Islamic Fiqh > Oaths and vows > Vows (nudhur) > The legislation of the oath
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An oath (ymyn) is swearing by Allah, by one of His names or one of His attributes, over a past or future matter, with a fixed formula. The jurists of the four schools settled its definition, its types, its concluding formulas and the ruling on its expiation; the following gathers those rules from the encyclopedia of the four madhhabs.
Quranic quotations give the meaning of the verse, and hadiths carry their exact sources.
The origin of the conclusion of an oath and of its legality is the Book, the Sunnah and consensus. In the Book:
Allah will not hold you accountable for the laghw (thoughtless words) in your oaths, but He will hold you accountable for what your oaths have concluded.
Surah al-Ma'ida 89
It is also said: "Those who purchase the covenant of Allah and their oaths for a small price will have no share in the Hereafter: Allah will not speak to them, nor look at them on the Day of Resurrection, nor purify them, and theirs is a painful punishment" (Surah Ali 'Imran 77); "And do not break the oaths after their confirmation" (Surah an-Nahl 91). Allah even commanded His Prophet (peace be upon him) to swear in more than three places: "They ask you: is it true? Say: yes, by my Lord, it is surely the truth, and you cannot prevent it" (Surah Yunus 53); "Say: yes, by my Lord, it will surely come to you" (Surah Saba 3); "Say: yes, by my Lord, you will surely be resurrected" (Surah at-Taghabun 7).
The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "By Allah, I will surely fight Quraysh, by Allah, I will surely fight Quraysh, by Allah, I will surely fight Quraysh", then he said: "if Allah wills".
reported by Abu Dawud (3285) and Ibn Hibban in his Sahih (4343)
Whoever swears an oath and then sees something better than it, let him do what is better and expiate his oath.
reported by Muslim (1650)
Ibn 'Umar reported that the Prophet (peace be upon him) often swore: "No, by the Turner of hearts" (reported by al-Bukhari 6956). Zuhdam reported that a man had sworn not to eat from a bird he considered impure; Abu Musa told him that the Prophet, after swearing not to carry the Ash'arites who asked him, later ordered five camels loaded with ghee for them and said: "It was not I who carried you, it was Allah who carried you. By Allah, if Allah wills, I never swear an oath but that, seeing something better, I do what is better and expiate it" (reported by al-Bukhari 2964 and Muslim 1469).
As for consensus, many scholars transmitted it on the legality of the oath and its conclusion. Ibn Qudama wrote: "The origin of its legality and the establishment of its ruling is the Book, the Sunnah and consensus, and the ummah agreed on the legality of the oath and the establishment of its rulings" (al-Mughni 9/385). Al-'Imrani said the same (al-Bayan 10/483-485). An-Nawawi commented on the hadith "whoever is to swear, let him swear by Allah": "In this hadith lies the permissibility of swearing by Allah and all His attributes, and this is agreed upon" (Sharh Sahih Muslim 11/106). Al-'Iraqi (Tarh at-Tathrib 7/136) and az-Zayla'i (Tabyin al-Haqa'iq 3/107) confirmed it. Az-Zarkashi gave the definition: "al-ayman is the plural of yamin; in the root of the language it is swearing by something great in itself or in the eyes of the swearer, over some matter, with a restricted formula such as: by Allah I will do it" (Sharh az-Zarkashi 3/297).
Ibn Qudama divided oaths into five categories (al-Mughni 9/388-390; al-Insaf 11/13-14; al-Bayan 10/489-491):
The Shafi'is define it: swearing over a past matter while lying: "by Allah I did it" though he did not, or "by Allah I did not do it" though he did; its speaker is a disobedient sinner, and such an oath is called ghamus (devouring). The Hanbalis say: swearing over the past while lying deliberately. If he speaks the truth it is not a ghamus; if he forgot, he bears no sin (al-Hawi al-Kabir 15/267; al-Muhadhdhab 2/128; al-Bayan 10/487; Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/298; ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/598).
The people of knowledge agreed that it is forbidden and counts among the major sins. Ibn 'Umar reported that a Bedouin asked the Prophet (peace be upon him) what the major sins are; he said: "associating others with Allah"; the Bedouin asked again, he said: "then disobedience to parents"; he asked again, he said: "then disobedience to parents"; he asked again, he said: "the devouring oath"; the Bedouin asked what the devouring oath is, and he answered: "the one by which a man seizes the wealth of a Muslim while lying" (reported by al-Bukhari 6522).
Ibn Mas'ud reported that the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) said: "Whoever swears an oath unjustly to seize the wealth of a Muslim will meet Allah while He is angry with him." Al-Ash'ath ibn Qays said: this happened to me: a Jew and I had a piece of land which he denied me; I brought him to the Prophet (peace be upon him), who asked me for proof; I had none; he asked the Jew to swear; I said: O Messenger of Allah, he will swear and take my wealth; then Allah revealed: "Those who purchase the covenant of Allah and their oaths for a small price..." (Surah Ali 'Imran 77).
reported by al-Bukhari (2523)
Abu Hurayra also reported: "five things have no expiation: associating others with Allah, killing a soul without right, devouring the wealth of a believer, fleeing on the day of battle, and the obstinate oath by which wealth is seized without right" (graded hasan for other chains: reported by Ahmad 8722).
