Islamic Fiqh > Companies and leases > Wakala (agency mandate) > Seventh: apostasy
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Updated on 25 September 2026 at 6:57 PM
This part belongs to the full section: All sections of this part.
The jurists differed in the case where the agent, or the principal (we seek refuge in Allah), apostatizes: does the mandate lapse, or does it remain until he joins the territory of war and his apostasy and his joining are judged? The majority of the jurists, the Hanafis with the detail to follow, the Malikis and the Hanbalis according to one view, hold that the mandate becomes void by apostasy.
The Hanafis say: if the principal joins the territory of war in a state of apostasy, his mandate becomes void according to Abu Hanifa; for the apostate's acts are suspended according to him, and the agent's mandate is therefore suspended too: if the principal returns to Islam, it is implemented, and he remains agent; if he is killed or joins the territory of war, it becomes void. According to the two companions, the agent does not leave the mandate by that; for his acts are binding, and so is the mandate, unless he dies, is killed for his apostasy, or is judged to have joined.
If the principal is a woman who apostatizes, the agent remains agent until she dies or joins the territory of war and her joining is judged, by consensus; for a woman's apostasy does not prevent her acts from being implemented, does not affect her contracts and does not remove her properties, since she is not killed, except the delegation for marriage: her apostasy removes from his mandate the agent appointed for it; for when she owned the contract at the time of the delegation, the mandate is established at once, then her apostasy removes her from the ownership of the contract, which amounts to the dismissal of her agent; once dismissed, he becomes agent again only by renewal.
If the principal returns from the territory of war a Muslim before the judgment of joining, it is as if he had never left it, and the agent remains agent. If he returns a Muslim after the judgment of joining, the mandate does not return according to the apparent narration. It has been transmitted from Muhammad that it returns; and its reasoning is that the lapse of the mandate is due to the lapse of the principal's ownership: if he returns a Muslim, his first ownership returns, and he returns with his rights. The reasoning of the apparent narration: his joining the territory of war takes the place of death; if he died, no return would be conceivable; and so it is with joining.
If the agent apostatizes and joins the territory of war in a state of apostasy, his mandate is cut when the judge rules that he has joined; for his joining is established only by the judge's ruling, and the mandate then becomes void by their consensus. If he returns a Muslim before the judgment of joining, the suspension is lifted, and it is as if he had never apostatized. If he returns a Muslim after the judgment of joining the territory of war, does the mandate return to him or not? Two views in the school. The first, Muhammad's: it returns; and the reasoning of his position is that apostasy in itself does not contradict the mandate: does one not see that it does not become void before the joining of the territory of war? Only his act in the territory of war was not permitted, its implementation being impossible because of the difference between the two abodes; when he returns, the obstacle ceases and the act becomes permitted again. Its like: the one who appoints a man to sell a slave in Kufa, who does not sell him there until he leaves for Basra, where he cannot sell him; when he returns to Kufa, he can sell him there; the same applies here. The second, Abu Yusuf's view: the mandate does not return; and the reasoning of his position is that the mandate is a contract whose lapse was judged upon the joining of the territory of war, so that no return is conceivable, like marriage.
If the apostate joins the territory of war and the heirs take his property without the judge's order and consume it, then he returns a Muslim, he is permitted to hold them liable. If the judge ruled on his joining and adjudged his property to the heirs, then he returns a Muslim and finds a slave girl in an heir's hand who refuses to return her to him, or frees her, sells her or gives her away, what he did is permitted and the apostate has no right (Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 6/38-39, al-Hidaya 3/153, al-'Inaya 11/240, Mukhtasar al-Wiqaya 2/177, al-Ikhtiyar 3/196, al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 3/493-494, al-Lubab 1/562, Ibn Abidin 7/389, al-Hindiyya 3/638).
As for the Malikis, al-Dasuqi (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "The agent is dismissed by his apostasy during the days of the invitation to repentance; as for after them: if he is killed, it is evident; if he is deferred for an impediment such as pregnancy, the scholars differed over his dismissal. Likewise the agent is dismissed by his principal's apostasy after the days of the invitation to repentance have passed, if the latter has neither returned nor been killed for an impediment" (Hashiyat al-Dasuqi on al-Sharh al-Kabir 5/83).
