Islamic Fiqh > Companies and leases > Ju'ala (task reward) > Ju'ala: pillars and conditions
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Updated on 25 September 2026 at 6:57 PM
The ju'ala is a contract by which a person commits to pay a defined reward to whoever performs a defined task, as when one says: "Whoever returns my runaway slave shall have a dinar." This page translates, leaf by leaf, the ju'ala chapter of the legal encyclopedia (al-Mawsu'a al-fiqhiyya): the four pillars of the contract (the promiser, the formula, the work, the reward), then the questions discussed by the jurists, with the positions of the Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali and Hanafi schools and their classical references.
The promiser (ja'il) is the one who commits himself by the ju'ala, whether he owns the thing or not, on condition that he has the capacity of exchange such that sale and hire may be valid from him: whoever can validly be hired can validly be a promiser.
The Shafi'is and the Hanbalis require him to be fully free to dispose of his property (Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/248): no contract is valid from a child, an insane person or one interdicted for prodigality.
As for the worker, if he is designated, only the capacity to work is required of him, which includes the slave and one not bound by religious obligations: neither legal accountability (maturity), nor uprightness, nor freedom, nor the permission of the master or guardian is required. The contract is therefore valid from a child or an insane person endowed with some discernment, from one interdicted for prodigality and from a miser, according to the preponderant opinion among the Shafi'is. Excluded from it is the one incapable of working, such as the powerless young child, for his benefit is known, like that of a blind man hired as a watchman.
If the worker is designated vaguely, mere mention by call suffices. If someone says for example: "Whoever brings me my conveyance or my runaway slave shall have a dinar," whoever brings it deserves it, man, woman, child, slave or insane person, once he has heard the call or learned of it, for all fall under the generality of the phrase "whoever brings me" (Rawdat al-Talibin, 4/90; Mughni al-Muhtaj, 3/542-543; Nihayat al-Muhtaj with al-Shirbini's gloss, 5/533; al-Najm al-Wahhaj, 6/90; al-Dibaj, 2/583; al-'Umayra's gloss on Kunz al-Raghibin, 3/322; Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/248).
Among the Malikis, majority is not required of the promiser: it suffices that he be discerning, as in sale and hire. The binding force of a hire or ju'ala contract concluded by the discerning child remains suspended upon the permission of his guardian. The meaning is that the condition for the validity of the promiser's contract is discernment, while the condition for its binding character is full legal responsibility, as in hire and sale: thus nothing is required of the two contracting parties except the capacity to be hired and to work (al-Sharh al-Kabir with al-Dasuqi's gloss, 5/435, 429; al-Mukhtasar al-fiqhi, 12/365-366; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 7/3, 60; al-Taj wa-l-Iklil, 4/456, 539; Tahrir al-Mukhtasar, 4/616; al-Sawi's gloss on al-Sharh al-Saghir, 8/468, 9/103).
The formula (sigha) is any utterance indicating permission to perform a work against a known, intended and binding countervalue.
The Malikis define it thus: a man says to another: "If you manage to recover my young runaway slave, or if you bring me my stray camel, you shall have such a thing as he names" (Sharh al-Zarqani on the Muwatta, 3/513).
The Shafi'is: the formula is any utterance by a speaking person who does not intend writing, indicating permission to act upon request against a known, intended and binding countervalue, like "Return to me my slave or the slave of such a one, and you shall have such a thing," or conditional, like "If you return my slave, you shall have such a thing," and the like; for it is an exchange, which therefore requires a formula indicating the thing requested and the amount committed. The intelligible gesture of a mute person stands in place of the formula. Writing is a metonymy: if the intention is attached to it, it is valid; otherwise not (Rawdat al-Talibin, 4/89; al-Wasit, 5/141; Mughni al-Muhtaj, 3/541-542; Nihayat al-Muhtaj with al-Shirbini's gloss, 5/535; al-Najm al-Wahhaj, 6/90, 93; al-Dibaj, 2/582; al-'Umayra's gloss, 3/323).
The Hanbalis: the promiser with capacity to dispose says to Zayd for example: "If you return my found object, you shall have such a thing," or renders it vague, saying: "Whoever returns my found object or finds it shall have such a thing, or whoever builds me this wall, or whoever returns my runaway slave, shall have such a thing," and the contract is valid (Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/248; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 4/282).
The jurists differed about one who returns the lost thing without the owner having permitted its return and without having promised a reward: is he entitled to an equivalent reward, or has he nothing and does his act remain a voluntary gift?
The Shafi'is: whoever returns a runaway or a lost thing without the owner's permission is like one who acted before the call: he has nothing, whether or not the returner is known for returning lost things for a fee; for it is an act without a formula, hence without any commitment in his favor, and his act falls into voluntary giving; the slave, for example, then enters into his guarantee. The same applies to one who acted with permission but without any countervalue being mentioned (Rawdat al-Talibin, 4/89; Mughni al-Muhtaj, 3/542; Nihayat al-Muhtaj, 5/535; Asna al-Matalib, 2/439; al-Najm al-Wahhaj, 6/91; al-Dibaj, 2/582; al-'Umayra's gloss, 3/324).
The Malikis: if the master said nothing and a person brings the runaway, while seeking lost things and runaway slaves is his habit, he deserves an equivalent reward; if this is not his habit, he has no reward, but only the expense, that is, the expense incurred for the runaway: what he spent on him in food, mount and clothing, not his own spending nor that of his mount during the search.
The master remains free to refuse the thing if the workers bring him the runaway slave before he has committed himself to a reward: he may leave it with the one who brought it, and the worker then has nothing to claim, whether the reward equals the value of the slave or not (al-Sharh al-Kabir with al-Dasuqi's gloss, 5/435; al-Mukhtasar al-fiqhi, 12/365-366; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 7/64; al-Taj wa-l-Iklil, 4/544; Tahrir al-Mukhtasar, 4/621; al-Sawi's gloss, 9/107-108).
The qadi 'Abd al-Wahhab (may Allah have mercy on him) said (al-Ma'una, 2/120): whoever of his own initiative brings a runaway or a lost thing and then asks for a fee, if this is his occupation and habit and he is known to earn his living by it, has an equivalent wage in proportion to his toil, his journey and his search, contrary to Abu Hanifa and al-Shafi'i, for whom he is a volunteer entitled to nothing; for were the master to lose his property, the labors of this seeker would be counted as a charge warranting compensation. Its origin: one who falls from a high place or into a well and is pulled out deserves an equivalent wage, no sum being named. If the master refuses to pay it, he is separated from the slave, for his refusal expresses his contentment with the slave's Islam. But if it is known that this is not his habit and that he normally shuns such tasks, and that he did it out of piety and to gain affection, he has no wage if he claims it, for his claim contradicts his apparent state, as if he had repented and made amends; he then has no right to anything.
The same author adds that he found in Ibn Rushd (may Allah have mercy on him) that there is no disagreement that the one who finds the slave before the reward is announced has no right to it, since returning the slave was already obligatory upon him; the disagreement concerns only the one who finds him after the announcement, with two views: the first, that of Ibn al-Qasim: he has nothing unless he heard the announcement and sought the slave; the second, that narrated by Ibn Habib: the reward is due to him even if he neither heard nor sought. And this well-known detail is not mentioned among the Malikis (al-Bayan wa-l-Tahsil, 8/467).
The Hanbalis: whoever returns a found or lost object, or works for another without a promise or permission, is entitled to no countervalue, for he has bestowed a benefit without countervalue and does not deserve it; and a man must not be bound by what he has not committed himself to and which does not please him. Except in two cases:
The Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) fixed a dinar for the return of the runaway slave when the one who brought him brings him coming out of the sanctuary.Reported by al-Bayhaqi (6/200); a weak hadith
The returner also recovers his expenditure, for he is legally permitted to incur costs given the sanctity of the human person; this applies if he does not intend a gift, and even if the slave escapes from him on the way. If the master dies, the claim passes to his estate. It is established that the runaway may be entrusted to the one who found him and is a deposit in his hands: whoever claims him and the slave confirms his word takes him; if he does not find his master, he hands him over to the imam or his deputy, to keep him for the owner's benefit. The owner may sell him if there is benefit in it, and the finder does not become its owner by mere identification, like stray camels; if he sells him, the sale is corrupt.
Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him) said: whoever returns a found or lost object, or performs for another a task other than returning the runaway, without a promise or permission, is entitled to no countervalue; no disagreement is known on this, for it is a work that deserves compensation only with exchange, not without it, like the work in hiring. If they dispute over the reward, one saying: "You promised me such a thing for returning your found object," and the owner denies it, the word is the latter's with his oath, for the presumption is in his favor (al-Mughni, 6/22; Sharh al-Zarkashi, 2/220; al-Insaf, 6/390, 393; Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/250; al-Rawd al-Murbi', 2/153-154; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 4/284-285).
Question 3: whoever performs the act before the promise reaches him, is he entitled to anything? Among the jurists who accept the ju'ala: if the owner of the lost thing promises a reward to whoever returns it and someone acts before the promise reaches him, is he entitled to the reward?
The Shafi'is, the Hanbalis and Ibn al-Qasim among the Malikis (with a detail to come) hold that if one says "whoever returns my lost thing shall have such a thing" and someone returns it without hearing the call or knowing of the promise, he is entitled to nothing.
The Shafi'is: if one says "whoever returns my runaway slave shall have such a thing" and someone who did not hear the call returns him, he is entitled to nothing, being a volunteer; and even if he aimed at a countervalue, believing that such work is never wasted, he still has nothing according to the madhhab, and his belief produces no effect (Rawdat al-Talibin, 4/89; al-Bayan, 7/410; Mughni al-Muhtaj, 3/542; Nihayat al-Muhtaj, 5/535).
The Hanbalis: whoever performs the promised act before the promise reaches him deserves neither the reward nor anything of it, for he is a volunteer by his act; it is unlawful for him to take it, that would be consuming wealth unjustly, unless the owner gifts it to him after informing him of the situation, whether the return occurred before or after knowledge of the promise; for the reward is given against the act, not against the delivery of the thing (al-Mughni, 6/25; Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/250; al-Rawd al-Murbi', 2/153; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 4/281; Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 4/208).
