Islamic Fiqh > Oaths and vows > Vows (nudhur) > Conditions of the vow-maker and the vow
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Updated on 24 September 2026 at 12:48 AM
This section is part of the full chapter: All sections of this chapter.
The majority of jurists, the Malikis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis, hold that the one making the vow must act of his own free will: if he is coerced into making the vow, it is not valid on his part and its fulfilment is not required of him (Mawahib al-Jalil 4/458, at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/346, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/92, al-Sharh al-Kabir with the hashiya of ad-Dasuqi 2/454, Tahbir al-Mukhtasar 2/421, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/745, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/96, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/253, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/5-6, al-Insaf 11/117, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/346, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/438, Manar as-Sabil 3/439).
The Hanafis, for their part, hold that free consent is not a condition for the validity of the vow: it is therefore valid from one who acts under coercion and from one who speaks in jest (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 81-82). According to the relied-upon view among the Shafi'is, the vow is valid from a person in a state of intoxication (Rawdat at-Talibin 2/745, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/96, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/253, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/5-6).
The jurists differ on the vow of the disbeliever: is it valid on his part or not?
According to the Malikis, if a disbeliever makes a vow while in a state of disbelief, he is not required to fulfil it after entering Islam, but it is recommended for him to fulfil it once he has become a Muslim (Mawahib al-Jalil 4/458, at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/346, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/92, al-Sharh al-Kabir with the hashiya of ad-Dasuqi 2/454, Tahbir al-Mukhtasar 2/421).
According to the Hanafis, and the Shafi'is according to the prevailing view of the school, Islam is a required condition of the one making the vow: the vow is therefore not valid from a disbeliever, since he lacks the capacity for an act of devotion or for committing himself to one, and he is not required to fulfil his vow after converting. Indeed, according to the Hanafis, the vowed matter being an act of devotion is a condition for the validity of the vow, and the act of a disbeliever cannot be described as an act of devotion (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/82, al-Bayan 4/474, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/745, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/96, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/253, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/5-6).
According to the Hanbalis, and one view among the Shafi'is, the vow of a disbeliever is valid, even if it concerns an act of worship, and he must fulfil it after converting, based on what Nafi' reported from Ibn Umar, from Umar ibn al-Khattab, may Allah be pleased with him (al-Bayan 4/474, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/745, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/96, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/253, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/5-6, al-Insaf 11/117, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/346, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/437, ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/614):
"O Messenger of Allah, I made a vow in pre-Islamic times to observe a spiritual retreat of one night in the Sacred Mosque." The Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) replied to him: "Fulfil your vow." And he observed a retreat of one night.
Reported by al-Bukhari (1937) and Muslim (1656)
The jurists as a whole state that the validity of the vow requires a formula indicating commitment.
The Hanafis say: "The pillar of the vow is the formula that indicates it, namely the saying: 'Such and such is due to Allah, exalted is His majesty, upon me', or 'such and such is incumbent upon me', or 'this is an offering', or 'an act of charity', or 'my wealth is charity', or 'all that I own is charity', and similar expressions" (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/81).
The Malikis say: "The vow becomes binding through any wording carrying a commitment to a recommended act, such as: 'If Allah heals my sick one, if my absent one returns, or if I escape from such and such an affliction, then I shall fast two days, or pray such and such, or give such and such in charity.' The formula is not limited to 'I owe to Allah' or 'such and such is incumbent upon me': any binding wording takes effect. According to the relied-upon view of the school, it is not required to use the very word 'vow': if he says 'I owe it to Allah to perform such and such an act of devotion' without using that word, it is incumbent upon him."
According to another Maliki view: "He must necessarily use the word 'vow', saying: 'I owe to Allah the vow of such and such a thing'" (hashiya of ad-Dasuqi on al-Sharh al-Kabir 2/456, Mawahib al-Jalil 4/462, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/93, hashiya of as-Sawi on al-Sharh as-Saghir 4/263 and 265, Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/309).
The Shafi'is say: "The formula requires a term indicating commitment, such as 'I have made a vow to Allah', 'to you', 'I owe you such and such' or 'for this', and likewise 'I have taken upon myself' and 'I have formed a vow' for one whose ordinary language is that,
The hadith of Imran ibn al-Husayn rests on the chain of Zuhayr ibn Muhammad from his father: this father is unknown, none but his son reported from him, and Zuhayr himself has rejected narrations to his credit; Muslim nevertheless reported it through the route of Uqba ibn Amir. The Malikis customarily support Malik's position in this question with what was reported: the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) saw a man standing in the sun and asked: "What is the matter with this one?" They said: "He has vowed not to speak, not to shelter in the shade, not to sit down, and to fast." The Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) then said: "Instruct him to speak, to sit down and to complete his fast."
They said: he therefore commanded him to carry out what was obedience to Allah and to abandon what was disobedience. Yet it is not apparent that remaining silent is a disobedience, and Allah Himself reported that this was the vow of Maryam. Likewise, standing in the sun does not appear to be in itself a disobedience, except as regards the fatigue it inflicts upon oneself; and if one wished to see a disobedience there, it would be by analogy and not by text: the basic rule is that it belongs to the permissible acts (Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/309-310).
The absolute or unspecified vow consists in saying, for example: "I owe a vow to Allah", or: "If Allah heals my sick one, a vow will be incumbent upon me", without naming anything specific and without having the intention of anything fixed by a time or a place. According to the vast majority of jurists, this vow is valid and binding.
Imam Ibn Rushd, may Allah have mercy on him, says: "They agreed that the absolute vow concerning acts of devotion is binding, apart from what is related from some companions of ash-Shafi'i that the absolute vow is not valid. What they agreed upon is that the absolute vow is binding if it is made in a spirit of contentment, not of obstinacy, and if the word 'vow' is expressed in it, not otherwise; whether the vow explicitly names the thing vowed or not. Likewise, they unanimously agreed that the vow formulated as a condition is binding when it concerns an act of devotion" (Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/309).
The jurists differ, however, on what then becomes incumbent upon the votary: is the expiation of an oath due, or does he have the choice between the expiation of an oath and performing any act of devotion, or is nothing at all incumbent upon him?
The majority of jurists, the Hanafis, the Malikis and the Hanbalis, hold that one who makes an absolute vow, or a vow suspended upon a condition, without naming anything and without the intention of anything fixed by a time or a place, owes the expiation of an oath: immediately for the absolute vow, and for the suspended vow, once the condition occurs. This is based on what Uqba ibn Amir reported:
The expiation of the vow, when nothing has been specified, is the expiation of an oath.
Weak hadith, reported by Abu Dawud (3323) and at-Tirmidhi (1528)
And from Ibn Abbas, the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said:
Whoever makes a vow without specifying it: its expiation is that of an oath. Whoever makes a vow consisting of a disobedience: its expiation is that of an oath. Whoever makes a vow beyond his capacity: its expiation is that of an oath. And whoever makes a vow he is able to fulfil: let him fulfil it.
Weak hadith, reported by Abu Dawud (3322)
Moreover, he has left his vow without an outlet: it can neither be left without effect, since no specific act is designated as vowed, nor be adjudicated in favour of one of the categories of acts, for that would be giving preponderance without proof. The just solution was therefore the expiation of an oath. The proof is what Muslim reported: the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: "The expiation of the vow is the expiation of the oath" (Muslim 1645), meaning the vow that has no outlet and cannot be construed as one that has an outlet, because of the obligation attached to that specific thing.