The Shafi'is and the Hanbalis according to the school hold that the mandate does not become void by apostasy. The Shafi'is say: if a Muslim appoints a Muslim and then the agent apostatizes, his mandate does not become void; likewise if the Muslim appoints an apostate, his mandate is valid, by a single view; for his apostasy does not affect his act, but his property.
As for the principal's apostasy, does his delegation become void? Three views, according to the disappearance of his ownership by apostasy. The first: his ownership disappears, and his mandate becomes void. The second: his ownership does not disappear, and his mandate does not become void. The third: his ownership is suspended: if he returns to Islam, his ownership has not disappeared, nor has his mandate; if he dies or is killed in apostasy, his ownership disappears by apostasy, and his mandate becomes void. Likewise the apostate who appoints a Muslim: is his mandate valid? It proceeds according to these three views (al-Bayan 6/456, al-Najm al-Wahhaj 5/65).
The Hanbalis according to the school say: the mandate does not become void by the agent's apostasy, whether he joined the territory of war or stayed; for his act for himself is valid, and his mandate therefore does not become void; and apostasy does not prevent his mandate in the first place, so it does not prevent its persistence, like the other forms of unbelief. According to one view, it becomes void by the principal's apostasy. Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him) said: if the principal apostatizes, the mandate does not become void for what he may dispose of. As for the agent over his property, the act is founded upon his own act: if we say "his act is valid", his delegation does not become void; and if we say "it is suspended", his mandate is suspended.
Before intoxication, the Hanbalis treated the effect of manifest sin (fisq) upon the mandate. The agent is not dismissed by his own sin nor by that of his principal as regards the act of disposal, unless the mandate bears upon what sin invalidates, like the offer in the marriage contract: he is then dismissed by his own sin or that of his principal, for having left the capacity of disposal.
If he is agent for the acceptance on behalf of the principal, he is not dismissed by the principal's sin, for it does not invalidate his acceptance. Is he dismissed by his own sin? Two views. If he is agent for what requires trustworthiness, like the agent of the orphan's guardian and the agent of the administrator of the waqf for the poor and their like, he is dismissed by his own sin and that of his principal, both of them having thereby left the capacity of disposal. If he is agent for the agent of someone who disposes of his own property, he is dismissed by his own sin; for the agent cannot delegate a sinner; and he is not dismissed by his principal's sin; for his principal is agent for the owner of the property, which sin does not invalidate.
The mandate does not become void by sleep, drunkenness and fainting; for that does not remove one from the capacity of disposal and does not establish guardianship; unless sin occurs through drunkenness, in which case the detail already set out applies (al-Mughni 5/71-72, al-Insaf 5/369, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/546, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 3/515).
Ninth, intoxication. The Shafi'is say: if either of the two, agent or principal, becomes drunk without excess, that is, lawfully, the agent is dismissed. If either of the two becomes drunk through excess, that is, unlawfully, there are two possibilities: the first, that it be likewise, that is, that the agent be dismissed; the second, the opposite, that is, that he not be dismissed; for the one guilty of excess resembles the sober one (Hashiyat al-Qalyubi wa-'Umaya on Kanz al-Raghibin 2/870, Hashiyat al-Jamal on Sharh al-Manhaj 3/420, Hawashi al-Shirwani on Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 5/430).
The Hanbalis say: the mandate does not become void by the drunkenness that entails manifest sin, except in what it invalidates; for it does not remove one from the capacity of disposal. As for what invalidates the sin, like the offer in the marriage contract, the mandate becomes void through drunkenness with regard to it. Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him) said: as for drunkenness, where we said that he commits manifest sin, the mandate becomes void for what sin invalidates, like the offer in the marriage contract and the like; otherwise not (al-Mughni 5/71-72, al-Insaf 5/369, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/546, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 3/515).
As for the Hanafis, Ibn Nujaym (may Allah have mercy on him) said: the drunken man is legally accountable, by the word of Allah:
"Do not approach prayer while you are intoxicated"
Surah An-Nisa, 43
He addressed them and forbade them while in the state of their drunkenness. If the drunkenness comes from something unlawful, the man drunk from it is the accountable one; if it comes from something lawful, it is not so: he is like the fainted one, whose divorce does not take place; and the verification differed in the case where he was forced or compelled to drink and then divorced. We have already set out, in the benefits, that the man drunk from something unlawful resembles the sober one, except in three situations: apostasy, the confession of the pure legal punishments, and testifying in one's own favor.
