Islamic Fiqh > Marriage and family > Khul' (dissolution by compensation) > First issue: when the compensation is unknown
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Updated on 25 September 2026 at 3:23 PM
This part belongs to the full section: All sections of this part.
The jurists differ over the case where the compensation of the khul' is unknown, for instance if she says "Make khul' with me against what is in my hand of dirhams," while he does not know what is in her hand: is the khul' valid? The majority of jurists, the Hanafis, Malikis and Hanbalis according to the school, hold that the khul' is valid even if the compensation handed over is unknown, for instance if she deals with him against what is in her hand of dirhams, and he takes what was allocated to him. For divorce is a meaning that may be suspended upon a condition, so it is permitted for an unknown compensation to arise by it, like a testamentary bequest; and because the khul' is the relinquishment of his right over the private part, without transfer of ownership, and relinquishment admits gratuity, which is why it is valid without compensation, unlike marriage. The khul' being valid, the dower of the like is not due, for she did not hand it over nor cause the husband the loss that would require it: the exit of the private part from the husband's ownership has no value, the proof being that if she removes it from his ownership by her apostasy or her suckling that annuls her marriage, nothing falls upon her; if she killed herself or a stranger killed her, no compensation is due to the husband, whether she was able or not; the private part is valued for the husband only in marriage specifically, and He permitted her the ransom of herself for her need, so that what is due is what she consented to hand over: compelling what she did not consent to has no basis. On this basis, if he makes khul' against what is in her hand of dirhams, it is valid, and what is in her hand of dirhams is his.
The Hanbalis say: if there is nothing in her hand, three [dirhams] are due to him from her; Ahmad stated it, for it is the smallest number bearing the name of dirhams literally, and her wording indicated it, so that he becomes its creditor, as if dirhams were bequeathed to him by will. If there is less than three in her hand, it is possible he is entitled only to that, for it belongs to the dirhams and is in her hand, and it is possible he is entitled to three full, the wording requiring them when nothing is found in her hand; the same applies when there is some in her hand (al-Mughni, 7/253).
The Hanafis say: if she says "Make khul' with me against what is in my hand," he deals with her and there is nothing in her hand: he has nothing against her, for she did not deceive him, having named no property of value. Likewise if she says "against what is in my house" while her house is empty: the khul' is valid and he has nothing. If she says "Make khul' with me against what is in my hand of property," he deals with her and there is nothing in her hand: she returns his mahr to him, for having named property, he was not willing to part with it without compensation; and there is no way to impose upon her the named amount or its value, because of the indeterminacy, nor the value of the private part, that is, the dower of the like, because it is not valued at the moment of exit; what stands in place for the husband therefore becomes necessary, namely the restitution of the mahr. When the restitution of the mahr is due to him and she has absolved him of it, he takes back nothing from her, for the very thing he is entitled to claim was handed over to him by the absolution; were he to return to her, it would be as a gift, and a gift imposes no warranty upon the giver.
If she says "against what is in my hand of dirhams" in the plural, he deals with her and there is nothing in her hand: three dirhams are due to him, for she named the plural whose least is three; if dirhams of three and above are found in her hand, they belong to the husband; if there are fewer than three in her hand, three are due to him. If the khul' takes place against the mahr, it is valid: if the woman has not received it, it falls from his obligation; if she has received it, he takes it back from her. And if he makes khul' against the maintenance of her 'iddah, the khul' is valid and the maintenance falls (al-Hidayah, 2/15; Tabyin al-haqa'iq, 2/269; al-'Inayah, 5/476-477; al-Jawharah al-nirah, 4/520-522; al-Lubab, 2/118-119).
The Malikis say: the validity of the khul' does not require that it be free of uncertainty and indeterminacy; if he deals against an indeterminate thing, the khul' is valid and the divorce occurs, for the khul' does not belong to pure exchanges, like sales in which prices are sought: what is sought here is that the wife free herself from the husband and become owner of herself again, and the marriage dissolves. If the husband says to his wife: "If you hand over to me what is in your hand, you are divorced," while he has possession of it, and she opens it: if there is in it a trifling thing having value, however slight, such as a dirham; or a thing without value, such as a rag, a raisin or a grain; or nothing having value, there being nothing at all, the hand being empty, or a thing without value such as dust: she is thereby separated from him, for he entered into uncertainty, having divorced against a thing he will or will not take. Ibn Abd as-Salam said it is the nearest view.