Such was the view of Ibn Mas'ud, Jabir and Aisha, with no opponent known to them in their era: it is therefore a consensus (Tabyin al-Haqa'iq 3/110, al-Binaya 6/130-131, al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/19, Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari 6/161-162, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/57, Tahbir al-Mukhtasar 2/366, al-Mughni 10/68, al-Kafi 4/418, Sharh al-Zarkashi 3/350-351, al-Mubdi' 9/326, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/348, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/439, ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/614, Matalib Uli an-Nuha 6/422, Manar as-Sabil 3/440).
According to the Shafi'is, if he says: "A vow is incumbent upon me", the vow is valid and he has the choice between an act of devotion (such as glorifications, a prayer of two rak'ahs or fasting one day) and the expiation of an oath. Al-Buwayti's text implies for its part that the vow is not valid and that nothing is incumbent upon him. But if it belongs to the vow of devotion, such as saying: "If Allah heals my sick one, a vow will be incumbent upon me", or saying outright: "I owe a vow to Allah", an act of devotion is incumbent upon him, and the choice of that act belongs to him, as al-Bulqini indicated (Rawdat at-Talibin 2/747, Asna al-Matalib 1/576, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/255-256, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/11).
Imam Ibn Rushd, may Allah have mercy on him, says: "They differed on what is due in the absolute vow, where the votary designates nothing apart from his saying: 'I owe a vow to Allah.' Many scholars said: only the expiation of an oath is due. Others said: the expiation of zihar applies to it. Still others: the minimum that deserves the name of an act of devotion, namely fasting one day or praying two rak'ahs. If the majority held that the expiation of an oath is due in this case, it is because of what is established by the hadith of Uqba ibn Amir: the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: 'The expiation of the vow is the expiation of an oath', reported by Muslim.
As for those who held fasting one day or praying two rak'ahs, they followed those who consider that the sufficient act is the minimum that deserves the name: now praying two rak'ahs or fasting one day is the minimum that deserves the name of a vow. And the one who said that the expiation of zihar applies to it departs from analogy and from transmitted report" (Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1/311).
The vow of incitement is the one uttered in the manner of an oath, to urge the doing of something or to prevent it, without intending by it the vow or the act of devotion, such as saying: "If I speak to so-and-so, if I enter this house, or if I do not leave the town, then I owe Allah a month of fasting, a prayer, a pilgrimage or the freeing of a slave." If he then speaks to that person, enters the house or does not leave the town, the jurists differ on what is incumbent upon him: must he honour what he committed himself to, does he have the choice between honouring his commitment and the expiation of an oath, or is only the expiation of an oath incumbent upon him, once the suspending condition occurs?
According to one view among the Shafi'is, the relied-upon view of the Hanbali school, Imam Abu Hanifah according to one narration from him, Muhammad ibn al-Hasan as will come, and Ibn al-Qasim among the Malikis, the votary here has the choice between honouring what he vowed, such as emancipation, pilgrimage or charity, in consideration of vows and paying nothing, and the expiation of an oath, in consideration of oaths. His vow, in this case, is a vow of incitement uttered in the manner of an oath: he may therefore choose between honouring his commitment and turning away from it towards the expiation of an oath, because Muslim reported that the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said:
The expiation of the vow is the expiation of the oath.
Reported by Muslim (1645)
And because of the hadith of Imran ibn al-Husayn: "I heard the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) say:
There is no vow in anger, and its expiation is that of an oath.
Weak hadith, reported by an-Nasa'i (3842) and Ahmad (19901)
And based on what Aisha reported: "Whoever swore to walk, or to offer a sacrificial offering, or who dedicated his wealth to the cause of Allah, to the poor, or to the door of the Ka'bah: its expiation is that of an oath." Malik reported it in al-Muwatta (1023) with the following wording: "Aisha, Mother of the Believers, may Allah be pleased with her, was asked about a man who had said: 'My wealth belongs to the door of the Ka'bah'; Aisha replied: he expiates it as an oath is expiated."
This vow resembles the oath in that the votary intended to prevent himself from doing something or to compel himself to do it; it resembles the vow in that he imposed upon his liability an act of devotion. It is not possible to combine the two nor to suspend both: he was therefore given the choice between the two obligations, and this is the meaning of his saying (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him): "The expiation of the vow is the expiation of the oath."
This view was reported from Umar, Aisha, Ibn Abbas, Ibn Umar, Hafsa and Umm Salama, may Allah be pleased with them (al-Hawi al-Kabir 10/362, al-Bayan 4/475-476, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/746-747, Sharh Sahih Muslim 11/104, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/96-97, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/254-255, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/8-9, al-Mughni 9/399 and 10/67, al-Kafi 4/417, Sharh al-Zarkashi 3/350-351, al-Mubdi' 9/326, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/348, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/439, ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/615, Matalib Uli an-Nuha 6/422, Manar as-Sabil 3/440, at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/346, al-Sharh al-Kabir with the hashiya of ad-Dasuqi 2/455).
According to one view among the Shafi'is and one narration among the Hanbalis, the expiation of the oath is exclusively required of him in the vow of incitement: nothing else suffices, even if he performs what he had sworn upon. For Muslim reported that the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: "The expiation of the vow is the expiation of the oath" (Muslim 1645); now there is assuredly no expiation in the vow of devotion, so the vow meant is necessarily the vow of incitement. And because of the hadith of Imran ibn al-Husayn: "I heard the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) say: There is no vow in anger, and its expiation is that of an oath" (weak hadith, reported by an-Nasa'i 3842 and Ahmad 19901).
This view is further supported by what Abu Dawud reported in his Sunan from Sa'id ibn al-Musayyab: two Ansari brothers had an inheritance between them; one asked the other for the division, and he said: "If you return to ask me about the division, all my wealth belongs to the door of the Ka'bah." Umar said to him: "The Ka'bah has no need of your wealth: expiate your oath and speak to your brother", for he had heard the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) say:
No oath is sworn against you, nor any vow, in disobedience to the Lord, in severing the ties of kinship, nor concerning what you do not possess.
Reported by Abu Dawud (3272) and Ibn Hibban in his Sahih (4355)
According to the Malikis, one view among the Shafi'is and the Hanafis according to the manifest narration, as will come, the vow of incitement and anger must be fulfilled like the vow of devotion. Such is the one who says in his anger: "If I enter Zayd's house, such and such is incumbent upon me", intending to prevent himself from something and to punish himself: he must fulfil it like a vow of devotion. For the difference in the situation in which he concluded the vow does not cause the vowed matter to lapse in favour of another, any more than in the vow of devotion; and because it is an act of devotion he imposed upon himself in the form of a vow: once its condition occurs, it is not permitted to cancel it, as with pilgrimage.
Al-Mawwaq, may Allah have mercy on him, said: "Even if he is angry." Ibn Rushd said: "The vow made in anger is binding by agreement, like his oath made in that state."
Ibn Bashir said: "We have already stated that, according to us, the commitment to all acts of obedience is binding, whether taken in contentment or in obstinacy; this is the known view. The masters reported that they settled upon this statement of Ibn al-Qasim: 'I noted that whatever belongs to this kind, out of obstinacy and hardship, the expiation of an oath suffices for it, and this is one of the views of ash-Shafi'i.' The masters we met inclined towards this view and counted this vow among the vows of disobedience, whose fulfilment is not required." End of quote.