He added to the three questions. The first: the marriage of the minor boy and girl for a dower less than the dower of similitude or greater: it is not implemented. The second: the agent for divorce, sober, if he becomes drunk and divorces, the divorce does not take place. The third: the agent for sale, if he becomes drunk and sells, the act is not implemented upon his principal (al-Ashbah wa-l-Naza'ir p. 310-311, Ibn Abidin 8/196).
The generality of the jurists of the four schools, the Hanafis, the Malikis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis, stated that the mandate lapses when the principal disposes himself, or through another agent, of what he was entrusted with, before the agent's act, by an act rendering the latter unable to comply with it; as when he is appointed to sell his slave and the principal sells him, frees him, orders his tadbir, concludes his mukataba or gives him away; likewise if it is claimed under a right, or if he was originally free; for the agent finds himself unable to dispose because of the disappearance of the principal's ownership, and the effect of the mandate ends, as if the slave had perished; likewise if he is appointed to divorce his wife and the husband divorces her before him, or if he is appointed for his wife's khul' and he concludes the khul' himself: the mandate becomes void; for the principal's act has ceased, and his mandate with it; when the principal disposes of what he was entrusted with, the agent's act becomes impossible thereafter (Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 6/39, al-Ikhtiyar 3/197, Tabyin al-Haqa'iq 4/289, al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 3/496-497, Mukhtasar al-Wiqaya 2/178, al-Lubab 1/563, Durrar al-Hukkam 7/363, Ibn Abidin 7/394, al-Mughni 5/73, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 3/517, Matalib Uli al-Nuha 3/455-456).
The Hanafis say: whoever appoints another for a thing and then disposes of it himself, or through another agent, by an act rendering the agent unable to comply with it, sees the mandate become void; for when he disposes of what was entrusted, the agent's act becomes impossible thereafter. This as when he is appointed to sell his slave and the principal sells him, frees him, orders his tadbir, concludes his mukataba or gives him away; likewise if it is claimed under a right or if he was originally free; for the agent finds himself unable to dispose because of the disappearance of the principal's ownership, and the effect of the mandate ends, as if the slave had perished. Or he is appointed to divorce his wife, and the husband repudiates her three times or once, and her waiting period comes to its term. The restriction to the ending of the waiting period lies in that, if it has not ended, the agent is permitted to repudiate her as well; once the period has ended, that is no longer permitted to him. If the principal marries her after that, the agent cannot repudiate her, whereas the principal may; for her repudiation at that moment proceeds from a new cause, which the principal holds to the exclusion of the agent.
Likewise if he is appointed for the khul' and he concludes the khul' himself, or if he is appointed to sell his slave and sells him himself: the agent is dismissed in all these situations, the act having become impossible after the principal's act.
Al-Mawsili (may Allah have mercy on him) said: if he is appointed to sell a slave and the principal sells him, the mandate becomes void; and if they both sell, Muhammad said: the sale belongs to the buyer against the principal; for he sold his own property, and he is therefore the more entitled. According to Abu Yusuf, it lies between the two; for the agent's sale is like the principal's according to him: does one not see that, if the agent's sale preceded, the principal's becomes void, as, if the principal's sale preceded, the agent's becomes void; and when the two are equal, it lies between the two, for lack of priority (al-Ikhtiyar 3/197, Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 6/39, Tabyin al-Haqa'iq 4/289, al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 3/496-497, Mukhtasar al-Wiqaya 2/178, al-Lubab 1/563, Durrar al-Hukkam 7/363, Ibn Abidin 7/394).
The Malikis say: whoever appoints a person to sell goods, and then the principal sells them and the agent sells them as well: the first of the two sales is the one that prevails, unless the second buyer has taken possession of the thing sold; he is then more entitled to it, provided he did not know of the first sale; if the second knew that another had bought it, he is not more entitled, by analogy with the question of the two guardians (al-Sharh al-Kabir with Hashiyat al-Dasuqi 5/76, al-Taj wal-Iklil 4/215, Mawahib al-Jalil 7/174, Tahrir al-Mukhtasar 4/297, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 6/82, Minah al-Jalil 6/405).