But if she makes the khul' against a thing over which she has no right, the khul' does not bind him: for example, the woman says to her husband "Make khul' with me against this animal" while pointing to it, and he deals with her on that basis; the animal is not hers and she has neither ownership nor semblance of ownership over it, so the khul' does not bind him, for he dealt against a thing that was not completed for him, and the apparent meaning is non-bindingness, even with the owner's permission.
Or against a trifling thing: if he says to his wife "If you give me that against which I make khul' with you, you are divorced, or I have made khul' with you": if she brings him the dower of the like, the khul' binds him; if she brings him less than the dower of the like, which is the meaning of the trifling thing, the khul' does not bind him and they are separated, and according to the narration no oath falls upon him ('Iqd al-jawahir al-thaminah, 2/498; al-Ishraf 'ala nukat masa'il al-khilaf, 3/392-393, no. 1221; al-Taj wa-l-iklil, 3/34; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 4/26; al-Sharh al-kabir with Hashiyat al-Dasuqi, 3/237; Tathbir al-Mukhtasar, 3/126-127).
The Shafi'is hold that the compensation requires the conditions of the price: that it have value, be known and be deliverable. On this basis, if he makes khul' against an unknown thing, such as a cloth without designation or description, or like one of the two slaves, or against a known thing accompanied by an unknown, or against what is in her palm while there is nothing in it and he knows it, or against a usurped thing or known wine, the two spouses being Muslims, or against any other corrupted thing intended: she is separated with the dower of the like, for it is a contract upon the benefit of the private part, which is not corrupted by the corruption of its counter-value and returns to its counterpart, like marriage. According to one view, he returns against the equivalent of the wine, that is, its measure of juice (Rawdat al-Talibin, 5/252-253; al-Najm al-Wahhaj, 7/440-441; Mughni al-Muhtaj, 4/434; Nihayat al-Muhtaj, 6/462-463).
Imam Ibn Rushd (may Allah have mercy on him) said: the cause of the dispute is the oscillation of the compensation here between compensation in sales or in things given as gift and bequeathed. Whoever likened it to sales required in it what is required in sales and their counter-values, and whoever likened it to gifts did not require it (Bidayat al-mujtahid, 2/51).
The jurists differ over the case where the compensation of the khul' lacks value, such as wine or pork, the two spouses being Muslims: is a counter-value due or not, after their agreement that the divorce occurs? The Shafi'is hold that the compensation requires the conditions of the price: value, being known, and deliverability: if he deals against known wine, the two being Muslims, or against any other corrupted thing intended, she is separated with the dower of the like, for it is a contract upon the benefit of the private part which is not corrupted by the corruption of its counter-value and returns to its counterpart like marriage. According to one view, he returns against the equivalent of the wine, its measure of juice (Rawdat al-Talibin, 5/252-253; al-Najm al-Wahhaj, 7/440-441; Mughni al-Muhtaj, 4/434; Nihayat al-Muhtaj, 6/462-463).
The majority of jurists, the Hanafis, Malikis and Hanbalis, hold that when the compensation of the khul' is void, as if he deals against wine, pork, carrion or a free man, the husband is entitled to nothing, for the exit of the private part from the husband's ownership has no value: if he is content with what is not a compensation, he is entitled to nothing, as if he had divorced her or suspended her divorce upon her performing an act and she performed it, and he separates from the marriage, the entry of the private part into the husband's ownership having, for its part, value.
They differ only as to whether the separation occurs in a revocable manner, definitively, or according to intention. The Hanafis say: when the compensation of the khul' is void, for instance if she deals with her husband against wine, pork or carrion, the husband is entitled to nothing, the named compensation being void, and the separation is definitive; nothing is due from her to him because she named no property having value that would become deception against him, and there is no way to impose upon her the named thing, the Muslim refusing to deliver it and to receive it, nor to impose another, for lack of commitment. This in contrast to the case where he deals against a specified vinegar that turns out to be wine: it is then obligatory upon him to return to her the mahr she took according to Abu Hanifah, and according to the two companions an equivalent measure of that vinegar is due; and this is the same for the dower as here, for she named property and deceived him, thereby becoming liable, deception within the contract entailing warranty.
