Islamic Fiqh > Companies and leases > Ijara (leasing) > The first pillar: the two contracting parties
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Updated on 25 September 2026 at 6:57 PM
This part belongs to the full section: All sections of this part.
This page sets out the pillars of the ijara (lease) contract according to the four Sunni schools, based on al-Mawsua al-fiqhiyya. The ijara rests on four pillars: the two contracting parties (the lessor and the lessee), the formula (sigha), the wage (ujra) and the benefit (manfa'a) which is its object. The jurists also discuss the option (khiyar), whether the object of the contract is the benefit or the thing itself, payment of the wage in advance or on deferred terms, and the estimation of the benefit by duration or by work.
The first pillar consists of the two contracting parties: the lessor (moujir) and the lessee (mousta'jir). What is required in the sale is required of them: soundness of mind, puberty, consent and maturity (rushd), taking up here the earlier discussion concerning the sale, because the ijara is a sale of benefits, and there is no difference between the sale of benefits and the sale of objects.
Soundness of mind is agreed upon: the ijara of the insane, the mentally deficient (ma'tuh) and the coerced is therefore not valid. The same applies to the prodigal (safih), taking up the earlier ruling established for his sale.
As for the discerning minor, the binding force of the ijara he concludes over himself or his property is suspended on the permission of his guardian according to the Malikis. The meaning is that discernment is the condition of validity of the contract of the one renting out, while legal obligation (taklif) is the condition of its binding force, as in the sale (Ash-Sharh al-kabir with the Hashiyat ad-Dasuqi, 5/335; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 7/3; at-Taj wal-Iklil, 4/456; Hashiyat as-Sawi on ash-Sharh as-saghir, 8/468).
As for the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis, the ijara of the discerning minor is not valid in their view: it is only valid from a pubescent person of sound mind, as in the sale (Rawdat at-talibin, 4/5; Mughni al-muhtaj, 3/379; Nihayat al-muhtaj, 5/299; an-Najm al-wahhaj, 5/318; ad-Dibaj, 2/455; Kanz ar-raghibin, 3/163).
The Hanafis said: puberty is not a condition of the contract coming into existence nor of its efficacy, to the point that if the minor of sound mind rents out his property or himself, the contract is enforceable if he is authorized, and suspended on the guardian's approval if he is interdicted.
If the interdicted minor hires himself out, works, and comes out of the work safe, he deserves the wage, and the wage belongs to him. He deserves the wage because the lack of efficacy was a reservation held in his consideration, and this consideration disappears once the work is completed: he therefore deserves the wage, and his effort must not go to waste to his detriment. And if the guardian authorized him in that, it amounts to accepting a gift from others. As for the named wage, it belongs to him because it is the compensation of the benefits, and it is his right.
If the minor dies in the hands of the lessee during the term, the latter is liable, for he becomes a usurper having employed the minor without his guardian's permission; and the wage is not due, because the wage and liability do not combine. If the minor kills by mistake, his liability group (aqila) owes the blood money or the value, while the wage over his property is due to him, because the obligation of the wage here does not lead to combination, the persons obliged being different (Bada'i' as-sana'i', 4/176). A full discussion of this has already been given at the beginning of the book of sale.
The jurists of the four schools agree that the ijara contract requires a formula, namely the offer and the acceptance (ijab and qabul). They then differ: does the contract conclude without the words specific to the ijara, as in the sale? And does it conclude by the mu'ata (the direct hand-to-hand exchange)? The majority of jurists, the Hanafis, Malikis, Hanbalis and Shafi'is, admit conclusion by the mu'ata as in the sale, as well as by the words of the sale, with the following details.
The Hanafis said: the pillar of the ijara is the offer and the acceptance, whether by the words of ijara, of taking into hire (ista'jar), of taking on lease (iktara) or of letting out (ikra'), and once these elements exist, the pillar is complete.
The same applies to whatever indicates them: the ijara therefore concludes by the words of the loan for use (ariyya), to the point that if he says to someone: "I lend you this house for a month for such a sum", or: "Each month for such a sum", and the addressee accepts, the ijara is valid, for it is derived from mutual assistance (ta'awur) and the circulation of property: just as this is done without compensation, it is done with compensation, and mutual assistance with compensation is an ijara, unlike the loan for use, which does not conclude by the words of ijara. If one says: "I rent you this house without compensation", it is a corrupt ijara, and it is not a loan for use, for the loan for use is a specific contract meant to transfer the benefit, just as if one said: "I sold you this object without compensation", which would be void or corrupt without being a gift.
If he says: "I grant you the benefits of this house for a month for such a sum", it is permissible, and it is an ijara.
On its conclusion by the words of the sale, two views exist in the first aspect of the school: it does not conclude by those words, for they were coined to transfer objects, whereas the ijara transfers non-existent benefits; benefits are not an object of sale, and it is a corrupt ijara, as if one said: "I bought from you the service of this slave of yours for a month for such a sum": it is a corrupt ijara. According to the second view, it concludes by the words of the sale.
The ijara concludes by the direct exchange (ta'atuy), as in the sale, for what is not of long duration, such as boarding the ship of travelers, the boats of the harbors and the animals for hire, without bargaining: if the wage is known, it is paid, otherwise it is the wage of the like (ujrat al-mithl), for the permissibility of the ijara rests on consent. When the exchange of the two parties arises from the consent of each, the contract is necessarily binding.
Muhammad (may Allah have mercy on him) mentioned in the ijara questions of al-Asl, concerning the hire of garments: if a man rents from another cooking pots without their bodies, it is not allowed because of the difference in size between the pots; if he brings pots and the renter accepts them at the first rate of hire, it is allowed, and this is an ijara initiated by the direct exchange.
The long-term ijara does not conclude by the direct exchange, for the wage is not known there: they may set for each year a danq, or money.
Silence in the ijara counts as acceptance and consent, and it is of two types. The first is the lessor's silence: a man rents a shop for fifty piastres per month; after residing there for several months, the lessor comes at the beginning of the month and says: "If you accept sixty, remain in this shop; otherwise, leave it". The renter answers: "I do not accept", and he continues to reside there without the lessor opposing him afterwards: fifty piastres remain due from him as before, for the lessor's silence, while the renter has informed him of his refusal of the increase and he has let him remain in the shop, indicates his consent to the previous wage.
The second type is the lessee's silence: the lessor asks the renter for an increase on the previous wage; the renter says nothing, that is, does not say that he refuses the increase, does not leave the shop, and continues to reside there beyond the time within which he could move his belongings and goods. He is then bound to pay the increase from that month onward, for the renter's silence, when it was his duty to refuse the increase if he did not consent to it, is the proof of his consent.