The Shafi'is say: the agent is dismissed by the exit of the object of the act from the principal's estate through sale or the like, like the freeing of what he was appointed for; for the persistence of the delegation becomes impossible in this state, and even if the property returns to his ownership, the mandate does not return. Likewise if he appoints him for the transfer of his wife and he repudiates her, the mandate becomes void, the act having become impossible. Resembling the exit of the property from his ownership is the case where he lends it or leases it: if he appoints him to sell it and then leases it, he is dismissed; for the lease, if it prevents the sale, leaves no disposing owner; otherwise it is a sign of regret for the sale, for whoever intends to sell does not lease, given the scarcity of demands. He is not dismissed by the appointment of another agent, nor by the offer for sale. And the dismissal of the agent through the principal's grinding of the wheat entrusted to the agent for its sale admits two views (al-Bayan 6/455, Rawdat al-Talibin 3/523, Mughni al-Muhtaj 3/218, Nihayat al-Muhtaj 5/63, al-Najm al-Wahhaj 5/65, Kanz al-Raghibin 2/870, al-Dibaj 2/323).
The Hanbalis say: if a man appoints a man for the transfer of his wife, the sale of his slave or the recovery of his house from so-and-so, and evidence becomes established of the wife's divorce, the slave's freeing and the transfer of the house out of the principal's ownership, the mandate becomes void; for the principal's act has ceased, and his mandate with it. The mandate also becomes void by the agent's acknowledgment, against his principal, of having received what the agent was appointed to receive, or of the litigation over it; for the agent acknowledged the leaving of the object of the mandate through the receipt (al-Mughni 5/73, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 3/517, Matalib Uli al-Nuha 3/455-456).
Likewise, if he is appointed to divorce his wife and he repudiates her himself three times, or once, and her waiting period comes to its term; for she admits no divorce after the triple repudiation and the ending of the waiting period; and if the husband repudiates her once while the period remains, the mandate remains valid, for she admits divorce during the waiting period. If he is appointed for the mukataba and concludes it, then finds himself unable, he is not permitted to conclude it a second time. Likewise if he is appointed to marry him a woman, and he performs the marriage and then declares her free of any bond, the agent cannot contract a second marriage; for the command of an act does not entail repetition: done once, the compliance is obtained and the commander's effect ends, as in the legal commands; unlike the one appointed to sell his slave, whom the agent sells, and who is then returned to him by a decree: he is permitted to sell him a second time; for the restitution by the judge's decree entails the raising of the contract from the origin and renders it as if it had never been, so that it is not a repetition; even if it is returned to him without a judge's decree, he is not permitted to sell him; for it is a new sale, and the mandate ended with the first, so that the second is possible only by the renewal of the delegation (Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 6/39, al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 3/496-497, Mukhtasar al-Wiqaya 2/178, al-Lubab 1/563, Rawdat al-Talibin 3/523, Mughni al-Muhtaj 3/218, Nihayat al-Muhtaj 5/63, al-Najm al-Wahhaj 5/65, Kanz al-Raghibin 2/870, al-Dibaj 2/323).
Eleventh, the destruction of what the mandate is attached to. The generality of the jurists, the Hanafis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis, stated that the mandate becomes void by the destruction of the thing whose disposal was entrusted; for its object has gone, and the mandate with it, as if he were appointed to sell a slave and he died (Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 6/39, al-Hindiyya 3/368, Asna al-Matalib 2/274, Mughni al-Muhtaj 3/212, al-Mughni 5/73, al-Mubdi' 4/365, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 3/516, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/547-548, Matalib Uli al-Nuha 3/457).
The Hanafis say: the mandate becomes void by the death of the slave appointed for his sale, his freeing, his gift, his tadbir, his mukataba or the like; for the act upon the object becomes inconceivable after its destruction, and the mandate for the disposal of what admits no disposal is impossible, so that it becomes void (Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 6/39, al-Hindiyya 3/368).