This meaning was already mentioned in the chapter of fasting on the authority of the shaykh of shaykhs Ibn Lubb: its expiation would be that of an oath, a view Ibn Abd al-Barr endorsed, saying: "The one who swears to obey, in obstinacy and anger, is far removed from intending worship." It is reported of Malik, faced with a man who had said to his she-camel "you are a sacrificial camel": "Did you intend to restrain her?" He said: yes. He said: "Nothing is incumbent upon you." Ibn Rushd clarified: "Because he did not intend an act of devotion" (at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/346-347, al-Ma'una 1/430, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/92, Sharh az-Zarqani on Mukhtasar Khalil 3/162, al-Sharh al-Kabir with the hashiya of ad-Dasuqi 2/455).
As for the Hanafis, ad-Durr al-Mukhtar reads: "The suspended vow involves a distinction: if he suspended it upon a condition he desires, such as 'if my absent one returns' or 'my sick one is healed', it is to be fulfilled obligatorily if the condition occurs; and if he suspended it upon one he does not desire, such as 'if I fornicate with such a woman', for example, and then breaks his oath, he fulfils his vow or expiates his oath, according to the school; for in form it is a vow and in meaning an oath: he is therefore given the choice by necessity."
Imam Ibn Abidin, may Allah have mercy on him, said: "His words: 'the suspended vow, etc.': know that the books of the manifest narration indicate that the suspended vow must be fulfilled absolutely, whether the condition is one whose occurrence is desired, such as 'if Allah heals my sick one', or not, such as 'if I speak to Zayd or enter the house, then such and such'; this is what the Shafi'is call the vow of incitement. The distinction mentioned here was narrated from Abu Hanifah, who returned to it seven days before his death; and in al-Hidaya it is the view of Muhammad, and it is the correct one. End.
The authors of the reference epitomes such as al-Mukhtar, al-Majma', Mukhtasar an-Naqaya and al-Multaqa followed it, and it is the school of ash-Shafi'i. It is stated in al-Fath that this is what is narrated in an-Nawadir and that it is the choice of the verifiers. The author of al-Bahr was mistaken: he believed this had no basis in the narration, that the version of an-Nawadir gave the choice absolutely in both cases, and that the Khulasa said: it is according to this that legal answers are given. Now you know that what is narrated in an-Nawadir is the distinction mentioned, and it is stated in an-Nahr that what the Khulasa contains concerns suspension upon a condition not desired: the generalisation is therefore rejected. End.
The upshot is that the question contains only two views: the first, that of the manifest narration, is the absence of any choice at all; the second is the distinction mentioned. As for the third view supposed by the author of al-Bahr, absolute choice, which he believed to be the answer given in consultations, it has no basis, as the erudite ash-Shurunbulali clarified in his epistle entitled Tuhfat at-Tahrir. Understand, then.
His words: 'for in form it is a vow, etc.': because he intended by it to prevent the occurrence of the condition, he inclines to whichever of the two aspects he wishes, unlike one who suspends his vow upon a condition whose occurrence he desires, for the meaning of the oath, namely the intention to prevent, is absent from it: his intention is to manifest his desire for what was set as a condition (Durar al-Hukkam). His words: 'he is given the choice by necessity' answer the statement of Sadr ash-Shari'a. I say: if the condition is unlawful, such as 'if I fornicate', there should be no choice, for choice is a leniency, and the unlawful does not entail leniency.
It is answered in ad-Durar: what makes the leniency applicable is not the unlawful, but the existence of a proof of leniency; for since the wording is a vow in one respect and an oath in another, the demands of both aspects had to be applied without annulling either: the choice, which entails the leniency, was therefore necessary. Reflect upon this (hashiya of Ibn Abidin on ad-Durr al-Mukhtar 3/738-739; see also Sharh Fath al-Qadir 5/93-94 and Durar al-Hukkam 5/186).
Imam Ibn al-Humam, may Allah have mercy on him, said: "If he suspends the vow upon a condition and the condition occurs, he must fulfil the vow itself, by virtue of the absoluteness of the hadith we reported from al-Bukhari and others: he commanded that without distinguishing between an immediate and a suspended vow; and because the vow suspended upon a condition is, for him, like an immediate one: it is as if he said, at the moment of the condition, 'such and such is incumbent upon me for Allah'.
It is narrated from Abu Hanifah, may Allah have mercy on him, that he retracted this, that is, the obligation of the specific vowed act itself when it is suspended upon a condition: in other words, there is a choice between performing it specifically and the expiation of an oath, and this is the view of Muhammad. If he says: 'If I do such and such, a pilgrimage is incumbent upon me' or 'a year of fasting', he may, if he wishes, perform the pilgrimage or fast a year, and if he wishes, expiate; if he is poor, he chooses between fasting a year and fasting three days.
The first view, the obligation of fulfilling it in its very substance, is the one mentioned in the manifest narration; the choice is narrated from Abu Hanifah in an-Nawadir. It is reported from Abd al-Aziz ibn Khalid at-Tirmidhi: "I set out for pilgrimage; when I entered Kufa, I read to Abu Hanifah the book of vows and expiations. When I reached this question, he said: 'Stop, for I intend to retract.' When I returned from the pilgrimage, Abu Hanifah had passed away. Al-Walid ibn Aban informed me that he had retracted seven days before his death, and he said: he has the choice. It was according to this that Ismail az-Zahid gave legal answers. Al-Walwaliji said: 'The masters of Balkh and Bukhara give answers according to this, and it is the choice of Shams al-A'imma; he said: because of the prevalence of the case in our time.'"
The evidence of the manifest narration lies in the texts: the noble verse and the hadiths. The evidence of the narration of an-Nawadir is what is in the Sahih of Muslim, the hadith of Uqba ibn Amir: the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: "The expiation of the vow is the expiation of the oath"; now this implies that the vow lapses absolutely through expiation. The two texts therefore conflict: the absolute fulfilment of the specific act is applied to the immediate vow, and its lapse through expiation to the suspended vow.
This poses no difficulty, for the suspended vow is non-existent at the present moment: the vow in it is non-existent, it becomes like the oath in that its cause of obligation, the breach, is absent at the moment of speech; it therefore attaches to it, unlike the immediate vow, which is a vow established in its time and to which the hadith of fulfilment applies. The author and the verifiers held that the condition for which expiation suffices is the condition whose occurrence is not desired, such as entering the house or speaking to so-and-so: if he does not desire its occurrence, it is known that he does not desire the existence of the vow, since he set it to prevent that condition.
Indeed, suspending a vow upon something whose occurrence is assuredly not desired aims to prevent oneself from it. Man does not wish to impose acts of worship upon himself permanently, even if they attract reward, for fear that it burden him and expose him to punishment; hence it is authentically reported of him (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) that he forbade vows and said: "They bring no good" (authentic hadith, previously cited), according to the hadith.
As for the condition whose occurrence he desires, such as saying: "If Allah heals my sick one, if my absent one returns or my enemy dies, I owe Allah a month of fasting", if the condition occurs, nothing suffices but the performance of the specific vowed act; for if he desires its occurrence, he desires the existence of the vow, and the vow then falls under the meaning of the immediate one and comes under its ruling: the obligation to fulfil it.
Thus the text requiring fulfilment covers the immediate vow and the suspended vow whose occurrence is desired, and the text admitting expiation covers the suspended vow whose occurrence is not desired, the one a group of jurists calls the "vow of incitement". Ahmad's school follows this distinction retained by the author.
