Islamic Fiqh > Financial transactions > Murabaha and riba-free credit > The murabaha to order of purchase: legal ruling
Contents
Updated on 26 September 2026 at 7:12 PM
This part belongs to the full section: All sections of this part.
The twelve leaves gathered here deal with the murabaha, the cost-plus sale with a known markup, and its sister sales: tawliya (resale at the original price without profit), ishirak (partnership over a share), and wadi'a (sale with a rebate). They cover in turn the murabaha to order of purchase, the ruling of the binding promise, the capital and the expenses attached to it, the seller's duties of disclosure, the betrayal that appears in the contract, and the sale to the non-bargainer. The positions of the four schools are given with their classical sources and takhrij.
The compound murabaha, called murabaha to order of purchase, is when a person asks another to buy a good for him, then sells it to him at a markup over what he paid. The seller says for example: 'I sold it to you at what I bought it for, or at what it cost me, or at the capital, plus a profit of one dirham per ten', or 'on condition that I gain one dirham for every ten'.
Imam al-Shafi'i ruled this sale permissible in 'al-Umm'. In substance he said: if a man sees a good with another man and says to him 'buy this and I will give you such a gain in it', and the man buys it, the purchase is permitted. The one who said 'I will give you a gain in it with an option (khiyar)' may conclude a fresh sale or leave it, whether he described the item or not. If he says 'buy it and I buy it from you for cash or credit', the first sale is permitted and both sales carry an option in the second sale. But if they sell it to each other binding themselves to the first transaction, the whole is annulled for two reasons: they sold it before the seller owned it, and the deal rests on speculation ('if you buy it at such a price I will give you such a gain') (al-Umm, 3/39).
Imam Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani records the same device in 'al-Makharij fi al-hiyal': a man orders another to buy a house for 1000 dirhams, informing him that if he does, he will take it from him for 1100. The ordered man fears that after buying, the orderer will back out. The solution: he buys the house with a three-day option and takes possession; the orderer then comes and says 'I have taken it from you for 1100', and the ordered man replies 'it is yours at that price'. The scholar explains that the orderer must speak first: if the ordered man began by saying 'I sell it to you', the orderer might no longer want it and the ordered man's option would lapse. The precaution makes the sale complete only after 'it is yours at that price', and if the orderer declines, the ordered man can return it under the option, which wards off harm (al-Makharij fi al-hiyal, p. 40).
Ibn al-Qayyim cites the same scheme in 'I'lam al-muwaqqi'in': a man says to another 'buy this house or this good from so-and-so for such a price, and I will give you such a gain in it'. The latter fears that if he buys it, the orderer will refuse it and he will be unable to return it. The device (hila) is to buy it with a three-day option or more, then tell the orderer 'I have bought it at the price you mentioned; take it, otherwise I return it to the seller under the option'. If the orderer will only take it with an option, he is granted one shorter than the one kept against the first seller, so that the period for returning it remains open if it is returned to him (I'lam al-muwaqqi'in, 4/29).
The Malikis also discussed the murabaha to order of purchase within the 'ina sales. They ruled that whoever is asked for a good he does not hold may buy it from one of the people of 'ina, that is, people who devote themselves to buying goods from merchants in order to resell them to requesters, whether the sale to the requester is for cash, on credit, or mixed. But if the requester says 'buy it for 10 cash and I will take it from you for 12 on credit', the sale is barred: it carries the odor of a profitable loan (salaf jarr naf'an), as if he had lent him the 10 of the price to receive 12 after the term.
The Malikis detail: if the requester says 'buy it for me', the good binds the requester to the 10 cash, and the ordered man receives the lesser of a like wage and the profit, with rescission of the second sale (the 12 on credit). If the good still exists it is returned as it is to the ordered man; if it perished through the void sale, the orderer owes its value on the day of receipt, whether above or below the 12. On another view the second sale stands with the orderer at 12 on credit, whether the good exists or not. If the requester did not say 'for me', the second sale at 12 on credit goes through, the suspicion of a profitable loan being remote; the orderer remains bound by the 12 on credit since he guaranteed the good before the second purchase, and he may decline to buy since the good did not bind him.
