Question 14 (continued): Ibn al-Qayyim's detailed evidences in Ighathat al-Lahfan

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Question 14 (continued): Ibn al-Qayyim's detailed evidences in Ighathat al-Lahfan

At the head of the evidences Ibn al-Qayyim places the Prophet's mercy: with the messenger of Allah there were breadth and mercy, whereas with all others there is severity and harshness; whoever came to him distressed found the relief of his affliction, and every suffering man found the aid of his weakness. He never separated two spouses except through deliberate intent and choice, never scattered the union of two lovers except through the will and preference of one of them; he never destroyed the homes of lovers through the tongue's error, nor separated for what ran upon man's tongue without intent: rather he waived accountability for the word the speaker did not intend and which ran upon his tongue through error, forgetfulness, coercion or slip, by consensus; and he said, in what the people of the Sunan reported from Aisha, mother of the believers: "There is no repudiation and no manumission under ighlaq"; reported by Imam Ahmad, Abu Dawud, Ibn Majah, and al-Hakim in his Sahih, who said: authentic hadith fulfilling the condition of Muslim, but they did not report it.

The ways of the Quran. The first: the word of the Most High:

"Allah does not take you to task for the idle in your oaths, but He takes you to task for what your hearts have earned."

Surah al-Baqara, 225

From Ibn Abbas: the idle of the oath is that you swear while you are angry. And Tawus said: every oath a man swears while angry entails no expiation, according to the word: "Allah does not take you to task for the idle in your oaths". And this is one of the opinions of the Maliki school: the idle of the oath is the oath in anger; and it is the choice of the greatest and most eminent of the Malikis absolutely, qadi Isma'il ibn Ishaq, who held that the angry man's oath does not bind. No contradiction between this view and the word of Ibn Abbas and Aisha: "the idle of the oath is that the man say: no, by Allah, and yes, by Allah", nor with the word of Aisha and others: "the man's oath over a thing he believes as he swore it, then the contrary becomes clear"; all of that belongs to the idle, and the one who explained the idle of the oath as the oath of anger intended thereby the two other kinds of the idle. And this is the sound view: for Allah set the idle of the oath opposite the heart's earning; now the angry man and the one swearing over a thing he assumes firmly believe, while the one who says "no, by Allah, yes, by Allah" without binding the oath, his heart earned neither the binding of the oath nor its intent; Allah waived accountability for the formula that ran upon the tongue without the heart earning it or intending it: it is therefore not permitted to hold accountable for what Allah waived accountability for; one even says that the idle of the angry man is more apparent than the idle of the two last oaths.

The second way of the Quran: "If Allah were to hasten for people the evil as they hasten the good, their term would be decreed; so We leave those who do not expect Our meeting wandering in their rebellion" (Surah Yunus, 11). In the tafsir of Ibn Abi Najih from Mujahid: it is man's word over his child and his property when he becomes angry with them: "O Allah, bless him not and curse him"; and were the answer hastened to them in that as it is answered in the good, they would perish. Anger thus stood as preventing the contraction of the cause of supplication, whose effect upon the answer is faster than the effect of causes upon their rulings: Allah answers the supplication of the child, the fool, the mubrasm and the one whose repudiation and contracts are not valid. When anger therefore prevented the supplication from being a cause, it is because the angry man did not intend it with his heart: the reasonable man does not choose the destruction of himself and his family, the loss of his property, the cutting of his hand and leg, nor that by which he supplicates; the mercy of the Mighty therefore required not holding him accountable nor answering his supplication, for it emanates from him without intent, and the one who carries it upon him is anger, which comes from the devil. Of this is His word: "And man supplicates evil as he supplicates good, and man is ever hasty" (Surah al-Isra, 11): it is the man who supplicates evil against himself and his family in the state of anger.

The third way: "Then when Musa returned to his people, angry and grieved, he said: Evil is what you have done after me! Did you hasten the command of your Lord? And he cast down the tablets and seized his brother's head, pulling it toward him" (Surah al-Araf, 150). The meaning of the argument is that Musa, upon him the prayer of Allah, would not have cast down the tablets as a result of anger; Allah therefore excused him and did not blame him for what he did, for its source was an anger exceeding the servant's capacity and choice: what resulted from it is therefore not attributed to his choice nor his consent.

The fourth way clarifies that: His word: "And when the anger subsided from Musa, he took the tablets" (Surah al-Araf, 154). The Most High abandoned the word "settled" for the word "quieted", giving anger the rank of the sultan who commands and forbids and who says to his subject: do, do not; he therefore answers to the caller of anger who speaks within it and speaks upon his tongue: he is thus more worthy of being excused than the coerced man upon whom an anger commanding and forbidding did not seize. When anger is the one speaking upon his tongue, what runs upon his tongue in that state is not attributed to his choice nor his consent: the effect therefore does not complete upon him.