Ibn al-Jawzi, in at-Tahqiq, justified resting, for this particular vow, upon the hadith of Muslim although it is absolute; this is explained only by what we have said, and this formulation is preferable to what has been advanced. For when the condition is not desired, the vow falls under the meaning of the oath: the oath is concluded to prevent, and expiation suffices for it, unlike the desired condition. It was objected to this formulation that the oath serves to compel as much as to prevent, and that its meaning is therefore not specific to what is not desired: the distinction would then be arbitrary (Sharh Fath al-Qadir 5/92-95, al-Mabsut 5/135-136, al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/35-36).
The shaykh of Islam Ibn Taymiyyah, may Allah have mercy on him, said: "As for swearing by a vow, which is the vow of incitement and anger, such as saying: 'If I do such and such, the pilgrimage is incumbent upon me', or 'my wealth is charity', or 'fasting is incumbent upon me', intending thereby to prevent himself from the act, or saying: 'If I do not do such and such, the pilgrimage is incumbent upon me' and the like, the view of most people of knowledge, among the people of Mecca, Medina, Basra and Kufa, is that the expiation of an oath suffices him. It is the view of the jurists of hadith such as ash-Shafi'i, Ahmad, Ishaq, Abu Ubayd and others; it is one of the two narrations from Abu Hanifah, and the later one.
They then differed: most of them said he has the choice between fulfilling his vow and the expiation of an oath; this is the view of ash-Shafi'i and the well-known view from Ahmad. Others said: rather the expiation is required of him specifically, as is required of him in the oath by Allah; this is the other narration from Ahmad and the view of some companions of ash-Shafi'i. Malik, Abu Hanifah in the other narration, and a group said: rather the fulfilment of this vow is required.
It is related that ash-Shafi'i was asked about this question in Egypt and gave a ruling of expiation; the questioner said to him: "O Abu Abdallah, is this your view?" He replied: "It is the view of someone better than me: Ata ibn Abi Rabah." It is also related that the son of Abd ar-Rahman ibn al-Qasim broke such an oath; his father gave him the ruling of the expiation of an oath according to the view of Layth ibn Sa'd and said: "If you repeat it, I shall answer you according to the view of Malik", namely the fulfilment. This is why the companions of Malik derive the cases of this oath from the vow, by virtue of the general texts requiring fulfilment of the vow, and because it is a valid ruling suspended upon a condition, which therefore applies once its condition is established, like other rulings.
The first view is the correct one. The proof of it, together with what we shall mention, Allah willing, of the indications of the Book and the Sunna, is what Imam Ahmad and others relied upon. Abu Bakr al-Athram reports in his Masail: "I heard Abu Abdallah asked about a man who had said: 'my wealth belongs to the door of the Ka'bah'; he said: expiation of an oath, and he supported this with the hadith of Aisha. I heard Abu Abdallah asked about a man who swears to walk to the House of Allah, or to give all his wealth in charity, and similar oaths; he said: if he breaks it, there is expiation; however, I do not press him to break it as long as he has not broken it.
"It was said to him: would you do it? It was said to Abu Abdallah: so if he breaks it, he expiates? He said: yes. It was said to him: is it not the expiation of an oath? He said: yes." Al-Athram further reports: "I heard Abu Abdallah speak of the account of Layla bint al-Ajma': she had sworn such and such, and every slave she owned would be free, and all her wealth would be an offering; he gave the ruling of the expiation of an oath and supported it with the hadith of Ibn Umar and Ibn Abbas when they were consulted about one who swore to free a bondmaid and similar oaths; he said: as for the bondmaid, she is to be freed."
Al-Athram reports: al-Fadl ibn Dukayn reported to us, from Hassan, from Ibn Abi Najih, from Ata, from Aisha: "Whoever says: 'my wealth for the inheritance of the Ka'bah', 'all my wealth is an offering', or 'all my wealth for the poor', let him expiate his oath."
He further reports: Arim ibn al-Fadl reported to us, from Marar ibn Sulayman, from his father, from Bakr ibn Abdallah, that Abu Rafi' reported to him: "My patroness Layla bint al-Ajma' said: every slave she owns is free, all her wealth is an offering, and she is a Jewess, she is a Christian, if you do not divorce your wife or separate the man from his wife. I therefore went to Zaynab bint Umm Salama: when a learned woman was mentioned in Medina, Zaynab was mentioned. I went to her and she came with me to her. Layla said: 'In the house are Harut and Marut.'
"She said: 'O Zaynab, may Allah grant me in ransom for you, she has said: every slave she owns is free, all her wealth is an offering, and she is a Jewess, she is a Christian.' She replied: 'A Jewess and a Christian! Leave the man with his wife.' I then went to Hafsa, Mother of the Believers, who sent for her and she came to her. Layla said: 'O Mother of the Believers, may Allah grant me in ransom for you, she has said: every slave she owns is free, all her wealth is an offering, and she is a Jewess, she is a Christian.' She replied: 'A Jewess and a Christian! Leave the man with his wife.'
"I finally went to Abdallah ibn Umar, who came with me to her; he stood at the door, greeted and said: 'Are you of stone, or of iron, or of what are you made? Zaynab gave you her ruling and the Mother of the Believers gave you her ruling, and you accepted neither of the two.' She said: 'O Abu Abd ar-Rahman, may Allah grant me in ransom for you, she has said: every slave she owns is free, all her wealth is an offering, and she is a Jewess, she is a Christian.' He said: 'A Jewess and a Christian! Expiate your oath and leave the man with his wife.'"
Al-Athram reports: Abdallah ibn Rajah reported to us, from Imran, from Qatada, from Zurara ibn Abi Awfa: a woman asked Ibn Abbas about another who had made her cloak, if she wore it, an offering. Ibn Abbas asked: "In anger or in contentment?" They said: in anger. He said: "Allah, blessed and exalted, is not drawn near to through anger: let her expiate her oath."
He further reports: Ibn at-Tabban reported to me, from Abu Bakr ibn Ayyash, from al-Ala ibn al-Musayyab, from Yala ibn an-Numan and Ikrima, from Ibn Abbas, asked about a man who had dedicated his wealth to the poor: "Keep your wealth, spend it on your family, settle your debt with it, and expiate your oath."
Al-Athram reports from Ahmad: Abd ar-Razzaq reported to us, from Ibn Jurayj: Ata was asked about a man who had said: "a thousand camels are incumbent upon me"; he said: "it is an oath." And about a man who had said: "a thousand pilgrimages are incumbent upon me"; he said: "it is an oath." And about a man who had said: "my wealth is an offering"; he said: "it is an oath." And about a man who had said: "my wealth is for the poor"; he said: "it is an oath."
Ahmad said: Abd ar-Razzaq reported to us, from Marar, from Qatada, from al-Hasan and Jabir ibn Zayd, concerning the man who says: "If I do not do such and such, I shall be in a state of ihram for pilgrimage"; they both said: "Ihram applies only to one who has intended the pilgrimage: it is an oath, which he expiates." Ahmad further said: Abd ar-Razzaq reported to us, from Marar, from Ibn Tawus, from his father: "It is an oath, which he expiates."
Harb al-Kirmani said: al-Musayyib ibn Wadih reported to us, from Yusuf ibn Abi as-Safar, from al-Awzai, from Ata ibn Abi Rabah: "I asked Ibn Abbas about the man who swears to walk to the Sacred House of Allah; he said: walking applies only to one who resolved it; as for one who swore in anger, the expiation of an oath is due from him."
Moreover, it is the meaning of the speech that counts, not its wording. The one who swears this oath does not intend an act of devotion towards Allah: he intends to urge an action or to prevent it, which is the very meaning of the oath, for the one who swears intends to urge an action or prevent it. If he then attaches that action to Allah, exalted be He, expiation suffices him: all the more so when he attaches to Him the obligation of an act of worship or the prohibition of a permissible thing.