If he says 'buy it for me for 10 cash and I take it from you for 12 cash', the sale is barred if the requester imposes cash payment: he has then given him two dirhams against a loan and the delegation of purchase, which is a loan and a hire with a condition. Without that condition, voluntary cash payment is permitted and the ordered man keeps the two dirhams as a wage. Likewise, saying 'buy it and I will give you a gain in it' without fixing the profit is disliked; if he fixes it, the sale is barred. And saying 'buy it for me on credit and I buy it back from you for 8 cash' is barred: it is a loan with an increase, a view with no basis according to al-Dasuqi and al-Sawi. Ibn Rushd and others see in it the hiring of the ordered man against the 8 lent, a view al-Sawi calls 'too far-fetched to entail prohibition' (al-Sharh al-kabir, 4/143, 146; al-Taj wa-l-iklil, 3/420, 422; Mawahib al-jalil, 6/243, 245; Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 5/105, 107; Hashiyat al-Sawi, 6/396; al-Khulasa al-fiqhiyya, p. 610-611).
Imam Ibn Rushd classified 'ina into three cases: permitted, disliked, and forbidden. Permitted: a man asks one of the people of 'ina whether he holds such a good for sale on credit; he answers no; the requester goes away and buys it for himself, then the reseller meets him, says 'I have what you asked for' and sells it to him. Disliked: the requester orders him to buy and then resell to him at an agreed profit. Forbidden: 'buy such a good at such a price and I buy it back from you at such a price', a case divided into six questions with different rulings:
The author notes that these 'ina questions are reported here because they detail the sale of the murabaha to order of purchase. Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya was asked about a woman who buys cloth at a cash price and sells it at a third more for a known term: is that riba? He answered: if the buyer buys it to benefit from it or to trade in it, not to resell it and recover the price because he needs it, there is no harm; but if the buyer is in need, one should grant him the gain that custom establishes (Majmu' al-fatawa, 29/496).
Linguistically the promise (wa'd) denotes incitement by speech; it is used literally for good and metaphorically for evil, while the threat (wa'id) is only used for evil (Maqayis al-lugha, 6/125, entry wa'ada). In the jurists' terminology the promise does not bind its maker right away: it is, as Ibn 'Arafa said, an information about the creation of a thing known in the future (al-Mukhtasar al-fiqhi of Ibn 'Arafa, 13/176). What distinguishes commitment from mere promise is understood from the context of the words and the circumstances: the present form indicates in principle the promise ('I will do'), unless the context shows commitment; so, to a debtor asking for a delay, answering 'I will defer it for you' is a promise, while 'I have deferred it for you' is a commitment (Fath al-'Ali al-Malik of al-'Aliyish, 1/257). Abu Hilal al-'Askari adds that the pact ('ahd) differs from the promise in that it comes with a condition: 'if you do this, I will do that' (al-Furuq fi al-lugha, p. 62). Al-'Aliyish cites Shaykh Khalil in the khul' chapter: the separation is demanded if the husband says 'if you give me 1000 I will separate from you', whether he understood commitment or promise should she fear he would withdraw, and promise and commitment are not distinguished by past or present form, the past form always indicating commitment and the execution of the gift.
