Islamic Fiqh > Oaths and vows > Vows (nudhur) > Oaths: special cases and rules
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Updated on 27 September 2026 at 3:52 AM
Beyond the general types, the fiqh of the oath deals with concrete cases: the target acts unwillingly, the swearer delegates the act to another, he swears over two things, he is adjured by Allah, he pronounces conditional oaths, or he repeats the oath several times. These are also the rules of the vow (nadhr) and the bequest (wasiyya), close relatives of the oath.
Quranic quotations give the meaning of the verse, and hadiths carry their exact sources and grades.
Ibn Qudama fixed: whoever swears to do a thing and does not do it, or swears not to do it and does it, owes the expiation, with no disagreement among the jurists of the cities. Ibn 'Abd al-Barr wrote: the oath whose expiation is due by the consensus of the Muslims is the one over the future. As-Suyuti confirmed: the oath over a future act, once violated, entails the expiation by consensus (al-Mughni 9/390; al-Mubdi' 9/295; Jawahir al-'Uqud 2/258).
The jurists divided over one who swears not to do a thing, then does it in forgetfulness, by mistake or in ignorance; or swears to do it, then forgets or errs: does he violate his oath and does the expiation fall on him? The Hanafis, the Malikis in the famous view, the Shafi'is in one view and Ahmad in one narration make the deliberate one, the forgetful one and the mistaken one equal in the oath: Allah said: "that is the expiation of your oaths when you have sworn" (Surah al-Ma'ida 89): for the people this means when you violate; and violation exists in forgetfulness as in deliberation, with consensus on joining the mistaken one to the deliberate one. An example of ignorance: one who swears to enter the house at such a time believing entry is not due from him at that time. An example of error: swearing not to enter the house of so-and-so then entering it believing it another's; in speech: swearing not to mention so-and-so then mentioning the target by mistake, or swearing not to greet Zayd then greeting him while taking him for 'Amr. The one who does the sworn act deliberately or in forgetfulness is equal in the ruling: the act exists in reality, forgetfulness does not remove it; the absolute oath covers every case of the act; any added condition can validly be stipulated; he acted freely, without coercion, like the deliberate one; and per the Hanafis, if he does the sworn act while unconscious or insane the violation still stands: the condition exists in reality even if the sin is not realized, for the ruling follows its proof, the violation, not the reality of the sin (Mukhtasar Ikhtilaf al-'Ulama 3/260; al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/12; at-Taj wal-Iklil 2/312; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/70-71; al-Hawi al-Kabir 15/367; al-Mughni 9/391, 420; al-Insaf 11/24-25).
The Shafi'is within the madhhab, the Hanbalis within the madhhab and some Malikis like Ibn al-'Arabi and as-Suyuri hold that he does not violate if he does the sworn act in forgetfulness or by mistake: Allah said: "No blame upon you for what you have erred in, but for what your hearts have premeditated" (Surah Luqman 5); the rulings of the oath fall within this general passing-over;
The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "Allah has passed over my ummah the error, the forgetfulness and what they are forced into".
authentic hadith: reported by Ibn Majah (2043) and Ibn Hibban (7219)
the absolute negations of the law are carried on the deliberate, not the involuntary: as with speech in prayer or eating while fasting; and since the conclusion of the oath binds only by intention and free choice, its release by violation can only come from intention and free choice. If he does the sworn act without knowing it is the sworn one (he greets a man taking him for a stranger; he parts from his creditor believing he has received his due; he sells a garment for Zayd who sends it back through an intermediary and he resells it unknowingly), he is like the forgetful one, for he does not intend the violation. Except the oath by divorce or manumission with the Hanbalis in the apparent of the madhhab: it is suspended on a condition and occurs by the presence of the condition without intention, as in: "you are divorced if the sun rises or the pilgrim arrives"; for a human right attaches to it and the ruling occurs with forgetfulness, as with destruction. Another narration from Ahmad makes him not violate: the forgetful one is not charged in his forgetfulness, so the violation does not bind him. Ibn Taymiyya fixed three views on the swearer who does the sworn act in forgetfulness or unknowing: none ever violates (the school of the Makkans, of Ishaq ibn Rahawayh, and one of the two views of ash-Shafi'i, the more apparent); all violate (the school of Abu Hanifa, of Malik and of Ahmad in a third narration); and the first is the sounder: the oath is like a confirmed command and prohibition, and whoever does the forbidden act in forgetfulness or by mistake neither sins nor contradicts; the same applies to one who acts with an interpretation, by imitating a mufti, or a deceased scholar, or as a right or mistaken mujtahid: not having premeditated the contradiction, he is not a violator (Majmu' al-Fatawa 33/208-209).
And if he does the sworn act under coercion, he does not violate: Allah has passed over error, forgetfulness and coercion; the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "no oath rests upon the coerced one" (a fabricated hadith: reported by ad-Daraqutni 4401); what prevents the conclusion of the oath, like madness, prevents the violation here; and the oath of Yamanah, father of Hudhayfa, was sworn voluntarily while he was still an idolater.