For if he attaches it to Allah and then breaches, the cause of his breach is that he has torn his pledge to Allah by failing to keep his promise; whereas if he attaches to Him the obligation of an act or its prohibition, the cause of his breach is the abandonment of an obligation or the commission of a forbidden act. Now the breach whose cause is a defect in monotheism is graver than the one whose cause is a disobedience among disobediences. If Allah legislated expiation to repair and mend the damage that breach caused to monotheism, it is even more fitting that He legislate the repair of the damage caused to obedience.
We further say that what renders binding the formula of the oath is like what renders binding the formula of suspension. The vow is a species of oath, and every vow is an oath: the votary's saying 'I owe it to Allah to do' is equivalent to his saying 'I swear by Allah to surely do it'; these two sayings commit the performance of the action by attaching it to Allah. The proof of this is the saying of the Prophet: "The vow is an oath." His saying 'if I do such and such, the pilgrimage is due to Allah from me' is equivalent to 'if I do such and such, by Allah I shall surely perform the pilgrimage'.
It follows that if he swears to surely do a righteous act, he must do it and may not expiate, for his swearing to do it is a vow to do it. It also follows that if he vows to surely commit a disobedience or a permissible act, he has sworn to commit it, as if he said: 'by Allah, I shall surely do such and such'; and if he swore by Allah to commit a disobedience or a permissible act, the expiation of an oath would be due from him: likewise if he said: 'I owe it to Allah to do such and such.' Among the jurists, some of ours and others, are those who distinguish between the two questions" (Majmu' al-Fatawa 35, 253, 258).
The vow of obedience and devotion takes three forms.
The vow of exchange consists in committing oneself to an act of obedience in return for the arrival of a blessing or the repelling of an affliction, such as saying: "If Allah heals me, if Allah grants me a child, wealth or knowledge, if Allah heals my sick one or delivers me from imprisonment", and the like, "then I owe Allah a month of fasting, an emancipation, a prayer or a pilgrimage", among what has a basis of obligation in the Law. If the suspending condition occurs, namely Allah grants him what he hoped for or repels what he feared, he must fulfil what he vowed, by consensus of the people of knowledge.
They proved it by the Book, the Sunna and the consensus. The Book: the word of Allah, exalted be He:
"And among them are those who made a covenant with Allah: if He gives us from His bounty, we will surely give charity and we will surely be among the righteous. But when He gave them from His bounty, they begrudged it and turned away while averse. So He caused hypocrisy to ensue in their hearts until the Day they meet Him, because they broke their covenant with Allah and because they used to lie."
Surah At-Tawbah (The Repentance), verses 75 to 77
Allah thus blamed them for abandoning the fulfilment of their vow and punished them for neglecting it. As for the Sunna: the hadith of Ibn Abbas:
"A woman travelled by sea and vowed, if Allah saved her, to fast a month. Allah saved her, but she did not fast until she died. Her daughter, or her sister, came to the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), and he commanded her to fast on her behalf."
Authentic hadith, reported by Abu Dawud (3308)
As for the consensus, Imam Ibn Qudamah, may Allah have mercy on him, said: "Its fulfilment is required by consensus of the people of knowledge" (al-Mughni 10/68, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/745). The shaykh of Islam Ibn Taymiyyah, may Allah have mercy on him, said: "If he says: 'If Allah heals my sick one, the freeing of a slave is incumbent upon me' or 'then my slave is free', that is incumbent upon him by agreement" (Majmu' al-Fatawa 23/137-138).
If he commits himself to an act of obedience without a condition, such as saying outright: "I owe Allah a month of fasting, to give charity, a pilgrimage, an umrah or a prayer", or any similar work of devotion, its fulfilment is required according to the vast majority of the people of knowledge: the Hanafis, the Malikis, the Shafi'is according to the relied-upon view and the Hanbalis, and it is the view of most of the people of knowledge. For the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said:
Whoever vows to obey Allah, let him obey Him.
Reported by al-Bukhari (6700)
He made no distinction there. And because he imposed upon himself a work of devotion, not in the form of obstinacy and anger, its fulfilment is incumbent upon him, as if he had vowed a sacrificial animal (al-Ikhtiyar 4/91, al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/35, al-Ma'una 1/430, at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/348, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/93, Sharh az-Zarqani on Mukhtasar Khalil 3/163, al-Sharh al-Kabir with the hashiya of ad-Dasuqi 2/456-457, Tahbir al-Mukhtasar 2/422, hashiya of as-Sawi on al-Sharh as-Saghir 4/268 and 270, al-Hawi al-Kabir 15/466-467, al-Bayan 4/475, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/746, al-Mughni 10/68, al-Kafi 4/417, Sharh al-Zarkashi 3/350-351, al-Mubdi' 9/326, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/348, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/439, ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/615, Matalib Uli an-Nuha 6/422, Manar as-Sabil 3/440).
According to one view among the Shafi'is, this vow is not constituted and its fulfilment is not required, but it is recommended for him to fulfil it. For the rights a man imposes upon himself are of two kinds: a right of human beings and a right of Allah. Now the right of human beings is only binding upon him when there is consideration, which is the case of commutative contracts; as for what is without consideration, such as the gift, it is not binding by the word alone without delivery: the same applies to the rights of Allah, exalted be He. And because among the Arabs the vow is a conditional promise: such was the usage of the tongue concerning it (al-Hawi al-Kabir 15/466-467, al-Bayan 4/475, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/746, al-Mughni 10/68, al-Kafi 4/417, Sharh al-Zarkashi 3/350-351, al-Mubdi' 9/326, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/348, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/439, ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/615, Matalib Uli an-Nuha 6/422, Manar as-Sabil 3/440).
The jurists differ concerning one who vows an act of obedience that has no basis of obligation, such as spiritual retreat or visiting the sick: is its fulfilment required, or must the vowed matter be an act of devotion whose very kind is obligatory, like prayer, fasting and pilgrimage?
According to the majority of jurists, the Malikis, the Shafi'is according to the relied-upon view, the Hanbalis and the generality of the people of knowledge, the vow of an act of devotion is valid even if its kind is not obligatory, because of the words of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him):
Whoever vows to obey Allah, let him obey Him.
Reported by al-Bukhari (6700)
And He blamed, (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), those who make vows and do not fulfil them, by His word:
"And among them are those who made a covenant with Allah: if He gives us from His bounty, we will surely give charity and we will surely be among the righteous. But when He gave them from His bounty, they begrudged it and turned away while averse. So He caused hypocrisy to ensue in their hearts until the Day they meet Him, because they broke their covenant with Allah and because they used to lie."
Surah At-Tawbah (The Repentance), verses 75 to 77
Allah blamed them for abandoning the fulfilment of their vow and punished them for neglecting it. Nafi' reported from Ibn Umar, from Umar ibn al-Khattab, may Allah be pleased with him, that he said: "O Messenger of Allah, I made a vow in pre-Islamic times to observe a retreat of one night in the Sacred Mosque." The Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said to him: "Fulfil your vow", and he observed a retreat of one night (al-Bukhari 1937, Muslim 1656).