There is no disagreement among the jurists: fulfilling the promise is recommended. Imam Badr al-Din al-'Ayni reports that the scholars hold strongly recommended the fulfillment of a promise, whether of a gift or otherwise, and its breaking disliked by mere disapproval without prohibition; it is recommended to follow it with the will of Allah to leave the shape of lying; breaking a threat, however, is permitted when the threat was lawful and its non-execution causes no harm ('Umdat al-qari, 1/221). The disagreement is on obligation: the majority of the Hanafis, the Malikis on one view, the Shafi'is and the Hanbalis hold that the promise is not legally binding. Al-'Ayni adds that the majority, including Abu Hanifa, al-Shafi'i and Ahmad, hold it recommended, while al-Hasan and some Malikis made it obligatory ('Umdat al-qari, 12/121). Al-Suyuti reports the consensus that keeping a promise of good is sought, the question being whether it is obligatory: Abu Hanifa, al-Shafi'i, Ahmad and most scholars hold it recommended, the one who leaves it missing the merit and committing a grave dislike without sin; a group, including Omar ibn Abd al-Aziz, hold it obligatory; and the Malikis have a third view: a promise tied to a cause, like 'marry her and you shall have such', must be kept, but not the absolute promise (Jawahir al-'uqud, 1/315-316).
Al-Sarakhsi writes that man is invited to keep his promise without its being a right established against him (al-Mabsut, 21/29). Ibn 'Abidin reports that breaking the promise is disliked, not unlawful, in al-Dhakhira by mere disapproval, with this precision: the dislike targets one who promised intending to fulfill and then the break befell him; the illustrious Abu al-Su'ud nonetheless inclined to prohibition, followed by his master (Radd al-muhtar, 8/386-387). Sayyidi al-Walid holds that the promise does not legally bind to fulfillment. Imam al-Nawawi holds the promise strongly recommended and its breaking strongly disliked, the proofs of the Quran and the Sunna being known (Rawdat al-talibin, 4/200). Shaykh al-Islam Zakariyya al-Ansari explains that it does not bind and its breaking is not forbidden because it is in the meaning of the gift, which binds only with taking possession (Asna al-matalib, 2/487). Imam Ibn Muflih reports textually that it does not bind, as most scholars say, for nothing is forbidden without exception, as this verse shows:
'Do not say of anything: I will do it tomorrow, except if Allah wills'
Surah al-Kahf, 23-24
And the promise resembles the gift before possession; his master (Ibn Taymiyya) nonetheless mentioned a case of obligation that he chose, resembling the deferral of a loan or a settlement; Ahmad was once asked 'how are liars known?' and answered 'by the breaking of promises', a view held also by Ibn Shubruma (al-Furu', 6/369; al-Mubdi', 9/345).
Ibn al-'Arabi the Maliki holds the view of Omar ibn Abd al-Aziz weightier, relying on this verse:
'It is a great hatred with Allah that you say what you do not do'
Surah al-Saff, 3
He relies also on this hadith: 'The sign of the hypocrite is threefold: when he promises, he breaks', on a well-chained report 'the promise is a gift', and on a weakly chained one 'the promise is a debt' (al-Furu', 6/369; al-Mubdi', 9/345). Imam Ibn Rajab reports the disagreement: some make the promise absolutely obligatory, and al-Bukhari mentions in his Sahih that Ibn Ashwa' judged by the promise; that is the view of some Zahiris; others make it obligatory when it implies a benefit for the promised one, reported from Malik; and many jurists do not obligate it at all (Jami' al-'ulum wa-l-hikam, p. 431-432). Ibn Hazm the Zahiri writes that one is not bound by every promise, only by the obligatory one that Allah imposed, for no one is bound by his own commitment, but by what Allah bound him to on the tongue of His prophet (al-Muhalla, 8/205-206). Ibn Abd al-Barr reports from Abu Hanifa and his companions, al-Awza'i, al-Shafi'i, Ubayd Allah ibn al-Husayn and the other jurists that the promise binds to nothing: it is a benefit not taken in hand, like the loan for use or the undelivered gift, whose owner may retract (al-Tamhid, 3/209).