If the lessor asks the renter for sixty piastres instead of fifty, and the renter says: "I did not hear your request for the increase, so as to consent to it": if the renter is deaf, his statement is credited in appearance, otherwise not.
Another example of the lessor's silence: the owner of the shop says to the renter: "If you accept a hundred piastres, stay; otherwise leave the shop". The renter answers: "I accept eighty piastres", the lessor falls silent and the renter continues to reside there: eighty piastres are due from him from that month onward. But if the two parties insist on their positions, and the renter continues to reside in the shop without any wage being named, the wage of the like is due from him: at the expiration of the lease, the first contract is dissolved and no second contract has been concluded by their insistence. The shop remains in the renter's hands without a contract, ready for exploitation: the wage of the like therefore applies, and the renter is as one occupying it with the intention of paying its rent (Bada'i' as-sana'i', 4/174; al-Bahr ar-ra'iq, 7/297; Majma' al-anhar, 3/512; Tanqih al-fatawa al-hamidiyya, 5/496; al-Hindiyya, 4/409; Durrar al-hukkam, 1/404-405).
The Malikis said: the ijara concludes by a formula as in the sale, including what indicates consent, and even by the mu'ata (Ash-Sharh al-kabir, 5/334; Hashiyat as-Sawi with ash-Sharh as-saghir, 8/468). It has been said that the formula is a word, or what takes its place and indicates the transfer of the benefit for a compensation. The mu'ata enters into "what takes its place", as does everything indicating consent; the words of the musaqat (irrigation contract) do not enter into it: the contract does not conclude by them, so as to exclude the legal effect from what it was not assigned to (Mawahib al-jalil, 7/379; Sharh az-Zurqani, 7/4).
The Shafi'is said: the second pillar is the formula, as in the sale, with the same conditions as the formulas of sale, except the absence of specification of time. Thus the lessor says: "I rent you this garment", or: "I give it to you on hire", or: "I transfer its benefits to you for a year for such a sum", and the renter answers at once: "I accept", "I rent", "I take on lease" or "I take it on hire". Among the metonymies are: "Reside in my house for a month for such a sum" or "I have granted you its benefit for a year for such a sum"; there is also writing with intent, and the intelligible gesture of the mute.
On the soundest position, it does not conclude by the mu'ata; it has been said that it is permitted. The soundest view is that the ijara concludes when the lessor says of a house, for instance: "I rent it to you", or: "I give you its benefit for a year for such a sum", and the renter accepts; mentioning the benefit is then a confirmation, as if the seller said: "I sold you the object of this house and its liability", the sale being valid.
The second view is prohibition: for the word "ijara" was coined in connection with the object, the benefit having no body: how could the contract be attached to it? The soundest view is the prohibition of concluding by the words "I sold you its benefit", for the word sale was assigned to objects and is not used for benefits, just as the sale does not conclude by the word ijara; the words of purchase follow those of the sale. The second view is that it is permitted, for it is a kind of sale: this is the view of Ibn Surayj, affirmed in at-Tanbih and followed by a number of later scholars such as al-Isnawi and al-Adhra'i.
If it is objected that the words "I transferred its benefit to you" are unanimously held valid, what is the difference with "I sold you its benefit"? The answer is that the transfer of ownership (tamlik) is broader: it applies in one and the same sense to the sale of objects and to the sale of benefits, whereas the sale, in its absolute sense, is specific to objects.
All of this concerns the ijara of an object; as for the ijara of an obligation (dhimma), it suffices to say: "I bind your obligation for such a sum", without the words of ijara or their like: "I hand over to you these dirhams for the sewing of this", or "for an animal thus described", or "for my transport to Mecca", and the addressee answers without interruption: "I accept", "I commit myself", "I rent", "I take on lease" or "I take it on hire". From the requirement of the formula it is deduced that if someone resides in the house of another for a time with his permission, without the wage being mentioned, the owner cannot claim it from him (Nihayat al-matlab, 8/68-69; Rawdat at-talibin, 4/5-6; Mughni al-muhtaj, 3/379-380; Nihayat al-muhtaj, 5/300-301; an-Najm al-wahhaj, 5/318-319; ad-Dibaj, 2/455-456; I'anat at-talibin, 3/208; Hashiyat Qalyubi and Umayra on Kanz ar-raghibin, 3/164).
The Hanbalis said: the ijara concludes by the word ijara and by the word kira': "I rent it to you" (ajjartuka), "I take it from you on lease" (iktaraytuka), "I hire you" (ista'jartuka), "I am taken on hire" (ikturiyta), for these two words were assigned to this contract. It also concludes by what indicates their meaning, such as: "I give you the benefit of this house", or: "I transfer it to you for a year for such a sum"; likewise if the words are attached to the object: "I give you this house for a year for such a sum".
Does it conclude by the word of the sale? Two positions exist. The first, which is the sound position: it concludes by that word as well if it is attached to the benefit, such as: "I sold you the benefit of my house", or: "I sold you the residence of my house for such a sum", or absolutely; for it is a sale, and the contract concludes by its word, as in the exchange (sarf); benefits, like objects, may be substituted for, and are guaranteed in case of seizure or destruction. If the words are attached to the object, such as: "I sold you my house for a month", it is not valid. The second position: it does not conclude by that word, for it carries a specific meaning requiring a word specific to that meaning; the ijara is attached to the object to which the sale is attached in a single addition, hence the need for a word that names and distinguishes the two, as with dissimilar contracts; moreover it is a contract that differs from the sale in ruling and name, which brings it close to marriage.
The ijara validly concludes by the mu'ata, for it is a kind of sale: this is the relied-upon view (Al-Mughni, 5/251; al-Mubdi', 5/63; al-Furu', 4/317; al-Insaf, 6/4-5; Kashshaf al-Qina', 3/643; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 4/7; Matalib uli an-nuha, 3/582).
Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya (may Allah have mercy on him) said: the truth is that if the two contracting parties know the purpose, the contract concludes with any word by which they expressed their objective. This rule applies to all contracts, for the Lawgiver did not delimit any specific words for contracts, but mentioned them absolutely: just as contracts conclude with Persian, Roman and other non-Arab words that designate them, they conclude with the Arabic words that indicate them (Majmu' al-fatawa, 20/533). Ibn al-Qayyim (may Allah have mercy on him) said: this is the view of the majority of scholars, such as Malik and Abu Hanifa, and it is one of the two views in the school of Ahmad; our shaykh said: the very texts of Ahmad indicate only this view (I'lam al-muwaqqi'in, 2/23).