The jurists divided over one who swears not to do a thing then orders another to do it: does he violate? The Hanafis separate two orders of things. One who swears not to sell, buy or hire, then delegates someone who acts: he does not violate, unless he intended it; for the rights of these acts return to the contractor, not to the commander; if he intended it, he violates, for he bound himself harshly, even if the agent is the swearer himself; and if the swearer is one whose habit is not to handle it himself, like the sultan, and orders another, he violates: his oath bears on the command; if he intends not to handle it himself he is liable in judgment. One who swears not to marry nor divorce, then delegates someone who does it, violates; likewise the mutual release, reconciliation over intentional blood, the gift, charity, clothing and maintenance; for the agent in these acts is a spokesman who does not attribute them to himself: he says "I married off so-and-so", not "I married"; and the rights of the contract return to the commander; if he says: "I intended to do it myself", he is not liable in judgment but in what lies between him and Allah; likewise the slaughtering of his ewe (al-Mabsut of ash-Shaybani 3/347; Mukhtasar Ikhtilaf al-'Ulama 3/274-275; Tabyin al-Haqa'iq 3/148; al-Bahr ar-Ra'iq 4/377; al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/63-64).
The Malikis and the Hanbalis judge: if he swears not to do a thing then orders another who does it, he violates, unless he intended doing it with his own hand, whatever the act in which delegation is valid; for the delegable act being intended, the absolute word is shared between doing it with his own hand and doing it by delegation, as one says of a man that he bought food or clothing while he delegated another; the sworn act occurred in a manner attributed to him (al-Mudawwana al-Kubra 3/141; al-Ishraf 'ala nukat masa'il al-khilaf 4/302-303; adh-Dhakhira 4/55-56; al-Mughni 9/419; Sharh az-Zarkashi 3/318; al-Ifsah 2/374).
The Shafi'is return fulfillment or violation to the requirement of the wording: if he swears not to strike his slave, not to sell, buy, marry or divorce, then orders another who sells, buys, strikes, marries or divorces for him: he does not violate, for the wording aims at his not doing it with his own hand; but if he intended the figurative sense (not acquiring the thing), he violates, for he bound himself harshly. Rabia reported from ash-Shafi'i another view: the sultan who does not act himself and orders another violates for the sale, the purchase and the blow, but not for marriage and divorce, following habit. The famous view is the first: the oath rests on the reality, not the figure; this is why one who swears "I will not sit in the light of the lamp" then sits in the sun does not violate, though Allah said: "and We made a blazing lamp" (Surah an-Naba 13); and one who swears not to sit under a ceiling then sits under the sky does not violate, though Allah said: "and We made the sky a protected ceiling" (Surah al-Anbiya 32) (al-Bayan 10/561-562; Kifaya al-Akhyar, pages 592-593).
Al-Mawardi arranged the situation in three states. First: he intended not to do it himself: he does not violate by ordering another, without divergence, whatever the standing of the swearer. Second: he intended that the act not proceed from him, neither directly nor by cause: he violates by ordering, as he would by acting. Third: an absolute oath with no intention: the sworn act divides into three kinds: that whose usage runs through the command of another (being cupped, scarified, having the head shaved, having one's house built): ordering violates, for usage never has him do it himself; that whose usage runs through his own action (writing, reading, performing the pilgrimage, the umra): ordering does not violate; and that whose usage varies: here stands the usage of the law (establishing the punishments, which only the holders of authority establish): the commander holding authority violates even without acting himself, the other only by acting; and where usage varies without the usage of the law (contracts of sale and purchase, disciplining slaves and servants): if the usage of the swearer runs through his direct action (the common man who swears not to sell, buy, marry, divorce, strike or discipline), ordering does not violate, per the chosen view; Malik makes him violate in all of it; Abu Hanifa distinguishes by whether the agent attributes the act to himself ("I bought this house for my principal") or not ("I married for my principal"). If the usage of the swearer runs through delegation (the sultan), his violation divides: he violates per one view (the usage having become joined to the figurative, and usage being a carrier); the most apparent view is that he does not violate: the reality is direct action, which is not carried elsewhere except by a general usage, whereas this one is specific, as the sultan who swears not to eat bread nor wear clothes, then eats corn and wears a cloak: he violates, though his habit does not carry him there, for the specific usage does not rise to the rank of the general. If the usage of the swearer runs through delegation but his direct action is neither blameworthy nor unseemly (marriage, divorce, manumission): the companions divided over his violation; the upshot is that the oath rests on the realities of names and acts as long as usage does not displace them; and one who swears not to divorce his wife, then returns to her the right of divorce and she divorces herself does not violate: he is no divorcer but a grantor of choice; but if he says: "if you enter the house you are divorced" and she enters, she is divorced and he violates, for he is a divorcer upon an attribute that occurred (al-Bayan 10/561-562; Kifaya al-Akhyar, pages 592-593).