The Malikis: if the owner says "whoever brings me my runaway slave or my stray camel shall have such a thing" and someone brings it without having heard his word, while seeking lost things and runaways is his habit, he deserves an equivalent reward, whether equal to the named sum, less or greater. If the two adversaries dispute after completion of the work over the amount of the reward, and no testimony resembles the case, they undergo the mutual oath and the worker is restored to an equivalent reward; if a testimony resembles, the word belongs to the one it supports; if both resemble, as when the worker's testimony resembles, the word is his, their oaths are retracted as they swore, and judgment is given for the swearer against the retracter.
As for one who did not hear the master's word and whose habit is not seeking lost things and runaways, he has no reward and only the expense, that is, the expense incurred for the runaway in food, mount and clothing, not his own spending nor that of his mount during the search (al-Sharh al-Kabir with al-Dasuqi, 5/435; al-Mukhtasar al-fiqhi, 12/365-366; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 7/64; al-Taj wa-l-Iklil, 4/544; Tahrir al-Mukhtasar, 4/621; al-Sawi's gloss, 9/107-108).
Ibn Rushd (may Allah have mercy on him) said: Ibn al-Qasim dealt with the case of a man who promises ten dinars to whoever brings him his slave, and the slave is brought by a man who had not heard of the promise. He said: if he is among those who bring back runaways, he has an equivalent reward; if not, he has only his expense; and if he heard, whether he is among those who do not take runaways or among those who take them, he has the ten dinars.
Muhammad ibn Rushd said: Ibn Habib reported in al-Wadiha, from Ibn al-Majishun, Asbagh and other companions of Malik, that the worker has the named reward, whether he knew of it or not, whether he took the trouble to seek it or not, as soon as he finds it after the announcement; and he states that this is Malik's own view.
The rationale of Ibn al-Qasim's view (may Allah have mercy on him) is that the one who brought the slave did not act upon a request, for the named reward, since he did not know of it: it is therefore not due to him. The rationale of what Ibn Habib reports is that the promiser bound himself to what he named as a reward for whoever brings the slave: it must therefore be his, even without seeking, and even more than an equivalent reward if he sought it, being one of those who seek runaways. Ibn al-Qasim's view is the more apparent, for the promiser, in saying "whoever brings me my slave shall have ten dinars," intended to incite the hearer of his words to go seeking him: the ten dinars are thus due only to the one who heard and then sought. As for one who did not hear, or who heard but found the slave without seeking him, there is no disagreement that whoever finds the slave before the announcement has no right to the reward, since returning him was already obligatory; and for the one who finds him after the announcement, the two views already cited recur, that of Ibn al-Qasim and that narrated by Ibn Habib (al-Bayan wa-l-Tahsil, 8/467).
The Hanbalis: one to whom the promise comes in the course of the work has a full share of the reward, that is, in proportion to what he performs after learning the news, if he completes it with the intention of the reward; for his work before the information was not authorized in his favor, so he deserves nothing for it, having acted as a volunteer. If he learns of the promise only after the act, he has nothing for it (al-Mughni, 6/25; al-Insaf, 6/390; Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/248-249; al-Rawd al-Murbi', 2/153; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 4/281; Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 4/208; I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in, 4/190).
The Malikis distinguish according to whether seeking lost things is or is not the worker's habit: if it is his habit, he has an equivalent reward, equal to, less or greater than the named sum; if it is not his habit, no reward, only the expense incurred for the thing, in food, mount and clothing, not his own spending nor that of his mount during the search. If after completion they dispute over the amount, without probative testimony, they undergo the mutual oath, the worker is restored to the equivalent reward, the one whose testimony resembles prevails, and if both resemble the word is the worker's, their oaths being retracted as they swore, and judgment given for the swearer against the retracter (al-Sharh al-Kabir with al-Dasuqi, 5/435; al-Mukhtasar al-fiqhi, 12/365-366; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 7/64; al-Taj wa-l-Iklil, 4/544; Tahrir al-Mukhtasar, 4/621; al-Sawi's gloss, 9/107-108).
The Shafi'is: whoever learns of the permission before returning deserves the committed reward, whether informed through an intermediary or not. However, if the promiser says "whoever among those who hear my call returns my slave shall have such a thing" and the one who knew of the call without hearing it returns him, he is entitled to nothing, even if he acted out of greed, as al-Mawardi said (Mughni al-Muhtaj, 3/542; Nihayat al-Muhtaj, 5/535).
The Malikis here restate their position: one who brings the thing without having heard the master's word, but whose habit is seeking strays and runaways, deserves an equivalent reward, equal to, less or greater than the named sum; otherwise, only the expense; the same rule of the mutual oath in case of dispute over the amount, with the Maliki references already cited.
Ibn Rushd (may Allah have mercy on him) again reports Ibn al-Qasim's answer about the ten dinars (see Question 3), Muhammad ibn Rushd's version from Ibn Habib in al-Wadiha, from Ibn al-Majishun, Asbagh and other companions of Malik (the worker has the named reward, whether he knew or not, sought or not, as soon as he finds the slave after the announcement), and the exposition of the two rationales: Ibn al-Qasim's (no acting upon an unknown request, hence nothing) and Ibn Habib's (the promiser committed himself, so the reward is due even without seeking); Ibn al-Qasim remains the more apparent, for the promise of ten dinars aimed at inciting the hearer to seek; and there is no disagreement on the absence of right for the one who finds the slave before the announcement, with the two views already cited for the one who finds after the announcement (al-Bayan wa-l-Tahsil, 8/467).
The Hanbalis: whoever performs the promised act after the promise reached him deserves the reward, like the other debts owed by the promiser; for the contract settled with the completion of the work, and he deserves what was named to him, like the profit in the mudaraba. If a group performs the promised act, they share the reward, for they shared the work by which the reward is earned, contrary to the case "whoever enters this hole shall have a dinar" where a troop enters: each deserves a whole dinar, for each entered totally; unlike the return of the found object, which none of them performed entirely. Likewise "whoever digs through this wall shall have a dinar": if three pierce it with a single piercing, they share the dinar; if each pierces his own digging, each deserves a dinar (al-Mughni, 6/25; al-Insaf, 6/390; Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/248-249; al-Rawd al-Murbi', 2/153; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 4/281; Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 4/208; I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in, 4/190; Manar al-Sabil, 2/293).
If permission is given to a specific person but another acts, as if one said to Zayd: "Return my runaway slave and you shall have a dinar," and 'Amr returns it, does either of the two deserve the reward? The Shafi'is and the Hanbalis: neither of the two is entitled to anything: the worker, because the promiser stipulated nothing for him and did not conclude a ju'ala with him for this return; the designated person, because he did not act.
The Shafi'is specify: if the promiser designates a person and another acts, as in the example of Zayd and 'Amr, neither of the two is entitled to anything: the worker ('Amr), because nothing was stipulated for him and he acted without permission; the designated one (Zayd), because he did not act. But if the other is the slave of the permitted person and returns the thing after his master learned of the commitment, the permitted person deserves the reward, for his slave's hand is like his hand (Rawdat al-Talibin, 4/89; Mughni al-Muhtaj, 3/542; Nihayat al-Muhtaj, 5/535; Asna al-Matalib, 2/439; al-Najm al-Wahhaj, 6/91; al-Dibaj, 2/582; al-'Umayra's gloss, 3/324).
The Hanbalis: if the promiser with capacity to dispose says to Zayd: "If you return my found object, you shall have such a thing," Zayd deserves the reward if he returns it; whoever returns it besides him is entitled to nothing, for the master did not conclude a ju'ala with him (al-Mughni, 6/21; Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/248; Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 4/209).
If a man is designated, saying "if Zayd returns it he shall have such a thing," and Zayd returns it without knowing his master's permission, is he entitled to the reward? The Shafi'is: if the promiser designates a man ("if Zayd returns it, he shall have such a thing") and Zayd returns it without knowing he is permitted, or if the master gives him permission without stipulating a countervalue, or stipulates one that is not intended, such as blood, the returner is entitled to nothing (Rawdat al-Talibin, 4/89; Mughni al-Muhtaj, 3/542; Nihayat al-Muhtaj, 5/535). This is also what the Hanbalis' words imply: he is entitled to nothing.
Question 8: the thing is in a person's hands and the owner promises him a reward for returning it.
The majority of jurists, Malikis, Hanbalis and Shafi'is (with the detail to come in their schools), hold that when a person finds another's lost thing and its owner then promises a reward to whoever returns it, the finder is not entitled to it, for returning it is already obligatory upon him.
Ibn Rushd (may Allah have mercy on him) said: there is no disagreement that the one who finds the slave before the announcement has no right to the reward, since returning him to the owner was obligatory upon him even before the announcement (al-Bayan wa-l-Tahsil, 8/467; al-Mukhtasar al-fiqhi, 12/367).
Al-Hattab (may Allah have mercy on him) reports from the book of Nawazil, in the chapter of the ju'ala and hiring: the ju'ala is only admitted for seeking a slave whose whereabouts are unknown. As for one who found a runaway, a lost thing or clothes, he may not take a reward for returning them nor for indicating their place: that is rather obligatory upon him (Mawahib al-Jalil, 7/453-454).
Al-Tusuli (may Allah have mercy on him) says in al-Bahja fi Sharh al-Tuhfa: if a man's property is stolen or he loses it, and his master commits, for the benefit of the one who brings the good news today, to the named reward, such a commitment is valid, and the bearer of good news is paid for it under two conditions: that the commitment take place before the existence of the stolen item or the like, and that its location be unknown. If someone has found the runaway or the stolen item, or knows their place, and then comes to the master asking for a commitment of reward for returning it or indicating its place, he has no reward; and if he takes it, he returns it. The verse of the 'Amaliyyat sums it up: "Take the good news of a reward promised before existence (of the thing) and ignorance of the place." Yet Abu al-'Abbas al-Mallawi mentions in one of his notes, and a similar statement occurs in the commentary, that some judges of Fez issued a fatwa obliging judgment according to the good announcement absolutely, out of regard for the public interest and for fear that the Muslims' wealth be lost through the concealment of lost and stolen things. He says: the scholars indeed stated that the fatwa varies with circumstances; and where the good announcement is granted to the owner of the stolen goods, he recovers it from the thief, for the latter is an unjust one who caused the promiser's loss. This fatwa follows what preceded from Ibn Siraj and others on preserving the interests, and it is according to it that the majority of Muslims act today: none can stop them concealing lost things if they do not take the good announcement. And Allah knows best (al-Bahja fi Sharh al-Tuhfa, 2/312-313).
The Hanbalis: if the lost thing is in a person's hands and the owner promises him a reward for returning it, it is not permitted for him to take it, for he is obliged to return it (Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/248; Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 4/209).