The fifth way: "And if an incitement from the devil incites you, seek refuge in Allah", in three places of the Quran; and what the angry man utters in the violence of his anger, like repudiation, insult and the like, belongs to the incitements of the devil: he drives him to say what he was not choosing to say; when the veil is lifted from him, he knows that it belongs to the devil's casting upon his tongue what was neither of his pleasure nor his choice. And anger comes from the devil and its effect from him; as in the Sahih two men were insulting each other before the Prophet until the face of one of them reddened and the veins of his neck swelled; the Prophet said: "I know a word which, were he to say it, what he feels would leave him: I seek refuge in Allah from the accursed devil." And in the Sunan, the Prophet said: "Anger comes from the devil, and the devil is created from fire, and fire is only extinguished by water; when one of you becomes angry, let him perform ablution." This means and its effect being of the devil's driving, they are therefore not of the servant's choice: the ruling does not attach to it.

The ways of the Sunna. The first is the mentioned hadith of Aisha. The second is what Ahmad and al-Hakim reported in his Mustadrak from Imran ibn Husayn: the messenger of Allah said: "No vow in anger, and its expiation is the expiation of the oath"; authentic hadith, and it has ways. The meaning of the argument: he annulled the obligation of fulfilling the vow when it is uttered in the state of anger, although Allah praised the fulfiller of vows and the Prophet commanded the one vowing obedience to Allah to fulfill his vow and said: "Whoever vows to obey Allah, let him obey Him; and whoever vows to disobey Him, let him not disobey Him." Since therefore the vow whose fulfiller Allah praised, and whose fulfillment His messenger commanded if it is of obedience, anger could affect its contraction, because the angry man did not intend it, but anger carried him to it: repudiation is then, by priority, even more worthy. The third is what is established in the Sahih that he said: "The judge does not judge between two men while he is angry"; and were anger not affecting his intent and knowledge, he would not have forbidden him to judge in the state of anger; and the jurists differed over the validity of the ruler's judgment in the state of his anger into three views.

As for the traditions of the Companions, they are of several ways. One is what Bukhari mentioned in his Sahih from Ibn Abbas: "Repudiation is what is deliberate (an watr), and manumission is what is sought thereby of the face of Allah"; he therefore restricted repudiation to what is deliberate, and the angry man has no deliberate intent; and this, in repudiation, is the parallel of his word and that of his companions: "the idle of the oath is that you swear while angry". The second is that al-Zuhri reported from Aban ibn Uthman from Uthman that he rejected the drunkard's repudiation, with no opponent known among the Companions; and this is the sound view, and it is the one to which Imam Ahmad finally returned: he said in the narration of Abu Talib that the one who does not command repudiation in it came with only one trait, while the one who commands repudiation came with two: he forbade it to himself and permitted it to another; this one is therefore better than that one, and I guard against all of it. And he said in the narration of Abd al-Malik al-Maymuni: I used to say that the repudiation of the drunkard is valid, until I examined it; then it appeared preponderant to me that his repudiation is not valid, for were he to acknowledge, he would not be held, and were he to sell, his sale would not be valid; he said: I impose the homicide on him, and everything other than that is not imposed on him; Abu Bakr said: and this is what I say. And he said in the narration of Abu al-Harith: what I count as highest is the hadith of al-Zuhri from Aban ibn Uthman from Uthman: "The madman and the drunkard have no repudiation". And this is the choice of al-Tahawi, Abu al-Hasan al-Karkhi, Imam al-Haramayn and shaykh al-islam Ibn Taymiyya, and one of the two opinions of al-Shafi'i. When those do not make the drunkard's repudiation occur because he does not intend repudiation, it is known that the angry man is often in a state worse than the drunkard.

Drunkenness is of two kinds: drunkenness of joy and drunkenness of anger, and now this one is stronger, now that one; when anger becomes exacerbated upon him to the point that he becomes like the drunkard, he is more worthy that his repudiation not occur, for he is excused by what the drunkard is not excused, and anger reaches him to the utmost drunkenness reaches, as is observed in the state of the drunkard and the angry man.

As for consideration and the principles of the Law, they are of several ways. The first: accountability attached to words only because they are proofs of what the heart contains of earning and volition, as the Most High said: "Allah does not take you to task for the idle in your oaths, but He takes you to task for what your hearts have earned"; He made the heart's earning the cause of accountability, and earning is his volition and intent. The one upon whose tongue the word runs without intent or choice, but through the violence of anger or drunkenness or other, his word is therefore not of his heart's earning; this is why Allah did not hold accountable the one whose joy was exacerbated by the presence of his mount after despairing of her: when he recovered her, he erred through the excess of joy and said: O Allah, You are my servant and I am your Lord; that formula ran upon his tongue without intent, and He therefore did not hold him accountable, as error runs upon the reciter's tongue in the Quran. One would however say: this one intended the correct and erred, and he was therefore not held accountable, for he intended the contrary of what he uttered, unlike the angry man when he repudiates, for he intends repudiation. It is answered: there is no dispute concerning the angry man who knows what he says, intending and choosing its ruling to repel the nuisance of living with his wife; the dispute concerns the one whose anger was exacerbated to the point that the devil drove him to speak of what he was not choosing to speak, as he drives him to do what he would not have done without anger.