The jurists divided over one who swears over two acts (in affirmation or negation) then does only one, or swears not to eat such a loaf then eats part of it. The Hanafis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis within the madhhab judge: the oath attaches to both, and he violates only by doing all or leaving all: "by Allah I will surely greet these two men" or "I will surely eat these two loaves": he does not fulfill without greeting both and eating both; and "by Allah I will not greet these two men": he violates only by greeting both. And if he swears not to eat of this loaf then eats part of it: he does not violate, for the oath attached to the whole. The Prophet (peace be upon him), in retreat, would put out his head to 'Aisha so she would comb his hair while he was in the state barring leaving the mosque and she in her menses; and he said to Ubayy ibn Ka'b: "I will not leave the mosque before teaching you a surah of the Quran", then put out a leg and taught it; Ahmad concluded: the whole is not a part, and the part is not a whole (Mukhtasar Ikhtilaf al-'Ulama 3/226; al-Muhadhdhab 2/139; al-Bayan 10/569-570; ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/612-613).
The Malikis and the Hanbalis in one narration judge: if he does part of the sworn act in a formula of negation, he violates: one who swears "I will not eat of this loaf or this food" then eats part of it, even a morsel, violates; for he forbade himself the sworn act and must abstain from every part of it, as in the prohibition. But if the formula is one of affirmation ("by Allah I will surely eat this food", or "if I do not eat it she is divorced"), he does not fulfill by a part. Ibn Bashir said: violation enters by the least of the cases, and fulfillment occurs only by the most complete; the foundational proof: Allah permitted the triple divorce after consummation and forbade the wives of fathers and sons from the mere contract without consummation; what renders a thing lawful is stronger than what makes it merely conceivable: one who swears not to eat of this loaf violates by eating part of it, unless an intention or a triggering cause shows he meant the whole; and one who swears to eat the whole loaf does not fulfill without eating all of it, unless an intention or a cause shows otherwise. Ibn Rushd summarized the divergence: Malik requires the entirety in affirmation and makes him violate by the part in negation, as a precaution; ash-Shafi'i and Abu Hanifa make neither violation nor fulfillment in both cases, carrying the word to the broadest of its field (at-Taj wal-Iklil 2/312-313; al-Mudawwana al-Kubra 3/127; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/71; ash-Sharh al-Kabir ma'a hashiyat ad-Dasuqi 2/424; Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/303-304).
Ibn al-Qayyim dismantled the trick: eating the loaf while leaving a single morsel, dwelling in the house the whole year but one day, eating all the food but a small portion: a cold, invalid trick, the very reality of violation; it avails neither those who make the part violate nor those who do not; then it would oblige permitting everything the law forbids by leaving a small portion of it: like permitting the pilgrim in ihram to shave nine tenths of his head; and one who swears not to shave his head would be believed while shaving it almost entirely. Picture the sick man doing what the physician forbade him: would he be counted obedient toward him? Or the slave, the wife or the child doing what the master forbade them: would they be counted obedient or disobedient? And if one of them schemes by the smallest of tricks to annul the purpose of the commander, would he approve of him or excuse him? How then be excused before the One from whom nothing is hidden? (I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in 3/249; al-Mughni 9/406, 422; adh-Dhakhira, parallel discussion).
The jurists divided over the value of: "I ask you by Allah to do this", "I adjure you by Allah", or "by Allah you will surely do this": is it an oath entailing expiation? The Hanafis judge: one who says "by Allah you will do this" and the other answers "yes": if both intended the oath, they are both swearers and both owe the expiation if the act does not occur; the answer "yes" calls back the content of the request, as if he said: "yes, by Allah, I will surely do it"; if the initiator intended the adjuration and the answerer the oath, the answerer alone is the swearer; if neither intended anything, the answerer is the swearer when he says "by Allah", and the initiator when he says "and by Allah"; and if the initiator intended the adjuration and the answerer wanted a promise without oath, so it is: no oath upon either (Sharh Fath al-Qadir 5/80; ad-Durr al-Mukhtar ma'a hashiyat Ibn 'Abidin 3/848-849).
The Malikis judge: one who says "I ask you by Allah to do this" or "I adjure you by Allah" and then abstains: nothing upon either, for it is no oath, whether the oath was intended or not; this formula has received no legal nor linguistic usage: it means calling to the act in the form of a request, and that is not an oath in any respect; it is like saying: I ask it of you and I seek it (al-Mudawwana al-Kubra 3/104; at-Taj wal-Iklil 2/276; ash-Sharh al-Kabir ma'a hashiyat ad-Dasuqi 2/401; Tathbir al-Mukhtasar 2/360).
The Shafi'is arrange the situation in four states. First: he intends an oath over himself attached to the act of his fellow: the oath stands over him, suspended on the act of another; if the other does it, he fulfills; otherwise he violates, and the expiation weighs on the swearer, not the target: Allah said: "that is the expiation of your oaths when you have sworn" (Surah al-Ma'ida 89), and the Sunnah accords with it, placing fulfillment and violation on the woman who swore and the sin on the target:
'Aisha reported: a woman offered us a dish containing dates; she ate of it and left a portion; the woman said: I have adjured you to eat it; the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) said: "eat it, for the sin weighs on the one who violates".
reported by Rashid ibn Sa'd from 'Aisha
Second: he intends that the oath stand upon the adjured one, who would have to fulfill it: it is neither the oath of the swearer (he did not accept it) nor that of the adjured one (he did not swear): no oath at all, like the oath of the coerced. Third: he intends the request and the wish, with no oath for himself or the other: no oath at all. Fourth: a formula uttered with no intention of an oath at all: no oath, for no legal usage nor usage of employment attached to it (al-Umm 7/62; al-Hawi al-Kabir 15/278-279; al-Bayan 10/511; an-Najm al-Wahaj 10/20).
