Islamic Fiqh > Companies and leases > Wakala (agency mandate) > The first case (conclusion): the agent who dismisses the principal
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Updated on 25 September 2026 at 6:57 PM
This part belongs to the full section: All sections of this part.
This chapter sets out the causes that terminate the mandate (wakala) according to the four schools: the agent's resignation, dismissal by the principal, the death of either party, total or partial insanity, fainting, legal interdiction, apostasy, intoxication, the exit of the object of the mandate from the principal's ownership, the destruction of the object of the mandate, the agent's excess beyond what was entrusted to him, the completion of the object of the mandate, and the separation of the partners. For each cause the schools' positions are set against one another, with their proofs and their practical consequences for the validity of the agent's acts.
The agent's resignation is valid in the absence of the principal, as in partnership (charika) and qirad (al-Sharh al-Kabir with Hashiyat al-Dasuqi 5/82-83, al-Taj wal-Iklil 4/222, Mawahib al-Jalil 7/178, Tahrir al-Mukhtasar 4/302, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 6/86, Hashiyat al-Sawi 'ala al-Sharh al-Saghir 8/103, al-Hawi al-Kabir 6/512, al-Bayan 6/454-455, Rawdat al-Talibin 3/522, Mughni al-Muhtaj 3/216-217, Nihayat al-Muhtaj 5/59 and 61, al-Najm al-Wahhaj 5/63-64, Kanz al-Raghibin 2/869-870, al-Dibaj 2/323, al-Mughni 5/71, Sharh al-Zarkashi p. 152). The Hanafis and Ahmad according to one narration hold that he does not leave the mandate unless the principal knows of it; for it is a contract concluded between the two, and each of them has a right attached to it, so that annulling it without the knowledge of either causes him harm.
The Hanafis say: on this basis, if a man says to another: "buy me the slave of so-and-so, in partnership between me and you", and the appointee says "yes", then goes and attests at the time of purchase that he bought it for himself alone, the slave remains in partnership between them; for he is agent on behalf of the commander for half of the slave, and the agent cannot dismiss himself without the principal's knowledge (al-Ikhtiyar 3/196, Tabyin al-Haqa'iq 4/287, al-Muhit al-Burhani 5/552, Majma' al-Anhar 3/338-339, al-Durr al-Mukhtar 5/537, al-Mughni 5/71, Sharh al-Zarkashi p. 152).
The jurists differed concerning the principal who dismisses his agent: is the agent's knowledge, or his presence, required, or not? After their agreement that, if the agent learns of the dismissal, he is dismissed and his act becomes void once he knows of the dismissal:
The Hanafis and the Malikis according to the school, the Shafi'is according to one view, as well as Ahmad according to one narration, hold that the validity of the dismissal requires that the agent know of it; for if he were dismissed before knowing, harm would result: he may carry out acts that turn out void; he may sell the slave girl and the buyer consummates her, or sell the food which the buyer eats and disposes of; the guarantee becomes due, and both the buyer and the agent suffer loss. Moreover he acts upon the principal's command, and the effect of the revocation does not attach to the appointee before he knows of it, like rescission: as long as he does not know, he remains on the validity of the mandate for what the principal entrusted to him, and his act is implemented; since his knowledge was taken into account at the conclusion of the mandate, his knowledge must be taken into account at its dissolution.
And because the agent acts by authorization, his charge is not cut by mere prevention of which he has no knowledge, as when Allah commands an act and then forbids it. The Hanafis say: the dismissal being a rescission of the contract, its effect binds only after knowledge of it, in the manner of rescission, in consideration of the Lawgiver's prohibition; and the dismissal involves harm to the agent, either by the annulment of his authority, or by the return of the rights to their holder: he is thereby wronged, for the rights revert to him; he disposes of the principal's property on the basis of the mandate, pays out the price and delivers the thing sold, incurring thereby the guarantee; and this is harm inflicted upon him.
If the principal dismisses him while he is present, he is dismissed. If the agent is absent and the principal writes him a letter of dismissal which reaches him and whose content he knows, he is dismissed; for a letter from an absent person is like the address of a present one.
Likewise if he sends him a messenger who delivers the message, saying: "so-and-so sent me to you and says: I have dismissed you from the mandate": he is dismissed, whatever the messenger's condition, whether upright or not, free or enslaved, minor or adult, once the message has reached him as described; for the messenger stands in the place of the sender, he is his spokesman and his envoy, and his delegation is valid once his wording is valid, whatever his condition.