The second way: his volition is a volition carried to him, to which he is driven like the coerced man; the coerced man is even in a better situation, for he has a true intent and volition, but they are carried to him, while this one has no intent in truth: when the coerced man's repudiation does not occur, this one's is even more worthy of not occurring. The third way: what carries the coerced man to speak of repudiation resembles what carries the angry man to speak by it; for the one who speaks under coercion intends only relief from the expectation of what he is coerced to if he does not do it: he therefore speaks of repudiation intending his relief from the pain of what he is coerced to. Likewise the angry man: when anger becomes exacerbated upon him, bearing it pains him: he says what he says and does what he does to repel from himself the heat of anger and find rest thereby; and likewise he slaps his face, cries out loudly, tears his garments and casts what is in his hand, to repel the pain of anger and unload its burden; and likewise he supplicates evil against himself and against the people dearest to him: he speaks in the form of request and supplication without truly seeking it; likewise he speaks in the form of utterance without intending its meaning. That is why kings and others, in anger, command matters whose intimates know they uttered them to repel the heat of anger and do not want their requirement: their intimates therefore do not execute it but delay it, and they are praised for it when their anger calms. Likewise the man, at the moment of violent anger, rises to assault his child or his friend; another turns him away from it; he praises them afterwards, as the drunkard and the fevered man praise the one who interposes between them and what they aim to do in that state.

The fourth way: the reasonable man does not seek anger nor want it; rather it is the thing he hates most; and it is as the Prophet said: "a burning coal in the heart of the son of Adam; do you not see the reddening of his eyes and the swelling of the veins of his neck?"; and the reasonable man does not intend to cast the coal into his heart: it arises in him without his choice. Once it is therefore the cause carrying to the speech of repudiation and the like, that too is not attributed to his choice nor his volition; and this is like the fact that the will of the cause is will of the caused: the hatred of the cause and loathing of it are hatred of the caused. The fifth way: you say to the angry man when his anger has been exacerbated and he has done what he did not do or uttered what he did not utter before anger: did you want that or intend it? He swears that he neither wanted it nor intended it, and that it was not of his choice; do not find this strange: you find it in yourself. The verification of the matter is that there is in it a volition carried to him, which anger made him carry: it is like the coerced man's volition; the coerced man is even more entered into volition, which indicates that the angry man is more worthy of non-occurrence than the coerced man.

The sixth way: fear in the coerced man's heart is like anger in the angry man's heart; but the coerced man is overpowered by another from outside, while the angry man is overpowered by his anger within him; and the domination of coercion annuls the status of the words he was coerced upon, not the status of acts: he is killed if he kills, and he guarantees if he destroys; likewise the domination of anger annuls the status of the angry man's words, not his acts, to the point that were he to kill in that state or destroy something, he would guarantee it. All of this concerns the angry man who hates in truth what he said; as for the one who wants it, on the estimation that his anger does not require the cause of that, he is not of this chapter: like the one whose wife fornicated and who, angry, repudiated her; he does not see the living together with the fornicator, and he did not therefore intend by the repudiation to extinguish the fire of anger, but to free himself from living with a fornicator: his repudiation occurs. Consider this difference, for it is the letter of the question and its subtle point; and it is contrary to the one with whom his wife quarrels and who knows of himself the will of living with her in quarrel and bad character, but whom anger carried to say that his soul is healed by speaking of repudiation to break her and extinguish the fire of his anger.

The seventh way: the angry man does things like tearing garments, destroying property and other: were he coerced to speak of repudiation, his repudiation would not execute and his words would be idle; when he therefore does these things himself, it is known that what drove him to them is greater than coercion; for the coerced man, were he coerced to them, would not do them, and this one did them: it is therefore known that what requires him to do them is stronger than coercion's requirement; and the coerced man, were he afflicted with that, would be coerced: the angry man is likewise; and this is very clear. If it is said: the coerced man, when he speaks of what he was coerced to, repels harm from himself, while the angry man does not repel by this word a harm: he is therefore not like the coerced man; it is answered: without any doubt they differ in this aspect, but it does not require that the angry man be choosing and seeking what he said or did: rather it is the thing he hates most, and it is something he cannot repel. If it is said: what then carries him to do what he hates and that pains him, without thereby reaching what is dearer to him? It is answered: anger being the enemy of reason, and being to him like the wolf to the sheep, it seldom masters him without seizing his reason; he therefore intended the disappearance of anger and the extinguishing of its fire, and this is a sound aim in itself; but when his reason left him, he intended the disappearance of that, though harmful to him, to lighten what he bears as trial; without that he would not have done what he does not do in pleasure nor uttered what he did not utter: he intended that he rest, calm down and his anger cool through those words and acts, although he did not repel all that violence: it lightens and weakens; the mercy of the Law therefore required that they be annulled in that state, for it may be that their effect does not attach to them, and that they be like the words of the mubrasm and the raging madman and the like; as for acts, their effect cannot be annulled: the requirement of his act therefore attaches.