The Hanbalis judge: one who says "by Allah so-and-so will surely do this" or "he will not do it", or adjures a man present who answers "by Allah I will do it" then does not: the expiation weighs on the swearer, for he is the violator; if he says "I ask you by Allah to do it" intending the oath, he violates if the target does not do it, and the expiation is on the swearer; if he intended intercession by Allah, it is no oath, for lack of swearing, and no expiation upon either. And "by Allah I will do it" as an answer to the adjuration is an oath, unless an intention turns it; "by Allah I do" is not, for it is not the answer of the adjuration; that is why "by Allah I will do" stands while "by Allah I do" does not. Granting to the one who adjures is recommended: the Prophet (peace be upon him) ordered granting to the one who adjures (reported by al-Bukhari); it is a recommendation, not an obligation: Abu Bakr said: "I adjure you, O Messenger of Allah, to inform me whether I have succeeded or failed", and he answered: "do not adjure me, O Abu Bakr", without informing him. Ibn Qudama said: granting may become obligatory if no harm lies in it; and the refusal of the Prophet toward Abu Bakr lay in the harm he saw in it; and if the questioner demands a form without wanting its meaning, the meaning being impossible, it is good: al-'Abbas brought a man to the Prophet for the pledge of emigration; he said: "no emigration after the conquest"; al-'Abbas said: "I adjure you to accept his pledge"; the Prophet placed his hand in his and said: "I have granted the oath of my uncle, and no emigration", answering the form without the substance. Answering one who asks by Allah is recommended: the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "whoever seeks your protection, protect him; whoever asks you by Allah, give him; whoever seeks refuge by Allah, grant him refuge; whoever does you good, reward him; if you find nothing, pray for him" (authentic hadith: Abu Dawud 1672, an-Nasa'i 2567). And the hadith of the three whom Allah loves, among them the man who asks the people by Allah (reported by at-Tirmidhi 2568 and an-Nasa'i 1615 and 2570, weak hadith).
The jurists divided over one who says: "if I do this I am a Jew, a Christian, an idolater or a disbeliever": an oath entailing expiation, or nothing? The Malikis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis in one narration judge that the oath by what the law forbids to say (I am innocent of Allah, of His Messenger or of Islam; I am a disbeliever; I am innocent of the Ka'ba; I am outside of Islam; I am a Jew, an idolater, one who deems lawful the wine or the carrion) neither concludes nor entails expiation: Allah said: "they swear by Allah with their strongest oaths" (Surah al-An'am 109), thus fixing the supreme limit of the oath, which is not exceeded; the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "do not swear by your fathers, nor by your mothers, nor by the rivals; swear only by Allah, and do not swear by Allah except truthfully" (authentic hadith: Abu Dawud 3248, an-Nasa'i 4710); and he said: "whoever swears by other than Allah has disbelieved or associated"; the expiation thus falls away in the oath by other than Allah, as with: "if I do this I am a fornicator, a wine drinker or a murderer"; and he swore by a transient creature, for the proclaimed disbelief is transient; he forbade himself a thing by a forbidden means; the obligation comes from the Lawgiver and no text establishes it here, for the expiation occurs only in the oath by the name of Allah, in greatness of His name ('Uyun al-Masa'il, page 499; adh-Dhakhira 4/15; al-Qawanin al-fiqhiyya, page 106; al-Hawi al-Kabir 15/263; Sharh Sahih Muslim 11/107; an-Najm al-Wahaj 10/21; al-Mubdi' 9/273-274; al-Insaf 11/32; Manar as-Sabil 3/420).
The Hanafis and the Hanbalis within the madhhab judge: one who says "if I do this I am a Jew, a Christian, a Magian, a disbeliever or an idolater" pronounces an oath whose violation entails the expiation. Zayd ibn Thabit reported that the Prophet (peace be upon him) was asked about the man who swears: I am a Jew, a Christian, a Magian, innocent of Islam, then violates; he answered: the expiation of the oath is upon him (reported by al-Bayhaqi 19623, weak hadith). And the hadith of Thabit ibn Dahhak: "whoever swears upon a religion other than Islam while lying is as he said" (reported by al-Bukhari 1364 and Muslim 110). Likewise for: "I am innocent of the Quran or of Islam if I do this", and for: "I am innocent of this qibla, of the prayer or of the month of Ramadan": all of that is an oath if the oath bears on the future; if it bears on the past while he knows he did the intended act, he does not disbelieve: disbelief is a conviction of the heart, and he only aimed at being believed. And if he says: "if I do this, may the anger of Allah, His displeasure, His curse or His punishment be upon me": it is no oath; likewise: "I am a fornicator, a wine drinker or an eater of usury"; but "I deem lawful the wine, the carrion or the usury" is an oath, for whoever deems that lawful disbelieves, as in "I am a Jew" (al-Ikhtiyar 4/62-63; al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/20-21; al-Mughni 9/400-401; Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/305; al-Insaf 11/32; Manar as-Sabil 3/420).