Abu Umama reported that the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) said: "Whoever seizes the right of a Muslim by his oath, Allah has made the Fire obligatory for him and forbidden Paradise to him"; a man asked: "even a small thing, O Messenger of Allah?" He said: "even a twig of arak" (reported by Muslim 137). Everything over which Allah, or His Messenger, threatens with the Fire is among the major sins.
The jurists divided: is the expiation due for the devouring oath? The Shafi'is and Ahmad in one narration hold it due: Allah said: "that is the expiation of your oaths when you have sworn" (Surah al-Ma'ida 89), and Surah al-Baqara 225 reserves accountability for what the hearts have earned, while the devouring oath is intended; so being held accountable for it requires its expiation; it is an oath by Allah deliberately chosen, and it must divide into fulfillment and violation like the oath over the future; whatever is a lie outside an oath is a violation within it; and the obligation of expiation is broader in the more sinful. In their view this oath is dissolved without conclusion: conclusion only occurs over what may follow in fulfillment or violation, whereas violation accompanied the very wording of the oath, so it never concluded, and the expiation became due by the wording alone (al-Hawi al-Kabir 15/267; al-Muhadhdhab 2/128-129; al-Bayan 10/488; Rawdat at-Talibin 7/119; al-Mughni 9/392; al-Kafi 4/374).
The majority of jurists (the Hanafis, the Malikis and the Hanbalis within the madhhab) require no expiation: the offender must return what he seized from his brother's wealth, then repent and seek forgiveness; Allah forgives or punishes as He wills; the expiation has no place in a lying oath uttered with intent to lie: Allah fixed the requital of the devouring oath in the threat of the Hereafter (Surah Ali 'Imran 77); had the expiation been due He would have mentioned it, for it would only be due to remove that stated threat, which no one claims. Allah said: "Allah will not hold you accountable for the laghw in your oaths, but He will hold you accountable for what your oaths have concluded" (Surah al-Ma'ida 89): accountability through expiation occurs only in a concluded oath, and the devouring oath is dissolved without conclusion; the concluded is what can be dissolved, which is impossible here. The hadith of the five things with no expiation (reported by Ahmad 8722) and the hadith of Ibn Mas'ud (reported by al-Bukhari 2523) state its ruling without expiation: had there been one it would have been cited. The hadith "do what is better and expiate" (reported by Muslim 1650) shows the expiation concerns only oaths over future acts. Ibn Mas'ud said: "we counted among the sins with no expiation the devouring oath; it was asked what it is; he said: seizing the wealth of one's brother by a lying oath" (reported by al-Bayhaqi 19668); the expiation is an act of worship requiring a lawful cause and an intention, and no worship attaches to a forbidden oath, unlike the concluded oath which is permitted. And this oath is among the major sins: "Among the major sins: associating others with Allah, disobedience to parents, killing a soul and the devouring oath" (reported by al-Bukhari 6476).
Az-Zarkashi fixed it: the oath over the past, if he speaks the truth, is a fulfillment by consensus (Sharh az-Zarkashi 3/301). The oath of laghw has two interpretations among the scholars:
The people of science agreed: no oath of laghw, under whichever interpretation, entails an expiation. "No, by Allah" and "yes indeed, by Allah" are a matter of consensus; the mistaken oath over the past entails no expiation for the majority, while it does for the Shafi'is and Ahmad in one narration, as will follow. The proof: "Allah will not hold you accountable for the laghw in your oaths, but He will hold you accountable for what your oaths have concluded... that is the expiation of your oaths when you have sworn" (Surah al-Ma'ida 89) and "Allah will not hold you accountable for the laghw in your oaths, but He will hold you accountable for what your hearts have earned" (Surah al-Baqara 225). Ibn 'Abd al-Barr wrote: "what entails no expiation by consensus is the laghw" (at-Tamhid 21/247). Ibn Qudama wrote: "among those who said there is no expiation here: Ibn 'Abbas, Abu Hurayra, Abu Malik, Zurara ibn Awfa, al-Hasan, an-Nakha'i and Malik, and that is the view of whoever counts it among the laghw of oaths; we know of no disagreement on this. The reason is the verse of al-Ma'ida: Allah made the expiation for the oath for which one is held accountable and denied accountability in laghw, so the expiation falls away; and the statement of the named Companions, with no known opponent in their time, stands as consensus; and the explanation of 'Aisha is an explanation of the word of Allah, and the explanation of a Companion is accepted" (al-Mughni 9/393). Al-Marwazi wrote: the laghw is the saying "no, by Allah", "yes indeed, by Allah" without conviction of the oath or desire for it; Ibn Juzayy wrote: "the laghw entails no expiation at all, unanimously" (al-Qawanin al-fiqhiyya, page 107).