The eighth way: the Prophet legislated for the angry man that he say: "I seek refuge in Allah from the accursed devil", that he perform ablution and that he change state: if he is standing, let him sit, and if he is sitting, let him lie down; he said: "Anger comes from the devil, and the devil is created from fire, and fire is only extinguished by water: when one of you becomes angry, let him perform ablution"; this indicates that it is carried to him from another, and that the devil makes him angry to carry him through his anger to doing what the devil loves and speaking of it. And what is attributed to the devil among what the servant hates and does not love, man is not held accountable for it, like insinuation and forgetfulness, as the young companion of Musa said to Musa: "It is none but the devil who made me forget to mention it to you" (Surah al-Kahf, 63). Allah does not therefore hold accountable for insinuation nor forgetfulness, for both belong to the effect of the devil's act in the heart; and the Prophet informed that anger comes from the devil: its effect is therefore likewise attributed to him, and the servant is not held accountable for it like the effect of forgetfulness; for had he sworn not to speak of such a thing and then spoke of it forgetting, he would not have violated his oath, for lack of intent and volition to contravene what he bound his oath upon, although he intended the speech: it only occurred from him through his intent and volition. Such is the angry man's situation: he did not intend the reality of what he uttered nor its effect, but it ran upon his tongue as the forgetful man's word ran upon his tongue; the forgetful man's intent to speak is even more apparent than the angry man's intent: that is why the forgetful one says: "I intended to say such and such", while the angry man swears that he did not intend.

The ninth way: intents are taken into account in all contracts; and the angry man has no intent taken into account in dissolving the knot of marriage, just as he has no intent in killing himself, his child and destroying his property: he does this and says this in anger; when he therefore has no intent taken into account, his repudiation is not valid. If it is said: this contradicts you by the jester, for his repudiation is valid although there is no intent in it; it is answered: the difference between them is that the jester intended to speak through the formula and wanted it by his pleasure and choice, without being carried to it; and his limit is that he did not want its ruling nor its effect, and that returns to the Law, not to him: the cause to which he came, he came to it by choice and intent, knowing it, not carried to it; and the cause that returns to the Legislator does not return to him: considering the one by the other is therefore not valid; and how would the angry man be likened to the one who takes the verses of Allah in mockery?! And this is among the most corrupt of analogies.

The tenth way: anger is a disease among diseases and a sickness among sicknesses; it belongs to the sicknesses of hearts as fever, insinuation and epilepsy belong to the sicknesses of bodies; the angry man overcome by his anger is therefore like the sick, the fevered and the epileptic overcome by their illness, and like the mubrasm overcome by his mubrasm; and this is a sound analogy for the angry man whose anger was exacerbated to the point that he does not know what he says. As for the one who knows what he says but speaks of it through pain, constraint and locking without intending the occurrence, he resembles the mubrasm and the raging fevered man on one side, and resembles the coerced man intending to speak on one side, and resembles the chooser intending repudiation on one side: he wavers among these; but the share of choice and intent in him is weak, for he knows of himself that he was not choosing what emanated from him: the ruin of his home, the separation of his beloved, seeing her in another's hand; were he reasonable, he would choose that only to repel thereby what is more hated to him, or for what is dearer to him to be realized; when these two are negated, he was therefore not choosing it. It is a thing every man knows of himself: his wavering is therefore between the overcome sick man, the coerced man and the one upon whom repudiation is carried; and whichever he be, his repudiation does not execute. If it is said: the difference is that the overcome sick man does not possess himself in the state, while the coerced man, although possessing himself, cannot repel from himself what he hates; and the angry man can possess himself, as the Prophet said: "The strong is not the one who wrestles, but the one who possesses himself in anger"; it is answered: there is of anger what permits its subject to possess himself, and that is anger in its beginnings; when it becomes firm and masters him, he does not possess himself in it; likewise the grief carrying to lamentation permits its subject to possess himself at first, but when it becomes firm and dominates, he does not possess himself. Likewise anger permits its subject to possess himself at the beginning; when it becomes firm and its domination seizes the heart, its subject does not possess his heart: he is choosing at the beginning and coerced at the end, as the poet said: "O you who blame me and the matter is in his hand; why not blame, while the matter is in my hand." Likewise the drunkard: the cause of drunkenness is in his power: he can do it and leave it; when he has come through the cause, the matter has left his hand and he does not possess himself in drunkenness. Since therefore the drunkenness whose subject neglected taking its causes, and he can possess himself by avoiding them, the Companions and other jurists excused him when he repudiates in that state, although he is not excused in taking its cause: the excuse of the drunkard of anger who did not neglect, despite the violence of his drunkenness over the drunkenness of wine, is more worthy and more necessary.