And because he imposed upon himself a work of devotion in the form of devotion, it is incumbent upon him as in the cases of consensus: as if he had imposed upon himself a sacrificial animal or made an offering obligatory, and like the spiritual retreat or the umrah, whose vow is valid while they are not obligatory according to the Hanafis (al-Ma'una 1/430, at-Taj wa-l-Iklil 2/348, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/93, Sharh az-Zarqani on Mukhtasar Khalil 3/163, al-Sharh al-Kabir with the hashiya of ad-Dasuqi 2/456-457, Tahbir al-Mukhtasar 2/422, hashiya of as-Sawi on al-Sharh as-Saghir 4/268 and 270, al-Bayan 4/474, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/746 and 753, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/99, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/256, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/11-12, al-Mughni 10/68, al-Insaf 11/117, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/348, Manar as-Sabil 3/442).
According to the Hanafis and one view among the Shafi'is, it is required that the vow concern an act of devotion sought for itself and whose kind is obligatory, like fasting, prayer, pilgrimage, emancipation, charity and the like. As for acts whose kind is not obligatory, such as glorification, visiting the sick, accompanying funeral processions, ablution, the major ritual bath, entering the mosque, touching the mushaf, the call to prayer, building ribats and mosques and other things, the vow of them is not valid even though they are acts of devotion, for they are not acts of devotion sought for themselves.
The principle is that the obligation a servant imposes upon himself is assessed against the obligation enacted by Allah, exalted be He: he has no authority to create an obligation on his own initiative; we only validated the obligation he imposes upon himself in what Allah, exalted be He, has Himself made obligatory, in order to secure the interest attached to the vow (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/82-83, al-Ikhtiyar 4/89-90, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/746 and 753).
The jurists differ on the ruling of one who vows a permissible act: to eat or not eat a specific thing, to walk or not walk, to drink or not drink, to have or not have marital relations, and the like, or to divorce his wife in a permissible manner. Is this vow valid, or is it not valid with a choice between performing it and expiating, or are neither fulfilment nor expiation nor anything else required?
According to the relied-upon view of the Hanbali school, one who vows a permissible act, such as wearing a garment, riding a mount or divorcing his wife in a permissible manner, has the choice between fulfilling it and the expiation of an oath, because the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said:
There is no vow except in what seeks the face of Allah.
Hasan hadith, reported by Abu Dawud (2192) and Ahmad (6732)
If he does not fulfil it, an expiation is due from him, because Aisha reported that the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said:
There is no vow in disobedience, and its expiation is that of an oath.
Authentic hadith, reported by Abu Dawud (3290), at-Tirmidhi (1524) and Ibn Majah (2121)
And if the expiation is due for disobedience, it is due a fortiori for the permissible act. And if he fulfils it, it suffices, because of what Abu Dawud reported: a woman said: "O Messenger of Allah, I have vowed to play the tambourine over your head." The Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said to her:
Fulfil your vow.
Authentic hadith, reported by Abu Dawud (3312)
And if the vow contains many undertakings, a single expiation suffices him, as with the oath (al-Mughni 10/70, al-Kafi 4/419, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/349, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/440, Manar as-Sabil 3/440).
According to the majority of jurists, the Hanafis, the Malikis, the Shafi'is and Ahmad in one view, one who vows what is neither obedience nor an act of devotion, such as saying: "I owe it to Allah to enter Basra or not enter it, to eat a delicious food or not eat it, to wear something new or not wear it", there is in neither doing nor leaving it any obedience to Allah, exalted be He, nor any act drawing near to Him: performing it is not required of him and no expiation is due.
For He has permitted both its doing and its leaving: the two are therefore equal in ruling before Him. And because of what al-Bukhari reported from Ikrima, from Ibn Abbas: "While the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) was preaching, he noticed a man standing; he asked about him and they said: Abu Israil has vowed to remain standing without sitting, without sheltering, without speaking, and to fast. The Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said:
Instruct him to speak, to shelter and to sit down, and let him complete his fast.
Reported by al-Bukhari (6326)
" He thus commanded him to complete the worship, forbade him the merely permissible acts, and did not command him to make an expiation.
From Humayd, from Anas: a woman vowed to walk to the House of Allah; the Prophet of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) was consulted about that and said:
Allah is surely in no need of her walking: instruct her to ride.
Hasan authentic hadith, reported by at-Tirmidhi (1536)
And from Thabit al-Bunani, from Anas ibn Malik: the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) saw a man walking with difficulty between his two sons; he asked about him and they said: he has vowed to walk. He said:
Allah is surely in no need of this man's torturing himself.
Reported by al-Bukhari (1766) and Muslim (1642)
And he commanded him to ride. He prescribed no expiation for him; and because it is a vow that does not oblige the doing of what was vowed, it does not oblige an expiation either, like the vow of the impossible. If he combines a permissible act and a recommended act, he must fulfil what is prescribed; as for the permissible act, its ruling is the same as if it stood alone, because of the hadith of Abu Israil (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/82, al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/30, Ahkam al-Qur'an of Ibn al-Arabi 1/352 and 2/12, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/91, al-Sharh al-Kabir with the hashiya of ad-Dasuqi 2/457, hashiya of as-Sawi on al-Sharh as-Saghir 4/286, al-Hawi al-Kabir 15/467, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/753, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/102-103, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/258, Tuhfat al-Muhtaj 12/31-32, al-Mughni 10/70, al-Kafi 4/419, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/349, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/440, Manar as-Sabil 3/440).
The jurists differ on the ruling of one who vows a disliked act: praying after al-Fajr and after al-Asr, eating garlic or onion, or divorcing his wife. Is this vow constituted or not?
According to the Hanafis, the Malikis, the Shafi'is according to their relied-upon view and the Hanbalis according to one narration, the vow of a disliked act is not constituted and its fulfilment is not required, because the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said:
There is no vow except in what seeks the face of Allah.
Hasan hadith, reported by Abu Dawud (2192) and Ahmad (6732)
Now the face of Allah, exalted be He, is not sought in this act. And because of what al-Bukhari reported from Ikrima, from Ibn Abbas: "While the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) was preaching, he noticed a man standing; he asked about him and they said: Abu Israil has vowed to remain standing without sitting, without sheltering, without speaking, and to fast. The Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: 'Instruct him to speak, to shelter and to sit down, and let him complete his fast'" (al-Bukhari 6326). Now he had vowed acts whose continuous practice is disliked and may become unlawful, and the Prophet prescribed no expiation for him: had the vow been constituted, he would have commanded the expiation (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/82, al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/30, al-Fawakih ad-Dawani 1/415, al-Sharh al-Kabir with the hashiya of ad-Dasuqi 2/456-457, hashiya of as-Sawi on al-Sharh as-Saghir 4/286, Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/259, Sharh al-Zarkashi 3/353, al-Mubdi' 9/328, al-Insaf 11/121).
The Hanafis specify: it is required that the vow concern an act of devotion; the vow of what is not one, nor of a permissible act like eating, drinking or marital relations, or "I owe it to Allah to divorce my wife", is not valid. It is required that it be an act of devotion sought for itself and whose kind is obligatory, like fasting, prayer and pilgrimage; as for acts whose kind is not obligatory, like accompanying the funeral procession or visiting the sick, the vow of them is not valid.
However, if he vows an act whose kind is obligatory at a disliked time, such as two rak'ahs at a disliked time, he may perform it there, and it is preferable to pray it at another time (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/82, Tabyin al-Haqa'iq 1/86, al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/30).
The Malikis say: vowing a disliked or permissible act is unlawful, because one has magnified what the Law did not magnify, such as "I owe it to Allah", or "if I speak to Zayd, I shall surely pray two rak'ahs after the obligatory prayer of al-Asr or as-Subh, or I shall surely recite aloud in the silent prayer, or the reverse".