The jurists differed concerning one who works for another, on property or otherwise, without contract, without condition or allusion to a wage, and without being in a situation of donation: does he deserve a wage for what he did? The Malikis hold that whoever works for another, with or without his order, brings about an enforceable act: if he acts by way of donation, he can claim nothing; if he does not act by way of donation, and it is a benefit, he deserves the wage of the like; if it is property, he has the right to take it back from the one he discharged of it. For this, the thing worked on must necessarily require that he have it worked on for hire, or that the property be spent; if it is the habit of the one handing it over to do it himself without hiring himself, or through his slave, and the interest is obtained without expense, he has no claim, and the worker's statement that there was no donation is accepted.
Al-Qarafi (may Allah have mercy on him) said: this is the rule of the school of Malik, stated by Ibn Abi Zayd in an-Nawadir and by the author of al-Jawahir in the book of ijarat. This rule is not limited to what is obligatory upon the one discharged, such as a debt: it also covers the washing of the garment, its sewing, the removal of dust from the house and the like, under the conditions stated. The owner's state of affairs takes the place of the spoken word, as if he had authorized it; ash-Shafi'i opposed us in this rule by making donation the default in the acts of others. If the one discharged does not authorize it by an express word, the worker cannot claim anything from him (al-Furuq, 3/340).
He said in adh-Dhakhira: a doctrinal rule: whoever pays for another property whose habit it is to be given, or performs for another a work whose habit it is to be hired for, may claim that property and the wage of that work, whether the payment was obligatory as a debt, or not obligatory, as the sewing of a garment or the shaving of the head. A rule transmitted by the author of an-Nawadir and the author of al-Jawahir in the ijara, giving the state of affairs the rank of the spoken word. If it is your habit to perform that work yourself or through your representative while being hired for it, you will not be claimed a wage, for your state did not require permission to pay one; the imams considered the payer a donor until a verbal authorization is established (adh-Dhakhira, 9/93-94).
The Hanbalis said: if someone gives his garment to a fuller, a tailor, a dyer or the like, to shorten it, sew it, dye it or the like, even if these craftsmen have no habit of taking a wage and even without an ijara contract, the operation is valid and the wage of the like is due if they pursue that trade. Otherwise they deserve a wage only with a condition, a contract or an allusion to the wage, for there is no custom that stands in place of a contract, and the act is as if done without the owner's permission.
Likewise if someone employs a porter or the like, or engages a witness, when the wage is permissible for him because he cannot walk or has consented to it: the wage of the mount is then due to him. The act is valid and the wage of the like is due, for the prevailing custom on this point takes the place of words, like the hander-over's allusion to the wage, for instance: "Take it, I know you earn your living by it", or "Take it, I will satisfy you", and everything indicating the payment of a wage.
Likewise, entering the bathhouse, boarding the ship of a sailor, having the head shaved, being washed, having one's garment washed, drinking water or coffee from him and the like belong to the permissible things: the wage of the like is due, even without a habit of taking a wage. Likewise, if a garment is given to a man to sell, the ruling is that of the fuller and the tailor if he sells for people for a wage: the wage of the like is due to him, which Ahmad explicitly stated; otherwise he has no right to anything.
As soon as the garment is handed to one of these craftsmen without bargaining over the wage, the wage of the like is due, for the wages of garments vary and nothing was determined: the act then follows the regime of the corrupt ijara. If the garment is lost while in his custody, or without his act, there is no liability, for what is not guaranteed in the sound contract is not guaranteed in the corrupt contract; if it is lost by his act, by tearing it or crushing it, he guarantees it, for whoever guarantees that in the sound contract guarantees it all the more in the corrupt one.
Ahmad (may Allah have mercy on him) said concerning one who gives a garment to a fuller to shorten it without fixing a wage, saying only: "I will give you as they give you", and the garment is lost: if it is lost by a piercing or the like that his hand did not bring about, there is no liability, whether he specified the hire or not; the cause of that is what we have mentioned.
If a man hires someone to carry a letter to Mecca or elsewhere, to one of his associates, and the carrier takes it, finds the addressee absent and brings it back, he deserves the wage for the outward and return journeys. He carried it out with the express permission of the one who commissioned him, and back by implication, for his words mean: "If you do not find my associate, bring it back", since nothing can be done with it except losing it; it is therefore established that he does not accept its loss, and the return becomes obligatory.
Al-Mardawi (may Allah have mercy on him) said in al-Insaf: his words "whoever works for another without a ju'l (a stipulated reward) has no right to anything" apply even if it is rescuing the goods of another from a desert, even from certain or near destruction, such as the sea or the mouth of the beast of prey. This is the view of al-Qadi in al-Mujarrad, and he admits another possibility beyond al-Mujarrad, which is the apparent meaning of the statement of a group of the Companions.
The sound position transmitted from Imam Ahmad (may Allah have mercy on him) is that he deserves the wage of the like, unlike the luqata (lost property), and this is the view of the Companions. Likewise, if a ship is wrecked and people rescue property from the sea: the wage is due to them from the shipowners, as mentioned in al-Mughni, ash-Sharh, the commentary of Ibn Razin and elsewhere.
Al-Qadi, Ibn Aqil, the author (Ibn Qudama) and a group applied this rule to the slave rescued from a deadly desert; Ibn Qudama advanced it in al-Furu' and elsewhere, mentioning it in the chapter of the revival of dead lands, as referred to here. Al-Qadi reported, for the slave, a possibility after the obligation, like the luqata. He reported in al-Mujarrad, against the text of Imam Ahmad, concerning one who rescues from a beast of prey a sheep, a lamb or the like, that it belongs to its first owner and that the rescuer has no right to anything. Al-Majd said in his draft: I hold that the words of Imam Ahmad, in their literal sense, oblige to the wage for rescuing goods from perils, excluding the human being, for the human being, in principle, deserves that his life be preserved. He said in the eighty-fourth rule: this is to be examined, for he may be a child or helpless, and his rescue may be more important than that of the goods; the words of Imam Ahmad make no distinction. End of quotation (al-Insaf, 6/392-393; al-Mughni, 5/326-327; al-Kafi, 2/334; ash-Sharh al-kabir, 6/17; al-Mubdi', 5/68; Kashshaf al-Qina', 3/652-653; ar-Rawd al-murbi', 2/154).
Ibn Muflih (may Allah have mercy on him) said in al-Mubdi': whoever works for another without a ju'l has no right to anything, with no known disagreement, for he gave his benefit without compensation and therefore did not acquire it; and so that a man is not bound by what he did not bind himself to and his soul does not accept, as long as he is not engaged to take a wage; if he is engaged and authorized in it, the wage is due. Ahmad however explicitly stated that whoever rescues goods for another deserves the wage of the like, unlike the luqata, except for the return of the runaway slave: he deserves the ju'l without condition (al-Mubdi', 5/270).
Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya said: the doctrine of Malik, of Ahmad ibn Hanbal according to the famous view transmitted from him, and of others, is that whoever discharges for another an obligation may claim it back from him, if he does not act by way of donation, even without his permission, like the one who pays the debt of another without authorization, whether he guaranteed it without permission and then paid it, or paid it without guarantee. Likewise, the one who ransoms a captive without authorization may claim what he spent; the one who discharges for another an obligatory expenditure, such as the maintenance of his child, his wife or his beasts, especially if the obligor has a right over them, as the pledgee or the lessor, or is their trustee, as the depositary of a custody; the return of the runaway slave; or the expenditure of one of the two partners for the shared beasts. Its foundation is the word of Allah:
"If they suckle for you, give them their wages."
Surah At-Talaq, 6
Allah commanded the payment of the wage by the mere fact of suckling, without a hire contract or the father's permission; as soon as the suckling of the child is obligatory upon the father, the woman who suckled him deserves the wage by the mere fact of her suckling. He then said: so it is with all the obligations upon him: he must settle with the one who paid them for him and did him a service by that payment (Majmu' al-fatawa, 30/348-349).
The Shafi'is said: if one works for another with his permission, such as giving a garment to a fuller to shorten it, to a tailor to sew it, to a washer to wash it, or sitting before a barber to have the head shaved or a masseur to be massaged, and the craftsman performs it while neither of the two mentions a wage nor a formula making it understood in the presence of the other, so that he may hear and answer or keep silent, four views exist. The soundest, which is the explicitly transmitted one, is that he has no wage, for he acts by way of donation, having obtained no compensation: it is as if he said "feed me" and he was fed; if he said "house me for a month in your house" and he was housed, he would have no wage, by consensus.
The second view: the wage of the like is due to him, this being the view of al-Muzani, for having consumed his benefit. The third: if the beneficiary initiates by saying "do this", the wage is binding; if the worker initiates by saying "give me your garment so I may shorten it", there is no wage. The fourth: if the worker is known to take a wage for that work, the customary wage is due to him; Shaykh Izz ad-Din said: the wage at usage is due to him, even if it exceeds the wage of the like; if he is not known for that work, he has no wage.
This last view merits preference, for its object is clear, custom indicates it and takes the place of words as in its like: the wage of the like is therefore due. Al-Khatib ash-Shirbini said: this is how people act. Al-Ghazali said: it is the most apparent. Izz ad-Din said: it is the soundest. Ar-Ruyani reported it in al-Hilya from the majority and said: it is the chosen view. It is said in al-Bahr: fatwa has been given on this view, and many later scholars followed it.
If we say that he has no wage, this holds, as al-Adhra'i specified, if he is a free man fully capable of disposal; if he is a slave, or interdicted for prodigality or otherwise, it does not, for such men are not among those who may donate their benefits in exchange for compensations. The author guarded, by his phrase "without mentioning a wage", against the case where he would say "for free": he then has absolutely nothing; if he mentions a wage, he obtains it absolutely, whether it is valid, in which case the named wage is due, or not, in which case the wage of the like is due. If he alludes by mentioning a wage, such as: "work and I will satisfy you", or: "work, expect from me only what pleases you", or: "so that I may reward you for it", he deserves the wage of the like, as in al-Bayan and elsewhere.
Excepted from the mentioned disagreement are these cases. The first: the worker of the musaqat, if he performs, with the owner's permission, a work foreign to its function: the wage is due to him. The second: the collector of the zakat, for the compensation is due to him even if unnamed; az-Zarkashi said: he is not excepted, for the wage is established for him by the text of the Quran: it is therefore named by the shari'a, even if the imam does not name it. The third: the worker of a division ordered by the judge, for the divider deserves the wage without anyone naming "such a sum"; some excepted it, and the controversy bore on the mention in the appointment (tawshih) when exempting; some said he is like the others, which is the apparent.
As for the one who enters the bathhouse without the permission of the keeper of the bath: the wage is binding upon him even without mention. The difference with the fuller and his like is that the latter directed their benefits to others, whereas the one who enters the bathhouse has fully consumed the benefit of the bath by his stay. If he is authorized to enter, the bathhouse with regard to him is like a hiree, as they said of the one who boards a ship with the permission of its owner until he reaches the shore without mention of a wage: he is like a hiree according to the previous views, the soundest of which is that he has no wage; if he enters without permission, the wage is due upon him. It is said in al-Matlab: perhaps this is so when the owner is unaware before setting it in motion, otherwise it resembles the case of the one who places his goods upon the mount of another and whose owner sets it moving: then neither wage upon the owner, nor liability (Mughni al-muhtaj, 3/411-412; Rawdat at-talibin, 4/57; Nihayat al-muhtaj, 5/355-356; an-Najm al-wahhaj, 5/377-378; ad-Dibaj, 2/482; Kanz ar-raghibin, 3/198; Asna al-matalib, 2/426).
Al-Amiri (may Allah have mercy on him) said in al-Bayan: if a garment is given to a man to sew, or goods to carry to a place, and he names a valid wage, the named wage is due without dispute. If he names a corrupt wage, or alludes to the wage by saying: "work and I will reward you for it", or: "expect from me only what pleases you", the wage of the like is due, for he alluded to an unknown wage: he therefore deserves the wage of the like, as if he had named a corrupt compensation.
If the garment is handed over and the worker performs it, does he deserve the wage of the like? Four views exist. The first: he deserves the wage of the like, for he destroyed its benefits and therefore deserves their compensation: it is as if he had been forced to work.
The second, the view of Abu Ishaq: if the craftsman initiates by saying "give me your garment so that I may sew it", he has no wage, for he chose to destroy his own benefit without compensation; but if the owner of the garment calls him to the work by saying "sew this garment for me", the wage of the like is binding, for he fulfilled what was owed for his benefit and deserves its compensation.
The third: if the craftsman is known to take a wage for the work, the wage is due to him, custom standing as a condition; if he is not, he has no wage. The fourth, the explicitly transmitted one: he is not entitled to a wage, for benefits are not more important than objects, and it is established that if food is presented to a man with the words "eat it", he is not entitled to its compensation; it is the same here, and Allah knows best.
The jurists differed on the validity of stipulating the option in the ijara. The majority of jurists, the Hanafis, Malikis and Hanbalis as set out below, hold that stipulating the option is permitted in the ijara contract, whether the benefit is determined or a debt in the obligation, for the ijara is a contract of pure exchange, rescindable by iquala (mutual rescission) as in the sale: the option is therefore permitted in it as in the sale (al-Jawhara an-nayyira, 3/345; Hashiyat Ibn Abidin, 6/77 and 6/89; al-Ashbah wa an-nazair with the commentary of al-Hamawi, 1/629-630; al-Fatawa al-Hindiyya, 3/39; Durrar al-hukkam, 3/165; al-Ishraf of al-Qadi Abd al-Wahhab, 3/200-201, no. 1045; al-Ma'una, 2/107; Aqd al-jawahir ath-thamina, 2/695; al-Jami' li-masa'il al-Mudawwana, 13/834; al-Mukhtasar al-fiqhi of Ibn Arafa, 8/224-225).