If the compensation of the divorce is void, the divorce is revocable so long as the count is not completed, and becomes definitive if it is completed, the explicit divorce devoid of compensation and not described as separation being revocable. When the compensation lacks value, such as wine, pork or carrion: if the statement is pronounced with the word of khul', the separation is definitive; if with the word of divorce, it is revocable if the marriage was consummated and fewer than three have occurred, the effecting being suspended upon the acceptance which took place, and the compensation being void: the operative factor in the first case is the word of khul', which is an allusive form whose effect is definitive, and in the second the word of divorce, which is followed by return (al-Hidayah, 2/14; Tabyin al-haqa'iq, 2/269; al-'Inayah, 5/473; al-Ikhtiyar, 3/193-194; Mukhtasar al-Wiqayah, 1/413; Sharh Fath al-Qadir, 4/219-220; al-Jawharah al-nirah, 4/520-522; al-Lubab, 2/117-118).
The Malikis say: when the husband makes khul' of his wife against what cannot be a compensation, such as wine or pork, the definitive divorce occurs and he is entitled to no counter-value, for divorce is a meaning that can occur without consideration, producing its effect by its mere occurrence without any rescission being possible; if it occurs against what cannot be consideration, he obtains by it no consideration, its origin being manumission, as if one said to his slave "If you bring me a skin of wine, you are free," and he brings it: he is freed and obtains no consideration. And because the dower of the like is a measure upon which consent did not occur in the khul', it does not bind by the corruption of the compensation, its origin being what exceeds the dower of the like; and because every meaning not due in the khul' despite the validity of the compensation is not due with its corruption, its origin being the specified mahr; and because the establishment of the counter-value in the khul' involves no right of Allah, the proof being the permission to agree upon its relinquishment: once the contract is valid with his consent without known counter-value, it is as if he had divorced without compensation. And because the obligation of the dower of the like can only be as compensation for the compensation or as compensation for the exit of the private part: it cannot be compensation for the compensation, for every subsisting counter-value has as its value its price, and the dower of the like is not the value of the wine; if it is compensation for the loss of the private part, it is not valid, for the exit of the private part from the husband's ownership has no value: the entire question rests on this point. Indeed, that by which he destroys it is the lawfulness of enjoying it, and that lawfulness is not valued at its equivalent, like the sick man who divorces: the private part is not valued against her for the third divorce, and if it had a value, it would be valued, as if property of his had been given to her. And because if she apostatized after consummation, nothing would be due to him, whereas if the exit of the private part from his ownership had a value, she would owe it as she owes the value of what she consumed. And because her killer owes the husband no value of the private part, whereas if it had one, he would owe it like other property ('Iqd al-jawahir al-thaminah, 2/498; al-Ishraf 'ala nukat masa'il al-khilaf, 3/388-389, no. 1217; Bidayat al-mujtahid, 2/51).
The Hanbalis say: if the khul' is pronounced with the word of divorce, it is a revocable divorce, being devoid of compensation; if with the word of khul' or the allusive forms of khul' while intending divorce, it is the same, the allusive forms with intention being like the explicit. If it is with the word of khul' without intending divorce, it depends on a principle: is the khul' valid without compensation? There are two narrations: if we say it is valid, it is valid here; if we say it is not, it is not and nothing occurs. If he says "If you give me wine or carrion, you are divorced" and she gives it to him, she is divorced and nothing falls upon her (al-Mughni, 7/261).
The formula of the khul' is the offer and the acceptance; it divides into explicit and allusive. There are terms upon which the jurists agree that they constitute the khul', and others over which they differ.
The Hanafis say that the terms of the khul' are five: "I have made khul' with you," "I have absolved you" (mubarat), "I have separated from you by bay'", "I have separated from you," "Divorce yourself against a thousand." If he says "I have made khul' with you against a thousand," she accepts, and he then says "I did not intend the divorce," he is not believed at court, for the mention of the compensation indicates it; he is believed on the religious level, Allah knowing the secrets of hearts; but she cannot remain with him, for she is like the judge who knows of him only the apparent, the mention of the compensation indicating it (al-Jawharah al-nirah, 4/517; al-Bahr al-ra'iq, 4/78). "ad-Durr al-mukhtar" added the terms of sale and purchase, such as "I have sold myself to you" or "Buy yourself" (ad-Durr al-mukhtar with Hashiyat Ibn Abidin, 3/443).
