Islamic Fiqh > Judgment and testimony > Testimony (chahada) > Impediments to testimony
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Updated on 24 September 2026 at 12:48 AM
This section is part of the full chapter: All sections of this chapter.
Enmity is of two types.
The jurists of the four schools agreed that religious enmity, such as the enmity of the Muslims toward the disbelievers, that of the people of truth toward the people of falsehood and innovation, and likewise of one who hates the sinner for his sin, does not prevent the acceptance of testimony, because religion prevents him from committing what his religion forbids him.
The majority of jurists, the later Hanafis, the Malikis, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis stated that the testimony of an enemy against his enemy is not accepted, even though he may be acceptable as a witness against others: he is suspect regarding his enemy, and it cannot be secured that his enmity will not lead him to harm him through his testimony; and because of the saying of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him):
« The testimony of a betrayer, male or female, and of one bearing rancor against his brother is not valid. »hasan hadith: reported by Abu Dawud 3600 and 3601, Ibn Majah 2366 and Ahmad 6899
Al-ghamr means enmity: this is an explicit text. And because it is testimony accompanied by suspicion, it is not accepted, like the father's testimony for his child.
And because enmity for the sake of worldly matters is forbidden: whoever commits it, nothing guarantees that he will not utter lies about him; and lest enmity be used as a means to attain his purpose against his enemy through false testimony.
And because suspicion between them predominates in natural dispositions: it is then effective in rejecting testimony, like suspicion between father and son.
When this is so, the testimony of the slandered against his slanderer, of the one dispossessed against the dispossessor, of the one stolen from against the thief, of the murdered person and his heir against the killer, and of the husband against his wife if she committed adultery in his bed, is not accepted, along with all cases of the same kind.
The enmity that causes the rejection of testimony is that which reaches a degree where one wishes the disappearance of the blessings the other enjoys, rejoices at his misfortune and is saddened by his joy. This may exist on both sides, or on one side only: in the latter case, only the testimony of the one affected by it against the other is rejected.
When enmity prevents testimony against the enemy, it does not prevent testimony for him: he is suspect when testifying against him, and not suspect when testifying for him, because what gave rise to the enmity is not a discrediting defect that annuls testimony (al-Mabsut 16/133; see al-Ishraf ala naka't masa'il al-khilaf 5/76, Ahkam al-Quran 1/387 and 388, Bidayat al-Mujtahid 2/347, al-Hawi al-Kabir 17/161 and 162, Sharh as-Sunna 10/128, al-Muhadhdhab 2/330, al-Bayan 13/310 and 311, Rawdat at-Talibin 7/389, al-Ifsah 2/420, al-Mughni 10/182, al-Kafi 4/531, I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in 3/144 and Manar as-Sabil 3/509).
Imam Ibn Qudama, may Allah have mercy on him, said: question: he said: the testimony of a litigant, of a claimant acting for himself and of a defendant is not accepted.
The litigant is of two kinds. The first: anyone who litigates over a right in which his testimony is not acceptable: the agent has no acceptable testimony in what he is agent for, nor the testamentary guardian in what he is guardian for, nor the partner in what he is partner in, nor the manager of a mudaraba for the capital or right of his principal; and if he forcibly seized the deposit from the depositary and sued for it, his testimony concerning it is not accepted. The same applies to all similar cases: he is a litigant in the matter, so his testimony is not accepted, like the owner's.
The second: the enemy. His testimony is not accepted against his enemy according to the view of the majority of scholars; this is reported from Rabi'a, ath-Thawri, Ishaq, Malik and al-Shafi'i. The enmity meant here is worldly enmity: such as the slandered testifying against his slanderer, the victim of a highway attack against his attacker, the murdered person and his heir against the killer, the wounded against the one who wounded him, or the husband testifying against his wife for adultery: his testimony is not accepted, because he himself acknowledges his enmity toward her for corrupting his bed.
As for religious enmity, such as a Muslim testifying against a disbeliever, or a holder of the truth among the people of the Sunna testifying against an innovator, his testimony is not rejected, because probity rests upon religion, and religion prevents him from committing what his religion forbids him.