The jurists of the four schools agreed: laghw in an oath occurs only by Allah. If someone swears by divorce, manumission or a vow over a past matter believing he speaks the truth, and the opposite appears, the divorce and manumission take effect; likewise swearing by a vow binds him, for these are not legal oaths but binding commitments: that is why the formulas of oath do not apply to them and swearing by them is prohibited; no human right attaches to them; unlike the oath by Allah, whose right is estimated between him and Allah, who best knows what he intended (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 3/3-4; al-Muwafaqat; al-Mudawwana al-Kubra 3/101; at-Taj wal-Iklil 2/279).
As for one who swears over something he believes to be as he says and it was not: the majority (the Hanafis, the Malikis and the Hanbalis within the madhhab) require no expiation, for this is laghw of the oath (Surah al-Ma'ida 89); it is an unconcluded oath, like the devouring oath; it was not intended for violation, like one who violates while forgetting. The Shafi'is and Ahmad in one narration require the expiation: intended laghw is only that of the hadith of 'Aisha ("a man's speech in his house: no, by Allah; and yes indeed, by Allah"), whose apparent wording restricts laghw to that one type; the question therefore hinges on the earlier dispute over interpreting laghw.
The third type is the concluded oath: the oath over a future matter, to do it or not do it; if he violates it, the expiation becomes obligatory for him (Tabyin al-Haqa'iq 3/109; al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/7; Durrar al-Hukkam 5/170). The people of knowledge agreed: the concluded oath is the one over the future, so that the swearer can fulfill it; if it is over the past, the scholars require no expiation: either he is truthful, and there is nothing; or he lies, and it is the devouring oath. The proof: "Allah will not hold you accountable... but He will hold you accountable for what your oaths have concluded... that is the expiation of your oaths when you have sworn; so guard your oaths" (Surah al-Ma'ida 89): guarding is conceivable only in the future; "for what your oaths have concluded": conclusion is speech bound to speech producing a ruling, like other legal contracts; and "do not break the oaths after their confirmation" (Surah an-Nahl 91): breaking occurs only in a conclusion, itself conceivable in the future; consensus on this was even transmitted (Tabyin al-Haqa'iq 3/109; al-Bahr ar-Ra'iq 4/303; Durrar al-Hukkam 5/171).
Ibn 'Abd al-Barr wrote: among oaths, some entail the expiation by consensus, others none by consensus, and others are disputed; the one entailing it by the consensus of Muslim scholars is the oath by Allah over future acts, which divides into two: swearing to do and then not doing, or swearing not to do and then doing (at-Tamhid 21/247). In al-Istidhkar (5/192): "the oath over the future, 'by Allah I will not do it', 'by Allah I will surely do it': the scholars did not differ: whoever violates owes the expiation Allah mentioned in His Book: 'that is the expiation of your oaths when you have sworn', that is, when you violate". Ibn Hazm wrote: "whoever swears not to do such a thing, or to do it, setting a term: tomorrow, such a day, today or a day he names; if that term passes and he deliberately, remembering his oath, does not do what he swore to do, or does what he swore not to do, the expiation of the oath falls on him; no one disagrees on this, and the Quran and the Sunnah came with it" (al-Muhalla 8/32). Ibn Hubayra wrote: "they agreed: the concluded oath is swearing by Allah over a future matter, to do it or not do it; if he violates, the expiation becomes due" (al-Ifsah 2/364).
The concluded oath divides into three: unrestricted, timed and immediate. The unrestricted oath mentions no term, in affirmation or negation. In affirmation ("by Allah I will surely strike Zayd"): as long as the swearer and the target exist, he does not violate; if one of them dies, he violates. In negation ("I will not strike Zayd"): the oath is not violated by the passing of time; if he strikes the target once, he violates, the expiation becomes obligatory, and the oath does not conclude a second time (al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/8).
The timed oath: "by Allah I will surely drink today the water in this jug" or "by Allah I will surely eat today this loaf"; he does not violate as long as the day has not passed; when the day passes without his drinking, he violates and the expiation becomes due without dispute among the jurists. If he dies before the day ends, he does not violate, by consensus. If he pours out the water before the day ends: Abu Hanifa and Muhammad do not make him violate; Abu Yusuf makes him violate when the day ends; Malik and ash-Shafi'i do not make him violate if the water spoiled without his choice. And if he swears "by Allah I will drink the water in this jug" while it holds no water: Abu Hanifa, Muhammad, az-Zufar, the Shafi'is within the madhhab and the Hanbalis do not make him violate, since the condition of conclusion is absent: picturing the drinking of the sworn water; Abu Yusuf, the Shafi'is in one view and Ahmad in one narration make him violate from the hour of the oath; if he knows there is no water, the majority of the Hanafi jurists in the sound version, the Malikis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis in the sound version make him violate; in the view of Abu Hanifa and az-Zufar he does not violate whether he knows or not (Mukhtasar Ikhtilaf al-'Ulama 3/273; Fatawa as-Saghdi 1/400; Tuhfat al-Fuqaha 2/292; Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 3/11; al-Mughni 9/422; Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/342).