The terms of the khul' among the Malikis: the khul', the ransom (fidyah), the amicable settlement (sulh) and the mubarat all denote one single meaning: the woman hands over a compensation against her divorce; but the term khul' specifies that she hands over the whole of what he gave her, the sulh part of it, the ransom more than he gave her, and the mubarat her relinquishment of a right she has against him (Bidayat al-mujtahid, 2/50; al-Istidhkar, 6/76; Hashiyat as-Sawi 'ala ash-Sharh as-saghir, 5/243).
The terms of the khul' among the Shafi'is divide into explicit and allusive. The explicit is what is pronounced with the word of khul' and what derives from it, such as "I have made khul' with you against such a thing": no intention is needed with it, for it was repeated upon the tongue of the bearers of the law to express separation, like the repetition in the Quran; no distinction is made as to whether the property is mentioned or not. According to one view, it is an allusive form that requires the intention of divorce. The ransom (mufadah) and its derivatives count as khul' according to the sounder view, such as "I have ransomed you against such a thing," owing to the use of the term of ransom in the Quran: "No blame is there upon the two of them for that by which she ransoms herself" (Surah Al-Baqarah, 229); according to the contrary view, it is an allusive form, having been neither Quranic nor widespread upon the tongue of the bearers of the law. The truth is that the khul' and the ransom, if property is mentioned with them, are explicit of divorce, its mention signaling separation; if it is not mentioned, they are allusive forms requiring the intention of divorce. The allusive form is what is pronounced with the allusive terms of divorce with the intention of divorce of both spouses together; if either lacks the intention, it is not valid.
The word of rescission is an allusive form, as in "I rescinded your marriage against such a thing" and she accepts: it is an allusive form in separation against compensation, having been neither Quranic nor customary in usage; the word of rescission came in the statement of Ibn Abbas and others, and spread upon the tongues of the scholars. The terms of sale, purchase and mutual rescission are allusive forms of the khul', whether they are deemed divorce or rescission: if he says "I have sold myself to you against such a thing" and she says "I have bought" or "I accept," it is an allusive form of khul'; if he says "I have released you against such a thing" and she says "I have transferred myself," likewise. The khul' is valid through translation into any other language, in consideration of the meaning (al-Bayan, 10/15, 18; Rawdat al-Talibin, 5/265, 270; al-Najm al-Wahhaj, 7/447, 449; Mughni al-Muhtaj, 4/438-439; Nihayat al-Muhtaj, 6/469, 471; ad-Dibaj, 3/380-381).
The Hanbalis say that the word of the khul' divides into explicit and allusive, for the khul' is one of the two types of separation and therefore has its explicit and its allusive, like the divorce. The explicit is what occurs with the word of khul', of rescission or of ransom, without intention of divorce: it is a rescission that does not count in the number of divorces, even without intention of the khul', for these terms are explicit in it as Quranic: "No blame is there upon the two of them for that by which she ransoms herself" (Surah Al-Baqarah, 229). The allusive terms are "I have separated from you by tabayyu'," "I have absolved you," "I have sold myself to you," for they admit the khul' and other things. With the request for khul' and the handing over of the compensation, the khul' is valid without intention, the circumstantial indication derived from the request for khul' and the handing over of the compensation turning toward it and dispensing from intention. The allusive forms require the intention of khul' from the one of the two spouses who pronounced them, like the divorce by allusive form. If the two spouses agree that the wife gift him the dower and absolve him, if it is a debt or something like maintenance or a loan, on condition that he divorce her, and she absolves him or gifts him the dower if it is a commodity, and then he divorces her, the divorce is definitive, the circumstantial indication showing the divorce in exchange for the absolution: it is a divorce against compensation. The same applies if the husband says to her "Absolve me and I will divorce you," or "If you absolve me, I have divorced you," and similar particular and general expressions from which it is understood that he requested the absolution against his divorcing her and that she absolved him against his divorcing her. If she absolved him with an absolution unconnected to the divorce and he then divorces her, it is revocable, being devoid of compensation in word and in meaning. And the translation of the khul' is valid in every language of its speakers, for it is the term established for it in their languages, like Arabic, with no cult of the word (Kashshaf al-Qina', 5/246-247; Sharh Muntaha al-iradat, 5/340-342; Manar al-sabil, 3/76-77).
The jurists differ over the suspension of the khul' upon a condition: is it valid? Is there a difference between a condition coming from the husband and one coming from the wife? The majority of jurists, the Hanafis, Malikis, Shafi'is and Ibn Qudamah among the Hanbalis, hold that the suspension of the khul' upon a condition and its attachment to a term are valid when they come from the husband.