The vow of fasting the fourth day of the Day of Sacrifice, the vow of entering ihram for pilgrimage before its months, and the vow of an act of prayer or fasting that is hard to perform are not of the disliked: these mentioned vows must be fulfilled, for their being disliked is not due to their essence. Unlike the vow of two rak'ahs after completing the prayer of al-Asr or after the rising of the dawn: their fulfilment is not required even though they are disliked, lest the votary, by performing them, cause them to fall at the time of rising or setting. And among the disliked acts whose vow must be fulfilled is the vow of a recurring day, such as every Thursday (Sharh Ibn Naji 1/415, al-Fawakih ad-Dawani 1/415, al-Sharh al-Kabir with the hashiya of ad-Dasuqi 2/456-457, hashiya of as-Sawi on al-Sharh as-Saghir 4/286).
The jurist al-Khatib ash-Shirbini, may Allah have mercy on him, said: "Notification: the author passed over in silence the vow of a disliked act, such as fasting perpetually excluding the two Eids and the days of Tashriq, for one who fears harm or the loss of a right by it: is this vow constituted or not? It is said in al-Majmu': 'It is constituted and its fulfilment is required without disagreement.' Az-Zarkashi said: 'It is not as he said; rather, the statement of al-Mutawalli gives the non-constitution, which ar-Rafi'i alluded to by juristic inference, for the vow is a drawing near, and one does not draw near to Allah by a disliked act; this is the chosen view.' End of quote. This is manifest: since the vow of a permissible act is not constituted, that of a disliked one is not constituted a fortiori.
"If he fears neither the loss of a right nor harm to himself, the vow is constituted. If he vows a fast thereafter, it is not constituted, for that time is due to something else. Excluded from the validity of the vow of perpetual fasting are: Ramadan, in performance and make-up, the two Eids, the days of Tashriq, menstruation and postnatal bleeding, as well as an expiation that preceded the vow; if it comes after it, he fasts for it and ransoms the vow. He first makes up the missed Ramadan; then, if its loss was without valid excuse, he ransoms the vowed fast for the days of breaking during the year.
"If he breaks during it for a valid excuse, such as travel or sickness, no ransom is due from him; if it was travel for pleasure, the ransom is due from him for his negligence. If his guardian wishes to fast on his behalf during his lifetime, it is not valid, whether it be an act of righteousness or not, whether he is capable or not, according to the relied-upon view. If the husband prevents his wife, with right, from the vowed perpetual fasting, the fast lapses from her with no ransom; if without right, the fast does not lapse from her and the ransom is due from her if she does not fast; and if he permitted her and she did not fast out of transgression, she offers the ransom" (Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/259).
Derived rulings: the vow to fast the day of doubt is not constituted, nor the vow to pray at the disliked times outside the sacred precinct of Mecca, even if the performance of the vowed act there is valid; nor the vow of dry ablution, for it is resorted to only in case of necessity, and it follows that outside necessity, such as dry ablution in place of the recommended major bath, it is valid.
The vow of the major ritual bath for every prayer is not valid, according to the more correct view that its renewal is not recommended. If he vows ablution, the vow is valid and is construed as the lawful renewal, namely that he prayed at least one prayer with the first ablution; if he vows it for every prayer, it is incumbent upon him, and the ablution of minor impurity suffices him to exit the liability of his vow, as has been indicated.
If he vows the fast of Ramadan while travelling, the vow is constituted if he is not harmed by it, otherwise not. If he vows standing during the obligatory prayer in sickness: if he is harmed by that, the vow is not constituted, otherwise it is; if he vows standing during the supererogatory prayer in the absence of harm, it is constituted. If he vows a fast on condition of not breaking it during sickness, fulfilment is not required of him during the sickness, for the obligation arising from the vow does not exceed the obligation arising from the Law. If he vows not to flee from a group of disbelievers and he is able to withstand them, his vow is constituted, otherwise not (Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/259).
"A disliked vow is not valid, as has passed: this applies only if it is construed that he had vowed two consecutive days of fasting and fasted one of them forgetting the other; in that case there is no dislike, and it is true to say of him that he vowed the fast of a day of the week and forgot it. This construction sometimes imposes itself, and none hesitates over it but one of little understanding or an obstinate man" (Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/264; see also al-Fatawa al-Fiqhiyya al-Kubra 4/271-272).
According to one view among the Shafi'is, as has passed, and the relied-upon view of the Hanbali school, the vow of a disliked act is constituted: it is valid among them despite the dislike. The Hanbalis say: if he vows a disliked act, a divorce or otherwise, eating garlic or onion, or leaving a sunnah, it is recommended for him to expiate like the expiation of an oath, in order to exit the liability of the vow without performing it, for leaving the disliked is preferable to doing it; and if he performs it, no expiation is due, for he has fulfilled his vow (Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/349, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/440, ar-Rawd al-Murbi' 2/615, Manar as-Sabil 3/441).
The jurists as a whole, the Hanafis, the Malikis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis according to the relied-upon view, state that the vow of an individual obligation, such as vowing the prescribed prayer, the fast of Ramadan or the obligatory pilgrimage, is not constituted: these obligations are already obligatory by the enactment of the Law, and committing oneself to them is meaningless. The vow is a commitment, and the commitment to what is already binding upon oneself is not valid. No expiation is due in it according to the majority: the Hanafis, the Malikis, the Shafi'is according to the correct view and the Hanbalis according to the relied-upon view (Bada'i' as-Sana'i' 5/90, al-Bahr ar-Ra'iq 4/331, hashiya of Ibn Abidin 3/732, hashiya of al-Adawi 2/35, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 3/93, al-Sharh al-Kabir with the hashiya of ad-Dasuqi 2/457, Rawdat at-Talibin 2/751, al-Mughni 10/70, al-Kafi 4/421, Sharh al-Zarkashi 3/254, al-Mubdi' 9/326).
...for the mere violation of his vow; and if he is unable due to an impediment that arose, its ruling is that of fasting, the same as in what we have detailed (al-Mughni 10/72-73, al-Mubdi' 9/340, al-Insaf 11/146, Kashshaf al-Qina' 6/357).
The principle, according to the majority of jurists, is that it is not lawful for the votary to eat from what issues from his vow.
The Hanafis say: if he vows the slaughter of a sheep, even if he vows a sacrifice without specifying anything, it falls upon the sheep, and the votary does not eat from it; if he eats from it, the value of what he ate is due from him, for its course is to be given in charity, and the giver of charity may not eat from his charity (al-Muhit al-Burhani 5/661, Majma' al-Anhar 4/170, ad-Durr al-Mukhtar 6/321).
The Malikis say: it is not permitted to eat from the vow designated for the poor by wording or by intention, such as saying: "This is a vow I owe to Allah" while intending the poor, whether they are determined or not: it is unlawful for the one drawing near by this vow, his messenger and their subordinates, among those not entitled, to eat from it.
As for the vow for the poor without their being determined, neither by wording nor intention, such as "an offering is incumbent upon me" or "a camel for the poor", it is permitted to eat from it before it reaches its place. As for the vow not determined in favour of others than the poor, he may eat from it absolutely, take provisions from it and feed the rich and the poor, whether it reaches its place or perishes.
He may eat from it beforehand because he owes its substitute, and he eats from it afterwards because the one eating from it is not determined: the rule is that of offerings (Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 2/384, al-Sharh al-Kabir with the hashiya of ad-Dasuqi 2/337-338, al-Fawakih ad-Dawani 1/383, hashiya of al-Adawi 1/725).