Al-Hafiz Ibn Hajar explains in 'Fath al-Bari' that a man's promise is like his testimony against himself (al-Kirmani); al-Muhallab says fulfilling it is commanded and recommended by all without being obligatory, the reported consensus being rejected since the disagreement is famous; Ibn Abd al-Barr and Ibn al-'Arabi prefer the view of Omar ibn Abd al-Aziz; and some Malikis obligate when the promise is tied to a cause: 'marry her and you shall have such', if he marries for that, fulfillment is owed. Ibn Hajar noted having read in al-Nawawi's own hand in his 'Ishkalat al-adhkar' that he gave no answer to the verse nor to the hadith of the hypocrites, whose proof of obligation is strong, and wondered how they were read as mere recommendation despite the severe threat, asking whether one can say that breaking is forbidden while fulfillment is not owed (Fath al-Bari, 5/290).
The Malikis hold four views: the first, like the majority, that the promise does not bind even when tied to a cause; the second, that it binds in everything promised and is judicially enforced, even without cause, Omar ibn Abd al-Aziz having judged so; the third, that it is enforced when it bears on a cause even if the promised one entered into nothing because of it (the view of Asbagh): 'I intend to marry, to buy, or to pay my creditors, lend me', 'I intend to travel tomorrow, lend me your mount', 'I intend to plow my land, lend me your cow': he says yes, then retracts before carrying out: it binds him as long as he has not abandoned the motive, and likewise if he offered of his own accord to lend or give for those aims; with no cause mentioned, nothing binds him. The fourth view, the famous one, is that the promise is enforced when it bears on a cause and the promised one entered, because of it, into a financial commitment following that cause: for instance promising a loan to someone about to marry, to pay the dower or buy merchandise; if he marries or buys and then the promiser withdraws, he is judicially compelled to fulfill his promise (al-Bayan wa-l-tahsil, 15/344, 346; al-Dhakhira, 6/297-298).
Imam al-Hattab sets out these views in 'Tahrir al-kalam fi masa'il al-iltizam': the promise is sought without disagreement, judicial enforcement differing over four views reported by Ibn Rushd in the books on the totality of sales, the loan for use and the promise. He cites Asbagh's transmission from Ashhab: a man who had bought a vineyard fearing loss came asking for a price cut; he was told 'sell, and I will satisfy you'; if he sells at his capital or at a profit, nothing against him; if he sells at a loss, he must satisfy him, swearing by Allah as to what he meant; Ibn Wahb holds that he owes him satisfaction to the amount resembling the price of the good and the loss suffered, the view Asbagh preferred. Muhammad ibn Rushd comments that 'sell and I will satisfy you' is a promise with a cause, which binds on the famous view, that being the madhhab of the Mudawwana. In 'Isa's transmission, Sahnun explains what binds in the loan and the loan for use: 'demolish your house and I will lend you', 'set out for the hajj and I will lend you', 'marry a woman and I will lend you'. Al-Qarafi reports from Sahnun that the bare promise does not bind to execution: keeping it is one of the noble morals. Al-Lakhmi holds likewise in the book of preemption: 'buy this slave and the price rests on me' binds to guaranteeing the price, for he brought him into the purchase: the view of Malik and Ibn al-Qasim; the opposite views of no judgment at all and of absolute judgment are held very weak (Tahrir al-kalam, p. 154, 159; al-Furuq, 4/54-55).
Branches follow: 'my creditors hold me to a debt, lend me so I may pay them', answered yes and then retracted, binds and is enforced, on Asbagh's view; on Ibn al-Qasim's, only if the creditors hold the orderer to a promise or he bore witness of it against himself; and 'I call you to witness that I will do it': Malik's wording seems hesitant, the apparent being obligation, while Ibn Rushd judges that 'I call you to witness that I have done it' raises no hesitation. And one who swears to pay his creditor by a term, fears perjury, promises to pay in the evening and then refuses: Ashhab holds it neither binding nor among the noble morals; Muhammad ibn Rushd holds obligation more apparent, for he deceived him and prevented him from providing for his need through a loan. The author concludes that the first view rests on the promise never being judicially enforced even with a cause, and the second on enforcement with a cause on the famous view, the promised one having been kept from providing for himself until he feared perjury (Tahrir al-kalam, p. 154, 159; Fath al-'Ali al-Malik, 2/254, 257). Ibn Abd al-Barr reports from Sahnun that what binds in the loan and the loan for use covers 'demolish your house and I will lend you what you build with', 'set out for the hajj and I will lend you what gets you there', 'buy such a good' or 'marry and I will lend you the price and the dower', everything that brings the promised one into it and ties him to it; but 'I will lend you' or 'I will give you' with nothing by which the ordered one binds himself: nothing binds him. Asbagh adds that a promise coming after the sale itself is placed at the buyer's disposal and binds the seller (al-Istidhkar, 5/161).