The Hanafis say: the suspension of the khul' and its attachment to a term are valid from the husband and not from the wife, and they depend upon the wife's acceptance: if he says "I have made khul' with my absent wife against such a thing" and the news reaches her and she accepts, it is permitted. As for what comes from the woman, it does not depend upon the husband's acceptance by consensus: if she says "I have made khul' from my absent husband so-and-so against such a thing" and the news reaches him and he permits it, it is not permitted. The reason for the difference is that the khul' on the husband's side is an oath, being the suspension of the divorce upon the acceptance of property; he therefore cannot return from it, and its attachment to a term and its suspension upon a condition are valid, as in "I make khul' with you tomorrow," or "if so-and-so arrives, I make khul' with you against such a thing"; and being an oath, the wife's absence does not prevent its validity, as in the suspension upon entering the house. As for the woman's side, it is an exchange, so that its suspension upon a condition is not valid, nor its attachment to a term, and she may return before the husband's permission; and the condition in exchanges is not suspended, as in the sale (Bada'i' al-sana'i', 5/138).
Imam Ibn al-Humam (may Allah have mercy on him) said: the suspension and the attachment are valid, to the extent that if he says "when tomorrow comes, I make khul' with you against a thousand, or I divorce you against a thousand" and she accepts the next day in a session in which she has knowledge of it, it occurs and the property becomes binding upon her; her acceptance before tomorrow is not valid, the offer itself being suspended upon the condition and non-existent before it, and acceptance before the offer not being valid; there is no option in oaths, so his option is void. A branch of the forms of suspending the khul': if he says "If you enter the house, I make khul' with you against a thousand" and they consent to it and she does it, the khul' is valid, mentioned in the letter of the sin of "at-Tajnis," the suspension coming from the husband being permitted since it is a divorce. In "al-Wajiz": if he says "when so-and-so arrives, I make khul' with you against a thousand, and when tomorrow comes," the acceptance belongs to her after the coming of the term and the arrival of so-and-so (Sharh Fath al-Qadir, 4/231-232).
Imam Ali ibn Khalil al-Tarabulusi (may Allah have mercy on him) said: the suspension of the khul' upon a condition is valid from him and not from her; the khul' being suspended by "If you enter the house, I make khul' with you against such a thing," her acceptance is considered after entering the house; likewise if he says to his wife "Every woman I marry, I have sold her divorce to you against such a thing": the acceptance belongs to her after the marriage, so that if she accepts after the marriage or says "I have bought her divorce," she is divorced, and not if she accepts before the marriage; for this speech of the husband constitutes a khul' after the marriage, the acceptance therefore being conditioned after it; if the option is stipulated for the wife, it is permitted according to Abu Hanifah and not according to the two companions, and the husband's option is not permitted by consensus, the khul' on his side being an oath which she does not accept with option, and on her side an exchange which she accepts (Mu'in al-hukkam, 1/152).
The Malikis say: the suspension of the khul' upon a condition is valid. If the husband suspends the khul' upon taking possession or upon payment, as if he says to his wife "If you hand me such a thing, you are divorced," or "If you pay me such a thing, you are divorced," or "when you pay me such a thing, I have divorced you," her taking possession or her payment is not restricted to the session, that is, the one in which he pronounced this statement to her: as soon as she takes possession or brings him what he asked of her, she is divorced, even after the session, unless the delay grows so long that one understands the husband did not intend the transfer of ownership at that moment, unless an indication shows he meant the session, in which case it is applied upon that indication. As for the acceptance, it is not considered here: the ruling depends on the existence of that upon which the suspension is made; if it exists, the suspended thing occurs, otherwise not (al-Taj wa-l-iklil, 3/32; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 4/24; al-Sharh al-kabir with Hashiyat al-Dasuqi, 3/234-235; Tathbir al-Mukhtasar, 3/123-124).