The Shafi'is: if one says "whoever returns my property shall have such a thing" and it is the holder who returns it, we consider: if the return involves toil, like a runaway, he deserves the reward; if not, like dirhams and dinars, no: what involves no toil is not matched by a countervalue. If one says "whoever indicates my property to me shall have such a thing" and it is the holder himself who indicates it, he has nothing, for that is legally obligatory upon him; if the property is in another's hands and he indicates it, he deserves the reward, for he most likely undergoes the toil of the search (Rawdat al-Talibin, 4/90-91).
The Shafi'is: if the owner generalizes the call, saying "whoever returns my slave shall have such a thing," and two undesignated persons share in the return, they share the reward, for the return came from both of them; and the sharing is equal, by heads, even if their works are unequal, for the work is, as a rule, not measurable so as to distribute the reward upon it. This is when the call is generalized ("whoever returns it shall have such a thing") or addressed to a group ("if you return it, you shall have such a thing") and it is known that he does not increase it with the number of returners; contrary to "whoever enters my house receives a dirham" if a troop enters: each receives a dirham, for each entered, whereas all together returned the slave, none having returned him alone: so they share the reward by heads, the work being by nature unknown and not distributable.
The Imam (al-Shafi'i) said: distribution according to their equivalent wages is not far-fetched, for the wage is paid to them only upon completion of the work; once completed, each one's share becomes measurable. If one says "whoever returns the two slaves from such a place shall have a dinar" and a single hearer returns both from half the distance, or returns one from the whole distance, he has half, applying distribution according to the work. If he says to two: "if you both return the two slaves, you shall have such a thing" and one of them returns both, he has half; if one of them returns one of the two slaves, he has a quarter of it.
Al-Subki (may Allah have mercy on him) said: if one says "whichever man returns my slave shall have a dirham" and two return him, they split the dirham; this is closest to my view. If a slave belongs for a third to each of two partners and they say to a man: "if you return our slave, you shall have a dinar," and he returns him, the dinar is divided into three according to the shares of ownership, according to the sounder of the two views, as Qadi Husayn said. If one says to a man "return my slave and you shall have a dinar" and he returns him with two others: if they say "we helped him," the one promised the reward takes the whole dinar and the other two have nothing, for they worked without a countervalue; if they say "we shared the work in order to share the reward," the promised one takes a third of the dinar, for he did a third of the work, and the others have nothing, for the master stipulated nothing for them, only for the third man. The co-worker therefore has nothing, in any case intended by the master, for the latter committed nothing to him; however, if the worker commits something to him, it binds him. If one says to Zayd "return my slave and you shall have a dinar" and another helps him, all belongs to Zayd, for help may be needed and the promiser intends the performance of the act by whatever means possible: no shortcoming is presumed against the addressee.
The worker may seek help from another if he is not designated, even without being unable, for the ju'ala has been lightened; if he is designated, he is like the agent: he may seek help for what exceeds him or does not befit him, just as delegation is given for that; and the fact of another person deputizing after hearing the call is like delegation in wood-gathering and the like: it is permitted.
Al-Shirbini (may Allah have mercy on him) noted this subtlety: al-Subki derived, from the promised one deserving the whole reward when the co-worker intends to help him, and from the worker in irrigation (musaqa) deserving his share when the owner or a stranger volunteers in the work, the permissibility of delegation in the office of imam of prayer. Every function admitting delegation, such as teaching, on condition of delegating one's equal or better, and each deserves the agreed fee. Ibn 'Abd al-Salam and al-Nawawi, however, judged that neither of the two deserves the fee: the delegator, because he does not perform the work with his own hands; the deputy, because he lacks authority, unless the supervisor permits him to hold the function in person.
Al-Zarkashi (may Allah have mercy on him): their common point is that the stipend belongs neither to hiring nor to the ju'ala, for both require that the work be performed for the hirer or the promiser, whereas here the work cannot be performed for the promiser; only permission conditional on attendance remains, which did not occur: attaching this issue to that question is therefore invalid.
Al-Adhra'i (may Allah have mercy on him): what he mentions opened a door for holders of posts and the ignorant to occupy religious functions and delegate to them the unfit or the barely fit, taking the revenues of the waqf across the ages.
Al-Ghazzi, after al-Subki's example of the imamate: and this differed from the jurists' view. Ibn Shuhba (may Allah have mercy on him): and it is clear, for one cannot delegate someone to study under him. In the same historical note: the shaykh Fakhr al-Din Ibn 'Asakir taught at the Adhrawiyya (being its first teacher), at the Taqiyya and the Jarukhiyya of Damascus, and at the Salahiyya of Jerusalem, spending months in one and months in the other, despite his knowledge and piety. In his time, a man was asked about one who held the teaching of two madrasas in two distant cities such as Aleppo and Damascus: a group, including the qadi of qadis Baha' al-Din Abu al-Baqa' al-Subki, the shaykh Shihab al-Din Ahmad ibn 'Abdallah al-Ba'labakki, Shams al-Din al-Ghazzi and the shaykh 'Imad al-Din al-Hasbani, among other Hanafis, Malikis and Hanbalis, judged it permissible with delegation; another group forbade it, and this is the more apparent view, for his absence from one in order to be present in the other is no excuse.
The Hanbalis: if a group takes part in the work and performs the promised act, they share the reward, for they shared the work by which the reward is earned. If one says "whoever digs through the wall shall have a dinar" and they pierce it, that is, three pierce it with a single piercing, they deserve one dinar divided in three among them, for they shared the work by which the countervalue is earned, so they share the countervalue, like the wage in hiring; if each digs his own digging, each takes a dinar, like "whoever enters this passage shall have a dinar" if a troop enters: each deserves a dinar, for each entered totally, like the solitary entrant, and thus deserves the full countervalue.
If the master of a runaway slave promises a specified thing to one designated man, Zayd, and the slave is returned by Zayd with two others who say "we returned him to help Zayd," Zayd takes the whole reward and the other two nothing, for they acted as volunteers. If they say "we returned him to take the countervalue for ourselves," they have nothing, for they acted without a promise, and Zayd takes a third of the reward, for he did a third of the work; the other two have nothing, having acted without a promise. Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him): all of this is al-Shafi'i's madhhab, and no disagreement is known in it (al-Mughni, 6/21; al-Mubdi', 5/267; Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/249; Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 4/209; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 2/282).
The Shafi'is and the Hanbalis: if the promiser differentiates among the workers, promising a dinar to one, two dinars to the second and three dinars to the third, saying to one "return my slave and you shall have a dinar," to another "return him and you shall have two dinars," to the third "return him and you shall have three dinars," and they return him all together, each deserves a third of what was promised to him, for each performed a third of the work. If two of them return him, each has half of his promise, for he performed half of the work. If one alone returns him, he has his whole reward. Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him): all of this is al-Shafi'i's madhhab, with no known disagreement (al-Bayan, 7/411; al-Hawi al-Kabir, 8/32; al-Mughni, 6/21; al-Mubdi', 5/268; Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 4/209).
Al-'Imrani the Shafi'i (may Allah have mercy on him) reports from Ibn al-Sabbagh: if one says to a man "if you sew this garment today you shall have a dinar, and if you sew it tomorrow half a dinar," the contract is corrupt; if he sews, he has an equivalent wage; and Malik and Zufar said the same.
Abu Hanifa: the first condition is valid, the second corrupt: if he sews on the first day, he has the dinar; afterwards, an equivalent wage. Abu Yusuf and Muhammad: both conditions are valid. Our proof: it is a single contract; if the countervalue differs in it according to earlier or later, it is corrupt, as if one said: "I hire you this for a dirham on credit or half a dirham in cash." Hence, in every case where a corrupt reward was stipulated and the worker worked, he has an equivalent wage, as we said in hiring (al-Bayan, 7/408-409).
The Shafi'is: in every case where a corrupt reward was stipulated and the worker worked, he has an equivalent wage, as in hiring. If a corrupt ju'ala was stipulated for one and a valid ju'ala for others, the one for whom the valid ju'ala was stipulated takes a third of what was named to him, and the one for whom the corrupt ju'ala was stipulated takes a third of an equivalent wage, in consideration of singularity. This is also the Hanbalis' madhhab: if a known countervalue, a dinar for example, is promised to one and an unknown countervalue to another, and they return it together, half goes to the one whose countervalue is known, and the other has the wage of his work (Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 4/209).
The Malikis: in the ju'ala corrupted by the absence of a condition, there is an equivalent reward if the work is completed, its outcome being returned to him sound in itself; if the work is not completed, he has nothing: this is the famous view. It is also said: he has an equivalent wage, by referring it to its sound origin, hiring: he is then treated according to the rules of hiring, that being its origin, for the contracting parties of the ju'ala stipulated what the contracting parties of hiring stipulate. Unless the ju'ala falls with an absolute reward, work done or not, like "if you bring me my runaway slave you shall have such a thing, and if you do not bring him you shall have such a thing or your expenses": he then has an equivalent wage even without bringing him, for it then departs from its reality, its rule being that there is no reward without completion of the work, whereas he promised in both cases, which is no longer the reality of the reward (al-Sharh al-Kabir with al-Dasuqi, 5/437-438; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 7/65; al-Taj wa-l-Iklil, 4/545; Tahrir al-Mukhtasar, 4/622-623; al-Sawi's gloss, 9/113).
The majority of the scholars who affirm the validity of the ju'ala: the worker deserves the stipulated reward only upon completion of the work; if he abandons it, he has nothing of what was stipulated for him, for he forfeited his work by his own choice; and no distinction is made between the case where part of the work is deliverable, as in the promise of reward for teaching the Quran or building a wall of which he teaches or builds a part, and the non-deliverable case like returning the runaway: he has nothing. Exception: if the promiser increases the work and the worker does not accept the increase and dissolves for that reason, he then has an equivalent wage. Such is the position of the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis, and also that of the Malikis: he has nothing, unless another completes it, according to this detail.