The Hanbalis say: the mandate also becomes void by the destruction of the thing whose disposal was entrusted; for the object of the mandate has gone. It also becomes void by the agent's payment of a substitute he was not ordered to pay: if he is appointed to buy a slave with these dirhams and a slave girl with other dirhams, and he devotes the price of the one to the other, the mandate becomes void; for he was only appointed for the purchase of this one. It also becomes void by the agent's borrowing of the money he holds for the principal, as it becomes void by its destruction: if the principal gives him a dinar, appointing him to buy with it, and the agent borrows the dinar and disposes of it for himself, the mandate becomes void. If he sets aside a dinar in substitution and buys with it, the purchase becomes like a purchase for the principal without authorization; for the mandate has become void, and the dinar set aside in substitution does not become the principal's until he receives it: if he buys something for the principal with it without designating it in the contract, the purchase is suspended upon his ratification: if the principal ratifies it, the purchase is valid for him and the price binds him; otherwise, the principal not having ratified it, the sale binds the agent, who pays its price.
Ibn Qudama (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "And it binds the agent in every case." Al-Qadi said: whenever he buys with the specific property of his estate for another a thing, the purchase is void; for it is not valid that he buy with the specific property of his estate what another owns. The companions of al-Shafi'i say: whenever he buys for another with his own money a thing, the purchase is valid for the agent, whether he bought it with the specific money or on liability; for he bought what he had not been authorized to buy, resembling the case where he would have bought it on liability (al-Mughni 5/73, al-Mubdi' 4/365, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 3/516, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/547-548).
The jurists differed concerning the mandate: does it become void if the agent exceeds what was entrusted to him, or not? The Shafi'is according to the soundest view and the Hanbalis according to the school hold that the mandate becomes void by the agent's excess; for he is a holder of trust, like the depositary who is dismissed from the deposit by his excess. The Hanbalis according to the school and the Shafi'is against the soundest view hold that the mandate does not become void by the excess in what was entrusted, like wearing the garment entrusted for sale or riding the mount; for the mandate involved trust and permission: the former having ceased through the excess, the permission remains; and it differs from the deposit in that the latter is a bare trust, annulled by excess and betrayal.
The Hanbalis say: on this basis, if he is appointed to sell a garment and he wears it, he becomes liable for his excess; if he sells it, his sale is valid and he is discharged of the guarantee, for having entered the buyer's ownership and guarantee; when the agent receives the price, it is a deposit of trust in his hand, not guaranteed against him, for he received it with the principal's authorization without committing an excess in it; if the buyer returns the garment to the agent for a defect, the guarantee returns, for the contract that had lifted the guarantee has lapsed, and what it had lifted returns; if the garment returns to him through another contract, the guarantee returns only if he commits a new excess, for this is another mandate in which no excess occurred. If money is given to him to buy something and the agent commits an excess upon the price, he becomes liable for it; if he buys with it and delivers the thing, the guarantee ceases, and his receipt of the thing sold is the receipt of a deposit of trust. If a defect is found in the thing sold and it is returned to him, or he himself finds a defect in his purchase, returns it and takes the price, it is guaranteed against him; for the contract that had lifted the guarantee has lapsed, and what it had lifted returns (al-Mughni 5/72, al-Mubdi' 4/365, al-Insaf 5/369-370, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 3/516-517, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/547).
Al-Shirazi (may Allah have mercy on him) said: if he is entrusted with the sale of a thing and commits an excess in it by wearing the garment or riding the mount, does the mandate become void or not? Two views. The first: it becomes void, and the sale is not permitted to him; for it is a contract of trust, which becomes void through betrayal, like the deposit. The second: it does not become void; for the contract comprises trust and act: when he commits an excess in it, the trust becomes void and the act remains, like the pledge, which comprises trust and security: excess in it annuls the trust and the security remains (al-Muhadhdhab 1/357, al-Hawi al-Kabir 6/534).
Al-'Imrani (may Allah have mercy on him) said: if dirhams are given to him and he is appointed to buy with their specific amount a good, and the agent commits an excess in them, he becomes liable for them; if he then buys it with them for the principal, is it valid? According to the two views of the preceding question; and if we say "it is valid", when does the guarantee of it cease? Also according to the two views. If he orders him to buy at a price on liability and to take the price from them, and the agent commits an excess by neglecting their safekeeping, then buys on liability for the principal afterwards, the purchase is valid for him, by a single view; for he did not commit an excess upon what the contract laid hold of; when he pays out the dirhams, he is discharged of their guarantee. If the agent borrows the dirhams and destroys them, the mandate becomes void, by a single view; for if he had ordered him to buy with their specific amount, that became impossible through their destruction, and it proceeds like the one appointed to sell a slave who dies; and if he ordered him to buy on liability, taking the price from them, he only ordered him the act upon those very dirhams: when they perished, the purchase is no longer possible for him (al-Bayan 6/460).