The Hanbalis said: the option of the session (khiyar al-majlis) is established in the ijara even without the contracting parties stipulating it, over an object such as a house or an animal, whether its term immediately follows the contract, as in renting a house for a month from now, or whether it is an ijara over a benefit in the obligation, such as having a garment sewn or a wall built; for the ijara is a kind of sale.
The option of the stipulation (khiyar ash-shart) is also established in the ijara over an obligation, such as the sewing of a garment, or over a term that does not follow the contract, such as three years deferred after two years, if a period ending before the entry into the third year is stipulated. If the period encompasses the contract, as a month from now, the stipulation of the option is not valid, lest it lead to losing some of the benefits that are the object of the contract, or consuming them during the period of the option: both are impermissible (al-Mughni, 4/23-24; al-Insaf, 4/364 and 4/368; Kashshaf al-Qina', 3/229-230; ar-Rawd al-murbi', 1/558).
The Shafi'is said: the ijara is either concluded upon a term or concluded upon a work. The ijara concluded upon a term, which is the ijara of an object, admits no option of the stipulation; as for the option of the session, two views exist: the sounder is that it is not established, like the option of the stipulation, for it is an uncertainty (gharar): the contract is upon a non-existent thing and the option is an uncertainty, and one does not combine uncertainty upon uncertainty. The other view: it is established, for it is an exchange and its amount is small.
As for the ijara in the obligation, such as having a wall built or a garment sewn, three views exist. The first: neither of the two options is established in it, for the ijara is a contract upon what has not been created, and it is an uncertainty to which the uncertainty of the option cannot be added. The second: both are established, for the passing of the term separates nothing from the object of the contract. The third: the option of the session is established in it but not the option of the stipulation, as in the salam (Nihayat al-matlab, 5/35-36; Rawdat at-talibin, 3/95-96; al-Majmu', 9/166 and 9/168; al-Bayan, 5/27; at-Tanbih, 123; Mughni al-muhtaj, 2/486-487; ad-Dibaj, 2/58-59; al-Ifsah, 1/351; al-Insaf, 4/364 and 4/368).
The jurists differed on the object of the ijara contract: is it the rented object or the benefit? The Hanafis, the Shafi'is according to the sounder view, and the Hanbalis according to the school, hold that the ijara bears upon the benefit, not upon the rented object, whether concluded over an object or over an obligation, for if it bore upon the object, the mortgaging of the rented object would be impossible when that object is already mortgaged. This way is the one pleasing to the jurists: the object of every contract is its purpose, and the benefits are what is sought. The ijara is a contract of transfer of ownership, and the benefits are what is transferred and acquired, not the object. In the ijara, the wage spreads over the benefits when the contract is partially dissolved or dissolved: they are therefore the purpose sought and the object of the contract. The shari'a nevertheless tolerated directing the contract upon the object, the benefits establishing gradually according to need.
The benefit is what is consumed, and the wage is given in exchange: this is why the benefits are guaranteed, not the object. The contract is attached to the object only as the place and source of the benefit, just as the musaqat contract is attached to the orchard while the object of the contract is the fruit: the profit from it is necessarily its consequence, the benefit existing only after it. The benefits are therefore neither the body of the rented property nor the qualities acquired in it, such as the rising of walls or the laying of the roof in the required forms. They designate the placing at disposal of the rented object for the lessee's use in the required manner, and nothing is added to the legal rulings from these positions (Bada'i' as-sana'i', 4/174-175; al-Hidaya, 3/249; al-Fatawa al-Hindiyya, 4/453; ash-Sharh al-kabir, 5/334; Hashiyat as-Sawi with ash-Sharh as-saghir, 8/468; Nihayat al-matlab, 8/67-68; Rawdat at-talibin, 4/5-6; Mughni al-muhtaj, 3/380; Nihayat al-muhtaj, 5/300-301; an-Najm al-wahhaj, 5/319-320; Hashiyat al-Bajirmi, 3/171; al-Mughni, 5/251; Kashshaf al-Qina', 3/642; Matalib uli an-nuha, 3/580).
The Hanafis said: once it is known that the ijara is a sale of benefit, cases derive from it:
"And ask the town."
Surah Yusuf, 82
and its like. Likewise, renting a trained dog for the hunt, or a falcon, is not permitted: it is a hire upon the object, which is the prey; these cases all derive from this principle.
Al-Kasani (may Allah have mercy on him) said: if it is objected that the hire of the wet-nurse (dha'ir) is permitted although it bears upon the object, which is the milk, the proof being that if she suckles the child with sheep's milk, she has no right to the wage: the answer is that it is reported from Muhammad that the contract bears upon the service rendered to the child, the milk entering only by way of accessory. It is therefore also a hire bearing upon the benefit, consumed by performing the service of the child: washing him, washing his clothes, clothing him, preparing his food and the like; the milk enters only as accessory, like the dye in the hire of the dyer. If she suckles him with the sheep's milk, she has not delivered what entered the contract and therefore has no right to the wage, like the dyer who dyes the garment a color other than the agreed one and has no right to the wage; this does not indicate that the object of the contract is not the benefit.
Some of our masters said: the object of the contract there is the object, which is the sought milk, the service being accessory, for the purpose is the upbringing of the child, which takes place only through milk: the milk has therefore been assimilated to the benefits, which is why its sale is not permitted. On this principle, the hire of the one maimed in the hand (aqta') or with the thumb cut off (ashall) for the sewing with his hand, of the fuller, of writing and of every work requiring the two hands, or of the mute to teach poetry and literature, or of the blind for the vocalization of Qurans, is not permitted, for the ijara is a sale of benefit and the benefit occurs only when the instruments and means are sound.
Likewise, renting salty land or land infested with gnats for an agriculture it cannot support is not permitted, for the agricultural benefit cannot ordinarily arise from it: the ijara as a sale of benefit does not come about, hence the prohibition. On this principle, renting a Quran is not permitted: its benefit is to read it and consult it, whereas consulting the Quran of another and reading it is free of charge, and the ijara is a sale of benefit, whereas what is free is not an object of sale, like the free objects such as firewood and grass. Likewise renting books to read poetry or fiqh in them: the benefit of notebooks is to consult them, and consulting the notebook of another is free without a wage, so it is like renting the shade of a wall outside one's house to sit in. If one rents books in order to read and reads, no wage is due, for want of a contract of exchange. On this principle also, the renting of the fish marshes and the reeds, and the renting of pastures for fodder, as well as the other free objects, is not permitted, for what we have shown (Bada'i' as-sana'i', 4/175-176).