If he writes no letter and sends no messenger, but informs him of the dismissal through two men, upright or not, or through a single upright man, he is dismissed according to the view of all of them, whether the agent believes them or not, once the truth of the report becomes evident; for the report of one is accepted in transactions. If he is not upright, the report of two upright men, or of an upright one, is stronger.
If a single man who is not upright informs him: if the agent believes him, he is dismissed by consensus; if he rejects him, he is not dismissed; and if the truth of the report becomes evident, he is dismissed according to Abu Hanifa; for the information about the dismissal resembles testimony: it entails the application of the informant's ruling, that is, the dismissal itself, the obligation to abstain from all disposal and the obligation of guarantee upon what might be done after the dismissal; it therefore resembles testimony, and one of its conditions must then be taken into account: probity or number. According to the two companions (Abu Yusuf and Muhammad), he is dismissed once the truth of the report becomes evident, even if he rejects it; for the information about the dismissal belongs to transactions, in which neither number nor probity is required, like the information in all other transactions.
If the principal dismisses his agent and brings witnesses to the dismissal while the agent is absent, and no one informs him of it, he is not dismissed, and his act done before knowing, after the dismissal, is treated like his act before the dismissal according to all the rules already set out. Consequently, if the dismissal is not conveyed to him, he remains agent and his act is valid until he knows of it; for the dismissal is a prohibition, and commands and prohibitions have no effect until they are known.
On this basis: if he is appointed to sell a slave, then dismissed without his knowledge, and the agent sells the slave and takes the price, and the slave perishes in the agent's hand and dies in the principal's hand before being delivered to the buyer, the buyer recourses against the agent for the price, and the agent against the slave's owner; for he was not dismissed, and what he disposed of remains at his principal's account, and the guarantee incumbent on him falls back upon the latter. Likewise if the slave has not died but the owner sold him without the agent's knowledge; for the sale, although it removed the ownership from the principal's hands, dismissed the agent and deceived him by not informing him of the dismissal, so that one recourses against him because of the gharar; and this even if the slave returns to the principal's ownership by the restoration of the first ownership, as when it is returned for a defect by judicial decree: the agent's sale is then permitted according to Muhammad, for the mandate was not annulled. But if it returns under a new ownership, as when it is returned without a decree or by mutual release, the mandate lapses; for he entered it anew, as in a deferred purchase (Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 6/37-38, al-Ikhtiyar 3/196, al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 3/490 and 492, al-'Inaya 16/220, Mukhtasar al-Wiqaya 2/177, al-Lubab 1/561, Tabyin al-Haqa'iq 4/287, al-Muhit al-Burhani 5/552, al-Bahr al-Ra'iq 1/187, Majma' al-Anhar 3/338-339, al-Durr al-Mukhtar 5/537).
The Malikis say: the principal dismisses his agent without the latter knowing: is he dismissed by the mere act of dismissal, or only after he learns of it? This is a point of divergence. Its consequence: if the agent disposes after the dismissal and before knowing of it, by a sale, a purchase or the like, does it bind the principal, the agent being excused by his ignorance, or does it not bind him, the agent having already been dismissed? This divergence, however, is restricted to the agent who is no party to the litigation, when the latter colludes with his adversary, like the case of the triple, as has passed (al-Sharh al-Kabir with Hashiyat al-Dasuqi 5/82-83, al-Taj wal-Iklil 4/221-222, Mawahib al-Jalil 7/178, Tahrir al-Mukhtasar 4/302, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 6/86, Hashiyat al-Sawi 'ala al-Sharh al-Saghir 8/103).
The place of the view that upholds the dismissal even without his knowledge: when the principal brought witnesses to the dismissal and made it public, and his failure to inform him was excused, such as distance and the like; in other words, when he abandoned informing him altogether without any excuse, whether or not he brought witnesses to the dismissal, or when he abandoned informing him for an excuse without bringing witnesses: his act is then void by agreement. On this basis, the two views agree that the agent's act done before knowing is void when the information was omitted without any excuse, even if witnesses were brought and it was made public; and likewise when the information was omitted for an excuse and the act took place before knowledge, without witnessing or publicity.