The Malikis: he deserves the reward only upon completion of the requested work, whose outcome is the attainment of its fruit; if the work is not completed, he has nothing, if what he did leaves no benefit to the promiser. As for what leaves a benefit: if another completes it after his abandonment, whether the master hires someone (for a wage, small or great), or promises a reward to whoever completes it, or completes it himself or with his slaves, the first receives from the wage a share proportional to the second worker's work, that is, proportional to what the second takes, whether the second worked as much, less or more; for the promiser then benefited from what the first did for him. Example: five (dirhams) are promised to the first for carrying a beam to a known place; he carries it halfway and abandons it; ten dirhams are promised to another for delivering the other half: the first takes ten, for he stands, in respect of the first's act, in the place of the second's hire; for when the second was hired for half the distance for ten, it is known that the value of his hire on the day the first was hired was twenty. It is not said: the first agreed to carry it the whole distance for five, so he should have half, the underestimation (mughabana) being permitted in the ju'ala and elsewhere; for the ju'ala contract is dissolvable by the promised one after the work: when he abandons it after carrying half the distance, his abandonment becomes a voiding of the contract from its very origin, and the second becomes the revealer of what the first deserves: the promiser therefore owes the first the share of benefit he draws from the second.
Ibn Yunus (may Allah have mercy on him) said: he should be given half of his first reward, that is, in the example, two and a half dirhams; for underestimation is permitted in the ju'ala and elsewhere; a similar view from al-Tunisi. Ibn al-Qasim (may Allah have mercy on him) has a view: the first has the value of his work on the day he worked; and according to Ibn Kinana: the value of his work on the day the second worked, that value being equal to the reward, less or greater (al-Sharh al-Kabir with al-Dasuqi, 5/430-431; al-Mukhtasar al-fiqhi, 12/396-399; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 7/61-62; al-Taj wa-l-Iklil, 4/540-541; Sharh Mayara, 2/179; al-Bahja, 2/310; Tahrir al-Mukhtasar, 4/617; al-Sawi's gloss, 9/103-105).
The Shafi'is: the ju'ala concerning the bestowal of services to obtain a thing has two forms. The first: the reward is on a single thing, like "whoever builds me a wall or sews me a garment shall have such a thing": if he sews part of the garment or builds part of the wall, he has nothing, for the aim is not attained. The second: it concerns the attainment of two things each detachable from the other, like "whoever returns the two slaves shall have such a thing": if he returns one, he deserves half the reward.
Al-Zarkashi (may Allah have mercy on him): it is on this model that the case of the student's absence from study on some days is derived, when the waqf endower says "whoever attends such a month shall have such a thing": the days are like the question of the slaves, they are separate things, and he deserves the share of the days he attended. Be attentive to this, for it is a point on which people err. Al-Damiri (may Allah have mercy on him): that is why the shaykh Taqi al-Din al-Qushayri, when he was absent an unaccustomed day from his lesson, took no agreed fee for that day. He said: I asked my shaykh twice about this and he answered: if the student during his absence was engaged in study, he deserves his share; otherwise not; and even if he attends without being in a state of work, he does not deserve, for the aim is his benefit through knowledge, not his mere presence; and he held that this falls under irsad, the oversight of waqf revenues. Al-Zarkashi: if someone holds a function and is prevented from performing it, the shaykh Taj al-Din al-Fazari ruled that he deserves the agreed fee; the apparent is the contrary, for it is a ju'ala and he did not work with his own hands; the apparent is what the shaykh Taj al-Din ruled. What should be said: these functions, if they come from the treasury and the holder has a right to them, he deserves the agreed fee, whether he attends or not, whether he delegates or not; the deputy deserves his if an agreed fee is promised him for his deputizing, otherwise not; if it is not from the treasury, or it is but the holder had no right to it, what the author (al-Nawawi) said is the apparent (Rawdat al-Talibin, 4/92-93; al-Bayan, 7/412; Mughni al-Muhtaj, 3/547-548; Nihayat al-Muhtaj, 5/546; al-Dibaj, 2/585-586; al-Najm al-Wahhaj, 6/98).
The Hanbalis: the worker does not deserve the reward before the completion of his work; if he dissolves before completion and does not complete it, he has nothing, having waived his own right, since he did not fulfill what was stipulated for him. If the promiser dissolves after the worker has begun the work, he owes him an equivalent wage of his work, for it is work against a countervalue that was not delivered to him: he thus has the right to the wage of his work; what he does after the dissolution has no wage, for it is unauthorized work. If the promiser increases or decreases the reward before the work begins, it is permitted and acted upon, for it is a revocable contract, like the mudaraba (Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 4/283-284; Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 4/211-212).
The Shafi'is and the Hanbalis: if one says "whoever returns my slave or my lost thing from such a city shall have a dinar" and a hearer returns it from half the distance, the distance being equal in ease and toil, he has half the reward; from a third, a third; for the whole reward is against the work, so a part is against a part, whether less or greater, by reckoning. If he returns it from a place farther than the designated city, he has only the named amount: the surplus is bestowed without commitment, no permission having been given for it.
The Shafi'is detail: if one says "whoever returns the two slaves from such a place shall have a dinar" and a hearer returns both from half the distance equal in ease and toil, or returns one from the whole distance, he has half, distributing according to the work; if one says to two "if you both return the two slaves, you shall have such a thing" and one of them returns both, he has half; if one of them returns one, he has a quarter; and if the slave is returned from a place farther than the one designated, the surplus is void, no reward, for lack of commitment.
Al-Subki (may Allah have mercy on him): if one says "whichever man returns my slave shall have a dirham" and two return him, the dirham is divided between them; this is what seems soundest to me (Rawdat al-Talibin, 4/91-92; Asna al-Matalib, 2/441).
The Hanbalis: if one says "whoever returns my slave from such a city shall have a dinar" and a man returns him from half the road of that city, he has half the reward, for he did half the work; likewise "whoever returns my two slaves shall have a dinar": if he returns one, he has half the dinar, for he returned half of the two; and if he returns the slave from another city than the one named, he has nothing, for nothing was promised for his return from there, as if one promised for the return of one of two slaves and he returns the other. If one says "whoever returns my slave shall have a dinar" and a man brings him to half the way and he escapes, he has nothing, for the reward was stipulated for the complete return, which he did not effect; like the tailor hired to sew a garment who sews it but does not deliver it before it is spoiled: no wage. Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him): if it is objected that the promiser said "whoever finds my found object shall have a dinar" and the finding, for its part, did occur, we answer that the context indicates the stipulation of the return: the aim is the return, not mere finding; he mentioned the finding only as the cause of the return, as if he had said "whoever finds my found object and returns it to me..." (al-Mughni, 6/22; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 4/282).
The Shafi'i and Hanbali jurists, and such is also the requirement of the Maliki madhhab and others, do not require that the one committing to the reward be the owner in whose property the work falls. If a non-owner says "whoever returns the slave of such a one or his lost thing shall have such a thing," the returner deserves it from the one who spoke, for it is he who committed to the countervalue; nothing falls upon the master, who did not commit himself.
If a fuduli says "so-and-so said: whoever returns my lost thing shall have a dinar," while the master said nothing, and a man returns the thing, the fuduli (the crier) guarantees nothing, for he reports another's speech without committing to the countervalue; and the returner is negligent for not taking precautions (al-Kafi, 2/334; al-Mubdi', 5/268; Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/249; Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 4/210; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 4/284).
The Shafi'is add that if the master calls the fuduli a liar in this case, nothing falls upon him; if he confirms his word, al-Baghawi said the reward is due from him. Al-Nawawi (may Allah have mercy on him): this is when the informant is among those whose word is trusted; otherwise, it is like one who returned without knowing of the permission. Al-Nawawi adds: if the fuduli testifies against the master of the permission, his testimony should not be accepted, for he is suspected of propagating his word. As for the author of the Bayan's statement that the madhhab's requirement is to accept it, he is not followed, and Allah knows best (Rawdat al-Talibin, 4/90).
Al-'Imrani, the author of the Bayan (may Allah have mercy on him), said: if a man says "whoever returns the slave of such a one shall have a dinar" and a man returns him, the dinar falls upon the one who said it, for he committed to the countervalue and bound himself by the act. If he cries out "so-and-so said: whoever returns my slave shall have a dinar" and a man returns him, the crier is bound to nothing, for he reports another's speech without engaging his guarantee; if the master of the slave denies having said it, the madhhab's requirement is that if the crier is just and testimony is given against him on this, the returner swears with him if he confirms him, and the dinar falls upon the master of the slave; if he is not just or no testimony is given against him, the crier is bound to nothing: he says "I speak truly and the master of the slave lies," and no loss befalls me from his lie, for he does not guarantee, and is therefore not bound by his report (al-Bayan fi madhhab al-Imam al-Shafi'i, 7/410).
The jurists differed: is it valid to stipulate a deadline in the ju'ala? The Hanbalis hold valid the fixing of a period, like "if you find it within a month" or "whoever returns my slave from Basra within this month shall have such a thing," as well as the combination of the period and the work, like "whoever sews my shirt today shall have a dirham" or "whoever builds me this wall today shall have a dinar": this is valid, given the generality of his words which tolerate the gharar, contrary to hiring according to the sound view; for if the period may be unknown, it is more fitting still that it be specified. If he brings the thing within the period, he deserves the reward and nothing else falls upon him; if he does not fulfill it within the period, nothing is due to him. If he completes the work before the end of the period, no further work falls upon him for the remainder, like the payment of a debt before its due date. If the period expires before the work, the master of the work may dissolve the hiring, for the worker did not fulfill his condition; if he accepts to keep him, the worker can no longer dissolve, for it is he who breached the condition, which does not ground dissolution; if he chooses to maintain the contract, it is he who demands the work, like the Muslim who is patient when the sold thing is not delivered until it exists: he is entitled only to the sold thing. If the contract is dissolved before the work, the wage and the work fall away, even if a part was done: he has an equivalent wage, for the contract is terminated, the named amount falls away and one reverts to the equivalent wage.
Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him) answers the objection: "the sound view of the madhhab is that this is not permitted in hiring; how did you permit it in the ju'ala?" by three differences. The first: the ju'ala tolerates gharar; ignorance of the work and the period is admitted in it, contrary to hiring. The second: the ju'ala is a revocable contract: entering it despite the gharar does no harm, unlike hiring which binds; whoever enters it with the gharar is bound by it. The third: in hiring specified by a period, the work is owed throughout the period and not after; now if one combines period and work, it may happen that he completes before the end: if we say the work is owed for the rest of the period, we impose on him more than the object of the contract; if we say it is not owed, part of the period remains without work; if the period expires before the work and we impose completion on him, we impose work outside the contracted period; and if we say no work is owed, this contradicts our issue, for the work that earns the reward is here a work restricted by the period: if he brings it within the period, he has the reward and nothing else falls upon him; if he does not fulfill it, he has nothing (al-Mughni, 6/21; cf. Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 3/637; Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/250; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 4/284).