Abu Hanifa said: enmity does not prevent testimony, because it does not undermine probity, so it does not prevent testimony, like friendship.
Our evidence is what Amr ibn Shu'ayb narrated from his father from his grandfather, who said: the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said:
« The testimony of a betrayer, male or female, of a fornicator, male or female, and of one bearing rancor against his brother is not valid. »reported by Abu Dawud
Al-ghamr means rancor. And because enmity begets suspicion, which prevents testimony, like close kinship; and it differs from friendship: in the false testimony of a friend for his friend, he benefits another at the cost of harming himself and sells his hereafter for the worldly gain of another, whereas the testimony of the enemy against his enemy is aimed at benefiting himself through vengeance against his enemy: the two cases therefore differ.
If it is said: why did you accept the testimony of the Muslims against the disbelievers despite the enmity? We say: the enmity here is religious, and religion entails neither false testimony nor the abandonment of his religion in accordance with his very religion (al-Mughni 10/182).
Imam Abu Hanifa, in the position transmitted from him, held that the testimony of the enemy against his enemy is accepted.
However, the later Hanafis said: the testimony of the enemy against his enemy is not accepted when it concerns a worldly matter, and is accepted when it concerns a religious matter.
Imam al-Mawsili, may Allah have mercy on him, said: (nor the testimony of an enemy if the enmity is due to worldly matters), for his lying cannot be ruled out, (and it is accepted if it is due to religion), for he does not lie for his religion, unlike the adherents of vain desires (al-Ikhtiyar 2/178).
Imam Ibn Nujaym, may Allah have mercy on him, said: his words (and the enemy, if the enmity is worldly) mean that the testimony of the enemy is not accepted for the sake of worldly matters, because maintaining enmity for their sake is forbidden, and whoever commits it, nothing guarantees that he will not utter lies about him. He restricted it to worldly enmity to exclude religious enmity: the latter does not prevent it, because it indicates the perfection of his religion and his probity. The reason is that enmity may be obligatory: when he saw in the other a wrongdoing condemned by the Law and it did not cease at his admonition. The proof is the acceptance of the Muslim's testimony against the disbeliever despite the religious enmity between them, of the murdered person and his heir against the killer, of the wounded against the one who wounded him, and of the husband against his wife for adultery; this was mentioned by Ibn Wahban.
In Khizanat al-Muftin: the enemy is the one who rejoices at the sadness of the other and is saddened by his joy; and it is said: he is recognized by established custom. End quote.
An example of worldly enmity: the slandered testifying against his slanderer, or the victim of a highway attack against his attacker. Including the husband here calls for examination, for the scholars expressly declared acceptable his testimony against her for adultery, unless he first slandered her; the unconditional prohibition is the position of al-Shafi'i. And in some legal opinions: the testimony of a friend for his friend is accepted. End quote.
Then know that what is expressly stated in most of the books of our companions, and what is well known on the tongues of our jurists, is the detail mentioned by the author. It is transmitted in al-Qunya that enmity due to worldly matters does not prevent it as long as he does not become sinful through it, or it brings him benefit, or he wards off harm from himself by it: this is the sound position and the one relied upon. What is in al-Waqi'at and other works is the choice of the later scholars; as for the position transmitted from Abu Hanifa, it is contrary to it.
In Kanz ar-Ru'us: the testimony of the enemy against his enemy is not accepted, because he is suspect. And Abu Hanifa said: it is accepted if he is upright. Our shaykh said: this is the sound position and the one relied upon, because if he is upright, his testimony is accepted even if there is enmity between them over a worldly matter. End quote.
Ibn Wahban chose it and Ibn ash-Shihna did not criticize him for it; but the hadith supports what the later scholars hold, as Abu Dawud reported it attributed to the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him):
« The testimony of a betrayer, male or female, of a fornicator, male or female, and of one bearing rancor against his brother is not valid. »reported by Abu Dawud
Al-ghamr means rancor. It can be understood as applying to one who is not upright, as evidenced by the fact that rancor is sinfulness, due to its being forbidden (al-Bahr ar-Ra'iq 7/85 and 86).