A point without disagreement: if the promiser dies before fulfilling his promise, it falls, whether absolute or tied to a cause. For the majority, because it never bound in origin; for the Malikis who obligate it in the mentioned case, because the good custom binds whoever imposed it on himself as long as he does not die or go bankrupt: death ends the commitment and nothing is taken from his estate for it. Ibn Rushd states it textually: the good custom, on the madhhab of Malik and all his companions, binds whoever imposed it on himself and is enforced as long as he does not die or go bankrupt (al-Bayan wa-l-tahsil, 15/324).
The majority of jurists ruled that the promise does not bind in the murabaha to order of purchase either, all the more: if the promise did not bind in principle, it does not bind here, for it contains what many overlook: it is a sale of what one does not yet own, which al-Shafi'i stated textually, adding that if the two bind themselves to the first transaction, the whole is annulled because they sold the good before it was the seller's property and because the deal rests on speculation (al-Umm, 3/39). The same solution is found with Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani in 'al-Makharij fi al-hiyal' (p. 40) and with Ibn al-Qayyim in 'I'lam al-muwaqqi'in' (4/29): the purchase with an option shows that the promise to resell does not bind, for if it bound, the option would have been unnecessary. The Malikis likewise connected this sale to the 'ina sales, with the rules described in the previous section.
One cannot, however, use the Malikis' view to prove that the promise binds once it leads to a commitment: they forbid the current form of murabaha to order of purchase as it exists in Islamic banks, and place it among the religiously forbidden forms of 'ina. One therefore cannot take their view on the binding force of the promise while leaving aside their view that forbids this current form.
Imam Abu al-Hasan Ali ibn Sa'id al-Rajraji expounds in 'Manahij al-tahsil wa nata'ij lata'if al-ta'wil fi sharh al-Mudawwana' the fifth issue, that of 'ina: a man sells a good on credit, then this second buyer sells it back to the first seller for cash at a price lower than his purchase. It is called 'ina because the item (al-'ayn) enters it with the cash of the first buyer, then is sold on credit. 'Ina divides into four questions: one unlawful, one disliked, one permitted, one disputed.
From what precedes, one sees that the majority of Hanafi, Shafi'i and Hanbali jurists did not hold the binding promise in the murabaha to order of purchase or elsewhere, for it would be, in al-Shafi'i's words, the sale of what one does not yet own. Tawliya is the sale of what one bought and took possession of, at the first price, with no markup of profit: the seller says 'I hand it over to you', or 'I sell it to you at its capital', at what you bought it for, or at its known figure, that is, the price written on it. If both parties, or one of them, do not know the price, the sale is invalid.
The proof of tawliya is this report: Abu Bakr bought two camels and the Prophet said to him 'hand one of them over to me'; he replied 'it is yours without price', and the Prophet said 'not without price' (al-Bukhari, 2031). Aisha reports in detail: hardly a day passed without the Prophet visiting Abu Bakr's house at one end of the day or the other; when permission to emigrate was granted, he came only at midday; Abu Bakr was told and said: the Prophet comes at this hour only for something new. Entering, he said to Abu Bakr 'bring out what you have', and he answered: they are my two daughters, meaning Aisha and Asma'. 'Do you know that permission to leave has been given to me?' 'Companionship, O Messenger of Allah.' 'Companionship.' 'I have two she-camels prepared for the departure, take one of them.' 'I have taken it at its price.'