The jurists divided over: "a vow is upon me" or "a vow of Allah is upon me": an oath entailing expiation, or nothing? The Hanafis, the Malikis and the Hanbalis judge that it is an oath whose violation entails the expiation. Ibn 'Abbas reported that the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "whoever made a vow without specifying it: its expiation is that of the oath; whoever made a vow of disobedience: its expiation is that of the oath; whoever made a vow beyond his capacity: its expiation is that of the oath; and whoever made a vow within his capacity: let him fulfill it" (reported by Abu Dawud 3322 and Ibn Majah 2128, weak hadith). And 'Uqba ibn 'Amir reported: "the expiation of the unspecified vow is that of the oath" (reported by at-Tirmidhi 1528, weak hadith).
The vow is defined: the commitment of a legally responsible person, free of his own will, to Allah of something possible, by any wording indicating it (ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/614); others say: the commitment of a means of nearness with no obligation of legal origin (an-Najm al-Wahaj 10/95). The difference between the suspended vow and the oath: the vow aims at drawing near to Allah; the oath aims at abstaining from the intended thing, or inciting to the act, or confirming a fact. This is why an oath by Allah may precede within an oath: "by Allah I will not enter the house, and if I enter it, such a commitment binds me" (the aim: abstention); or: "by Allah I will surely enter it, and if I do not enter, such a commitment binds me" (the aim: seeking entry); or: "by Allah Zayd has stood up, and if he has not stood, such a commitment binds me" (the aim: confirming the fact); unlike: "if Allah heals my sick one, such a thing becomes binding on me", which admits no preceding oath except as blessing or reinforcement of speech (hashiyat as-Sawi 4/263).
The people of knowledge agreed on the validity of the vow and its legality in principle, and on the obligation to fulfill it. In the Book: "They fulfill their vows" (Surah al-Insan 7); "and let them fulfill their vows" (Surah al-Hajj 29); "and fulfill the covenant: the covenant will be questioned about" (Surah al-Isra 34); "and fulfill the covenant of Allah when you have covenanted" (Surah an-Nahl 91): the vow is a covenant of the one vowing with Allah, whose fulfillment is binding on him; "and fulfill the covenants" (Surah al-Ma'ida 1); and the threat against the one who promised:
Among them are those who promised Allah: if He gives us of His bounty we will surely give charity and be among the righteous. But when He gave them of His bounty they became stingy and turned away. So He caused hypocrisy to settle in their hearts until the day they meet Him, for having failed Allah in what they promised Him and for having lied.
Surah at-Tawba 75-77
In the Sunnah:
'Aisha reported that the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "whoever vowed to obey Allah, let him obey Him; whoever vowed to disobey Him, let him not disobey Him".
reported by al-Bukhari (6700)
'Imran ibn Husayn reported the hadith of the generations: "there will come after you people who betray and are not trusted, who testify without being called to testify, who vow and do not fulfill, and upon whom obesity will appear" (reported by al-Bukhari 2508 and Muslim 2535). Ibn Battal wrote: "the scholars agreed: fulfilling the vow of obedience is a strict obligation upon whoever is able" (Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari 6/154). Ibn Qudama wrote: "the Muslims agreed on the validity of the vow in principle and the obligation of fulfilling it" (al-Mughni 10/67). An-Nawawi wrote: "in this hadith lies the obligation of fulfilling the vow, and it is an obligation without disagreement" (Sharh Sahih Muslim 16/88). Al-Kasani wrote: "the consensus of the ummah stands on it" (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/90). Ibn Rushd wrote: "they agreed on the binding force of the absolute vow as nearness, except what is reported from some companions of ash-Shafi'i; and they agreed on the binding force of the absolute vow by consent, not by obstinacy, and on the binding force of the vow whose outcome is that of the condition if it is a vow of nearness" (Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/309). The rational reason: the Muslim needs a means of nearness that removes from him the license of leaving it, in hope of the high degrees, and that his nature does not grant him: the vow creates the obligation that drives him to attain it (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/90).
The ruling of the vow: the Hanafis make it a lawful means of nearness: nearness by fasting, prayer, pilgrimage, manumission, charity; and its legality by the texts: "and let them fulfill their vows" (Surah al-Hajj 29); "fulfill your vow"; "whoever vowed and specified, fulfilling what he specified is upon him"; "whoever vowed to obey Allah, let him obey Him" (reported by al-Bukhari 6700) (al-Ikhtiyar 4/89-90; hashiyat Ibn 'Abidin 3/375). The Malikis recommend the absolute vow (neither suspended nor repeated) in thanksgiving for a favor that occurred; the repeated vow is disliked (fasting every Thursday), for it weighs on the soul and leads away from obedience; the vow suspended on other than disobedience is disliked in the sound view, contrary to Ibn Rushd who permits it; and the vow suspended on a disobedience is forbidden: he must leave it, and if he does it he sins and remains bound to what he vowed (Mawahib al-Jalil 4/461-462; at-Taj wal-Iklil 2/348-349; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/93; ash-Sharh al-Kabir ma'a hashiyat ad-Dasuqi 2/457).