Al-Haskafi said: (and the enemy: his testimony against his enemy is not accepted if it is worldly) (ad-Durr al-Mukhtar 5/356).
Imam Ibn Abidin, may Allah have mercy on him, said: what remains here is a reconciling verification: he mentioned in al-Qunya that worldly enmity does not prevent the acceptance of testimony as long as he does not become sinful through it, and that this is the sound position, the one relied upon; that what is in al-Muhit and al-Waqi'at, namely that the testimony of the enemy against his enemy is not accepted, is the choice of the later scholars, the position transmitted from Abu Hanifa contradicting it; that the non-acceptance is the school of al-Shafi'i; that Abu Hanifa said: it is accepted if he is upright; and that in al-Mabsut, on the other hand: if it is worldly, this entails his sinfulness and his testimony is not accepted. End quote, in summary.
The upshot is that the question carries two relied-upon positions. The first: its non-acceptance against the enemy; this is the choice of the later scholars, and of the author of al-Kanz and al-Multaqa. Its implication is that the effective cause is enmity, not sinfulness, otherwise it would not be accepted against the non-enemy either; and on this basis the judgment of the enemy against his enemy is not valid either.
The second: it is accepted except if he becomes sinful through it; this was chosen by Ibn Wahban and Ibn ash-Shihna. If it is accepted, then necessarily the judgment of the enemy against his enemy is valid when he is upright: this is why the two shaykhs chose its validity. It is thereby known that whoever holds the acceptance of the testimony of the upright enemy holds the validity of his judgment, and whoever does not, does not; and what an-Nasihi mentioned does not contradict the words of the two shaykhs, because the effective cause differs. Seize this verification and leave the patchwork (Hashiyat Ibn Abidin 5/358).
Some of the Shafi'is said: the testimony of the son against his father is not accepted in retaliation nor in the fixed penalty of slander, because he is neither killed for killing him nor given the fixed penalty for slandering him: none of it is therefore binding upon him.
The first position is that of the school, for the reasons we have mentioned, and because he is suspect when testifying for him and not suspect when testifying against him: his testimony against him is thus of accomplished truthfulness, like his own admission against himself (al-Mughni 10/186 and 187).
Imam al-Imrani, may Allah have mercy on him, said: the testimony of the father against his child is accepted in everything, because he is not suspect in it. The testimony of the child against the father is accepted in matters other than the fixed penalties and retaliation. Is his testimony against him accepted in the fixed penalties and retaliation? There are two views on it, which some of our companions reported as two positions:
The first: it is not accepted, because the father is not liable to the fixed penalty for slandering the child, nor to retaliation for an offense committed against him: the sanction is therefore not binding upon him through his word.
The second: it is binding upon him, and this is the more correct view; because suspicion does not attach to him in this, and it is not impossible that a sanction not bind him through his deed against him while binding him through his word. Do you not see that if a man slandered himself or cut off a limb of his own body, no fixed penalty or retaliation would bind him for it, whereas if he admitted against himself what entails a fixed penalty or retaliation, it would bind him? (al-Bayan 13/312 and 313).
The people of knowledge unanimously agreed on the acceptance of the testimony of a brother for his brother when he is upright, and likewise for the rest of the close relatives, such as the paternal uncle, his son and those like them; because of the word of Allah the Most High:
« And take as witnesses two witnesses from among your men. »
Surah al-Baqara, 282
to the end of the verse, and the word of Allah the Most High:
« And call to witness two upright persons from among you. »
Surah at-Talaq, 2
without any distinction being made.
It is reported from Umar and Ibn Umar that they said: the testimony of a brother for his brother in matters of lineage is accepted, and no one opposed them. And because, were he to own him, he would not be freed thereby: his testimony for him is thus accepted, like the cousin's.
A number of scholars transmitted the consensus on this point.