The immediate oath (fawr) is one with a cause: the situation restricts the oath to that cause. Every oath uttered as an answer to speech or following an affair becomes restricted by the situation: a woman prepares to go out; he says: "if you go out you are divorced"; she sits an hour then goes out: she is not divorced.
The requisites of fulfillment and violation in an oath are four: the intention, the triggering cause (bisat), verbal custom and the legal aim. The origin is that the oath rests on the intention of the swearer; the jurists divide when no intention exists: does one return to the cause that provoked the oath, then to custom, the law or the language, or directly to custom? Here are the rules.
The intention first. The intention specifies the general, restricts the absolute and explains the condensed when the wording admits it. One who swears "I will not wear the burnous" (a word said of both white and black) and declares: "I meant the white" may wear the black. One who swears not to eat meat or fruit while intending a specific meat or fruit is believed in the fatwa, unanimously. Likewise swearing over an act or its leaving within a set term: "I will not lunch" meaning today, "I will not eat" meaning this hour, or to the invitation "come lunch with me" the answer: "by Allah, I will not lunch with you", with the clarification "I meant today": it is accepted and his oath restricts itself to what he intended. Likewise if he intends a general meaning and expresses it by a specific wording, as in swearing not to give a certain man water to drink, or not to wear cloth spun by his wife, intending to cut off every favor attached to that: he violates by any benefit from them; for he intended by his oath what the wording admits and the language allows expressing, and his oath turns toward that like the allusive formulas. And one who swears not to lodge with his wife in a house he named, intending to punish her by distance: the oath covers all the houses (al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/9-10).
The Malikis arrange the intention in three states. First, an intention equal to the apparent sense of the wording (admitting both sides without preference): it is always accepted in the oath by Allah and in the other conditional oaths, in the fatwa and in judgment: like the oath over his wife that if he marries during her lifetime the one he marries is divorced; he marries after her divorce saying: "I meant during her marriage bond, and she is no longer in it": he is believed. Second, an intention contrary to the apparent sense yet close to parity: accepted in the fatwa in general, except for divorce and specified manumission before the judge (proof or confession): the judgment stands. One who swears "I will not eat meat" then eats mutton and says before the judge: "I meant beef", or "I meant mutton fat" after eating beef fat, is not believed; but in the fatwa he is believed, the intention being close to parity; likewise "I will not greet him" meaning only that month, or "I will not enter his house" meaning the mosque, or the oath not to sell or not to strike followed by the sale or the blow through an agent, with the declaration "I meant not to sell with my own hand": accepted in the fatwa, rejected in judgment for divorce and specified manumission only; for the unspecified, the intention that determines it is accepted. Third, an intention far from the apparent sense, like the absence of intent: never accepted, neither in the fatwa nor in judgment, for divorce, manumission or anything else: intending a dead wife ("if I enter the house of Zayd, his wife is divorced" then: "I meant my dead wife") is not believed; intending a lie ("you are forbidden to me" then: "I meant that your lying be forbidden") is not believed in anything (at-Taj wal-Iklil 2/302-303; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/66; ash-Sharh al-Kabir ma'a hashiyat ad-Dasuqi 2/415-417; an-Najm al-Wahaj 10/48-52; Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/311-312).
Ibn Qudama summarized: "the oath rests on the intention of the swearer; if he intends by his words what they admit, his oath turns to it whether it matches the apparent sense or opposes it. The matching: intending by the general wording its generality, by the absolute its absoluteness, and by each wording what immediately comes to mind. The opposing has several kinds: intending the specific by the general (not eating meat or fruit while intending each precisely); intending a set term (not lunching meaning that day, eating meaning that hour); intending something other than what the listener understands (the allusive formulas); intending the general by the specific (not giving a certain man water while intending to cut off every favor; not lodging with his wife in one house while intending distance in all; not wearing cloth of her spinning while intending to cut off the favor of wearing it or of its price: the view of Malik)" (al-Mughni 10/24). Abu Hanifa and ash-Shafi'i give no weight to the intention or the cause against the wording: violation consists in opposing what the oath concluded upon, and the oath is its wording; violating over something else would be violating over the intention, not over the oath; bare intention concludes no oath, so it causes no violation. The reply of the Hanbalis: he intended by his speech what it admits and the language allows expressing, and his oath turned to it like the allusions; that the wording admits the specific for the general appears in the Quran: "they do not possess even the husk of a date stone" (Surah Fatir 13); "and they are not wronged even the thread of a grooved date stone" (Surah an-Nisa 49); "then they would not give the people even a notch of it" (Surah an-Nisa 53); likewise the poet al-Hutay'a: "they wrong not the people by a grain of mustard" without intending that grain, but intending: they wrong them in nothing; and the general is used for the specific: "when the people said to them" (Surah Ali 'Imran 173) intending one man, Abu Sufyan; "you destroy everything" (Surah al-Ahqaf 25) without intending the sky and the earth. When the wording admits it, the oath must turn to it: the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "a man has only what he intended" (reported by al-Bukhari 1), and the speech of the Lawgiver is interpreted by His intent when the evidence establishes it; likewise the speech of others.