The third sister sale is ishirak, like tawliya but bearing on a part of the sold item: 'I make you a partner in this purchase for half, at half the price'. Identifying the shared part is required: mentioning a share without specifying it invalidates the contract, while the absolute partnership, 'I make you a partner in this purchase', is valid and yields a half-and-half division, for unrestricted partnership implies equalization. If the good belongs to two persons and a third asks them 'make me a partner', and they do, he has the third, again because absolute partnership implies equalization.
Wadi'a, also called al-muhatta and al-mukhasara, is selling what one bought while reducing, for example, a tenth per hundred. The jurists of the four schools agree that the sale of murabaha and its sisters is permitted. The proof is the generality of Allah's saying:
'Allah has permitted trade and forbidden riba'
Surah al-Baqara, 275
'O you who believe, do not consume your property among yourselves unlawfully, unless it be a trade carried out by mutual consent among you'
Surah al-Nisa', 29
Added to this is the Prophet's saying:
A sale is only concluded by mutual consent.Authentic hadith, reported by Ibn Hibban (4967) and Ibn Maja (2185)
Murabaha is a sale by consent between the two contracting parties. The proof of tawliya is the hadith of Abu Bakr and the two camels cited above (al-Bukhari, 2031). Abu Ja'far al-Tabari writes that all agree on the permissibility of the murabaha sale (Ikhtilaf al-fuqaha, p. 75). Al-Kasani adds that the basis of these contracts is the generality of sale without distinguishing one sale from another, Allah having said:
'Seek the bounty of Allah'
Surah al-Jumu'a, 10
'You commit no sin in seeking bounty from your Lord'
Surah al-Baqara, 198
And murabaha is textually a seeking of bounty through sale.
It is also reported that Abu Bakr bought a slave, Bilal, and freed him; the Prophet said to him 'a partnership, O Abu Bakr'; he replied 'O Messenger of Allah, I have already freed him'. Had partnership not been lawful, the Prophet would not have requested it. And people passed these sales down through the ages without denial: a consensus on their permissibility (Bada'i' al-sana'i', 5/220).
Imam Ibn Qudama writes: the murabaha sale is a sale at the capital plus a known profit, and knowledge of both is required; one says 'my capital in it is 100, I sell it to you plus a profit of 10': that is permitted, with no disagreement on its validity, and no dislike is known from anyone. But 'I sell you my capital, which is 100, and I gain one dirham per ten': Ahmad disliked it, and this dislike is reported from Ibn Omar, Ibn Abbas, Masruq, al-Hasan, Ikrima, Sa'id ibn Jubayr and Ata ibn Yasar (may Allah be pleased with them). Ishaq holds it impermissible, the price being unknown at the moment of the contract, as if selling at a price that comes out of a calculation; more lenient are Sa'id ibn al-Musayyib, Ibn Sirin, Shurayh, al-Nakha'i, al-Thawri, al-Shafi'i, the people of opinion and Ibn al-Mundhir. The dislike rests on Ibn Omar and Ibn Abbas having no opposer among the Companions, and on its containing a kind of uncertainty better avoided: a dislike of mere disapproval, the sale remaining valid, the uncertainty being removable by calculation, like one who sells aloe at one dirham per qafiz (al-Mughni, 4/129-130).
The price in murabaha is indeed known, the sale gathers the conditions of permissibility, and the need is pressing: one who cannot trade must rely on the astute man, contenting himself with what he bought plus a profit. This sale therefore rests on trust and the avoidance of betrayal: the buyer relies on the seller's report; the seller must thus guard against betrayal and lying so the buyer does not fall into loss and deception. The majority of Hanafi, Shafi'i and Hanbali scholars hold murabaha permitted without dislike; the Malikis hold it permitted but contrary to what is preferable, given the amount of explanation the seller owes: the state of the good, what he paid, what he was bargained down if he was; the preferable being sale by mutual negotiation (musawama), at an agreed price without informing the buyer of the capital. Ibn Rushd the grandfather writes that sale by measure and estimation is dearer to the people of knowledge and finer in their eyes. It is also the view attributed to Imam Ahmad: musawama is easier than the murabaha sale, because murabaha constrains the seller to inform the buyer of everything (Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 5/172; Tahbir al-Mukhtasar, 3/655, 665; Mawahib al-jalil, 6/394, 354; al-Taj wa-l-iklil, 3/512, 525; Hashiyat al-Dasuqi with al-Sharh al-kabir, 4/257, 274).