Imam at-Tirmidhi, may Allah have mercy on him, said: they did not differ concerning the testimony of a brother for his brother, that it is valid, and likewise the testimony of any relative for his relative (Sunan at-Tirmidhi 4/546).
Imam Ibn al-Mundhir, may Allah have mercy on him, said: they agreed that the testimony of a brother for his brother, when he is upright, is valid (al-Ijma 263).
Imam Ibn Rushd, may Allah have mercy on him, said: among the questions on which they agreed to drop suspicion is the testimony of a brother for his brother, as long as he does not thereby ward off a disgrace bearing upon himself, according to what Malik said, and as long as he is not dependent on his brother, receiving his kindness and support (Bidayat al-Mujtahid 2/347).
Imam Ibn Qudama, may Allah have mercy on him, said: question: he said: the testimony of a brother for his brother is valid.
Ibn al-Mundhir said: the people of knowledge unanimously agreed that the testimony of a brother for his brother is valid. This is reported from Ibn az-Zubayr, and it is the view of Shurayh, Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz, ash-Sha'bi, an-Nakha'i, ath-Thawri, Malik, al-Shafi'i, Abu Ubayd, Ishaq, Abu Thawr and the adherents of personal opinion.
It is transmitted from Ibn al-Mundhir, from ath-Thawri, that the testimony of anyone who is a relative within the prohibited degrees of marriage is not accepted.
And from Malik, that his testimony for his brother is not accepted when he is dependent on him for his support and kindness, because he is suspect concerning him.
Ibn al-Mundhir said: Malik said: the testimony of a brother for his brother in matters of lineage is not valid, and it is valid in rights.
Our evidence: the general purport of the verses, and because he is upright and not suspect: his testimony for him is thus accepted, like that of a stranger; and the analogy with the father and the child is not valid, because between them there is marital affinity and strong kinship, unlike the brother.
Section: the testimony of the paternal uncle and his son, of the maternal uncle and his son, and of the rest of the close relatives is even more deserving of validity: for if the testimony of the brother was allowed despite his closeness, it was an indication, all the more so, of the testimony of one more distant than him (al-Mughni 10/188).
Judge Abd al-Wahhab, may Allah have mercy on him, said: the testimony of a brother for his brother is accepted except in what he would be suspect concerning, such as warding off a disgrace or the like, contrary to those who prohibited it; because between the two brothers the rights do not carry a strength of suspicion requiring the rejection of testimony, so his testimony is allowed, like the uncle's; and because it is a kinship through which inheritance is not due alongside the father, like the uncle's (al-Ishraf ala naka't masa'il al-khilaf 5/74, no. 1827).
He should say: he took, and not: he stole; because his saying: he took, entails compensation, while his saying: he stole, entails amputation; concealment was encouraged in what entails amputation, and testimony is binding upon him in what entails compensation; and his saying: he took, revives the right of the one stolen from (al-Ikhtiyar 2/167; see al-Jawhara an-Nayyira 6/140 and 141, al-Lubab 2/446, Mukhtasar al-Waqaya 2/270, al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyya p. 205, an-Najm al-Wahhaj 10/326, Mughni al-Muhtaj p. 389, al-Insaf 12/3, Kashshaf al-Qina 6/515, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/638, Matalib Uli an-Nuha 6/594 and Manar as-Sabil 3/489 and 490).
The Hanbalis, in one view, held that bearing testimony in the rights of Allah the Most High is a communal obligation (al-Insaf 12/3).
The majority of jurists stated that it is not permissible to take a fee for the delivery of testimony, nor for bearing it, when neither of them causes him harm; if harm weighs upon him and it became personally binding upon him, it is permissible to take the hire of a mount, and likewise to take maintenance according to some of them.
The Hanafis said: the witness may not claim a fee for his testimony from the one for whom he testifies; if the witness claims a fee, his testimony is not accepted (Durar al-Hukkam sharh Majallat al-Ahkam 4/301).