Some Shafi'is, some Hanafis, al-Marwazi, as well as the two shaykhs of Islam Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim among the Hanbalis, held that the object of the contract in the ijara is the rented object, from which the benefit is consumed: the benefits are non-existent, and the contract is attached to it; one says "I rent you my house", as one says "I sold it to you".
The two shaykhs of Islam Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim said: the principle followed by the jurists, according to which what is acquired by the ijara contract is only the benefits and not the objects, is a corrupt principle which no Book, sunna, consensus or sound analogy establishes. What the principles establish is that objects that come about gradually while their root subsists have the ruling of benefits: like the fruit upon the tree, the milk upon the animal, the water in the well. This is why the two types were equalized in the waqf: the waqf immobilizes the root and sets free the benefit. Just as the benefit of the waqf can be a benefit such as residence, or a fruit, or milk, as in the waqf of a herd for profiting from its milk, so it is in the donations: the ariyya to the one who uses the object then returns it, the ariyya to the one who eats the fruit of the tree then returns it, the maniha to the one who drinks the milk of the sheep then returns her, the loan (qard) to the one who uses the dirhams then returns their equivalent standing in place of the body. So it is in the ijara: at times the object is rented for a benefit that is not an object, at times for the object that comes about gradually with the subsistence of the root, like the milk of the wet-nurse or the benefit of the well: these objects, coming about gradually with the subsistence of the root, are like the benefit.
What justifies the ijara is the common measure between the two: that the purpose sought by the contract comes about gradually, whether what comes about is an object or a benefit, and whether it is a body or a meaning subsisting through the body has no effect on permissibility or prohibition, both sharing what justifies it. This kind of objects with gradual production has even more title to permissibility, the body being more perfect than its qualities. The analogy is confirmed by the permissibility of renting the non-human animal for its milk: need calls for it as it calls, for the human wet-nurse, for her food and clothing. It is permitted to rent the milch beast for its fodder, and the livestock for its milk: two forms exist. The first: one buys the milk for a term, the fodder and the service being upon the seller: it is a pure sale. The second: it is handed over while its fodder and service are upon the hirer, its milk belonging to the lessor for the duration of the ijara: it is an ijara, like the guarantee of the orchard, and like the wet-nurse, for the milk is consumed gradually with the subsistence of the root, like renting an object to irrigate one's land.
Malik explicitly stated the permissibility of renting the animal for a term for its milk; thereafter, among his companions, some permitted it following his text, others prohibited it, others set conditions in it that restrict the scope of the text without the text indicating them. The correct view is permissibility, which is the pure analogy: those who permit fared better with the text than those who prohibit (Majmu' al-fatawa, 20/550-551; I'lam al-muwaqqi'in, 2/34-35).
Ar-Rafi'i and an-Nawawi among the Shafi'is held that the disagreement is verbal: ar-Rafi'i said that it does not seem to be a real disagreement, for the first does not turn away from the object, and the second does not mean by it ownership as ownership acquired by purchase, but use; an-Nawawi followed this statement in ar-Rawda, holding the disagreement verbal. Al-Amiri said: it is not so, but it has practical benefits. The first: if one has not taken possession of the rented object and wants to rent it out for someone other than its lessor, a disagreement is derived therefrom: if we say the ijara bears upon the object, it is not valid; if upon the benefit, it is. The second: the famous disagreement on the renting of the dog rests upon that. The third: the hire of a gold jewel for gold is not permitted, according to the path derived from it by Ibn ar-Rif'a. They agreed, however, on the validity of the free man renting out his own person, without deriving anything else from it; and As'ad al-Mihani reported from some of the companions that the object of the contract is a thing bound in the obligation like other debts (an-Najm al-wahhaj, 5/320).
The wage (ujra) is what the lessee binds himself to give in compensation for the benefit he acquires, or what the hiree takes as retribution for his work. What is required of the price in the sale is required of it, for each of the two contracts is an exchange of property for property: what counts as a price in sales counts as a wage in leases, and what does not, does not. Its conditions are the following.
First condition: that the wage be known. The jurists agree that the wage must be known by genus, quantity and quality, like the price in the merchandise sold: it cannot be unknown, for it is the compensation in a contract of pure exchange, like the price in the sale, and its ignorance leads to dispute as does the ignorance of the price. Allah, the Most High, said:
"He said: I wish to marry you to one of these two daughters of mine, on condition that you hire yourself to me for eight years."
Surah Al-Qasas, 27
It is also reported from the Prophet (may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him):
Whoever hires a worker, let him inform him of his wage.Narrated by Abu Hanifa in his Musnad (p. 89) and al-Bayhaqi in as-Sunan al-Kubra (11431); a very weak hadith
(Sources: al-Mabsut, 15/76; Bada'i' as-sana'i', 4/174; al-Ikhtiyar, 3/61; al-Jawhara an-nayyira, 3/322-323; al-Lubab, 1/472; Tabyin al-haqa'iq, 5/105; al-Inaya, 12/329; al-Ma'una, 2/109; al-Muqaddimat al-mumahhadat, 1/438; adh-Dhakhira, 5/376; ash-Sharh al-kabir, 5/335; Tahrir al-Mukhtasar, 4/550; at-Taj wal-Iklil, 4/456; ash-Sharh as-saghir with the Hashiyat as-Sawi, 8/468; al-Muhadhdhab, 1/399; Rawdat at-talibin, 4/6-7; Mughni al-muhtaj, 3/383; an-Najm al-wahhaj, 5/324; ad-Dibaj, 2/458; Hashiyat Qalyubi and Umayra, 3/167; al-Mughni, 5/255; Kashshaf al-Qina', 3/648; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 4/10.)
The manner of knowing the wage is specified as follows. The Hanafis said: knowledge of the wage is obtained only by designation or determination, or by description. The wage is either a determined object or something else.
If it is a determined object, it becomes known by the indicative gesture, without need to mention the genus, the quality, the species or the quantity, whether it is determinable by designation or not, like the dirhams and the dinars, the designation standing in place of the mention of genus, quality, species and quantity. If the designated object requires transport and burden, the mention of the place of delivery is required according to Abu Hanifa.
If it is not a determined object: if it is of what establishes a debt in the obligation among the absolute exchanges, like the dirhams, the dinars, the measures, the weights, the close counted units and the garments, it is known only by the mention of the genus, of the species within that genus, of the quality and of the quantity. Except that for the dirhams and the dinars, if there is only one currency in the country, the mention of the species and the weight is not required: the genus suffices, and the contract falls upon the currency of the country and its weight; if there are several currencies, it falls upon the predominant currency; and if a dominant currency exists, the description becomes necessary: without it, the contract is corrupt. The mention of the place of delivery is required for what requires transport and burden according to Abu Hanifa; according to Abu Yusuf and Muhammad, it is not: the place of the contract is determined for the delivery.