Al-Kasani writes that the capital is what bound the buyer at the contract, not what he paid after the contract: murabaha is a sale at the first price, and the first price is what became due through the sale; what is paid afterwards is paid through another contract, substitution (istibdal), and the second buyer takes what the contract made due, not what was paid afterwards; the same applies to tawliya. Explanation: if one buys a garment for 10 dirhams and pays a dinar or a garment instead, the capital remains the 10, for that is what the contract made due, the dinar or the garment being only the substitute of the price. If one buys a garment for 10 sound dirhams and pays counterfeit coins instead, the first seller waiving them, the buyer owes the sound coins. And if one buys a garment for 10 coins foreign to the country's currency then sells it in murabaha: if he mentions the profit absolutely, without specifying a determined description, saying 'I sell it to you at the first price plus one dirham of profit', the second buyer owes 10 coins of the same kind as what was paid, and the profit in the country's current dirhams; for murabaha is a sale at the first price, and the absolute profit refers to what is customary, the currency of the land. If he attaches the profit to the ten, saying 'I sell it to you at the profit of the ten', the rebate likewise attaches to the origin of the contract: what remains after a rebate is the capital, that is, the first price, and it is upon it that the murabaha is concluded.
If the increase in the price or the rebate were agreed after the sale became binding, the Hanafis rule that the increase the buyer gives the first seller on the first price attaches to the contract: the buyer sells in murabaha at the contracted price plus the increase. Likewise if the first seller waived part of the price: the rebate attaches to the origin, and the price of the murabaha is what remains after the rebate. The same applies if the rebate comes after the buyer has already sold in murabaha: it attaches to the capital he sold at, deducting its share of the profit, for the profit divides over the whole price; and if the whole price was waived, nothing is deducted from the second.
The Malikis rule that if the first seller let counterfeit coins pass in the price he received and was content with them, or if he gifted part of the price, whoever wants to resell in murabaha must disclose it to his buyer, if the gift or the rebate is customary among people; otherwise, or if the gift covered the whole price before or after separation, no disclosure is due. If he omits the due disclosure he ranks with the liar: if the good exists and the first seller rebates the murabaha by what he gifted of the price without his profit, the sale binds the buyer (Sahnun's view); on Asbagh's view it does not bind him until he rebates his profit.
The Shafi'is distinguish: if the wording is 'I sell you what I bought', an increase or rebate after the contract became binding does not attach to it, for it is a gift and gratuity; if the wording is 'I sell you what stood me at', they attach to the capital and the seller informs of it. And if the first seller waived the whole price, selling in murabaha with the wording 'what stood me at' is not permitted: a price is then appraised, with no duty to disclose the state. If the rebate and the increase come after the murabaha is concluded, the rebate does not attach to the buyer, and that is the madhhab; one view makes it attach, as in tawliya and ishirak. The Hanbalis rule close to the Shafi'is: the seller's rebate during the two options, the extension of the price's term, the gift of an extra item during the two options, the addition of two dirhams to the price after a purchase at 10 in that period, or the buyer shortening the agreed term (for instance a contract until Rajab brought back to until Jumada al-Ula) during the period of the two options, that of the session and that of the condition: all that attaches to the contract and the buyer must disclose it when selling by revealing the price, for it is part of the price, so it must be attached to the capital, and disclosing an addition equals disclosing the origin. If the first seller waived the whole price, it is a gift, and sale by it is not valid. Any increase or decrease in the price or the item after the two options' period does not attach to the contract once binding, like the option and the term themselves.