As for the Shafi'is, Imam ash-Shirazi, may Allah have mercy on him, said: "If it is a vow, examine: if he designated it in place of what is already due upon his liability, he may not eat from it, for it is a substitute for an obligation, like the blood due for neglecting ihram from the miquat. And if it is a vow of exchange, like the vow for the healing of the sick one or the return of the absent one, he may not eat from it, for it is a compensation, like the compensation of hunting; if he eats some of it, he guarantees it.
"Its guarantee is subject to three views: the first, the value of what he ate is due from him, as if a stranger had eaten from it; the second, its equivalent in meat is due from him, for if he had eaten all of it he would owe its equivalent, so if he eats part of it he owes its equivalent; the third, he must buy a share of a similar animal and participate in its slaughter. And if it is an absolute vow, three views likewise: the first, he may not eat from it, for it is the shedding of obligatory blood, like the blood of perfume and clothing;
"the second, he may, for the absolute vow is construed according to what is established in the Law, and the offering and sacrifice customary in the Law may be eaten from: the vow is construed upon them; the third: if it is a sacrifice, he may eat from it, for the customary sacrifice in the Law may be eaten from; if it is an offering, he may not eat from it, for most offerings in the Law may not be eaten from: the vow is construed upon them" (al-Muhadhdhab 1/240).
Imam an-Nawawi, may Allah have mercy on him, commenting on the words of ash-Shirazi, said: "Second case: the offering or the sacrifice is vowed. The companions of the school say: every offering due from the start without prior commitment, like the blood of tamattu' and qiran and the compensations of pilgrimage, may not be eaten from without disagreement; if he eats from it, he pays compensation, and the shedding of the blood a second time is not required. On what he pays, three views: the most correct, which is his text in al-Qadim, he pays the value of the meat, as if someone else had destroyed it; the second, the equivalent of that meat is due from him and he gives it in charity; the third, a share of a similar animal is due from him, and he participates in its slaughter, for by eating it the rule of shedding blood in it is annulled: it is as if he had slaughtered it and eaten it all, in which case another blood would be due from him.
"As for the offerings committed to by vow: if he designated it by the vow in place of blood already due upon his liability, for shaving, perfume, clothing or otherwise, he may not eat from it, as if he slaughtered a sheep with that intention without a vow, and like zakat. And if he makes a vow of exchange, suspending the commitment of an offering or a sacrifice upon the healing of the sick one or the like, he may not eat from it either, like the compensation of hunting; and the statement of the companions implies no difference between the committed animal being determined or an undetermined liability thereafter slaughtered for it.
"If he states the commitment absolutely without suspending it upon anything, and we say, according to the school, that his vow is valid and its fulfilment required: examine; if the commitment concerns a determined animal, such as 'I owe it to Allah to sacrifice this one or offer this one', the permissibility of eating from it is subject to two views, or three: the most correct, it is not permitted to eat from either the offering or the sacrifice; the second, it is permitted; the third, it is permitted for the sacrifice and not for the offering. The proofs of the three are in the book.
"Of this kind is the case of the undetermined and the prohibition, whether he designates the animal then slaughters it or slaughters without designation, for it is in discharge of a debt upon his liability: it resembles the compensations. This is the view of al-Mawardi, and it is what the exposition of Shaykh Abu Ali implies. Where we forbid eating from the vowed animal and he eats, compensation is due, according to the three preceding views on the compensations. Where we permit it, the amount he may eat follows the two views on the voluntary sacrifice; thus spoke al-Baghawi.
"Ar-Rafi'i said: 'You may say that this disagreement concerns the amount it is recommended to eat; and it may be said that eating is not recommended, the least merit of leaving it being exit from the disagreement; and Allah knows best'" (al-Majmu' 8/309-310, al-Bayan 4/479).
The Hanbalis say: it is not permitted to eat from the vowed animal, because it is designated for Allah, exalted be He, nor from the sacrifice of a vow according to the correct view of the school. Abu Bakr permitted eating from the sacrifice of a vow, and Ibn Qudamah inclined towards this view.
Ibn Qudamah, may Allah have mercy on him, said: "If he vows a sacrifice upon his liability and then slaughters it, he may eat from it. The judge said: among our companions are those who forbade eating from it; it is the apparent sense of Ahmad's words, and they built it upon the vowed offering. Our proof: the vow is construed upon the customary practice, and the customary practice of the lawful sacrifice is to slaughter it and eat from it; the vow changes nothing of the description of the vowed matter except the obligation. It differs from the offering obligatory by the Law itself, which may not be eaten from and upon which the vowed offering is construed, unlike the sacrifice" (al-Mughni 9/362).
According to the school, if he eats from it of what he was forbidden to eat, he guarantees it in its equivalent as meat, for the whole animal is guaranteed by him in its equivalent as an animal, so its parts likewise; similarly if he gives the butcher something from it: he guarantees it in its equivalent. If he sells part of it or destroys it, he guarantees it in its equivalent, for he is forbidden from that, so it resembles his gift to the butcher; and if a stranger destroys part of it, he guarantees its value, for the destroyed thing is not a living being: its value is due, as if he destroyed meat belonging to a specific person (al-Mughni 3/288-289, al-Kafi 1/468, Sharh al-Zarkashi 1/584-585, Kashshaf al-Qina' 3/20).
Imam Ibn Hubayra, may Allah have mercy on him, said: "They differed on what the offerer may eat from the offering and what he may not. Abu Hanifah said: 'He does not eat from any of the offering except from the offering of tamattu', qiran and the voluntary one, when it reaches its place.' Malik said: 'He eats from all the offering except from the compensation of hunting, the ransom for harm, the vow for the poor, and the voluntary offering when it perishes before reaching its place.' Ash-Shafi'i said: 'He eats only from the voluntary one.'
"Ahmad, in one of the two narrations, follows the school of Abu Hanifah; in the second narration: he does not eat from the vow, nor from the compensation of hunting, and he eats from everything besides that" (al-Ifsah 1/329).
The people of knowledge unanimously agreed that fasting the days of the two Eids is forbidden, whether as a vow or voluntarily.
Ibn Battal, may Allah have mercy on him, said: "The scholars are unanimous that it is not permitted for anyone to fast the Day of Breaking the Fast and the Day of Sacrifice, that fasting them is forbidden, whether making up an obligation or vowing, and that whoever vows their fast vows a disobedience: it falls under the saying of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him): 'Whoever vows to disobey Allah, let him not disobey Him.' They differed on making them up for one who vowed the fast of a specific day that coincided with them" (Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari 6/165).
Ibn Abd al-Barr, may Allah have mercy on him, said: "The scholars are not divided: under no circumstance, neither for the one fasting voluntarily, nor the vower, nor one making up an obligation, nor the mutamatti' who finds no offering, nor for any single human being, is it permitted to fast these two days, the Day of Breaking the Fast and the Day of Sacrifice; it is a consensus without dispute, so the discussion is closed. They are two days whose fasting is forbidden: whoever vows the fast of one of the two vows a disobedience, and it is established from the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) that he said: 'Whoever vows to disobey Allah, let him not disobey Him.'
"And if a vower vows the fast of a specific day, or a specific fast such as the fast of a specific year, and the like, and that coincides with the day of breaking the fast or of sacrifice, they unanimously agreed not to fast them. They differed on making them up: according to one of the two views of ash-Shafi'i, that of Zufar ibn al-Hudhayl and a group, their make-up is not due from him; it is also the view of Ibn Kinana, the companion of Malik. Abu Hanifah, Abu Yusuf and Muhammad, and it is the view of the Hanbalis, say: he makes them up,