Is the term required? In the measures, the weights and the close counted units, it is not, for these things, just as they establish a deferred debt in the obligation by way of salam, establish an absolute debt by way of loan: they therefore admit two cases. If the term is mentioned, it is valid and the term is established, as in the salam; if it is not, it is valid, as in the loan. As for the garments, the term is necessary, for they establish a debt in the obligation only as deferred: they admit only one case, the salam, hence the necessity of the term. If it is of what does not establish a debt in the obligation in the contracts of absolute exchange, like the animal, it does not become known by the mention of genus, species, quality and quantity: one sees that it does not count as a price in sales, therefore not as a wage in leases.
The ruling of disposing of the wage before taking possession of it, when it falls due in the obligation, is that of disposing of the price before taking possession of it when it is a debt. What is an object designated by a gesture follows the ruling of the price when it is an object: even if movable, its disposal before taking possession is not permitted; if it is real estate, the known divergence in the book of sales applies: permitted according to Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf, not permitted according to Muhammad, and it is a question belonging to the sales.
If a slave is hired for a known wage plus his food, or a mount for a known wage plus its fodder, it is not permitted, for the food or the fodder becomes the wage, and it is unknown: the wage thus becomes unknown. The analogy in the hire of a wet-nurse for her food and clothing is prohibition, which is the view of Abu Yusuf and Muhammad, because of the ignorance of the wage made up by the food and clothing; but Abu Hanifa preferred permissibility on the basis of the text, which is the word of Allah:
"Upon the father of the child fall their maintenance and their clothing, in a fitting manner."
Surah Al-Baqara, 233
with no distinction between the wife and the divorcée; and His word:
"And upon the heir, a like obligation."
Surah Al-Baqara, 233
that is, the maintenance and the clothing, and that after the death of the child; and in His word:
"If you wish to have your children suckled, there is no blame upon you for what you give in a fitting manner."
Surah Al-Baqara, 233
Allah lifted all blame concerning suckling absolutely. The two imams (Abu Yusuf and Muhammad) answer: that the wage is unknown is conceded, but ignorance does not prevent the validity of the contract either by its object or otherwise except by leading to dispute; the ignorance of the wage here does not lead to dispute, for custom has established leniency towards wet-nurses and generosity towards them, out of compassion for the children: it resembles the ignorance of the measure (qafiz) of the heap of grain.
If a house is rented for a known wage and the lessor stipulates the plastering and repair of the house, the hanging of a door, or the insertion of a beam in its ceiling, upon the lessee, the ijara is corrupt: the stipulated thing becomes the wage, and it is unknown, so the wage becomes unknown. Likewise if land is rented while stipulating the dredging of its canal, the digging of its well or the building of an enclosure wall, for all of that falls upon the lessor: stipulating it upon the lessee makes it the wage, unknown, so the wage becomes unknown (Bada'i' as-sana'i', 4/173-174; al-Ikhtiyar, 3/61; al-Jawhara an-nayyira, 3/322-323; al-Lubab, 1/472; Tabyin al-haqa'iq, 5/105; al-Inaya, 12/329).
The Shafi'is said: the wage that falls due in the obligation must be known by genus, quantity and quality, like the price in the sale; if it is a determined object, its sight suffices, whether it is linked to a determined benefit or to an obligation. Renting a house against a work of construction is therefore not valid, such as: "I rent it to you for what you need of construction", or against a dinar with which you will build it: the work is part of the wage, and it is unknown, so the wage becomes unknown; if he rents it for known dirhams without condition, authorizing him to spend them in construction without condition, it is valid.
Renting a mount for a month against a thing resembling the fodder, such as its fattening, is likewise not valid, because of ignorance. Renting a skinner to skin the sheep against its skin, or a miller to grind the wheat against part of its flour, such as a quarter, or against its bran, is likewise not valid, because of the ignorance of the thickness of the skin and of the quantity of flour and bran, and the incapacity for an immediate wage. The rule is therefore: it is invalid to make the wage a thing that results from the work of the hiree (al-Muhadhdhab, 1/399; Rawdat at-talibin, 4/6-7; Mughni al-muhtaj, 3/383; an-Najm al-wahhaj, 5/324; ad-Dibaj, 2/458; Hashiyat Qalyubi and Umayra, 3/167).
The Hanbalis said: knowledge of the wage is required by what establishes knowledge of the price, by analogy; knowledge by sight or by description is considered, as in the sale, equally. If the compensation is known by sight without being quantified, like a heap of grain, two views are admitted, the more probable of which is permissibility, which is the school: it is a known compensation on the basis of which the sale is permitted, so the ijara is permitted as well, as if its quantity were known. The other view: it is not permitted, for the contract may be rescinded after the loss of the heap, without one knowing what may be claimed: knowledge of the quantity is therefore required, as for the compensation of the salam. The first is preferable, and the apparent meaning of the words of al-Kharqi is that knowledge of the quantity in the compensation of the salam is not a condition. The difference between the two is that the benefit here has been rented according to the regime of objects, attached to a present object, whereas the salam bears upon a non-existent thing: the two therefore differ.
Everything that counts as a price in the sale counts as a compensation in the ijara, for it is a contract of exchange resembling the sale: the compensation can be an object as well as a benefit.
Renting a man to flay a beast against its skin is not permitted, for one does not know whether the skin will come out sound or not, thick or thin, and because it cannot be a price in the sale, therefore not a compensation in the ijara, like the unknown things; if he skins it on that basis, he has the right to the wage of the like. Renting a man to remove a dead animal against its skin is more corrupt still, for the skin of the dead animal is impure and cannot be sold, and the animal has left ownership by its death; if he does it, he likewise has the right to the wage of the like.
Renting a shepherd for a flock against a third of their dung, their offspring, their wool and their hair, or half, or all of it, is not permitted, for the wage is unknown and does not count as a compensation in the sale. Ismail ibn Sa'id said: I asked Ahmad about the man who gives a cow to a man to feed and guard it, the offspring being between them: he said: "I dislike that"; Abu Ayyub and Abu Khaythama said the same. Ibn Qudama said: I know of no opponent in this, for the compensation is unknown and non-existent: one does not know whether it will come about, the principle being its non-existence, and it cannot count as a price. If it is objected: "you have permitted giving the mount to the one who works it for half its profit", we answer: that is permitted only by assimilation to the mudaraba, for it is an object that grows by work, hence the permissibility of stipulating a share of the growth, and of the musaqat, as in the mudaraba; in our case, however, it is not possible, for the growth of the flock does not depend on his work: the assimilation is therefore impossible. If he hires him for its keeping for a known term for half, or a known share, it is valid, for the work, the wage and the term are known, as if the wage were set in dirhams; the growth obtained between them then follows the ruling of ownership, for he thereby owns the share assigned to him of the flock, and its growth belongs to him as if he had bought it (al-Mughni, 5/255-256; Kashshaf al-Qina', 3/648; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 4/10).