The Malikis and the Shafi'is hold that the absence of time-fixing is among the conditions of the formula: if one says "whoever returns it today shall have such a thing" or "whoever returns my slave from Basra within this month shall have such a thing," it is not valid and the ju'ala is corrupt; for gharar thus multiplies through the fixing of a known period: he may not find him in time, his work is wasted, the owner's aim is not attained; that is why fixing a deadline was forbidden in the qirad: neither the fixing of time nor the combination of period and work is valid in it. Al-Khatib al-Shirbini (may Allah have mercy on him): from the analogy with the qirad it is taken that conditional suspension (ta'liq) is not valid; it is the apparent, though I have seen no one address it (Mughni al-Muhtaj, 3/542; cf. al-Bayan, 7/408; Rawdat al-Talibin, 4/94-95; al-Najm al-Wahhaj, 6/91; Qaliubi's gloss, 3/323).
The Malikis: the absence of time-fixing is among the conditions of validity of the ju'ala, for the worker deserves the reward only by the work: the time may expire before completion and his work be wasted in vain, hence an increased gharar, whereas gharar is already the origin of this contract, admitted only by the Lawgiver's permission. The proof of the invalidity of time-fixing is the word of Allah:
"...and to whoever brings it, a camel-load..."
Surah Yusuf, 72
He promised without fixing a deadline. The fixing of time is corruptive only if the worker did not stipulate the right to abandon whenever he wishes; if he stipulated that, the ju'ala is not corrupted, for it then reverts to its origin of absence of time-fixing, the fixing being nullified. This right of abandonment, when the reward is promised for completing the whole period, work done or not, is permitted, but the contract then departs from the ju'ala into hiring: "I conclude with you a ju'ala that you bring me my slave within a month for a dinar, whether you work or not" turns into hiring; if the thing is not brought, we consider: if he worked, he has according to his work; otherwise nothing. Al-Kharshi (may Allah have mercy on him): if it is asked why this contract is not permitted without the condition, whereas its nature is abandonment at will, the answer is that without the condition the promised one enters from the outset upon completion, even with the right of abandonment, and the gharar in it is strong; with the condition, he enters from the start with a power of choice, and the gharar is light (Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 7/62; al-Mukhtasar al-fiqhi, 12/392; al-Sharh al-Kabir with al-Dasuqi, 5/432-433; al-Taj wa-l-Iklil, 4/542; al-Bahja, 2/313; Tahrir al-Mukhtasar, 4/618; al-Sawi's gloss, 9/107).
The Shafi'is and the Hanbalis: the promiser may increase the reward, decrease it or change its kind before the work begins.
The Hanbalis: if he increases or decreases before the work begins, it is permitted and acted upon, for it is a revocable contract, like the mudaraba (Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/251; Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 4/211).
The Shafi'is: the promiser may increase, decrease and change the kind before the worker finishes his work, whether before or after its start, like the sale during the option period, and even more so: if he said "whoever returns my slave shall have ten," then "five," or the reverse, or "whoever returns him shall have a dinar," then "a dirham." If the worker learns of it before the work begins, the second call is the one retained and he has what it mentions. If he did not hear it or the change occurs after the start, an equivalent wage is due to him, for the second call is a dissolution of the first, and the master's dissolution during the work entails reversion to the equivalent wage. If the one who heard the first call and the one who heard the second both work, the first has half an equivalent wage and the second half of the second amount. The meaning of "hearing" is knowledge. And the equivalent wage here is understood for the whole of the work, not only for the past part (Rawdat al-Talibin, 4/93-94; Mughni al-Muhtaj, 3/548-549; Nihayat al-Muhtaj, 5/546; al-Najm al-Wahhaj, 6/100-101; al-Dibaj, 2/586; Qaliubi and al-'Umayra's glosses on Kunz al-Raghibin, 3/328-329).
Knowledge of the work: the majority of jurists, Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis, do not require the work to be known when it is difficult to specify: the work may be unknown in it, like the return of the runaway slave or of the lost thing, whose place is not known; contrary to hiring, which requires the description of the work. If one says "whoever returns my slave shall have such a thing" or "whoever returns my slave from such a place shall have such a thing," it is valid; and if it is valid with the work unknown, then all the more so when the work is known.
When the work is easy to specify, such as digging a well to draw water or building a wall, it is not permitted, according to the Malikis in the madhhab and some Shafi'is, without knowing it; it is permitted according to the Shafi'is, as al-Rafi'i and al-Nawawi generalized (see below), and the Hanbalis: no difference for them between work unknown or known, easy or difficult.
The qadi 'Abd al-Wahhab (may Allah have mercy on him) said (al-Ma'una, 2/121): the reward is admitted for extracting water from wells and springs according to a known description, with knowledge of the distance or nearness of the ground, its hardness or softness; if the worker does not know this, it is not permitted, for it is an exchange over unknown work which no necessity calls for; and if no water comes out, he has nothing, unless the master of the house benefited from a part of his work: he then has a wage in proportion to that benefit.
Ibn 'Arafa (may Allah have mercy on him) said: knowledge of the difficult work is not required, unlike the easy work; for the whole madhhab admits the reward for returning the runaway while ignorant of both its aspects, contrary to the reward for extracting water from the earth: in al-Ma'una, it is permitted after knowing the distance or nearness of the water, its hardness or softness; otherwise it is not permitted, no necessity calling for it; and this is the text Ibn Fattuh transmits of the madhhab. As for the statement of the Muqaddamat (knowledge of the work is not among its conditions, the unknown is permitted in it), its apparent meaning is the absence of the requirement of expertise of the ground; and it is apparent (al-Mukhtasar al-fiqhi, 12/392; Minh al-Jalil, 8/71).
Al-Dasuqi (may Allah have mercy on him) said: knowledge of the object of the contract is not required; it is at times unknown, like the runaway: the validity of the reward for bringing him requires that his place not be known; if only the master knows it, more than the named sum and an equivalent reward fall due; if only the worker knows it, according to Ibn al-Qasim he has according to his toil; it is also said: he has nothing. If both of them know it, an equivalent reward is due to him, in consideration of the promiser's prior hostility. At times the object is known, like the ju'ala for digging a well: expertise of the ground and of its water is required in it (al-Sharh al-Kabir with al-Dasuqi, 5/429-430; al-Sawi's gloss, 9/105).
The Shafi'is: the work need not be known, for the ju'ala is a revocable contract: the work may therefore be unknown in it, and the return of the runaway is a work that cannot be measured. Al-Nawawi (may Allah have mercy on him): every work on which hiring is invalid for being unknown, its unknownness is tolerated for need; and every work on which hiring is valid, the ju'ala too is valid, according to the sound view; it is said: no, on account of dispensing through hiring (Rawdat al-Talibin, 4/90).
Al-Rafi'i and al-Nawawi generalized validity with the work unknown, but Ibn al-Rif'a, following Qadi Husayn, said: this is specific to what cannot be measured and whose work is arduous, like "whoever returns my slave shall have such a thing"; as for what is measurable and easy, like "whoever builds me a wall shall have such a thing," one must describe the place of the building, the length of the wall, its thickness, its height and its material; and in sewing, the description of the garment and of the sewing is considered, since there is no need to tolerate unknownness (al-Hawi al-Kabir, 8/31; al-Muhadhdhab, 1/411; al-Wasit, 5/142-143; al-Bayan, 7/407; al-Najm al-Wahhaj, 6/93; Mughni al-Muhtaj, 3/543-544; Nihayat al-Muhtaj, 5/539; al-Dibaj, 2/583; Kunz al-Raghibin with Qaliubi and al-'Umayra's glosses, 3/325).
The Hanbalis: the work may be unknown in the ju'ala, like a sewing not described for a garment, or the return of a found object whose place is not specified; for need requires that the work be unknown, since the place of the lost thing or the runaway is unknown; and the work does not become binding: its knowledge is therefore not required (al-Mughni, 6/20; Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/247-248; al-Rawd al-Murbi', 2/152; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 4/280-281; Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 4/207).
The majority of jurists require of the work, as object of the contract, that it be lawful, that it have a benefit, that it be among the works in which hiring is valid, and, according to some, that it involve toil. Here is the detail.
First: that it be lawful. The Malikis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis require the promised work to be lawful, not prohibited, like the flute and singing: every work for which taking a countervalue is permitted in hiring is permitted in the ju'ala; and every work for which it is not permitted in hiring, such as singing, piping and the other prohibited things, admits no reward, by the word of Allah:
"And do not help one another in sin and aggression"
Surah al-Ma'idah, 2
(al-Sharh al-Kabir with al-Dasuqi, 5/433; al-Mukhtasar al-fiqhi, 12/294; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 7/63; Minh al-Jalil, 8/63; Rawdat al-Talibin, 4/90; Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 4/207; Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/248; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 4/280).
Second: that it be among the works in which hiring is valid. The Malikis: everything that admits the reward, like digging wells in dead land, admits hiring; but not everything in which hiring is valid admits the reward, like sewing a garment, serving for a month, selling many goods or digging wells on the requester's property: the reward is prevented in these because a benefit remains to the promiser if the promised one does not complete the work. Hiring is thus broader than the ju'ala, and the ju'ala more specific: every case in which hiring is valid does not imply that the ju'ala is valid in it, just as the presence of animality does not imply that of rationality; and every case in which the ju'ala is valid, hiring is valid in it, just as the presence of rationality implies that of animality.
Al-Tusuli (may Allah have mercy on him) in al-Bahja fi Sharh al-Tuhfa: "in everything in which hiring is valid without exception...". And this is clear according to the famous view: what leaves a benefit to the promiser after abandonment does not validate the ju'ala; as for the opposite view, Ibn al-Qasim's, that the reward is valid wherever a benefit remains to the promiser, the ju'ala and hiring are equivalent and exclude each other in nothing.
Two remarks. The first: in the Muti'iyya: Malik disapproved of the reward for a lawsuit, the one taking it having a right to nothing but the recovery of the right, for its end is not known once finished; if he acts thus, he has an equivalent wage. And before that, the same text: according to one of Malik's two views, one may conclude a ju'ala with the physician for the cure and with the adversary for the recovery of the right, and this is what is practiced by the people of trust; likewise in the Majalis al-Maknusiyya. As for the physician, his stipulation holds only if the medicine comes from the patient; otherwise it is not permitted, for it is a gharar: if he heals, he takes his due, otherwise his medicine is lost. Ibn Naji said: I judged by it, and its text figures in the general work.