The Shafi'is say: the khul' is valid as immediate, because of the exchange it contains, and valid as suspended upon a condition, because of the divorce it contains. The immediate is that he effect the separation against compensation, as if the husband says "I have divorced you, or made khul' with you, or khal' you, or ransomed you, or absolved you against a thousand" and the wife answers straightaway "I accept," as the seller says "I have sold you this against a thousand" and the buyer "I accept"; and the husband may retract the offer before the acceptance, as we said for the sale. If the wife says "Divorce me against a thousand" and the husband, upon her request, says "I have divorced you," or if she says "Make khul' with me, or make khul' of me against a thousand" and he answers her request "I have made khul' with you," it is valid, as the buyer says "Sell me this against a thousand" and the seller "I have sold it to you"; if his answer to her request is delayed beyond the immediate, the request is annulled, and she may retract before his answer, as we said of the buyer. If the wife says "I have made khul' with you against a thousand" and the husband says "I accept," it is not valid and no separation occurs by it, the effecting belonging to him and not to her, and his "I accept" not being an effecting; it is as if she said to him "I have divorced you against a thousand" and he answered "I accept." If she says to him "If you divorce me, or when you divorce me, or whenever you divorce me, you shall have a thousand from me," and he says "I have divorced you," the divorce occurs definitive and he takes the thousand from her, for the divorce requires neither her request nor her satisfaction, and had he divorced her of himself it would be valid; what is needed from her is her commitment of the property, which did occur; his answer is required to be immediate, for it is a pure exchange from her side, requiring the immediate answer.
As for the suspended, it is for instance the suspension of the divorce upon the payment or the warranty of property. If the husband begins with a formula of suspension in the affirmative, such as "whenever, or at whatever time, or whatever era you give me such a thing, you are divorced," it is a pure suspension from his side, with no regard to the semblance of exchange, for it belongs to the explicit terms of suspension: the divorce occurs upon the realization of the attribute as in every suspension, and he has no return before the giving, like the suspension devoid of compensation in "If you enter the house, you are divorced." The acceptance is not required in wording, the formula not requiring it, nor the immediate giving in the session: as soon as the giving exists, she is divorced, even beyond what he mentioned, the word indicating time in its generality across all moments; if he restricted this to a determined time or place, it becomes determined. Excluded from the affirmative is the formula of suspension in the negative, such as "whenever you do not give me such a thing, you are divorced," which holds for the immediate, the negative requiring immediacy; and as for the case of the woman who says "whenever you divorce me, you shall have a thousand from me," the answer is restricted to the session of the contract, al-Ghazali having distinguished the two: what predominates on the husband's side is suspension, and on the woman's side exchange. If he says "If, or when, you give me such a thing, you are divorced," it is the same: it is a suspension with no return before the giving, no acceptance required in wording nor giving in the session, both being particles of suspension like "whenever"; excluded on the other hand are "inna" with fathah and "in" with fathah, by which the divorce occurs immediately definitive, because of causation. But the mentioned suspension requires an immediate giving in the session of the contract, for it stands in place of compensation in exchanges; the suspension is not waived in "whenever" and the like because these formulas are explicit on the permission of delay, what predominates on the husband's side being the meaning of suspension, unlike the wife's side.
If the wife begins by demanding the divorce, whether in the form of suspension such as "if" or "whenever," or not, such as "Divorce me against such a thing," and the husband answers immediately, it is an exchange from her side, for she acquires the private part by what she hands over of compensation, with an admixture of reward (ja'alah): she hands over the property against what the husband alone controls, the divorce; when he brings it, the effecting occurs and her aim is attained, like the worker in the ja'alah; she therefore has the return before his answer, for this is the ruling of all exchanges and ja'alahs, and the immediate answer is required in the session of the contract in the previous formulas requiring immediacy and others, like the suspension by "whenever," giving predominance to the exchange from her side, unlike the husband's side. If he divorces with delay, he is the initiator and obtains no compensation, and the divorce is then revocable; however, if she explicitly granted the delay, immediacy is not required. The matching of offer and acceptance is not required here: if she says "Divorce me against a thousand" and he divorces her against five hundred, the divorce occurs validly, for he consented to waive part of what she asked; if she asks the husband for three slaves he would own over her against a thousand and he divorces her once for a third of it, one divorce occurs for the third, predominance being given to the admixture of ja'alah, as if one said "If you return my three slaves, you shall have a thousand" and he returns one: he takes the third of the thousand; if he divorces her twice, he takes two-thirds (al-Muhadhdhab, 2/72-73; al-Bayan, 10/19, 23; Rawdat al-Talibin, 5/266-269; al-Najm al-Wahhaj, 7/450-455; Mughni al-Muhtaj, 4/440-442; Tuhfat al-Muhtaj, 9/266-273; ad-Dibaj, 3/382-385).