The people of knowledge agreed: the intention counts for specifying or restricting, unless the oath is administered to a man against whom another holds a claim: the oath then follows the intention of the one who administers it, whether wealth is at stake (debt, theft) or not. The claimant who administers the oath saying: "you owe me no debt" or: "you have already repaid me", or: "you did not steal, you did not seize by force", and the defendant swears then declares: "I meant such a sale or such a loan; my debt is of another kind": the oath binds him, by Allah and by other than Allah; or one who swears "I did not steal" then says: "I meant the chest; my theft was from the treasury": he is not believed. Likewise for the wife's stipulation at the contract (that she not be moved from her town, that he take no other wife) joined to an oath: if he swears then does the sworn act claiming an unfulfilled intention, he is not believed; for that oath stood in place of his right: it is its compensation, and its measure is the intention of the administrator, not of the swearer.
The Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) said: "Your oath rests on that by which your adversary makes you swear." And he said: "The intention follows the intention of the one who administers the oath."
reported by Muslim (1653)
An-Nawawi wrote: "this hadith concerns the oath administered by the judge: if a man claims a right against another and the judge administers the oath, and he swears concealing and intends something other than the judge intends, his oath concludes upon what the judge intended; the double meaning does not avail him; this is agreed upon, and its proof is this hadith and consensus. If he swears without the administration of the judge, the double meaning avails him and he does not violate, whether he swore on his own initiative or someone other than the judge or his deputy administered it; the intention of an administrator other than the judge is not considered. In sum: the oath follows the intention of the swearer in every state, except if the judge or his deputy administers it in a claim directed against him: it then follows the intention of the administrator, and that is the meaning of the hadith; if he swears before the judge without administration, the intention of the swearer counts, in the oath by Allah as in the oath by divorce and manumission; except that if the judge administers it by divorce or manumission, the double meaning avails him and the intention of the swearer counts, for the judge has no power to administer the oath by divorce or manumission: he administers only by Allah" (Sharh Sahih Muslim 11/117-118).
An-Nawawi added: the double meaning, though it averts violation, is not permissible where it annuls a deserved right: this is agreed upon; it is the detailed ruling of the school of ash-Shafi'i. Al-Qadi 'Iyad transmitted from Malik and his companions divergences: there is no dispute that the swearer without administration and with no right attached to his oath has his intention and it is accepted; if he swears for the right of another or over a document, offering himself to the oath or under judgment: no dispute that he is judged by the apparent sense of his oath; as for what lies between him and Allah: it is said the oath follows the intention of the target, it is said that of the swearer, it is said the administered one follows the intention of the target and the volunteer that of the swearer ('Abd al-Malik, Sahnun, and the apparent view of Malik and Ibn al-Qasim), and the reverse is also reported (the narration of Yahya from Ibn al-Qasim); it is said his intention avails him in what is not judged against him, and the volunteer differs from the administered one in what is judged against him; and Malik said: what involves trickery and deception is sinful and violating, and what involves excuse is fine; al-Qadi adds: no dispute on the sin of the swearer through whom the right of another falls, even with a double meaning. Ibn Rushd wrote: "they agreed: in claims the oath follows the intention of the administrator; they differed on anything else, like oaths on occasions: some said the intention of the swearer, others that of the administrator" (Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/304). Ibn al-'Arabi wrote: "if he states it explicitly in the oath, what he intended does not avail him if the meaning of the oath contradicts the apparent: 'your oath rests on that by which your adversary makes you swear', an authentic hadith of sound meaning, approved by all" (Ahkam al-Qur'an 2/251). Ibn Taymiyya wrote: "likewise the swearer interprets his oath if the ruler administers it to settle the dispute: your oath rests on that by which your adversary makes you swear; the intention belongs to the administered one in this case, by the agreement of the Muslims, and interpretation does not avail him; likewise interpreting without need is not valid with most of the scholars, except for the wronged: if the swearer interprets his oath, his interpretation is his if he is wronged; if he is an oppressor it does not avail him: 'your oath rests on that by which your adversary makes you swear'" (al-Fatawa al-Kubra 3/192).
Interpretation (ta'wil) consists in intending by one's words a meaning contrary to their apparent: swearing "he is my brother" while intending brotherhood of Islam or resemblance; intending by the ceiling and the building the sky, by the mat and the bedding the earth, by the pegs the mountains, by the garment the night; saying "I have not seen so-and-so" while intending that I did not strike his liver (that I did not kill him), "I did not mention him" while intending that I did not castrate him; saying "my handmaids are free" while intending his ships, "my women are divorced" while intending the women of his kin; or the long formula of denial in which writing means writing to the subordinate, making known means naming him chief, informing means naming him the most learned of the group, need is a small tree, the hen a ball of spun wool, the fur a cubit, the litters the young camels, the mat confinement, the blade the lancet; or "nothing of his wealth is with me in deposit or otherwise" intending a precise sense of negation; or "so-and-so is not here" intending a precise place; or "by Allah I ate nothing of this and took nothing from it" intending the remainder after eating and taking.