The Shafi'is held four views: disliked (from the narrations of Sufyan and Shu'ba: the Prophet forbade the vow and said: "it brings nothing, it only draws (wealth) out of the stingy"; reported by al-Bukhari 6608, 6693 and Muslim 1639; the version of Shu'ba: "it brings no good"); contrary to what is preferable; a means of nearness (the view of the upholder, al-Ghazali, ar-Rafi'i and an-Nawawi, by "whatever you spend or vow, Allah knows it: He repays it", Surah al-Baqara 270; the prohibition being only confirmation of the command and a warning against taking it lightly); and the division: the vow of thanksgiving not suspended is recommended, the suspended one is not, the choice of Ibn ar-Rif'a, and ash-Shirbini said: it is the closest to the truth (Tarh at-Tathrib 6/36-37; Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/253-254). The Hanbalis make it a disliked act, not recommended: it brings no good and turns back no decree, by the same hadith; the prohibition carries dislike, not forbidding, for Allah praised those who fulfill it; Ibn Hamid said: the madhhab makes it permitted, and a group of the people of hadith forbade it (al-Mughni 10/67; al-Insaf 11/117; Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/346; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/438; Manar as-Sabil 3/439).
The bequest is lawful by the Book, the Sunnah, consensus and reason. In the Book:
It is prescribed, when death approaches one of you and he leaves wealth, to make a bequest in favor of his parents and the nearest of kin in a fair manner: a duty upon the God-fearing. Then whoever changes it after hearing it, the sin rests upon those who change it. Allah is Hearing and Knowing.
Surah al-Baqara 180-181
and: "after a bequest he has made or a debt" (Surah an-Nisa 11). In the Sunnah:
Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas narrated: the Prophet (peace be upon him) visited me while I was sick at Mecca; I said: I have wealth, may I bequeath all my wealth? He said: no; the half? He said: no; the third? He said: "the third, and the third is much: to leave your heirs wealthy is better than to leave them dependent, holding out their hands to people".
reported by al-Bukhari (5039) and Muslim (1628)
Muslim reported from 'Imran ibn Husayn that a man of the Ansar bequeathed the freeing of his six slaves, and the Prophet freed two and returned four into gradual servitude (reported by Muslim 1668). Nafi' reported from Ibn 'Umar that the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) said:
"It is not the right of a Muslim who has something to bequeath to pass two nights without his written bequest at his side".
reported by al-Bukhari (2738) and Muslim (1627)
Ibn 'Umar said: no night passed since I heard him without my bequest at my side. And he said: "Allah gives charity to each of you from the third of his wealth at his death, an increase for his deeds and good works" (reported by Ibn Majah 2709 and Ahmad 27552, good hadith). And he said: "Allah says: O son of Adam, two things, neither of which belongs to you: I have allotted you a share of your wealth at the moment I seize you in your death throes, to purify you thereby and to raise you through the prayer of My servants upon you after your term has ended" (reported by Ibn Majah 2710, weak hadith). Jabir reported: "whoever dies upon a bequest dies upon a path and a sunnah" (reported by Ibn Majah 2701, weak hadith). And Abu Hurayra reported: "when the man dies his deeds cease, except from three: an ongoing charity, a knowledge from which benefit is drawn, or a righteous child who prays for him" (reported by Muslim 1631).
As for consensus: Ibn al-Mundhir wrote: all whose word is preserved agreed on the lawfulness of the bequest in favor of parents who do not inherit and of non-heir kin (al-Ijma', page 335). Ibn 'Abd al-Barr wrote: the hadith of Ibn 'Umar contains the urging toward the bequest, on the mode of recommendation, without disagreement; and the jurists of the cities agree that the bequest is recommended and lawful over all wealth, small or great, without exceeding the third: Malik, ath-Thawri, Abu Hanifa, al-Awza'i, al-Hasan, ash-Shafi'i, Ahmad and Ishaq said it (at-Tamhid 14/292; al-Istidhkar 7/263). Ibn Qudama wrote: "the scholars of all the cities and all the ages agreed on the lawfulness of the bequest" (al-Mughni 6/55). An-Nawawi wrote: the hadith contains the urging toward the bequest; the Muslims agreed on the command to make one, but our school and that of the majority make it a recommendation, not an obligation (Sharh Sahih Muslim 11/74). Al-'Iraqi and al-Kasani confirm it (Tarh at-Tathrib 6/161; Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 7/330). The rational reason: man needs to close his deeds with a means of nearness, or to make up for what he neglected in his lifetime; for man is deceived by his hope and negligent in his deeds; illness coming and death feared, he needs to repair some of his neglect; the Lawgiver therefore legalized the bequest to allow him the good deed and the discharge of the need. And the wealth of man does not vanish at his death in what he needs: his shroud and his grave remain, and his debt remains claimable from him; so here likewise (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 7/330; al-Hidaya Sharh al-Bidaya 4/231; Tabyin al-Haqa'iq 6/182).