The eleventh way: among people is the one whose anger, if not vented, kills him: he dies, falls ill or the veil of unconsciousness covers him, as it is reported of some Arabs that a man was insulted; he wanted to answer the insulter; one of his companions seized his hand upon his mouth; then he raised his hand when he thought his anger had calmed; he said: you killed me, you returned my anger into my belly, and he died on the spot. When such an anger vents itself through killing or injustice toward another, he is not excused by it like the drunkard; as for its venting through a word, the word may be disregarded and its effect may not attach to it, as Allah disregarded his supplication without attaching its effect and without answering it. That is why some jurists held that he is not flogged for slander in the state of quarrel and anger, but that he is flogged only if he came to it by choice and intending slander; and this is a very strong view. It is indicated by the fact that the disputant is not excused for wounding his adversary and attacking him in the state of quarrel by saying: he is a wicked man, an unjust, a cheat, he swears falsely, and the like. Whoever punishes him for it in that state distinguishes between his slander and his repudiation: slander is the right of a son of Adam, a profanation of his honor or an assault upon his person: it runs like the destruction of himself and his property; one is therefore not excused by anger in it, especially since, were one excused, every slanderer could say: I slandered him in the state of anger, and the punishment would fall; unlike repudiation: he may be held regarding what is between him and Allah; and the sound view does not exceed him. The intended meaning is that when he speaks of repudiation, it is a remedy for this sickness and a healing through expelling this word from his chest: it belongs to the perfection of this Law, its beauties and what it contains of mercy, wisdom and interest, that he not be held accountable by it nor imposed its requirement while he did not bind himself to it.

The twelfth way: the principle of the Law is that psychic accidents have an effect upon speech, sometimes disregarding it and not taking it into account, sometimes making it occur and annulling it; and this is like the accident of forgetfulness, error, coercion, drunkenness, madness, fear, grief, heedlessness and bewilderment; one therefore bears from one of them a word one does not bear from another, and one is excused by what one does not excuse others, for lack of the purity of intent and volition, and the presence of what carries to speech. That is why the Companions asked the vower: did you say this in pleasure or in anger? If he was in anger, they commanded him the expiation of the oath, for they argued from anger that his aim was blame and prohibition, like the swearer, not drawing near. Allah made the accident of drunkenness an impediment to taking into account the drunkard's recitation, remembrance and prayer, as the Prophet made it an impediment to the validity of his acknowledgment when he commanded the removal of the foul smell from the one acknowledging before him fornication, and an impediment to the disbelief of the one who said to him and his companions: "You are only the slaves of my father!" Allah made anger an impediment to answering the one who supplicates evil against himself and his family; coercion an impediment to the disbelief of the one speaking the word of disbelief; error and forgetfulness an impediment to accountability through word and act. The accident of anger may be stronger than many of these accidents: when for one of those his word does not require its requirement for lack of intent, the angry man who did not intend it, if he is not more worthy of excuse than them, is not below them.

The thirteenth way: repudiation in the state of anger has three forms. The first: that he be informed by his wife of a matter that exacerbates his anger over her, and he assumes she is truthful: he repudiates her for it, then it becomes clear that she is innocent of it; regarding the occurrence, two opinions, the sounder of the two being that it does not occur, for he only repudiated her for this cause and this ailment; and the cause is like the condition: it is as if he said: if she did that, she is repudiated; when she did not do it, the condition was therefore not fulfilled. This very issue was mentioned by Abu al-Wafa Ibn Aqil, and al-Sharif Ibn Abi Musa mentioned it in his Irshad in the case where he says: "You are repudiated if you enter the house", repeatedly, while he knows Arabic, then it becomes clear that she did not enter: she is not repudiated. It is not said: he here declared the ailment explicitly, unlike the case where he did not declare it: that has no effect, for he made repudiation occur for an ailment; when the ailment was negated, it was known that he did not want its occurrence without it, whether he declared the ailment or not: the ailment is in the rank of the condition; and were he to say: "You are repudiated", then say: "I meant: if you did such and such", he is held regarding what is between him and Allah. The companions of al-Shafi'i and Ahmad mentioned the case where he contracted his slave for a compensation, then paid it to him and said: "You are free", then it becomes clear that the compensation is due: he is not freed, despite his explicit declaration of freedom: repudiation is therefore even more worthy of non-occurrence in this form. The second form: that he became angry over a matter he knew had occurred from her: he utters the word of repudiation intending it, knowing what he says, as punishment against her for it: his repudiation occurs; for were this repudiation not to occur, most repudiations would not occur, for it most often occurs only in displeasure. The third form: that he does not intend a specific matter, but anger carried him to it, changed his reason and prevented him the perfection of conception and intent: he is therefore in the rank of the one in whom there is a kind of drunkenness and madness; he is neither absent of reason to the point of not understanding at all what he says, nor present of reason to the point that his intent is taken into account: repudiation does not occur through him either, as it does not occur through the mubrasm and the madman.

The fourteenth way: the madman, the mubrasm, the obsessive and the raging one may perceive what he said and be ashamed of it; and likewise the drunkard; that is why most jurists did not require, in his drunkenness, that he lose his discernment totally; Imam Ahmad and others said: he is the one who mixes in his speech and does not know his garment from another's nor his act from another's; and the explicit sound Sunna indicates it: the Prophet commanded the removal of the foul smell from the one acknowledging fornication, while he was present of reason and mind, speaking a comprehensible and ordered word, sound in articulation; and despite that he permitted that there be in him a drunkenness preventing the perfection of his reason and knowledge, and commanded its removal. The intended meaning is that those are not totally stripped of discernment, and are not like the people of reason with sound intent: what befell them required the change of reason that prevented the soundness of intent; none of them therefore intends the intent of the people of reason, whose aim is to attract what benefits and repel what harms: none of them conceived the requirement of what he uttered, and his reason was not absent from perceiving it: he is deficient in conception, weak in intent. The angry man, in the state of his anger, may be in a situation worse than theirs and more resembling the mad: he says and does what the madman neither says nor does.