Abu al-Walid Ibn Rushd (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "They agreed upon the case of the man who appoints another to sell his goods, then sells them himself, and the agent sells them after him without knowing of the owner's sale: it belongs to the second buyer if he took possession; their consensus on this point is a proof that the mandate is not dissolved by the rescission itself so long as the agent has not known of that rescission, or the buyer has not known of it" (al-Bayan wa-l-Tahsil 8/214-215).
Abu 'Umar Yusuf Ibn Abd al-Barr (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "Malik's position diverged concerning the agent dismissed by his principal who brought witnesses to the dismissal, whose entrusted act is carried out after that without his knowledge: it was transmitted from him that his act after that is void, whether he knew of the dismissal or not; that is Ibn al-Qasim's view, and it is what I hold, by analogy with their agreement that, if he is appointed to sell a thing and the principal sells it, the agent leaves the mandate and this amounts to a dismissal, even without his knowledge." It was also transmitted from Malik: if he learns of the dismissal, his act is void; if he does not learn of it, his act is valid; for he remains upon what he was entrusted with until the dismissal becomes established with him (al-Kafi 1/395).
The Shafi'is according to the school, the Hanbalis according to the school, Abu Ja'far al-Tahawi among the Hanafis, and the Malikis according to one view, as has passed, hold that the agent's knowledge is not required: if the principal says: "I have rescinded the mandate", or "I have dismissed the agent from it", or "I have removed him from it", this is valid and the agent is dismissed, whether he knew of it or not.
Two reasons for this. The first: since the principal's knowledge is not taken into account in the dissolution of the mandate when the agent himself dissolves it, the agent's knowledge is not taken into account in the dissolution of the mandate. The second: every contract which one of the contracting parties may raise without the consent of its holder may be raised without his knowledge, like marriage which may be raised by divorce without the divorced wife knowing. And because the dismissal is a meaning that rescinds the mandate when the agent learns of it, it must rescind it even if the agent does not learn of it, like the principal's madness. It is not permitted, however, to judge the state of rescission by the state of the contract, for two reasons: its corruption by the rescission carried out by the agent; and since consent was taken into account, knowledge was too, which is not the case of rescission.
Al-Bayhaqi transmitted, in the chapter on the agent who is dismissed once he is dismissed even without his knowledge, from Abu Abdillah al-Hafiz, from Abu al-Walid, from Ibrahim ibn Abi Talib, from al-Hasan ibn Isa, from Ibn al-Mubarak, from Dawud ibn Abi al-Furat, from Muhammad ibn Zayd who said:
Umar gave judgment concerning a slave girl whose master had gone on campaign; he ordered a man to sell her, then her master showed up and freed her, bearing witness to it, whereas the slave girl had already been sold; they made the reckoning and found that her freeing had preceded her sale; Umar therefore ruled that her freeing be carried out, that her price be returned and that her dower be taken, since he had consummated her.Reported by al-Bayhaqi in his Sunan (6/82)
Consequently, if the agent disposes after the rescission carried out by the principal, his act is void; for it is the raising of a contract which does not require its holder's consent, and therefore not his knowledge either, like divorce and manumission; and he guarantees what he delivered, for ignorance has no effect upon the guarantee.
The Shafi'is and the Hanbalis stated that the principal's claim to have dismissed his agent before his act is not accepted without proof of the dismissal; for the default is the persistence of the mandate and the agent's innocence of liability for what he had been authorized to do after the time at which the dismissal was claimed (al-Hawi al-Kabir 6/512, al-Bayan 6/454-455, Rawdat al-Talibin 3/522, Mughni al-Muhtaj 3/216-217, Nihayat al-Muhtaj 5/59 and 61, al-Najm al-Wahhaj 5/63-64, Kanz al-Raghibin 2/869-870, al-Dibaj 2/323, al-Mughni 5/71, Sharh al-Zarkashi p. 152, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 3/518).
Abu Ja'far al-Tahawi (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "The mandate is not a right that would oblige the principal to keep the agent as long as he wishes; this being so, the agent's knowledge of his dismissal must not be taken into account, and he is dismissed whenever the principal dismisses him, even without his knowledge; they did not differ over the fact that, if the principal sells the slave whom the agent was appointed to sell, the agent leaves the mandate; likewise if he dismisses him, even without his knowledge; and if this is established for the dismissal, all the more for death" (Mukhtasar Ikhtilaf al-'Ulama' 4/83).