The cause of the bequest is that of the other donations: aiming at good repute in this world and the high degrees in the Hereafter (al-Bahr ar-Ra'iq 8/459).
The scholars agreed: the bequest was first obligatory for the kin: "It is prescribed for you... to make a bequest in favor of your parents and the nearest of kin" (Surah al-Baqara 180); then its obligation was abrogated, in the four schools and with many scholars, by the verse of the inheritance shares, and only its lawfulness remained for whoever does not inherit (al-Muwatta 2/765; Nihayat al-Matlab 10/5; al-Wasit 5/368). 'Ikrima reported from Ibn 'Abbas that this verse stood so until its abrogation by the verse of inheritance (reported by Abu Dawud 2869). Ash-Shafi'i wrote: the bequest was an obligation in the Book of Allah for whoever leaves wealth, in favor of his parents and kin; then some scholars claimed it was abrogated for the heirs, and they divided over the non-heirs; most of the scholars I met say: the bequests are abrogated, for the command came only for what served as inheritance; when Allah divided the inheritance shares, it became voluntary; and it must be understood thus: "to each parent a sixth" (Surah an-Nisa 11); and the Prophet said: "no bequest for an heir" (authentic hadith: Abu Dawud 2870, 3565; an-Nasa'i 3641; Ibn Majah 2713-2714); and ash-Shafi'i adds: the bequest to the heirs abrogated by the verse of the shares, the prohibition of the bequest for the heir, and its lawfulness for the non-kin: all of this shows the abrogation. Abu 'Umar (Ibn 'Abd al-Barr) wrote: the Quran mentions the bequest only in this verse, revealed before the inheritance shares; when Allah revealed the ruling of the parents and the other heirs, He abolished their bequest and assigned them known shares; it is reported from Ibn 'Abbas, Sa'id ibn Jubayr and al-Hasan that the verse of the inheritance shares abrogated the bequest of the heir parents and kin: it is the school of ash-Shafi'i, of most of the Malikis and of a group of scholars (al-Umm 4/98-99).
The repeated oath presents four scenarios. The source opens on the condition of the exception (istithna) in the oath: those who require the swearer to hear it, himself or another, have no proof from the language, usage or law, and there is no consensus on the issue; the companions of Abu Hanifa (the wording of adh-Dhakhira) lay down that the condition of the exception is to pronounce the letters, heard or not, per Abi al-Hasan al-Karkhi; the jurist Abu Ja'far required him to hear himself, the shaykh Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn al-Fadl gave fatwa accordingly, and the shaykh of Islam Ibn Taymiyya inclined to this view (I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in 4/81). First: repetition of the oath over a single thing. The generality of jurists fixed: one who repeats the oath over one thing for emphasis ("by Allah I will surely do it... by Allah I will surely do it"), like the Prophet (peace be upon him): "by Allah I will surely fight Quraysh" three times (reported by Abu Dawud 3285 and Ibn Hibban 4343): a single expiation binds him. Repetition aiming at a new oath divides: the Hanafis and the Hanbalis in one narration judge: if he intends the repetition, a single oath; if he has no intention or intends emphasis, they are two oaths; if he pronounces it in separate sittings, two oaths, each being a concluded oath; al-Kasani adds: "by Allah and by Allah": Muhammad sees two expiations by reasoning, then prefers a single one by sound preference; and if both formulas are repeated with a conjunction ("by Allah I will not do it, and by the Merciful I will not do it") or without ("by Allah I will not do it... by Allah I will not do it"), they are two oaths beyond doubt; if he says: "I intended by the second to report the first", al-Karkhi believes him: the ruling attached to the oath is the expiation, an affair between him and Allah, and the wording is admissible; Abu Hanifa does not believe him (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 3/10; Mukhtasar Ikhtilaf al-'Ulama 3/243; Fatawa as-Saghdi 1/387; al-Mabsut 8/157; al-Mughni 9/406; Sharh az-Zarkashi 3/310). The Malikis judge: repetition in one sitting or in separate sittings ("by Allah and by Allah", or "by Allah, the Merciful, the Merciful") forms a single oath if he intended emphasis; it is said: if he intended a new oath, each oath entails an expiation; and if he intended the multiplicity of expiations, they multiply by the number of the formulas, by consensus (at-Tamhid 14/369-370; adh-Dhakhira 4/18; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/64; hashiyat as-Sawi 4/201; al-Ifsah 2/388). The Shafi'is look at the intention: emphasis: a single expiation; a new oath: two views, of which the sound one is the single expiation, for the second adds nothing over the first; with no intention: per the first view a single expiation is preferable, and per the second, two. The Hanbalis within the madhhab judge: a single expiation even intending repetition: a single violation requires a single kind of expiation; and expiations merge like the punishments (al-Muhadhdhab 2/141; hashiyat Qalyubi 4/699; Jawahir al-'Uqud 2/264; al-Mughni 9/406; Sharh az-Zarkashi 3/310). Ibn Hubayra summarized: Abu Hanifa, Malik and Ahmad in one narration: every oath carries an expiation, over one act or several; Malik considers the aim of emphasis (a single one) or of resumption (one per oath); and the second narration of Ahmad: a single expiation in all, the choice of Abu Bakr 'Abd al-'Aziz and the apparent of the words of al-Kharqi; ash-Shafi'i: one thing: a single expiation with emphasis; resumption: two views; different things: an expiation each; Ibn Taymiyya: these are the two narrations of Ahmad, the more famous being the single expiation (al-Ifsah 2/288-289; Jawahir al-'Uqud 2/264; Majmu' al-Fatawa 33/219).