The state of the interpreting swearer is one of three. First: he is wronged: an oath is administered to him which, if he confirms it, wrongs him or wrongs another, or brings harm to a Muslim: his interpretation is his. Muhanna asked Ahmad about a man with two wives both named Fatima; one died; he swore by the divorce of Fatima intending the deceased: "if the administrator is the oppressor, the intention belongs to the owner of the divorce; if the divorcing one is the oppressor, the intention belongs to the administrator". And the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "in the allusive formulas there is enough to avoid lying"; Muhammad ibn Sirin said: "speech is too broad for the clever one to lie", for the clever one masters interpretation and needs no lie. Second: he is an oppressor, like one upon whom the judge administers an oath over a right he holds back: his oath turns to the apparent sense intended by the administrator, and interpretation does not avail him; it is the school of ash-Shafi'i, with no known opponent: the Prophet said "your oath rests on that by which your adversary makes you swear" (reported by Muslim and Abu Dawud), and "the intention follows the intention of the administrator" (reported by Muslim); 'Aisha said: "the oath rests on what reaches the target"; were interpretation admitted, the purpose of the oath, frightening the swearer to turn him from denial, would be annulled, and interpretation would become a means of denying rights. Ibrahim (an-Nakha'i) said of a man upon whom the sultan administered the divorce oath and who turned it to something else: the double meaning avails him; but if he is the oppressor, it does not suffice him. Third: neither oppressor nor wronged: the apparent sense of the words of Ahmad is that his interpretation is his: Muhanna placed his finger inside his palm and said: "al-Marwazi is not here", meaning he was not inside his palm, and Abu 'Abdillah (Ahmad) did not disapprove; Muhanna said: "I want to go out" meaning to travel to another town, and Ahmad did not disapprove either; this is the school of ash-Shafi'i, with no known disagreement.
The Prophet (peace be upon him) joked and said nothing but the truth; his joke made the listener understand something other than what was meant, and that is interpretation: he told an old woman: "no old woman will enter Paradise", meaning that Allah recreates them as virgins, loving, full of vigor. Anas reported that a man asked the Prophet to carry him; he said: "we will carry you on the young of the camel"; the man asked what he would do with the young of the camel; he answered: "who but the she-camels gives birth to camels?" (reported by Abu Dawud). To a woman who mentioned her husband he asked: "is he the one with white in his eye?"; she replied: "O Messenger of Allah, his eye is sound", and the Prophet meant the white around the iris. To a man embracing him from behind he said: "who buys this slave?"; the man said: "you will find me penniless"; he answered: "but before Allah you are not penniless". Shurayh, leaving Ziyad at his death, said: "I left him commanding and forbidding", then explained: "I left him commanding patience and forbidding wailing and lamentation". It is reported from Shaqiq about the man who asked for a woman in marriage while having one, who swore "bear witness that I have divorced them three times" while intending three previously divorced wives, then was contradicted; Shaqiq informed 'Uthman, who adopted his intention. Ash-Sha'bi, in a gathering, said of a man staring at him: "he has a house and honor", then explained: his honor is his ears, and his house is the one he dwells in (al-Mughni 9/420-422).
The bisat is the cause that carries to the oath: it is the likely place of the intention, not a departure from it but an implicit intention. It intervenes when the intention of the administrator and that of the swearer are absent, while the wording is general or absolute in appearance, but the cause that stirred it is particular or restrictive. The Malikis call it bisat al-yamin, the cause carrying to the oath; the Hanbalis, the cause that provokes the oath; the Hanafis express it by the immediate oath (al-Mughni 9/420-422).
Among the Hanafis: the oath eternal in wording but restricted by indication is called the immediate oath: it has a cause and the situation restricts it. A woman prepares to go out; he says: "if you go out you are divorced"; she sits an hour then goes out: she is not divorced. He is told: "come lunch with me"; he answers: "by Allah, I will not lunch with you, and if I lunch my slave is free"; he does not lunch with him but goes home and lunches there: in all these cases he does not violate. Al-Kasani wrote: the first to discover the answer of such an oath was Abu Hanifa, and all who heard him approved it; reasoning (Zufar) would make it a violation, since he forbade himself lunch in general and restricting it to the offered lunch would specify the general; the answer is that his speech came as an answer to the invitation: it turns to what was asked, as if he said: "by Allah, I will not eat the lunch you invited me to". Likewise if his wife rises to leave the house and he says: "if you go out you are divorced": she sits then goes out later: he does not violate, the situation restricting to that very exit; but if he says: "if you leave this house now or today you are divorced", immediacy falls away: he mentioned what shows he did not aim at that precise exit but at any exit that day (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 3/13; al-Mabsut 8/131; al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/9-10; hashiyat Ibn 'Abidin 3/763).
