drawn near through anger, expiate your oath"; and to a man who had placed his wealth with the poor: "keep your wealth, spend it on your family, settle your debt and expiate your oath"; 'Ata' said of "a thousand sacrificial camels are binding on me", "a thousand pilgrimages", "my wealth is an offering", "my wealth is with the poor": it is an oath; and Ahmad, per Ma'mar, from al-Hasan and Jabir ibn Zayd: whoever says "if I do not do this, I enter ihram for pilgrimage": ihram applies only to one who intended it, it is an oath to expiate; and al-Awza'i, per 'Ata' ibn Abi Rabah: walking is due only to one who intended it, whoever swears in anger owes the expiation of the oath.
The origin among the majority of jurists: the nadhir does not eat from his vowed offering. The Hanafis: if he vows the slaughter of a sheep, even through "I make an offering" without naming, the vow falls on the sheep and the nadhir does not eat from it; if he eats, he owes the value of what he ate, its course being alms and the almsgiver not eating from his alms (al-Muhit al-Burhani 5/661, Majma' al-Anhar 4/170, ad-Durr al-Mukhtar 6/321). The Malikis: abstaining applies to the vow designated to the poor by word or intention ("this is a vow, Allah makes it binding on me" intending the poor, named or not); the vow of the poor not designated by word or intention ("an offering or an animal for the poor") permits eating from it before its place; and the vow not designated to others than the poor permits eating from it absolutely, provisioning oneself and feeding rich and poor alike, before and after its place, the eaten not being designated and following the rule of gifts (Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 2/384, ash-Sharh al-Kabir with Hashiyat ad-Dasuqi 2/337-338, al-Fawa'id ad-Dawani 1/383, Hashiyat al-'Adawi 1/725). ash-Shirazi (Shafi'i): the offering vowed in replacement of a duty is not eaten, like the blood due for ihram before the miqat; the offering of recompense (healing of a sick person, return of an absent one) is not eaten, like the hunting compensation; if he eats from it, he is liable, on three paths: the value of what he ate, its equivalent in meat, or buying a share of a similar animal and sharing the slaughter; the absolute vow has three paths: no right to eat, for it is the blood of a duty; eating permitted, the absolute of the vow referring to the offerings known in the Law; or eating permitted for the udhiyah and forbidden for the hady. an-Nawawi comments: the obligatory offering without commitment (tamattu', qiran, pilgrim compensations) is not eaten by agreement, whoever eats owes the value of the meat per the earlier text, without a second shedding of blood; one committed by vow to designate from his debt (ihram, perfume, clothing) does not eat, like one who slaughters with that intention without a vow, or zakat; the offering of recompense is not eaten; the absolute vow per the school is valid and binding, and if he designates ("Allah makes it binding on me to slaughter this one"), the most correct view is the prohibition of eating, the second path permits it, the third permits it for the udhiyah not the hady; and ar-Rafi'i says eating from it is perhaps not recommended (al-Muhadhdhab 1/240, al-Majmu' 8/309-310, al-Bayan 4/479). The Hanbalis: neither the one designated to Allah nor the vowed udhiyah (correct view of the school) may be eaten; Abu Bakr permitted it and Ibn Qudamah inclined to it for the vowed udhiyah: "if he vows an animal then slaughters it, he may eat; the qadi reported that some forbade it, the apparent of Ahmad, based on the hady; our proof: the vow refers to what is known in the Law, and the legal udhiyah is slaughtered and eaten, the vow changing only its obligation, unlike the hady made obligatory by the Law" (al-Mughni 9/362). Per the school, whoever eats from what may not be eaten replaces it with equivalent meat, the whole animal being guaranteed by its equivalent; likewise if he gives the butcher, sells or destroys a share; what a third party destroys is replaced by its value, the undesignated destroyed thing obliging its value like another's meat (al-Mughni 3/288-289, al-Kafi 1/468, Sharh az-Zarkashi 1/584-585, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/20). Ibn Hubayrah finally reports the schools' detail: Abu Hanifah: he eats from no offering except that of tamattu', qiran and the supererogatory that reached its place; Malik: he eats from all except the hunting compensation, the harm compensation, the vow of the poor and the supererogatory offering spoiled before its place; al-Shafi'i: he eats only from the supererogatory; Ahmad in one path like Abu Hanifah, in the other he eats neither the vowed one nor the hunting compensation, and eats the rest (al-Ifsah 1/329).
In practice, a vow is formulated explicitly and narrowly: name the vowed act, be sure of one's capacity, avoid vowing the permissible with no religious benefit, never vow a disobedience or the fast of the two festivals; the vow of obstinacy, often uttered in anger, is dissolved per the majority of schools by the expiation of the oath, and the prudent believer holds to the Prophet's counsel: if he vowed to obey Allah, let him obey Him, and if he vowed to disobey Him, let him not disobey Him.