The majority of the jurists, the Hanafis, the Malikis according to the widespread view, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis, hold that the mandate lapses and becomes void by the death of the principal; for the delegation proceeds from the principal's command, and his capacity to command ceased with death; and because he was a deputy over his property, which has passed to others, and no one disposes of another's property without his authorization; the heirs, at that moment, have given no known authorization, so that what the agent sold or bought after the principal's death does not bind them; they may ratify it if they wish, or not ratify it; in that case, if he has bought, the agent remains liable for the price, and if he has sold, they are owed the value of the thing sold if it has perished, and the return of the thing if it still exists.
Mutarrif and Ibn al-Majishun, among the Malikis, hold that the mandate does not lapse by the death of the principal: it remains in force until the heirs rescind it.
It has been said: it lapses for what the principal entrusted to him in the way of sale, and does not lapse for what the agent has charge of; the latter is entitled to the price of what he sold so long as the heirs do not rescind his mandate; this is Asbagh's view (al-Sharh al-Kabir with Hashiyat al-Dasuqi 5/82, al-Bayan wa-l-Tahsil 8/215-216, al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyya p. 216, al-Taj wal-Iklil 4/220, Mawahib al-Jalil 7/178, Tahrir al-Mukhtasar 4/301-302, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 6/86, Hashiyat al-Sawi 'ala al-Sharh al-Saghir 8/103, al-Bahja 1/338, Minah al-Jalil 6/413-414, Mukhtasar Ikhtilaf al-'Ulama' 4/83, Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 6/38, Mukhtasar al-Wiqaya 2/177, al-Ikhtiyar 3/196, al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 3/493, al-Lubab 1/562, al-Hindiyya 3/367-368, al-Bayan 6/455, Rawdat al-Talibin 3/523, Mughni al-Muhtaj 3/217, Nihayat al-Muhtaj 5/62, Kanz al-Raghibin 2/870, al-Dibaj 2/323, al-Mughni 5/71, al-Sharh al-Kabir 5/213, al-Mubdi' 4/363, al-Insaf 5/368, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/546, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 3/517, Matalib Uli al-Nuha 3/458).
The generality of the jurists, the Hanafis, the Malikis according to the widespread view, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis, with a reported consensus, hold that the agent who learns of his principal's death and then disposes without the heirs has his act void: it is a transgression, and whatever perishes by his own judgment and his own act is at his guarantee.
They nevertheless differed concerning the agent who disposes after the death of his principal without having known of it: is his act valid or not? The Hanafis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis according to the school, as well as a Maliki view, hold that the agent's knowledge of his principal's death is not required: his act is void; for it is the raising of a contract which requires neither its holder's consent nor his knowledge, like divorce and manumission; thus, if he buys after the principal's death without having known of it, it does not bind the heirs, and the price falls upon him, as well as the value of the thing if it has perished.
Abu Ja'far al-Tahawi (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "The mandate is not a right obliging the principal to keep the agent as long as he wishes; this being so, the agent's knowledge of his dismissal must not be taken into account, and he is dismissed whenever the principal dismisses him, even without his knowledge; they did not differ over the fact that, if the principal sells the slave whom the agent was appointed to sell, the agent leaves the mandate; likewise if he dismisses him, even without his knowledge; and if this is established for the dismissal, all the more for death" (Mukhtasar Ikhtilaf al-'Ulama' 4/83, Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 6/38, Mukhtasar al-Wiqaya 2/177, al-Ikhtiyar 3/196, al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 3/493, al-Lubab 1/562, al-Hindiyya 3/367-368, al-Bayan 6/455, Rawdat al-Talibin 3/523, Mughni al-Muhtaj 3/217, Nihayat al-Muhtaj 5/62, Kanz al-Raghibin 2/870, al-Dibaj 2/323, al-Mughni 5/71, al-Sharh al-Kabir 5/213, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/546, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 3/517, Matalib Uli al-Nuha 3/458).
The Malikis according to the widespread view and the Hanbalis according to a narration hold that the agent is not dismissed before having knowledge of the principal's death; for if he were dismissed before knowing, harm would result: he may carry out acts that turn out void; he may sell the slave girl and the buyer consummates her, or sell the food which the buyer eats and disposes of; the guarantee becomes due, and both the buyer and the agent suffer loss; moreover he acts upon the principal's command, and the effect of the revocation does not attach to the appointee before his knowledge, like rescission. According to this narration, if the act is done before knowledge, it is implemented (al-Mughni 5/71).