The jurists differed on renting a benefit for a benefit, whether of the same genus, as renting a house for the residence of another house, or of a different genus, as renting a house for riding a mount or for the service of a slave. The majority of jurists, the Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis, hold that the wage can be a benefit, whether of the same genus or of a different genus. Allah, the Most High, reports the word of Shu'ayb (peace be upon him):
"I wish to marry you to one of these two daughters of mine, on condition that you hire yourself to me for eight years."
Surah Al-Qasas, 27
He thereby made the marriage the compensation of the hire. The shari'a moreover permitted the contract of marriage against the teaching of the Quran: Sahl ibn Sa'd as-Sa'idi reports that a woman offered herself to the Prophet (may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), and the hadith mentions the man who had proposed to her, and that the Messenger of Allah (may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said to him:
I have married you to her for what you have of the Quran.Narrated by al-Bukhari (5149)
This is the balancing of the benefit of teaching against the benefit of the marital relation, the meaning being: "I have married you to her in exchange for the teaching of what you have of the Quran, or its recitation". And because these are two benefits upon each of which the ijara can individually conclude, it can conclude upon the one for the other, as if they were of two genera. And because the contracts of exchange are of two types, the objects and the benefits: just as the sale of one object for another is permitted within one or two genera, so it is with the benefits. And because the benefits in the ijara are like the objects in the sale, and the sale of a part of the objects for a part is permitted, so it is with the benefits. And because everything that can be a price in the sale can be a compensation in the ijara: just as the compensation can be an object, it can be a benefit, whether the genus is identical or different.
There is no riba in benefits in principle, to the point that renting a house for the benefit of two houses, or gold for gold, is permitted, and that taking possession in the session is not required in it, as the Shafi'is and Hanbalis explicitly stated.
The Hanbalis said: the hire of a jewel for a wage of a genus other than its own is valid, as well as for a wage of its own genus, for it is an object from which a sought benefit is drawn while it subsists: its hire is therefore permitted, like the lands. If the owner of the garment says to the tailor: "if you sew it today, you have a dirham; if you sew it in the Roman style, a dirham; if you sew it tomorrow or in the Persian style, half a dirham", it is not valid. Likewise if the owner of a land says: "if you sow it with wheat, you have five", or the owner of a shop: "if you open a tailor's shop in it, five; if you sow maize or open a smithy, ten", and whatever is not determined: the contract is not valid, for it is a single contract whose compensation varies according to earlier and later, like: "I sell it to you for ten in cash, or eleven deferred", so long as they do not part on one of the two, as previously in the sale; the Shafi'is say the same.
On the other hand, if a mount is rented saying: "if you return it today, five; tomorrow, ten", or it is rented ten days for ten dirhams, each additional day at such and such, it is valid, for it does not lead to dispute: a known compensation was fixed for each term. One cannot rent an unknown duration, like renting a horse for the duration of its campaign, for one does not know when it ends, it may lengthen or shorten: that leads to dispute; if one fixes for each day a known thing, it is valid. If a house is rented saying: "each month, a dirham", or it is rented for watering: "each bucket, a fruit", the contract is valid, based on what is reported from Ali (may Allah be pleased with him):
I once came to Medina starving and went out seeking work in the outskirts of Medina. I found a woman who had gathered dust and thought she wanted to wet that earth. I offered her: a bucket for a date. I drew sixteen buckets until my hands were worn, then I came to the water and drank of it. I returned to her and laid my palms before her, and Isma'il stretched out his hands, gathered the dates, and she counted out for me sixteen. I came to the Prophet (may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) and told him, and he ate with me a part of those dates.Narrated by Imam Ahmad in his Musnad (1135)
As in the previous case of selling against grain saying "each qafiz for a dirham", the ijara binds for the first month by the absolute of the contract, and what follows is taken month by month: each month that enters imposes upon the two parties the ruling of the ijara if they do not rescind it at its beginning, for entering the month amounts to the initial conclusion of the contract upon its object. The undertaking of each month, together with what was previously agreed in the contract on the estimation of the rent and the consent to give it, proceeds from the initial conclusion of the contract, like the sale by the mu'ata when the negotiation reveals the consent (al-Mughni, 5/255; al-Mubdi', 5/68; Kashshaf al-Qina', 3/653; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 4/11; al-Ma'una, 2/110; al-Ishraf, 3/219, no. 1067; Bidayat al-mujtahid, 2/170; Qawa'id al-ahkam fi masalih al-anam, 1/122; al-Muhadhdhab, 1/399; Rawdat at-talibin, 4/7-8; Asna al-matalib, 2/405; Mughni al-muhtaj, 3/383; an-Najm al-wahhaj, 5/324; ad-Dibaj, 2/458; Hashiyat Qalyubi and Umayra, 3/167).
The Hanafis, however, distinguished according to whether the benefit is of the genus of the object of the contract or not. If it is of the same genus, such as residence for residence, service for service, riding for riding, agriculture for agriculture, it is not permitted; if it is of a different genus, such as residence for service, service for riding, it is permitted. For the identity of genus does not allow the deferral of taking possession, whereas the benefit comes about gradually and is therefore deferred by nature; difference of genus, on the other hand, allows the deferral of taking possession. The reality of the matter is that the ijara is a legislated contract, not a mere analogical reasoning, out of necessity for people: no necessity is realized in the identity of genus, which therefore remains upon the principle of analogy; the necessity is realized in the difference of genus, hence the permissibility (Bada'i' as-sana'i', 4/174; al-Jawhara an-nayyira, 3/322-323; al-Muhit al-Burhani, 7/706; al-Hindiyya, 4/411).
Second condition: that the wage be pure. It cannot be an impure thing, such as a dead animal, for everything that counts as a price in the sale counts as a compensation in the ijara, a contract of exchange resembling the sale: the compensation can be a dead animal, but not the pig.
Third condition: that a lawful benefit be drawn from it, according to the preceding reasoning.
Fourth condition: that the lessor be capable of delivering it. The wage cannot be a fish in the water, a bird in the sky, a strayed camel or a runaway slave, as in the sale. All of this is a matter of agreement among the jurists of the schools (ash-Sharh as-saghir with the Hashiyat as-Sawi, 8/468, and the previous sources).