Among the Malikis: if the swearer has no intention or has forgotten it, one considers the cause carrying to the oath, which produces specification or restriction as the intention does; it is not a departure from the intention: it is its likely place, a legal intention surrounded by clues. The rule of its validity: "as long as this thing, the carrying cause, exists": swearing not to buy meat or not to sell in the market because of the crowd or the presence of a wrongdoer restricts the oath as long as that crowd or wrongdoer exists; a man troubled by a servant of the mosque or the bath who swears "by Allah I will no longer enter this mosque or this bath" is believed as long as that servant remains; when the servant leaves, entry becomes lawful again, otherwise he violates; one who swears not to pass by a road because of a wrongdoer molesting passers-by is believed as long as the wrongdoer is there; one who tells his wife: "if you enter this place you are divorced", because of a sinner present there, does not divorce her if the sinner has left and she enters. Conversely, one insulted who swears never to greet him again, or one who quarreled with his neighbor and swears that the latter will not enter his house: no bisat; for the cause to serve, the swearer must have no hand in the cause carrying to the oath; if he disputed with his child, his wife or a stranger, swore not to enter his house, then the dispute ended and reconciliation came, his entering violates the oath, for the swearer has a share in the cause. And the bisat does not avail in what has already occurred: the wife who quarreled with the brother, was divorced, then the brother dies: the divorce is not lifted, for lifting what has occurred is impossible; likewise one who divorced his wife believing she had damaged something of his creed, then learned she had damaged nothing: no bisat here. The bisat runs over all oaths: by Allah, by divorce or by manumission (at-Taj wal-Iklil 2/303-307; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/68; ash-Sharh al-Kabir ma'a hashiyat ad-Dasuqi 2/419-420; Tathbir al-Mukhtasar 2/383; hashiyat as-Sawi 4/218-219).
Among the Hanbalis: if the swearer intends nothing, one considers the cause of the oath and what stirred it as a clue to the intention: one who swears not to lodge with his wife in this house: if the cause is anger linked to the house (a harm that reached him through it, or a favor received by way of it), the oath is restricted to it; if the cause is anger at the wife herself, the house has no effect and the oath attaches to lodging with her in every house; likewise the oath not to wear cloth spun by her: if the cause is the favor received from her, any benefit or its price violates; if the cause is the roughness of her spinning and the poor quality of the cloth, wearing it does not violate; for the cause is a clue to the intention and the oath attaches to it. Ibn Qudama continues: if the wording is general and the cause specific, as with the guest invited to lunch who swears not to lunch or not to sit: if he had an intention, his oath rests on what he intended; if not, the words of Ahmad imply two narrations. In the first, the oath rests on the generality: Ahmad was asked about a man who swore not to enter a town because of an injustice he had seen there, then the injustice ceased; he said: "the vow is fulfilled", that is, he does not enter; for the wording of the Lawgiver, general over a specific cause, requires the generality of the wording without the specificity of the cause; so too the oath of the swearer. Al-Qadi mentions one who swore to his wife or his slave not to leave without his permission, then freed him and divorced her: they left without his permission and he does not violate; the indicator of the situation transfers the ruling of the speech to itself: he can only prevent them while he owns them, as if he said: "as long as you are in my possession". And one who swore to a worker not to see him commit a wrong without reporting it to him, then the worker is dismissed: two views: the oath is not dissolved by dismissal (the madhhab ruling per al-Qadi, and one of the two views of the companions of ash-Shafi'i), or it is dissolved (the view of Abu Hanifa); and if it is not dissolved, his violation after the dismissal divides: he violates, since the possibility of reporting has lapsed, like a death; or he does not, since its loss is not confirmed, a successor perhaps coming; if the worker dies before he can report, he violates as well; if they hold the oath not dissolved, reporting after the dismissal is a fulfillment. If the cause and the intention clash (the cloth spun by his wife annoyed him; he swore not to wear any cloth of her spinning intending to avoid the wearing alone, not the profit of its price): the intention precedes the cause by one view, since it matches the requirement of the wording; al-Qadi says the cause precedes, for the wording is general and the cause confirms and strengthens that generality, the annoyance cutting off the intention; the more correct is that the cause was considered only as a clue to the intent: when it contradicts the truth of the intent it is no longer considered, and only the wording remains in its generality, specified by the intention (al-Mughni 10/25-26; Sharh az-Zarkashi 3/334; al-Insaf 11/50-51; Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/313-315; Manar as-Sabil 3/424-427).