The Malikis said: the witness who is at a distance of two barids or less, upon whom delivery became personally binding, if he benefits from something from the one for whom he testifies for the delivery of his testimony, this constitutes a bribe undermining his probity, because he took payment for the performance of a duty incumbent upon him: he is like one who took payment for the prayer, which is not permissible.
However, if he did not refuse and the one for whom he testifies gave him something without his asking, or he has no mount and walking to the place of delivering the testimony is difficult for him, it is not a disqualifying defect; and in the second case he may benefit, from the one for whom he testifies, from a mount he rides to the place of delivering the testimony: the duty of delivery having then fallen from him, this does not undermine his testimony.
When the distance of prayer shortening separates the witness from the place of delivering the testimony, he is then not required to travel to the place of delivering the testimony: he delivers it before the judge who is in his town and writes about it to the judge located at the distance of shortening; and it is then permissible for the witness to benefit, from the one for whom he testifies, from a mount he rides to the place of delivering the testimony, and from maintenance for him and his household for the duration of his going and his return, without any fixed limit, because it is a taking for something not incumbent upon him (Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil 7/213 and 214; see ash-Sharh al-Kabir ma'a Hashiyat ad-Dasuqi 6/115 and at-Tahbir al-Mukhtasar 5/162).
The principle according to the Shafi'is is that if the duty of bearing testimony or of delivering it became personally binding upon him, it is not permissible for him to take a fee for it, because it is a duty laid upon him, and he may not take a fee for it, like the prayer. If it did not become personally binding upon him, is it permissible for him to take a fee for it? There are two views:
The first: it is permissible, because it is a documentation of the right and it did not become personally binding upon him: he may therefore take a fee for it, like the writing of the deed.
The second: it is not permissible for him, because suspicion attaches to him through the taking of the compensation (al-Bayan 13/269).
Al-Khatib ash-Shirbini, may Allah have mercy on him, said: the witness may not take a stipend for bearing testimony, neither from the imam nor from any of the subjects. As for taking it from the public treasury, he is like the judge, whose case was detailed above, although Ibn al-Muqri said: he may not take it in any circumstance, and others said: he may, without distinction. In any case, he may take from the one for whom he testifies a fee for the bearing, even if it became personally binding upon him, when he was called for it; if he bore the testimony in his place, no fee is due to him.
He may not take a fee for the delivery, even if it did not become personally binding upon him, because it is a duty upon him: he does not deserve compensation, and because it is a brief word for the like of which no fee is due.
It differs from the bearing in that the taking for the delivery breeds strong suspicion, while its time is short and no benefit of assessed value is lost through it, unlike the time of the bearing; unless he was called from a distance requiring a mount or more: he is then entitled to the maintenance of the road and the hire of the mount, even if he does not ride. Yes, the one who is in the town may take the fee if he needs it, and he may spend what the one for whom he testifies gives him on other than maintenance and fee; likewise one who gives a poor man something so that he clothes himself with it: the poor man may spend it on other than clothing. Then, if the witness walks from one town to another despite being able to ride, dignity may be breached, so that his refusal to walk becomes warranted in a person whose condition is such; this was said by al-Isnavi. Al-Adhra'i said: this is not limited to two towns: it may occur in the single town, and it then counts as a breach of dignity, unless need calls for it, or he does it out of humility (Mughni al-Muhtaj 6/412).
The Hanbalis said: it is forbidden to take a fee or recompense for bearing testimony and delivering it, even if it did not become personally binding upon him, because a communal obligation, when some perform it, is performed as an obligation, and it is not permissible to take recompense for it, like the funeral prayer.
However, if the witness is unable to walk or suffers from it, he may take the hire of a mount from the beneficiary of the testimony, just as it is permissible to take a fee and recompense for the attestation of probity, the identification of persons, the interpreting, the issuing of legal verdicts, the execution of a fixed penalty, the execution of retaliation, the guarding of the public treasury, the market inspection and the caliphate (Kashshaf al-Qina 6/515; see Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 6/637 and 638, Matalib Uli an-Nuha 6/593 and Manar as-Sabil 3/491).