It has been said: he is dismissed by that without restriction; and it has been said: he is not dismissed without restriction (Rawdat al-Talibin 3/524, Mughni al-Muhtaj 3/218, Nihayat al-Muhtaj 5/64, al-Najm al-Wahhaj 5/66, Kanz al-Raghibin 2/870, al-Dibaj 2/324). The Hanbalis say: the mandate does not become void either by the denial of the mandate by either of the two, agent or principal; for it does not indicate the lifting of the prior permission, like the denial of a woman's marital bond which evidence then establishes: it is not a divorce (Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/549, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 3/517).
Fourteenth, the completion of the thing and the agent's carrying out of what was entrusted to him. The Hanafis say: the agent is dismissed without a formal dismissal by the completion of the thing entrusted, as if he were appointed to collect a debt and he collects it himself, or appointed for a marriage and the agent performs the marriage (Ibn Abidin 7/388).
Fifteenth, the separation of one of the two partners. The Hanafis say: the agent is dismissed by the separation of one of the two partners: thus, if two persons conclude a contract of partnership, each of them is agent for the other; and as the partnership becomes void if the property perishes, or the property of one of them, that is, his capital alone, before the purchase, the implicit mandate also becomes void, whether the partners were aware of the property's destruction or not; for it is an automatic dismissal, when the mandate was not stated explicitly at the contract of partnership. Likewise if one of the two partners, or both, appoint someone to dispose of the partnership's property, and the partners then separate, the agent is dismissed with regard to the other's right, even without knowing of the separation, if they did not state the authorization explicitly in the delegation (Ibn Abidin 7/391, Durrar al-Hukkam 3/659).
Al-Haskafi (may Allah have mercy on him) said: he is dismissed by the separation of one of the two partners, even through the delegation of a third for the act, and even without the agent knowing of it; for it is an automatic dismissal.
Ibn Abidin (may Allah have mercy on him) said: his saying "he is dismissed by the separation of one of the two partners" admits two meanings. The first: the separation through the destruction of the two properties, or of one of them, before the purchase; the partnership becomes void thereby, and the implicit mandate included in the contract of partnership becomes void, with or without knowledge; for it is an automatic dismissal, when the mandate was not stated explicitly at the contract of partnership. The second: if one of the two, or both, appoint someone to dispose of the property, it is permitted; if they separate, this agent is dismissed with regard to the one of the two who is not his principal, if they did not state the authorization explicitly in the delegation. We mentioned these two meanings because, if the separation remained in its apparent sense, their statement would not be sound, even if the partner does not know of it; for it is not valid that one of the two alone rescind the partnership, which entails the dismissal, without his holder's knowledge. End of the quotation from the Durrar. This is what the commentator meant by his saying "even through the delegation of a third", that is, through the delegation by the two partners, or one of them, of a third: the mandate included in the partnership and the mandate of their agent for the act become void.
His saying "for the act": the outcome is that the mandate included in the partnership and the mandate of their agent for disposal become void when the two properties, or one of them, perished before the partnership, the latter becoming void thereby, as well as the mandate it contained, whether they knew of it or not; for it is an automatic dismissal, the mandate not having been stated explicitly at the contract of partnership; likewise if the two partners, or one of them, appoint an agent to dispose of the property: if they separate, he is dismissed with regard to the one of the two who is not his principal, if they did not state the authorization explicitly. His saying "even without the agent knowing of it" goes back to the commentator's saying "even through the delegation of a third"; for it cannot be referred to the implicit mandate, which occurs between the two partners, and it is far-fetched that they separate without knowing of their separation; as if the author meant that, and the commentator generalized much in his words for the benefit. Yes, it can be referred to the implicit mandate, when the lapse of the partnership results from the destruction of the two properties, or of one of them, before the purchase; for the partners may have no knowledge of it, or one of them, and yet the implicit mandate becomes void, so that his referral to the question in its generality is sound (Ibn Abidin 7/391-392).