The Malikis say: the agent is dismissed, a full agent or not, by the death of his principal; for he was a deputy over his property, which passed to his heirs at death, so that what he sold or bought after does not bind them if he knew of the principal's death. If he did not know of it, the question of his dismissal admits two interpretations. The first: he is dismissed by the death alone; if he buys or sells after the death without having known of it, it does not bind the heirs, and the price falls upon him, as well as the value of the thing if it has perished. The second, which is the school: he is not dismissed until the death of his principal reaches him.
This divergence applies when the seller to the agent, or the buyer from him, is present in the town where the death took place, and it was said to him that he is an agent, or it was established by evidence; otherwise he is not dismissed before the news reaches him, by agreement (al-Sharh al-Kabir with Hashiyat al-Dasuqi 5/82, al-Bayan wa-l-Tahsil 8/215-216, al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyya p. 216, al-Taj wal-Iklil 4/220, Mawahib al-Jalil 7/178, Tahrir al-Mukhtasar 4/301-302, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 6/86, Hashiyat al-Sawi 'ala al-Sharh al-Saghir 8/103, al-Bahja 1/338, Minah al-Jalil 6/413-414).
Ibn Abd al-Barr (may Allah have mercy on him) said: Malik said: "What the full agent did after the death of his principal proceeds and binds his heirs if he did not know of the principal's death; if he knew of it and did an act without the heirs, it is a transgression, and whatever perishes by his own judgment and his own act is at his guarantee" (al-Kafi 1/395).
Ibn Hazm (may Allah have mercy on him) reported this in "Maratib al-Ijma'" and said: "They agreed that, if the agent carries out an act of what he was entrusted with between the moment the news reaches him and becomes established with him and the moment of his dismissal by the principal, or of the principal's death, in what involves neither deceit nor transgression, the act is binding and obliges the principal and his heirs after him" (Maratib al-Ijma' p. 61-62).
Third, the death of the agent: there is no divergence among the jurists of the schools over the fact that the mandate becomes void by the death of the agent; for death annuls the capacity of disposal, and the mandate is not inherited. Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "The mandate becomes void by the death of either of the two, agent or principal, and by his total insanity; and we know of no divergence over all of this" (al-Mughni 5/71).
Fourth, the madness of the agent or of the principal: there is no divergence among the jurists of the four schools, except for a view reported among the Hanbalis (al-Mardawi said in al-Insaf 5/368: the mandate becomes void by madness according to the sound position of the school, followed by most of the companions; he said in al-Mughni wa-l-Sharh: it becomes void by total madness without divergence to our knowledge, and he ruled on it decisively in al-Hidaya, al-Madhhab, al-Mustaw'ib, al-Khilasa, al-Nazm and other works, and preferred it in al-Furu' and elsewhere; it has been said: it does not become void by it, and both formulations were stated in al-Talkhis, al-Muharrar, al-Ri'ayatan, al-Hawiyayn and al-Fa'iq): the mandate becomes void by the madness of either of the two, agent or principal, when it is total, that is, encompassing; for he has left the number of people capable of disposing, and the mandate thereby becomes void; the agent acting by way of the principal's command, the latter's madness annuls his command, so that the agent's act takes place without a command, which is not permitted.
Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "The mandate becomes void by the death of either of the two, agent or principal, and by his total insanity; and we know of no divergence over all of this." And as soon as either of the two leaves the status of a person capable of disposing, as when he goes mad or is interdicted for prodigality, his ruling is that of death; for he cannot dispose, and no one can dispose through him (al-Mughni 5/71).
They nevertheless differed over the definition of total madness. According to Abu Yusuf, and it is reported from Abu Hanifa, total madness is that which encompasses a month; for this measure is the least that voids the worship of fasting, and it is therefore more fitting to measure by it. It has also been reported from Abu Yusuf (may Allah have mercy on him): more than a day and a night; for it voids the five prayers. According to Muhammad (may Allah have mercy on him): what encompasses a year; for what encompasses the year is what voids all the acts of worship, and it is therefore more fitting to measure by that (Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 6/38, Mukhtasar al-Wiqaya 2/177, al-Ikhtiyar 3/196, al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 3/493-494, al-Lubab 1/562, Majma' al-Anhar 3/339, al-Hindiyya 3/367-368, Hashiyat al-Dasuqi on al-Sharh al-Kabir 5/83, Minah al-Jalil 6/417, al-Bayan 6/455, Rawdat al-Talibin 3/523, Mughni al-Muhtaj 3/217, Nihayat al-Muhtaj 5/62, Kanz al-Raghibin 2/870, al-Dibaj 2/323, al-Sharh al-Kabir 5/213, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/546, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 3/517, Matalib Uli al-Nuha 3/458).