The Hanbalis, according to the school, hold that the khul' is not valid suspended upon a condition, like the sale: if he says to his wife "If you hand me such a thing, I make khul' with you," the khul' is not valid, even were she to hand him what he named, as with binding exchanges. If she says "Put my matter in my hand and I give you this slave," and he does it, that is, puts her matter in her hand, and takes possession of the slave, the slave belongs to him, for he fulfilled toward her what he allocated to her in equivalent; he may dispose of the slave even before she chooses for herself, like his other properties; and she may choose whenever she wishes, the allocation he made of it to her, so long as he has not consummated nor made return; if he retracts from placing her matter in her hand, she may claim from him the compensation she handed over in exchange, slave or other, for he did not hand her the counterpart.
If the husband says to his wife "When the beginning of the month comes, your matter is in your hand," he may annul this attribute, for it is a delegation, which is revocable, and in no way belongs to the suspension of the divorce, unless he intends one by it. Imam Ahmad said: if she allocated to him a thousand dirhams so that he grant her the choice, and he granted it to her and she chose the husband, he returns nothing of the thousand, for he did what she engaged him for, and it therefore became established for him. If she says "Divorce me against a dinar" and he divorces her and she then apostatizes from Islam, the dinar remains binding upon her on account of the divorce, and the divorce occurs definitive, being against compensation, the apostasy changing nothing because of its posteriority. If he divorces her after her apostasy before consummating, she is separated by the apostasy and the divorce does not occur, the definitive separation not being followed by divorce. If he divorced her after her apostasy and after consummation, the matter awaits the end of the 'iddah: if she remains in her apostasy until her term ends, it is established that the divorce did not occur, for she was no longer a wife at the moment he divorced her; if she embraces Islam during the 'iddah, the divorce occurred, for it is established she was a wife at that time (Kashshaf al-Qina', 5/247-248; al-Furu', 5/271; Manar al-sabil, 3/73).
Ibn Qudamah (may Allah have mercy on him) says in "al-Kafi" (3/146-147): the khul' is valid as immediate with the word of exchange, because of the exchange it contains, and suspended upon a condition, because of the divorce it contains. The immediate with the word of exchange is that he effect the separation against compensation by saying "I have khal' you against a thousand, or divorced you against a thousand, or you are divorced against a thousand," and she say "I accept," as he says "I have sold you this garment against a thousand" and she says "I accept": this is the qadi's view, and the analogy of Ahmad's statement is that the divorce occurs revocable and he is entitled to nothing, for he effected the divorce he controls without suspending it upon a condition, and allocated from her a compensation she neither handed over nor consented to, which is therefore not binding upon her. As for the correct exchange, it is for instance that the woman say "Make khul' with me, or divorce me against a thousand, or for a thousand, or I have a thousand upon me," and he say "I have divorced you," as she says "Sell me this garment against a thousand" and he says "I have sold it to you"; there is no need to repeat the thousand in the answer, the divorce referring back to it as in the sale; and the answer is valid here only upon the immediate; the man may retract in the offer before the acceptance, and the woman retract in the request before the answer, as in the sale. As for the suspended, he may suspend the divorce upon the payment of property or its warranty, saying "If you give me a thousand, or when you give me a thousand, or whenever you give me a thousand, or whenever you warrant me a thousand, you are divorced": as soon as she warrants the thousand to him or gives it to him, she is divorced, upon the immediate or the delay, for it is a suspension of the divorce upon a condition, which occurs upon the existence of the condition as if it were devoid of mention of compensation; and it suffices for the gift that the property be presented and that he permit the taking, whether he takes or not, for the name of the gift falls upon it, one says "I gave him and he did not take." If she gives him part of the thousand, she is not divorced, the condition not being fulfilled. If she says "Divorce me against a thousand" and he says "You are divorced against a thousand if you wish," she is not divorced until she wishes, for he suspended upon the will, and nothing occurs without it, whether she wills upon the immediate or the delay; this is stated textually, for he made the will a condition, like the suspension upon entering the house. Section: if he says "You are divorced and you owe a thousand," she is divorced revocably and he is entitled to nothing, for he did not make the thousand a compensation for the divorce nor a condition in it: he only appended the thousand to the divorce whose effecting he controls, so that what he controls occurred, not what he does not control. If he says "You are divorced against a thousand, or against having a thousand upon you," Ahmad said likewise, for "against" is neither a particle of condition nor its counterpart, so that it is not valid to say "I sold you my garment against a thousand"; and the qadi said the divorce does not occur by it until she accepts that.