If it is said: is he then interdicted in that state as the madman is interdicted? It is answered: no; the difference between them is that this state does not last: he is like the one who raves rarely then comes back to himself: interdiction is therefore not imposed on him; indeed, were a word to emanate from him in that state without intent from him, it is like the word emanating from the madman in that its effect does not attach to it. And without any doubt fainting and the veil of unconsciousness can befall the angry man: he is in that state absolutely not subject to obligation, as befalls the sick man; it removes his obligation in the state of fainting, to the point that some jurists do not require of him the making up of prayer in that state, assimilating him to the madman, as al-Shafi'i says; and Ahmad requires of him the making up, assimilating him to the sleeper; and Abu Hanifa distinguishes the long one exceeding day and night, whom he assimilates to the madman, and the short one below that, whom he assimilates to sleep. Many people may deny that anger removes reason and carries its subject to that state: they know of anger only what they find in themselves, and they have not known an anger reaching that state; and this is an error: people differ greatly in anger: some is like breath, some like drunkenness, some like madness; some has fast onset and fast departure, and the contrary; some has fast onset and slow departure, and the contrary, as the Prophet divided it into these categories; and people's powers differ greatly in possessing their piety in anger, greed, grief, fear and desire: some possess it and act within it, and some are possessed by it and it acts upon them.

The fifteenth way: the angry man whose intent and view were locked in anger, and who became closer to accidental madness than to firm reason, is more worthy that his repudiation not occur than the jester uttering repudiation in the state of his reason, although his heart does not want it; and some jurists annulled the jester's repudiation, and this is one of the two narrations of Imam Ahmad, reported by Abu Bakr Abd al-Aziz and others; and on this say some companions of Malik when the proof of jest is established: neither manumission, nor marriage, nor repudiation is imposed on him; and without any doubt the angry man is more worthy of non-occurrence than this one. The sixteenth way: a group of our companions did not require, in the madman and the mubrasm, that he not remember his repudiation, although the apparent of Ahmad's text is that as soon as he remembers it, it is imposed on him; for he said in the narration of Abu Talib concerning the madman who repudiates, to whom it was said upon his coming back: "You repudiated your wife"; he said: "I remember that I repudiated and that my reason was not with me"; he said: when he remembers that he repudiated, it occurred. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi said: and this is what is transmitted from Imam Ahmad concerning the one whose madness is through the total disappearance of his knowledge and the invalidation of his senses; as for the one whose madness is through dryness or who is mubrasm, that nullifies the status of his transactions although his knowledge did not totally disappear: the memory of repudiation does not harm him therefore, if Allah wills. End of his word. And it is known that the full angry man is in a situation worse than the one whose madness is through dryness or mubrasm, and his states, at the least, are like it. The seventeenth way: the obsessive's repudiation does not occur; the companions of Abu Hanifa and others declared it explicitly; and that is only due to the invalidity of his reason and volition: so it is here.

The eighteenth way: no one said that the mere utterance through the formula of repudiation produces its occurrence in any state whatsoever, but another thing is required behind the utterance through the formula. A group required that he come to it only in the state of obligation, whether he intended it or it ran on his tongue without intent, whether he was coerced to it or came to it by choice: this is the madhhab of the one who makes the coerced man's repudiation occur and that which runs on the servant's tongue without intent from him; and it is what is textual from Abu Hanifa in two places. A group required with that that he come to the formula choosing and intending it: this is the view of the majority of those who do not execute the coerced man's repudiation. Then among them the one who required with that that he know its meaning: were he to speak of it by choice without knowing its meaning, its ruling is not imposed on him: this is the view of the one who says that the rulings of words are not imposed on the one subject to obligation until he knows their referents; and this is the sound view. Among them the one who required with that that he want its meaning and intend it: were he not to intend its meaning nor want it, its ruling is not imposed on him: this is the view of the one who requires for the explicit of repudiation the intention, and the view of the one who does not make the jester's repudiation occur; and it is a view in the madhhab of Imam Ahmad and Malik in the two issues: they require the consent of the linguistic utterance, the knowledge of its meaning and the volition of its requirement. Among them the one who requires with that that repudiation be permitted by the Law: this is the view of the one who does not make the forbidden repudiation occur; and it is the view of a group of the early generations among the Companions, the tabi'un and those who came after.