The jurists differed in the case where the madness is not total: does the mandate lapse or not? The Hanafis and the Malikis hold that non-total insanity does not render the mandate void. The Hanafis say: the mandate becomes void by the death of either of the two and by his total insanity; if he is mad one day and lucid one day, it does not become void; for it is akin to fainting: an incapacity that may cease, like the incapacity caused by sleep and fainting. It has been reported from Abu Yusuf: he is not dismissed so long as he is not mad for the greater part of the year; for if it persists so, it mostly does not cease, becoming like death; and according to Muhammad, up to a year, and this is the sound view; for if the madness stems from an illness or an ailment that ceases or changes within a year, the latter encompassing the four seasons through the heat of the air, its cold, its dryness and its humidity, then if it does not cease within it, its permanence is what appears most probable (Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 6/38, Mukhtasar al-Wiqaya 2/177, al-Ikhtiyar 3/196, al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 3/493-494, al-Lubab 1/562, Majma' al-Anhar 3/339, al-Hindiyya 3/367-368).
The Malikis say: the agent is not dismissed by his own madness nor by that of his principal, unless the principal's madness is gravely prolonged, in which case the judge examines his case (Hashiyat al-Dasuqi on al-Sharh al-Kabir 5/83, Minah al-Jalil 6/417).
The Shafi'is hold that the mandate becomes void by the madness of either of the two, agent or principal, even if the other does not know of it, and even if the madness ceases quickly; for if it accompanied the contract, it would have prevented its conclusion; so when it supervenes, it cuts it. Al-Damiri (may Allah have mercy on him) said in "al-Najm al-Wahhaj": it has been said: if the duration of the madness is short, not requiring the appointment of a guardian, it has no effect; as for total madness, they agreed upon the dismissal it causes (al-Najm al-Wahhaj 5/64).
Al-Mawardi (may Allah have mercy on him) said: if a man appoints a sane agent and then the agent goes mad, the ruling is the one we have mentioned concerning the madness of the principal: if it persists until he reaches the state of a person under guardianship, his delegation lapses; if he recovers from it quickly, his mandate lapses according to al-Shafi'i's school, and remains valid according to the view of Abu al-Abbas Ibn Surayj (al-Hawi al-Kabir 6/507, al-Bayan 6/455, Rawdat al-Talibin 3/523, Mughni al-Muhtaj 3/217, Nihayat al-Muhtaj 5/62, Kanz al-Raghibin 2/870, al-Dibaj 2/323).
As for the Hanbalis, they stated it without restriction: the mandate becomes void by a total madness of either of the two, principal or agent; for the mandate depends on the intellect; when it vanishes, its validity vanishes, for lack of its support, namely the capacity of disposal. Al-Mardawi (may Allah have mercy on him) said: most of the companions stated madness without restriction (al-Insaf 5/368-369, al-Mughni 5/71, al-Sharh al-Kabir 5/213, al-Mubdi' 4/363, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/546, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 3/517, Matalib Uli al-Nuha 3/458).
The jurists differed over the effect of fainting upon the mandate, when either the agent or the principal faints: does the mandate lapse or not? The majority of the jurists, the Hanafis, the Malikis and the Hanbalis according to the school, as well as the Shafi'is against the soundest view, hold that the mandate does not lapse by the fainting of the principal or of the agent; for fainting is an illness, illness does not annul the mandate, and it does not remove man from the capacity of disposal nor establish guardianship; it resembles sleep (al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 3/493, al-Lubab 1/562, al-Ikhtiyar 3/196, Mukhtasar al-Wiqaya 2/177, Hashiyat al-Dasuqi on al-Sharh al-Kabir 5/83, al-Insaf 5/369, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/547, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 3/517, Matalib Uli al-Nuha 3/458).
The Shafi'is according to the soundest view hold that the mandate becomes void by the fainting of either of the two, agent or principal, by analogy with madness, except the agent for the stoning (ramy al-jimar): the soundest view is that he is not dismissed by the principal's fainting, for it is an increase in his incapacity.