The second remark: if a man's property is stolen or he loses it, and his master commits today to the named reward for the benefit of the one who brings the good news, this commitment is valid and the bearer of good news is paid for it under two conditions: that the commitment take place before the existence of the stolen item or the like, and that its place be unknown. If someone has found the runaway or the stolen item, or knows their place, and then comes to the master asking for a commitment of reward for returning it or indicating its place, he has no reward; and if he takes it, he returns it. The verse of the 'Amaliyyat sums it up: "Take the good news of a reward promised before existence (of the thing) and ignorance of the place." Abu al-'Abbas al-Mallawi mentions in one of his notes, and a similar statement occurs in the commentary, that some judges of Fez issued a fatwa obliging judgment according to the good announcement absolutely, out of regard for the public interest and for fear that the Muslims' wealth be lost through the concealment of lost and stolen things. He says: the scholars stated that the fatwa varies with circumstances; and where the good announcement is granted to the owner of the stolen goods, he recovers it from the thief, an unjust one who caused the promiser's loss. This fatwa follows what preceded from Ibn Siraj and others on preserving the interests, and it is according to it that the majority of Muslims act today: none can stop them concealing lost things if they do not take the good announcement. And Allah knows best (al-Bahja fi Sharh al-Tuhfa, 2/312-313).
As for the Shafi'is, al-Nawawi (may Allah have mercy on him) said: every work on which hiring is invalid for being unknown, its unknownness is tolerated for need; every work in which hiring is valid, the ju'ala is valid in it too, according to the sound view; it is said: no, on account of dispensing (Rawdat al-Talibin, 4/90).
The Hanbalis: every work for which the countervalue is admitted in hiring is admitted in the ju'ala; what is not admitted in hiring, like singing, piping and the other prohibited things, admits no reward, by the word of Allah (Surah al-Ma'idah, 2). What is specifically reserved to its doer among the people of nearness (ahl al-qurba), by stipulating the doer's Islam, when the benefit does not extend beyond the doer himself, like prayer and fasting: no reward, as previously in hiring; what whose benefit extends beyond the doer, like the call to prayer and the like, the teaching of fiqh, of the Quran, judging, giving fatwa and the ruqya: it is permitted, according to Abu Sa'id's hadith about the ruqya, already mentioned.
If one says "whoever treats this wound of mine until it heals, or this sick man until his illness is cured, or this man of ophthalmia until his eye is healed, shall have such a thing," the contract is not valid in it at all, neither as hiring nor as ju'ala, as authenticated in the Insaf and elsewhere (Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/251; Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 4/210).
If the object of the contract is a thing which the holder is obliged to return, the countervalue is not permitted in it; likewise if it is among what is imposed on the promised one: in that case the reward is not permitted to him.
The Malikis: among the conditions of the object of the contract is that it be among what is not imposed on the promised one; otherwise the reward is not permitted to him, as when he finds a runaway without work: returning him is obligatory upon him. Al-Hattab (may Allah have mercy on him) reports from the Nawazil (chapter of the ju'ala and hiring): the reward is admitted only for seeking a slave whose place is unknown; one who found a runaway, a lost thing or clothes cannot take a reward for returning them nor for indicating their place: that is obligatory upon him (Mawahib al-Jalil, 7/453). Ibn Rushd (may Allah have mercy on him): there is no disagreement on the absence of right to the reward for one who finds the slave before the announcement, returning him being obligatory upon him (al-Bayan wa-l-Tahsil, 8/467; al-Mukhtasar al-fiqhi, 12/367).
Al-Tusuli (may Allah have mercy on him) in al-Bahja fi Sharh al-Tuhfa repeats here the passage of the good announcement: if a man's property is stolen or he loses it and his master commits today to the named reward for the benefit of the one who announces, the commitment is valid and the bearer of good news is paid under two conditions: the commitment before the existence of the stolen item, and the place unknown; one who found the runaway or the stolen item, or knows their place, and comes asking for a commitment has no reward; if he takes it, he returns it; the verse of the 'Amaliyyat: "Take the good news of a reward promised before existence (of the thing) and ignorance of the place"; and Abu al-'Abbas al-Mallawi's note on the fatwa of some judges of Fez obliging judgment according to the good announcement absolutely, for the public interest and for fear that the Muslims' wealth be lost through the concealment of lost and stolen things; the fatwa varies with circumstances, and the owner of the stolen goods recovers the good announcement from the thief, the unjust one who caused the promiser's loss; this fatwa follows Ibn Siraj and others on preserving the interests, and the majority of Muslims act according to it today (al-Bahja, 2/312-313).
The Hanbalis: if the lost thing is in a person's hands and the owner promises him a reward for returning it, it is not permitted for him to take it, for he is obliged to return it. They also said: what is reserved to its doer among the people of nearness, by stipulating the doer's Islam when his benefit does not extend beyond the doer, like prayer and fasting, admits no reward; what whose benefit extends beyond the doer, like the call to prayer, the iqama and the pilgrimage, admits two views like the two narrations in hiring, the sounder being that the reward is permitted in it (al-Mughni, 6/22; Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/248; Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 4/209).
The Shafi'is: it is required of the work, as object of the contract, that it not be an obligation established upon the worker: entering into it are medical treatment, the ruqya, freeing from prison, fulfilling a need and defending against an oppressor, even if they are established, for they are supervening things. If one says "whoever returns my property shall have such a thing" and it is the holder who returns it: if the return involves toil, like the runaway, he deserves the reward; if not, like dirhams and dinars, no. If one says "whoever indicates my property to me shall have such a thing": if it is the holder who indicates it, he has nothing, for it is legally obligatory upon him; if the property is with another and he indicates it, he deserves the reward, for he most likely undergoes the toil of the search (Rawdat al-Talibin, 4/90-91; Qaliubi's gloss, 3/325).
The jurists require of the promised work that it have a benefit: the ju'ala is not valid for one who would perform a vain work, without any benefit.
The Hanbalis, by juristic reasoning: the ju'ala is not valid for a pointless work without benefit, like one who spends his day counting the days; likewise impossibility exceeding capacity, like lifting a heavy stone or walking on a rope, for it is a risk-taking the Lawgiver has not permitted; the ju'ala is not concluded on any of that, lawfulness being required in it. These things, either the doer fears harm to his body or not: if he fears, it is unlawful; otherwise disliked; in either case it is not lawful (Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 4/207; Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/248; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 4/280).
The Shafi'is: Qaliubi (may Allah have mercy on him) says in his gloss: it is considered in the work, absolutely, that it involve toil, as in hiring, and that it not be an obligation established upon the worker: entering into it are medical treatment, the ruqya, freeing from prison, fulfilling a need, defending against an oppressor, even if established, for they are supervening; excluded from it are narrating a report, indicating a person or a road, the return of a usurped or borrowed thing on the part of the usurper or the lender, even with toil (Qaliubi's gloss on Kunz al-Raghibin, 3/325).
The Malikis: the transmitted sources differ among them on whether a benefit for the promiser is required; the disagreement exists, and the famous view in the madhhab is the first position: it is required that the work involve a benefit for the promiser. It follows that if someone concludes with someone a ju'ala to climb this mountain and come down from it, with no need being fulfilled for the promiser, it is not valid, according to the famous and sound view: it would be consuming people's wealth unjustly (al-Sharh al-Kabir with al-Dasuqi, 5/435; al-Taj wa-l-Iklil, 4/543-544; al-Furuq, 4/296; Tabsirat al-Hukkam, 2/215; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 7/63-64; Tahrir al-Mukhtasar, 4/620; Minh al-Jalil, 8/66).
The Malikis and the Shafi'is formally forbid it: the reward is not admitted for expelling the jinn from the human being.
The Malikis: the reward is not permitted for expelling a jinn from a person, for its reality is not known and cannot be established, and it does not befit the people of piety to enter into it; likewise the reward for untying one bewitched or bound by magic: its reality is unknown and unverifiable.
Al-Dasuqi (may Allah have mercy on him): his saying "for its reality is not known" means that it cannot be established whether the jinn has left or not; and this rationale implies that if the benefit repeats from this practitioner, after trial and verification of the reality, the reward becomes permitted for what is mentioned: thus ruled Ibn 'Arafa, on condition that the ruqya be Arabic or foreign of known meaning, from a just man, even in a general way, lest its words be words of disbelief (al-Sharh al-Kabir with al-Dasuqi, 5/435; al-Taj wa-l-Iklil, 4/543-544; al-Furuq, 4/296; Tabsirat al-Hukkam, 2/215; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 7/63-64; Tahrir al-Mukhtasar, 4/620; Minh al-Jalil, 8/66).
Al-Abi (may Allah have mercy on him) said: it is not lawful to take what the writer of the absolution for making the lost thing return takes, for it is of sorcery. As for what is taken on the object of the contract: if he treats with the Arabic ruqyas, it is permitted; if with foreign ruqyas, it is prevented, there being disagreement on it; the shaykh, that is, Ibn 'Arafa, used to say: if the benefit repeats from him, it becomes permitted (al-Sawi's gloss on al-Sharh al-Saghir, 8/472).
The Shafi'is: Ibn Hajar al-Haytami (may Allah have mercy on him) reports from Ibn Abi Zayd as well: the reward is not permitted for expelling the jinn from the human being, for its reality is not known, it cannot be established, and it befits neither the people of piety nor others; likewise the reward for untying the bewitched and the bound (al-Fatawa al-Hadithiyya, 1/88).
The jurists differed on the physician's stipulation conditioned upon the cure: is it valid?
The Hanbalis in the madhhab, along with the Zahiris, hold that the physician's stipulation upon the cure is not valid at all, for the cure is in Allah's hand, not in anyone's; the physician only treats and strengthens nature with what counters the disease, and he does not know the strength of the medicine against the strength of the disease: the cure is within Allah's power alone. If something is given to him upon the cure without condition, it is lawful, according to the Prophet's command (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) to take what is given without asking.
The Hanbalis: what whose benefit extends beyond the doer, like the call to prayer and the like, the teaching of fiqh, of the Quran, judging, giving fatwa and the ruqya: it is permitted, according to Abu Sa'id's hadith about the ruqya. If one says "whoever treats this wound of mine until it heals, or this sick man, or this man of ophthalmia, shall have such a thing," the contract is not valid at all, neither hiring nor ju'ala, as authenticated in the Insaf and elsewhere (Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/251; Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 4/210; al-Muhalla, 8/196).