Ibn al-Qayyim devotes a long passage to the release through the disappearance of the cause: the ruling follows its cause in existence and disappearance; wine, which carries impurity and the punishment by the description of intoxication: turned to vinegar, the ruling vanishes; likewise the description of wickedness that removes the acceptance of testimony; and so with prodigality, minority, madness and fainting. The swearer who swore not to do something because of a cause: the cause gone, he does not violate by doing it. Invited to an intoxicating drink, he swears not to drink it; the drink turns to vinegar and he drinks: he does not violate; his own prohibition is like the prohibition of the Lawgiver: when the latter fell, his fell with it; distinguishing the two is pure arbitrariness. Likewise one who swore to a man never to accept his word or his testimony because of his wickedness; the man repents and becomes among the best of people: the prohibition by the oath falls as the legal one falls. One who swore not to eat such a food, wear such a garment, speak to such a woman or touch her because it was unlawful for him; then he comes to own the food and the garment and marries the woman: he eats, wears and consummates without violating. One who swore "I will not enter this house" because of the sins and the wine drunk there; the place becomes a home of the righteous where Quran and hadith are read: entering brings no violation. One who swore not to eat the food of such a man who devoured usury and the wealth of people falsely; the man repents, leaves the injustices, his food becomes lawful earning of his hand or lawful trade: eating of it brings no violation. One who swore never to pledge allegiance to a bankrupt or prodigal man; bankruptcy and prodigality vanish: the pledge brings no violation. The sick man who swore not to eat meat because of his illness; healed, the food benefits him: eating brings no violation. The jurists stated cases of this kind explicitly: the governor to whom one swore not to leave the town without permission, dismissed, leaves the town without violating; the wife to whom one swore not to leave the house without permission, divorced, or the freed slave who leaves without permission: no violation, per the companions of Ahmad; the oath given to a judge not to leave a wrong unreported to him, then the judge dismissed: no violation; the oath given to his wife never to spend a night outside her house, then she dies or he divorces her: no violation; the oath given to his son never to sleep outside for fear of the wicked while he was young, grown into an old man: no violation. All of this is the madhhab of Malik and Ahmad: they consider the intention, the carrying cause and what stirred the oath, and they carry the oath upon them. Abu 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-Barr wrote in al-Kafi: "the origin in this chapter is consideration of the aim of the swearer; if he has no intention, one considers the cause of his affair and what drove him to the oath, then one judges by what is most likely in the souls of the people of his time".
The compendium al-Jawhara summarizes: the conditions of fulfillment and violation are, first, the intention when it is fit to be meant by the wording, whether matching it, restricting or specifying it; second, the cause that stirs the oath, also called bisat: the man intending the oath always has an intention, but mentions it at times and forgets it at others; the cause is its clue. The companions of Ahmad, like those of Malik, state explicitly the consideration of the intention: the man who buried money, forgot the place, searched without finding, swore it was his wife who took it, then found it: he does not violate; for his aim was only: "if the money is gone, it is you who took it". Likewise the guest who believes a meal unlawful and swears not to eat of it, then it proves clearly lawful: eating it brings no violation, for his oath attached only to its prohibition. Likewise the man greeted by someone he believes an innovator or a wrongdoer and to whom he swears not to return the greeting, then he proves otherwise: returning it brings no violation; likewise the mount believed harsh then found easy: riding it brings no violation. Abu Qasim al-Kharqi wrote in his Mukhtasar: the oath returns to the intention; if he intends nothing it returns to the cause of the oath and what stirred it. The companions of Ahmad add: invited to lunch, he swears not to lunch, or is told sit and swears not to sit: his oath is restricted to that lunch and to sitting at that moment; for a sane man does not intend never to lunch nor ever to sit. And their school reports that the oath over a town left for its injustice is not lifted by the disappearance of the injustice, for the swearer vowed it to Allah and confirmed his vow by the oath: the vow is a means of nearness: he vowed nearness by abandoning that town, and fulfillment is binding on him; this is why the Prophet (peace be upon him) forbade the emigrants to reside in Mecca more than three days after their pilgrimage: they had left their homes for Allah, and return was not lawful even though the cause of departure was gone.
As for the Hanafis, the book adh-Dhakha'ir sets the chapter on restricting absolute oaths by indication, with the examples given above: the exit of the wife, the blow delayed an hour, the lunch refused then taken at home. And their companions state explicitly that the intention acts within the wording to determine what it admits: if the wording is fixed and does not admit what is intended, the intention has no effect there. Here is the final rule: only bare intention has no effect in establishing the ruling; if the wording admits it and one of its possibilities is intended, it then acts. This is why the one who says: "if I wear a garment or eat a food or drink a drink or speak to a woman, my wife is divorced", while intending a specific garment, food, drink or woman, is liable in what lies between him and Allah, and his intention is accepted without dispute; and if the object is omitted in favor of the verb alone, it is the same, per Abu Yusuf in one narration, al-Khassaf, ash-Shafi'i, Ahmad and Malik. The upshot: the intention acts in the oath by specifying and generalizing, releasing and restricting, and the cause takes its place when absent and indicates it; this is what the fatwa follows: people are never carried on what is certain they did not intend by their oaths, still less when the contrary is certain (I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in 4/104-110).