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Salam al-Khushani said: Muhammad ibn Bashshar informed us: Abd al-Wahhab ibn Abd al-Majid al-Thaqafi informed us: Ubaydullah ibn Omar informed us from Nafi', from Ibn Omar, that he said concerning the man who repudiates his wife while she is menstruating: "no account is made of it"; and this chain suffices you if it is authentic; Abu Muhammad Ibn Hazm reported it. And it is the madhhab of the most juristic of the tabi'un absolutely, Sa'id ibn al-Musayyib, which al-Tha'labi reported from him in the tafsir of Surah at-Talaq; and it is the madhhab of the most juristic of the tabi'un among the companions of Ibn Abbas, namely Tawus; Abd al-Razzaq said: from Ibn Jurayj, from Abdallah ibn Tawus, from his father: he did not consider as repudiation what contradicts the face of repudiation and the face of the waiting period; and he used to say: the face of repudiation is that he repudiate her purified, without relations, and that her pregnancy become apparent. And it is the madhhab of Khalas ibn Amr: he said concerning the man who repudiates his wife while she is menstruating: "no account is made of it"; and it is the view of Abu Qilaba: when the man repudiates his wife while she is menstruating, no account is made of it. And it is the choice of Ibn Aqil in his book al-Wadih fi usul al-fiqh, which he declared in the issue that the forbidden requires corruption; and it is the choice of shaykh al-islam Ibn Taymiyya, and one of the two views in the madhhab of Ahmad. Abu Ja'far al-Baqir said: no repudiation except upon the sunna; no repudiation except upon a purification without relations; and every repudiation in anger, oath or manumission is not a repudiation, except for the one who wanted to repudiate. The intended meaning is that those require in the occurrence of repudiation the permission of the Law in it, and what the Law did not permit is void and non-executing according to them. Shaykh al-islam said: their view is the soundest in proof against the view of the one who makes occur the repudiation that Allah and His messenger did not permit, and holds it valid and imposed. The intended meaning is that no one said that the mere utterance of repudiation produces its effect attaching, in whatever way.

The nineteenth way: it is the purport of Ahmad's text, as was the preceding explanation of ighlaq in Hanbal's narration as anger. Abdallah, his son, said in the questions: I asked my father about the madman who repudiates at the time of the disappearance of his reason: is it valid? My father said: whoever was sound of reason then his reason departed from its soundness and he repudiated, his repudiation is nothing. This is therefore its generality, and that is its specification: he made the change of reason from its soundness an impediment to occurrence; and without any doubt the ighlaq of anger changes reason from its soundness.

The twentieth way: the jurists differed over the validity of the ruler's judgment in anger into three views, and they are three aspects in the madhhab of Ahmad. The first: it is not valid and does not execute, for the forbidden requires corruption. The second: it executes. The third: if anger befalls him after understanding the judgment, his judgment executes; and if it befalls him before that, it does not execute, for the ruler must be knowing and just. The one who executes his judgment said: anger does not prevent him from knowledge and justice, and the Prophet judged for al-Zubayr the strap of the free woman while he was angry. The one who does not make his judgment execute said: anger prevents him from the perfection of the aim and the goodness of the aim, it therefore prevents him from knowledge and justice. Analogy to the Prophet is not valid: he is protected in his anger and pleasure: when he became angry, he said only the truth, as it was in his pleasure. And the one who distinguished said: when he knew the truth before anger, anger did not prevent him from knowledge: he can then execute the truth he knew; and when he became angry before understanding, his judgment does not execute, for anger may interpose between him and understanding: they therefore argue by the affair of al-Zubayr, and that anger only came upon the Prophet after the understanding of the judgment. The intended meaning is that anger, when it affects them toward the nullity of judgment, it is known that the angry man's word is not the word of the choosing pleased one, and that anger has an effect in that.

The twenty-first way: the occurrence of repudiation is a legal ruling, it therefore requires a legal proof; and the proof is either the Book, or the Sunna, or consensus, or analogy in which the status of root and branch is equal; and none of that exists in our question; or you would say: the proof is either a text or the reasonable of a text, and both are negated; or you would say: were the occurrence established, its proof would need to exist; but the required is negated, therefore the necessary is like it. The twenty-second way: this man's marriage is established by consensus: it therefore only disappears by a like consensus; or you would say: his marriage before this formula came from him is established by consensus, and the origin is its persistence until what lifts it is established.

The twenty-third way: the majority of the scholars say that the repudiation of the discerning reasonable child does not execute and is not valid; this is the view of Abu Hanifa, Malik and al-Shafi'i, and of one of the two narrations of Imam Ahmad chosen by shaykh Abu Muhammad, and the view of Ishaq; although he knows the formula and its effect through his words, by choice and intent, and he has a sound intent and a sound volition; Allah commanded to try and test him in his transactions; Omar ibn al-Khattab executed his word; and the Prophet took into account his intent and choice in the choice between his two parents. The man violently angry whose door of intent and knowledge was locked is therefore more worthy, without any doubt, that his repudiation not occur than this one. If it is said: the angry man is subject to obligation, and this one is not, for the pen is lifted from him; it is answered: yes, the matter is so, but it does not follow from his being subject to obligation that the ruling attaches through his mere formula, as passed; and how then the coerced man is subject to obligation and his repudiation is not valid, and the drunkard is subject to obligation, and the sick man is subject to obligation? It does not therefore follow from the servant's subjection to obligation that a state not befall him preventing the taking into account of his words and the annulment of his acts.