Al-Mardawi (may Allah have mercy on him): if one says "whoever treats this for me until the healing of his wound, his illness or his ophthalmia shall have such a thing," it is not valid at all according to the sound view of the madhhab, as expounded in the Ri'ayatayn, the Hawi al-Saghir, the Faiq and others, and the qadi chose it. It is said: the ju'ala is valid in it, chosen by Ibn Abi Musa and the author of the Mughni, reported by al-Zarkashi in hiring. It is said: hiring is valid in it.
Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him): Ibn Abi Musa said: there is no harm in stipulating with the physician upon the cure, for Abu Sa'id, when he treated the man with the ruqya, stipulated upon the cure; the sound view, Allah willing, is that this is permitted, but as a ju'ala and not as hiring, hiring requiring a period or a known work, whereas the ju'ala is admitted over an unknown work, like the return of the found object and the runaway; Abu Sa'id's hadith in the ruqya was thus a ju'ala, and the same applies here (al-Mughni, 5/314; al-Sharh al-Kabir, 6/70).
Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim said: it is permitted to promise the physician a reward upon the cure, as the people of the village promised the Prophet's companions (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) a reward for the cure by the ruqya of the chief of the village who hosted them and whom they at first refused; but it is not permitted to hire the physician upon the cure, for it is not within his power and the work is not definable in it: the door of the ju'ala is thus wider than that of hiring (Mukhtasar al-Fatawa al-Misriyya, p. 527; al-Furusu, 325).
The Malikis differed on the physician's stipulation upon the cure, the teacher's for memorizing the Quran, and the hire of ships: is it hiring or ju'ala? and is it permitted? Ibn al-Hajib (may Allah have mercy on him): it is valid as hiring and as ju'ala. Ibn 'Abd al-Salam (may Allah have mercy on him): all these branches belong to hiring alone, according to the preponderant view in the madhhab; and Sahnun formally stated that the origin of treating the patient is the ju'ala. Al-Muti' (may Allah have mercy on him): the concluded ju'ala is that if he heals he has such property, and if he does not heal he has nothing; according to al-'Ubaidi from Ibn al-Qabsi: the medicine comes from the patient; if it came from the physician, it would be a gharar (al-Mukhtasar al-fiqhi, 12/401-402; al-Muntaqa, 5/117; al-Dhakhira, 6/22; 'Aqd al-Jawahir, 3/946; Bidayat al-Mujtahid, 2/177; al-Qawanin al-fiqhiyya, 1/182; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 7/61).
Ibn 'Abd al-Barr (may Allah have mercy on him): Malik's view on the permission of the physician's contract upon the cure varied: at times he permitted it, at times he said: it is permitted only for a known period (al-Kafi, 1/375).
Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani (may Allah have mercy on him): the physician's stipulation upon the cure resembles the hiring for teaching the Quran to the proficient jurists, the worker having a right to nothing but completion; that is why he mentioned it after it, saying: the physician's stipulation upon the cure is permitted, meaning that it is permitted to contract with the physician upon the cure for a fee known to the two contracting parties: if the patient is cured, the physician takes the fee; otherwise he takes nothing; and both agreed that all the medicine comes from the patient; it is permitted that it come from the physician on condition that, if the patient is cured, he pays the fee and the price of the medicine, and if he is not cured, he pays him only the value of the medicine. That form was prevented only when it results in combining a reward and a sale, which is not permitted.
In summary, the contract on memorizing the Quran, on the cure, on extracting water, the hire of the ship and the mugharasa, that is, a man gives his land to whoever will plant trees in it, the land and the trees being shared between them when they reach a known threshold, resemble hiring and the ju'ala: the worker having a right to nothing but completion of the work, this resembles the ju'ala; and the fact that, if the first abandons and another completes, the first receives according to his own account, not according to the second's share, resembles hiring; and the stipulation of cash is not permitted in that case, the sum oscillating between a loan for consumption and a price.
Note: the foregoing shows that the author's words concern the contract conditioned upon obtaining the cure. As for hiring for treatment during the illness, it divides into three categories. One category agreed upon: hiring him to treat him for a known period for a known fee: if the period elapses, whether he is cured or not, he has the whole fee; if he is cured mid-term, he has half; the medicine comes from the patient; and the stipulation of cash is not permitted in that case, the cure possibly occurring during the period, which would make the payment an advance. Two categories are disputed. The first: contracting him to treat him for a known period, the matter remaining as it is, except that the medicine comes from the physician: it is said permitted, it is said not, for it combines the reward and the sale. The second: "I contract you against such property to treat this patient until he is cured: if he is cured you have the reward, otherwise nothing," the medicine coming from the physician: it is said permitted, it is said not, because of the gharar (al-Fawa'id al-Dawani, 2/115; al-'Adawi's gloss, 2/256; al-Thamar al-Dani, 525).
Al-Tusuli (may Allah have mercy on him) in al-Bahja fi Sharh al-Tuhfa reports from the Muti'iyya: it is permitted, according to one of Malik's two views, to conclude a ju'ala with the physician for the cure and with the adversary for the recovery of the right, and this is what is practiced by the people of trust; likewise in the Majalis al-Maknusiyya; and the physician's stipulation holds only if the medicine comes from the patient, otherwise it is not permitted, for it is a gharar: if he heals, he takes his due, otherwise his medicine is lost. Ibn Naji said: I judged by it, and its text figures in the general work (al-Bahja, 2/312-313).
The Shafi'is: Qaliubi (may Allah have mercy on him) in his gloss: it is considered in the work, absolutely, that it involve toil, as in hiring, and that it not be an obligation established upon the worker: entering into it are medical treatment, the ruqya, freeing from prison, fulfilling a need and defending against an oppressor, even if established, for they are supervening; excluded from it are narrating a report, indicating a person or a road, the return of a usurped or borrowed thing, even with toil (Qaliubi's gloss, 3/325).
Abu Ja'far al-Tahawi (may Allah have mercy on him): al-Hasan ibn Hayy said: there is no harm in stipulating with the physician upon the cure, nor in stipulating with the slave upon teaching him a craft: if that occurs, he has the named fee; if not, an equivalent wage; this is 'Ubaydallah ibn al-Hasan's view. Al-Tahawi said: the medicine in treatment is like the threads with the tailor (Mukhtasar Ikhtilaf al-'Ulama, 4/107).
First condition: that it be known. The jurists differed on the countervalue in the ju'ala: must it be known, or is the unknown valid? The majority of jurists, Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis in the madhhab, require the reward to be known and the unknown not to be valid, as in hiring and the other contracts; for the ju'ala is like hiring, the reward like the wage; and the camel-load in the verse is, according to them, known; the analogy with the work is not valid. The difference between the work and the countervalue lies in two points: first, need requires that the work be unknown, since the place of the lost thing or the runaway is unknown, and no need requires ignorance of the countervalue; second, the work does not become binding: its knowledge is therefore not required; whereas the countervalue becomes binding upon completion of the work: its knowledge is therefore required.
The Hanbalis, in tolerance, as Ibn Qudama says: it is possible that the ju'ala be valid despite ignorance of the countervalue, when that ignorance does not prevent delivery, like "whoever returns my runaway slave shall have half of him" or "whoever returns my lost thing shall have a third of it." Ahmad (may Allah have mercy on him) said: if the commander in a raid says "whoever brings me ten heads shall have a head," it is permitted. They also said: if a reward is promised to whoever indicates a fortress or an easy road, and the reward comes from the disbelievers' property, it may be unknown, like a slave girl whom the worker will choose: its like is deduced here; but if the ignorance prevents delivery, the ju'ala is not valid in any way (al-Mughni, 6/20). It is also a Shafi'i view reported by al-'Umayra in his gloss (3/322): "it is like hiring, except in matters... among which the sixth: ignorance of the countervalue."
The Malikis: the reward must be known, the unknown is not valid, for the ju'ala is like hiring and the reward like the wage.
Abu al-Walid Ibn Rushd al-Qurtubi (may Allah have mercy on him) expounded in al-Bayan wa-l-Tahsil (8/464) this question: a man says to another: "stand surety over this merchandise; if you sell it for ten dinars, you shall have from each dinar its sixth." He said: this is lawful, there is no harm in it, for he said to him: "if you sell this merchandise for ten dinars, you shall have a dinar and two thirds." If the seller sells it for more than ten, he has only the first reward, the dinar and the two thirds, even if he sells it for twenty. If one says: "sell and stand surety over this merchandise, and of every dinar you sell it for you shall have the sixth," without fixing a price, Ibn Rushd answers: this is unlawful, there is no good in it. Muhammad ibn Rushd said: the matter is clear: among the conditions of the reward's validity is that it be known; if the reward is fixed, neither increasing with the price nor decreasing with it, it is permitted; if it increases with its increase and decreases with its decrease, it is not permitted, for it is unknown.
Ibn 'Arafa (may Allah have mercy on him): whoever says "whoever brings me my runaway slave shall have half of him": it is not permitted, for his share is not known; if he brings him, he has an equivalent wage; otherwise, nothing. 'Abd al-Haqq (may Allah have mercy on him): if he brings him and he perishes by his hand, he has the value of his toil in seeking him and half the value of his toil on the return, if the perishing is established; and the master has against him the value of half his slave on the day of seizure; it is a corrupt reward according to the statement reported from Ibn al-Qasim. Whoever concludes a ju'ala over his runaway saying "if you find him you shall have such a thing, and if you do not find him you shall have your expenses, your food and your clothing": there is no good in it. Ibn al-Qasim (may Allah have mercy on him): if it occurs, he has an equivalent reward if he finds him, and an equivalent wage if he does not find him. Asbagh reported from Ibn al-Qasim: he has no wage. Ibn Rushd (may Allah have mercy on him), concerning the corrupt reward judged by itself: if he brings him, he has an equivalent reward; otherwise nothing; or the judgment is that of hiring: an equivalent wage if he brings him; the third position: that is if a countervalue was committed to him; otherwise, like this question, nothing. The first is the first view, making the proof of the reward a foundation in itself; the second by considering it a form of hiring with gharar and conditions; the third in that the commitment of the countervalue in both its states strengthens its resemblance to hiring, and this is the most apparent of the three, chosen by Ibn Habib and narrated from Malik and the two brothers. The three views revert to a foundation and apply by analogy; Ibn al-Qasim's view here (an equivalent reward if he finds him, an equivalent wage if he does not find him) reverts to no foundation nor analogy; likewise in the Mudawwana: "if you bring me my runaway slave, you shall have half of him": he has an equivalent wage if he brings him, and if he does not bring him, neither reward, nor hiring, nor any share in examination or analogy.