Al-Qalyubi (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "Included among the faintings is the taqrif that occurs in the manner of fever; attention must therefore be paid to it, for it is a very widespread trial" (Hashiyat al-Qalyubi 2/870, al-Bayan 6/455, Rawdat al-Talibin 3/523, Mughni al-Muhtaj 3/217, Nihayat al-Muhtaj 5/62-63, al-Najm al-Wahhaj 5/64-65, Kanz al-Raghibin 2/870, al-Dibaj 2/323).
The jurists mentioned interdiction among the causes of the mandate's lapse in general terms, with a detail proper to each school.
The Hanafis say: if a permitted person appoints an agent, and then his guardian interdicts him, the mandate becomes void; for the subsistence of the mandate depends on the subsistence of the commander, and the interdiction has annulled his commander's capacity to dispose of the property, so that the commander becomes void by the interdiction, and the mandate with him; with no difference between knowing and not knowing, for it is an automatic dismissal that does not depend on knowledge, like death; this concerns the agent over contracts or litigations. As for the agent in charge of the settlement of a debt or its claim, he is not dismissed by the interdiction of the permitted person (Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 6/38, Mukhtasar al-Wiqaya 2/178, al-Ikhtiyar 3/196, al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 3/495, al-Lubab 1/562, Majma' al-Anhar 3/339, al-Hindiyya 3/638).
The Malikis say: the mandate becomes void and the agent is dismissed by the specific bankruptcy of his principal, because of the transfer of the property to the creditors (Hashiyat al-Dasuqi on al-Sharh al-Kabir 5/82).
The specific bankruptcy designates the judge's ruling stripping the insolvent of what he holds for the benefit of his creditors, under its conditions: that the creditors request the debtor's bankruptcy, that the debt he bears be due, and that this due debt exceed the property held by the debtor. The specific bankruptcy differs from the general bankruptcy, which consists in preventing whomever debt overwhelms, even if deferred, from disposing gratuitously of his property through manumission, gift, charity, waqf or debt transfer (Tahrir al-Mukhtasar 4/121 and 134, al-Sharh al-Kabir with Hashiyat al-Dasuqi 4/424 and 443, al-Tablsira 10/5543 and following, Mawahib al-Jalil 6/448 and 468, al-Taj wal-Iklil 4/37 and 63, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 5/263 and following, al-Sharh al-Saghir 7/280 and 282).
The Shafi'is say: if either of the two is interdicted for prodigality, the mandate becomes void for what the spendthrift's act does not make valid, like sale, gift and their like, and does not become void for what the spendthrift may dispose of, like divorce, khul' and the claim for retribution. If the interdiction is for bankruptcy, the delegation for the sale of the corporeal properties of his estate becomes void, his act upon them and their gifting being null; it does not become void for the act upon his liability, nor for divorce, khul' and the claim for retribution (al-Bayan 6/455, Rawdat al-Talibin 3/523, Mughni al-Muhtaj 3/218, al-Najm al-Wahhaj 5/65, Kanz al-Raghibin 2/870).
The Hanbalis say: the mandate becomes void by the interdiction of either of the two for prodigality in what he cannot dispose of, like sale and purchase, for the absence of capacity to dispose; unlike divorce and the conjugal return, which do not cause the lapse through prodigality; likewise if he appoints him for woodcutting, the drawing of water or the like. The mandate also becomes void by the principal's bankruptcy in what he was interdicted for, like the act upon the corporeal properties of his estate, because of the cutting of his act upon them; unlike the delegation for an act upon the liability, a guarantee, a loan or the like (Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/546, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 3/514-515, Matalib Uli al-Nuha 3/453-454).
Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "As soon as either of the two leaves the status of a person capable of disposing, as when he goes mad or is interdicted for prodigality, his ruling is that of death; for he cannot dispose, and no one can dispose through him." And Ahmad (may Allah have mercy on him) said concerning partnership: when one of the associates is beset by doubts, it is like the dismissal. If the agent is interdicted for bankruptcy, the mandate remains, for he has not left the capacity of disposal; and if the principal is interdicted while the mandate bears upon the corporeal properties of his estate, it becomes void, because of the cutting of his act upon his properties; if it bears upon a litigation, a purchase on liability, a divorce, a khul' or retribution, the mandate remains; for the principal is capable of it and may delegate it in the first place, so that its persistence is not cut (al-Mughni 5/71-72, al-Sharh al-Kabir 5/213).