The twenty-fourth way: the limit of the word of repudiation is that it be a part of a cause; and the status only completes through the existence of its cause and the negation of its impediment; and the mere utterance is not a complete cause, by consensus of the imams, as passed. Then intent, knowledge and obligation are either the remainder of the cause's parts, or conditions within its requirement, or their absence an impediment to its effect; and according to the three estimations, the word of repudiation without them produces no effect. The one who makes occur the repudiation of the angry man, the drunkard, the coerced man and the one on whose tongue it runs without intent has only the mere cause or its part, without its condition nor the negation of its impediment: it is therefore not sufficient for the establishment of the status.

The twenty-fifth way: if his tongue slipped into repudiation without him wanting it, he is held regarding what is between him and Allah; and it is accepted from him judicially according to one of the two narrations from Ahmad, unless an indication denies him; and the second narration: he is held and it is not accepted from him judicially; and likewise said the companions of al-Shafi'i: when repudiation slipped onto his tongue without intent, it is idle speech, but the claim of the tongue's slip is not accepted unless an indication appears: they therefore accept it from him inwardly without the judicial ruling, except with an indication. And likewise said the companions of Malik: the one whose tongue slipped into repudiation, repudiation does not occur against him, and it is accepted in fatwa. And Abu Hanifa does not consider the tongue's slip an impediment to occurrence; and there are from him two narrations in the tongue's slip regarding manumission; and his companions established that the woman is owner of her intimacy through a cause in which intent and its absence are equal, like drunkenness, coercion, jest, and suckling by consensus: the disappearance of intimacy therefore does not differ in its cause according to intent or its absence, unlike manumission, for the cause through which he becomes owner of his soul differs according to intent or its absence. Abu Yusuf reported from Abu Hanifa the equalization between the two, then his companions differed: a group said the two are equal in occurrence, and a group said rather they are equal in non-occurrence. The intended meaning is that the tongue's slip into repudiation without intent from him is an impediment to its occurrence among the majority; and the angry man, if he knows of himself that his tongue slipped into repudiation without intent, he may remain in his marriage, and he is held in fatwa; as for its acceptance judicially, it is debated, and the most apparent is that if an apparent indication attesting the soundness of his word is established, it is accepted judicially, otherwise not; and violent anger is among the strongest of indications, especially as many of those who repudiate in the violence of anger swear by Allah at the utmost of their oaths that they did not intend repudiation, but that their tongue slipped: the majority therefore do not make repudiation occur against him, as the companions of Ahmad, al-Shafi'i and Malik declared explicitly; and as for its acceptance judicially, there are three views, the soundest being that if an apparent indication of the soundness of his word is established, it is accepted, otherwise not.

Distinction: among what shows that the angry man may speak in anger of what he does not want is what Muslim reported in his Sahih from Abu al-Zubayr, who heard Jabir ibn Abdallah say: I heard the messenger of Allah say:

"I am only a human being; I stipulated with my Lord that any servant among the Muslims whom I insult or revile, it be for him a charity and a reward."reported by Muslim

In the Musnad of Imam Ahmad, from Masruq, Aisha said: two men entered upon the Prophet; he treated them harshly and reviled them; I said: O messenger of Allah, good has befallen you, you have been given the good of these two; he said:

"Do you not know what my Lord stipulated with me? O Allah, any believer whom I revile, strike or curse, make it for him a forgiveness and well-being."reported by Ahmad in his Musnad

And in the two Sahihs, from Abu Hurayra, that he heard the Prophet say:

"O Allah, any believing servant whom I revile, make it for You a means of nearness on the Day of Resurrection."reported by Bukhari and Muslim

And in some wordings of the hadith: "I am only a human being: I am pleased as human beings are pleased, and I become angry as human beings become angry; any believer whom I revile or curse, make it for him a charity." Had the Prophet willed, he would not have supplicated by that in anger, nor stipulated with his Lord nor asked that the contrary of it be done to the one supplicated against; for the union of the will of two contraries is impossible; and he declared explicitly the will of one of the two by stipulating it with his Lord: this therefore indicates the absence of his will for what he supplicated in the state of anger. This while he is protected in anger as he is protected in pleasure, and he is owner of his formula through his act: how then the one who is not protected in his anger nor masters his formula, and whose anger acts and upon whom the devil plays?! When the angry man speaks of what he does not want nor wants its content, he is therefore in the rank of the coerced man to whom speech is driven, or who speaks of it by his choice without wanting its content.

If it is said: what you mentioned is contradicted by what indicates the occurrence of repudiation, for the angry man came to the cause by choice, and he wanted in the state of anger that the effect attach to it; the absence of his will does not harm therefore, for the taking into account of will is only in the state of utterance, unlike the coerced man, who is carried to speak of the cause without wanting the effect to attach to it; and unlike the drunkard overcome in his reason, for he is not subject to obligation, while the angry man is subject and choosing: there is therefore no way to the annulment of his word. The answer is to say: if choice means his pleasure and preference, he is not choosing; and if you meant that it occurred through his will with which he is not content nor with its effect, that by itself does not produce the effect attaching; for this choice is established for the coerced man and the drunkard: we do not require of the drunkard that he distinguish the earth from the sky, but what is required for the non-occurrence of the effect of his words is that he raves and mixes in his speech; and likewise the fevered and the sick man.