Ibn 'Abd al-Salam (may Allah have mercy on him): the meaning of "if he brings him, he has an equivalent wage" is that the wage is due only if he brings him; if he does not bring him, neither reward nor hiring, according to the verifiers, he has an equivalent reward; for the equivalent wage is due even if no benefit appears for the work, whereas the equivalent reward is due only when a benefit appears, namely bringing him; and the fact of having linked the obligation of the countervalue to his bringing shows that he used the word "wage" for the reward figuratively. The author of these lines (al-Nawawi) says: what he attributed to the verifiers is what preceded from 'Abd al-Haqq, contrary to what preceded from Ibn Rushd; and Ibn Rushd's proof is his statement in the Mudawwana: "neither reward nor hiring": his conjoining hiring to the reward shows that he did not mean by hiring the reward.
Al-Lakhmi (may Allah have mercy on him) in al-Muwaziya: whoever promises a reward for a runaway or for collecting a debt: if he does not find him or does not collect the debt, he has his expenses, and it is corrupt; if he finds him or collects the debt, he has an equivalent reward; otherwise nothing. In the Utbiyya: if he does not find him, he has an equivalent wage, referring it to the corrupt hiring when he promised a second reward in any event; the other view refers it to the corrupt reward: he has nothing if he does not find him; that is, if the expense is light in relation to the reward.
Ibn Zarqun (may Allah have mercy on him), on judging by the reward or hiring absolutely: third position: if he brings him, the first; otherwise the second; fourth position: the contrary, according to the narration of the Wadiha, the two brothers and Ibn al-Qasim. The author (al-Tunisi) adds: fifth, Ibn Rushd's third transmission; sixth: if what was committed for the case where he does not bring him is light, the first; otherwise the second, according to al-Lakhmi's explanation.
It was reported from 'Isa ibn al-Qasim, concerning the reward of ten dinars promised for two runaways: he disapproves of it until a known reward is promised for each one; if the outcome comes and he brings one of them, he has of the reward in proportion to the value of the one he brought out of the total of the two values. Ibn Rushd (may Allah have mercy on him): this contradicts Ibn al-Qasim's view: he has the value of his work in proportion to his toil and his seeking. Ibn Nafi''s view (may Allah have mercy on him): he has half of the ten. The reward over both has four cases: if he promises a single reward for both, on condition that he have nothing unless he brings them both, it is corrupt by consensus. If it is like the corrupt case: if the condition is "whoever brings one of them shall have half the reward," or "whoever brings such one of the two shall have such a thing, and whoever brings the other shall have such a thing," it is permitted.
Al-Tunisi adds: if a different amount is promised for each of the two, it is permitted, provided the promised one knows them both; if he is ignorant of them, two views on its permissibility, the more apparent being the second. Al-Lakhmi: if the rewards differ, he admitted them in the Muwaziya even if unknown; forbidding them is sounder and more apparent; if they are equal and the values differ, he admitted it in the Muwaziya and forbade it elsewhere. Ibn Rushd (may Allah have mercy on him): whoever brings one of the two has of the reward in proportion to the value of the one he brought relative to the value of the other, what falls to him of the reward in what he brought, according to what appeared of the intention, based on one of his two views admitting the joining of two men's two merchandise in a sale (al-Mukhtasar al-fiqhi, 12/375-378; al-Sharh al-Kabir, 5/429-430; al-Ma'una, 2/119; al-Muntaqa, 5/111; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 7/61; Tahrir al-Mukhtasar, 4/616-617; al-Sharh al-Saghir, 9/103-105).
The Shafi'is: the validity of the ju'ala requires that the reward be known property in kind, description and quantity, like the price, for it is a countervalue, like the wage and the dower; and because the ju'ala is a contract permitted for need, whereas there is no need for ignorance of the countervalue, contrary to the work and the worker. If it is unknown, like "whoever returns my slave shall have a garment," or "I will satisfy him," or the like, or if the reward is wine or a usurped property, the contract is corrupt, because of the ignorance of the reward, the impurity of the entity or the inability to deliver it; and the returner has an equivalent wage, as in the corrupt hiring.
Two forms are excepted from this. The first: "perform the pilgrimage for me and I give you your expenses": this is admitted despite their ignorance, as al-Rafi'i formally asserted in the Sharh al-Saghir and the author (al-Nawawi) in the Rawda; it is said: these are provisions, not a ju'ala, which becomes a ju'ala only if given as a countervalue: "perform the pilgrimage at your expense"; al-Mawardi moreover formally stated that this form is a corrupt ju'ala, in the Umm. The second: the reward promised by the imam to whoever indicates to him the disbelievers' fortress: it may be unknown, for need. If the reward is described in a way that gives knowledge, the worker deserves it. If one says "whoever returns my slave shall have his clothes, or a quarter of him," he has what is stipulated if he knows it; otherwise an equivalent wage. Does the description of the slave suffice or not? The purposes varying, there is disagreement on it; what befits: if he describes it in a way that gives knowledge, it is valid. And the equivalent wage is estimated by the time in which the whole work took place, not by the time of the delivery (Rawdat al-Talibin, 4/89; al-Bayan, 7/407-408; Mughni al-Muhtaj, 3/542-543; Nihayat al-Muhtaj, 5/533; al-Najm al-Wahhaj, 6/90; al-Dibaj, 2/583; al-'Umayra's gloss, 3/322).
The Hanbalis: al-Mardawi (may Allah have mercy on him): it is required that the countervalue be known, like the wage, according to the sound view of the madhhab, and on this the companions are. The author of the Mughni (Ibn Qudama, may Allah have mercy on him): it is possible that the ju'ala be valid despite ignorance of the countervalue, if that ignorance does not prevent delivery, like "whoever returns my runaway slave shall have half of him" and "whoever returns my lost thing shall have a third of it." Ahmad (may Allah have mercy on him): if the commander in a raid says "whoever brings ten heads shall have a head," it is permitted. They said: if a reward is promised to whoever indicates a fortress or an easy road, coming from the disbelievers' property, like a designated slave girl, it is permitted, and its like is deduced here. Al-Harithi (may Allah have mercy on him): the reward must be known; if an unknown countervalue is stipulated, the contract is corrupt. If he says "you shall have a third of the lost thing or a quarter of it," it is valid, like what is formally stated for the cloth a third of which is woven, the harvest reaped, the palm cut of its sixth: no harm; and in a raid, "whoever brings ten heads shall have a head" is permitted. According to the author of the Mughni, it is not valid and the worker has an equivalent wage; the first is the madhhab. The author mentioned in the core of the issue an aspect admitting ignorance that does not prevent delivery; see the question of the third; the raid text was cited as proof, as well as the case of the reward for indicating a fortress or an easy road, coming from the disbelievers' property, which may be unknown, like a slave girl the worker chooses. Despite the stipulation of a known reward, it is stated in the Ri'ayatayn and the Hawi al-Saghir that the apparent is that promising a known share of the lost thing is not unknown. Benefit: when the ignorance prevents delivery, the ju'ala is not valid by a single view, and an equivalent wage is due absolutely; when it does not prevent it, according to the madhhab as presented, he also has an equivalent wage (al-Insaf, 6/390-391; al-Mughni, 6/20; Sharh al-Zarkashi, 2/220-221; Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/247-248; al-Rawd al-Murbi', 2/152; Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 4/280-281; Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 4/207).
The jurists require that the countervalue in the ju'ala be among what may be sold and hired: it cannot be a dead animal, wine, a usurped property nor anything whose sale is not permitted. Everything that can be a countervalue in hiring can be one in the ju'ala, and the ju'ala goes even further.
The Malikis: everything whose sale is permitted, hiring and reward are permitted in it; what whose sale is not permitted, neither hiring nor reward is permitted in it, except two cases. The first: the one to whom it is promised to plant saplings until they reach a defined threshold, then they be shared between the two with the origin: half of that cannot be sold. The second: "pick my olives: half of what you pick is yours": the ju'ala is permitted in it, the sale not. Ibn Lubaba (may Allah have mercy on him): it is reported from Malik that he did not permit it; and Malik's view did not vary concerning a hundred dinars one man owes another, when he says "of whatever you collect of my debt, half is yours": it is not permitted, and the two cases are identical. Ibn Rushd (may Allah have mercy on him): the two are not identical; the more apparent of the two views is that the ju'ala over picking olives against a share is not valid, for its beginning is lighter than its end; it is valid in it only as hiring over the whole: "pick it all, half or a third is yours." As for the ju'ala over collecting a debt against a share, the severest position does not admit it, and the more apparent is that it is permitted, for there is no difference between beginning and end in the toil of collection. As for harvesting and cutting palm branches, no disagreement among the jurists on the validity of the ju'ala against a share: "cut from my palms what you wish, harvest from my field what you wish, and a named share of what you harvest or cut is yours": this is admitted by consensus, for the contract binds neither of the two: the promised one may withdraw whenever he wishes, and the promiser withdraw it whenever he wishes; if the contract bound only the promiser, it would not be permitted, for the reward would then be what whose sale is not permitted, and it would be a gharar (al-Bayan wa-l-Tahsil, 8/416-417; Tahdhib al-Mudawwana, 2/122; al-Mukhtasar al-fiqhi, 12/373-375; al-Taj wa-l-Iklil, 4/539-540).
The Shafi'is: the reward must be lawful, pure and intended: if it is wine, pork or blood, the contract is corrupt; if it is a usurped garment, the imam said: two views are possible in it, like the usurped dower, with reversion in one view to the equivalent wage and in the other to the value of the named amount. Dissolution by an equivalent wage is possible in it (Rawdat al-Talibin, 4/91; Mughni al-Muhtaj, 3/544; Qaliubi and al-'Umayra's glosses on Kunz al-Raghibin, 3/322).
The Hanbalis: everything that can be a countervalue in hiring can be one in the ju'ala: it is valid to promise the worker his food and clothing, like hiring him for that alone or together with named dirhams; and the ju'ala goes further with an unknown reward coming from the property of an enemy at war (al-Mughni, 6/22; al-Mubdi', 5/269; Kashshaf al-Qina', 4/250; Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 4/215).