Second: oaths over different kinds. The jurists agreed: one who swears "by Allah I did not eat; by Allah I did not drink; by Allah I did not wear" and then violates one of them owes an expiation; if he expiates then violates another oath, another expiation binds him, like one who has intercourse in Ramadan, expiates, then does so again. The dispute bears on violating all the oaths before expiating: the Hanbalis within the madhhab judge: a single expiation, even for a thousand oaths, the text of Ibn Mansur from Ahmad, a narration held sound by al-Qadi: the expiations are of one kind and merge like the punishments, even if their places differ, as with adultery with several women or theft from several people (al-Mughni 9/406-407; Sharh az-Zarkashi 3/310; Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/310; Manar as-Sabil 3/423). The majority of the people of knowledge (the Hanafis, the Malikis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis in one view) judge: an expiation per oath: each is an independent oath; the violation of one does not violate the other; and this differs from the repeated oath over a single thing: there the violation is one; here they multiply; and it differs from the punishments, which merge, being established for deterrence and absorbed by doubts, whereas here the obligation is a giving of wealth or a fast with no great harm.
Third: a single oath over different things. The jurists of the four schools agreed: one who swears in one formula "by Allah and by Allah I will not enter the house of so-and-so, greet so-and-so or strike so-and-so" and then does all of that violates and owes a single expiation: the oath is one and the violation is one; by a single intended act he violates, the oath dissolves, and nothing weighs on him for the rest. Ibn Qudama wrote: "if he swears one oath over different kinds: 'by Allah I neither ate, nor drank, nor wore', then violates in all: a single expiation, with no known disagreement: the oath is one and the violation is one" (al-Mughni 9/406; al-Muwatta 2/478; al-Mudawwana al-Kubra 3/115). Ibn 'Abd al-Barr wrote: one who swears over different things in a single oath then does one of them violates and owes the expiation, and nothing weighs on him for the rest; it is said he does not violate until he does all that he swore over (al-Kafi, page 194; al-Istidhkar 5/198).
Fourth: enumerating the formulas of the oath. No disagreement: one who says "by Allah, the Great, the Merciful, the Merciful" and the like forms a single oath, whether the names differ or match. The differing: "by Allah, the Merciful, I did not do it": no conjunction, the second qualifying the first; the matching: "by Allah and by Allah": the second counting as repetition and emphasis: a single oath, unless he intends two oaths (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 3/9; at-Tamhid 14/370). The dispute bears on the conjunction between the formulas: "by Allah, and by the Merciful, I will not do it": the Hanafis divide: Muhammad in al-Jami' makes two oaths (one of the two narrations of Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf): the conjoined differs from the one conjoined to; and the judge administers the oath by the names and attributes without conjunction, for the defendant owes only a single oath; al-Hasan ibn Ziyad reports from Abu Hanifa a single oath, the choice of Zufar and a narration from Abu Yusuf: the conjunction sometimes serves resumption and sometimes qualification ("so-and-so, the learned, the ascetic, the generous, the brave"): doubt prevents establishing a second oath (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 3/9-10; al-Mabsut 8/157). The Malikis judge: one who swears over a single thing by different oaths (by manumission, by divorce and by Allah the Great, or by the covenant and the pledge of Allah) then violates owes everything he swore by, unless he intended emphasis: a single oath; for each formula being able to carry an independent oath, there are two. The Shafi'is, Mutrif, Ibn al-Majishun and 'Isa ibn Dinar among the Malikis judge: repeating oaths over a single thing, once violated, requires only a single expiation: it is one oath made stronger, like "by Allah, the Seeker, the Overpowering" (Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari 6/116; al-Istidhkar 5/198; al-Hawi al-Kabir 15/280).
In short: an oath violated in forgetfulness, by mistake or under coercion does not violate with most scholars; swearing not to do then delegating the act violates per the Malikis and the Hanbalis, but not per the Hanafis for delegable acts unless intended; repeating the oath over the same thing owes a single expiation per the soundest view; oaths over different things require an expiation each; and the vow and the bequest, close to the oath, follow their own rules: the vow of obedience is fulfilled, the vow of disobedience is not and its expiation is that of the oath; and the bequest remains lawful up to the third for the non-heir.