Islamic Fiqh > Financial transactions > Sulh (amicable settlement) > Is the iqala a sale or a rescission?
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Updated on 26 September 2026 at 7:12 PM
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The jurists have differed: is the iqala a new sale, or the rescission of the first sale? Three views.
The first view: a rescission in every case; it is the most apparent view among the Shafi'is, the madhhab of the Hanbalis, and the view of Zufar among the Hanafis. The evidence is the hadith of Abu Hurayra, that the Prophet said:
Whoever grants an iqala to a regretful buyer, Allah will overlook his stumbles.Narrated by Abu Dawud (no. 3460), Ibn Majah (no. 2199) and Ahmad (2/252)
The argument: the Messenger of Allah called it iqala and did not call it sale, and the rule in legal terminology is the Lawgiver's naming. Moreover, consensus is established on the permissibility of iqala in what is agreed upon, alongside consensus that selling food before taking possession is not permitted: this proves the iqala is not a sale. Moreover, iqala is in language the term for the lifting of a thing: one says 'Allah lifted your stumble', meaning removed it; it must therefore be a lifting of the contract and a rescission of it. Moreover, the merchandise returns to the seller by a wording by which no sale can be concluded: it must therefore be a rescission, like the return for defect. Moreover, sale and iqala differ in name, so they differ in ruling; the iqala is then a pure rescission, effective against all people.
The second view: a sale in every case, with the conditions required for sale and the impediments that bar it; this is the Malikis' view in the well-known madhhab, except for food before taking possession, the right of pre-emption (shuf'a) and the murabaha; it is also a narration from Abu Yusuf among the Hanafis, a view among the Shafi'is, and a narration among the Hanbalis. For the merchandise returns by the iqala to the seller in the state in which it left him: the first act was a sale, so the second is too. For the reality of sale is the exchange of wealth for wealth by mutual consent, which is present in the iqala: it is therefore a sale. And because rescission of contracts is what occurs under compulsion, not what occurs by choice and consent, the evidence being all other contracts; the iqala, however, is completed only by consent: it is therefore not a rescission.
A clarification: by 'sale' the jurists here mean the contract in general, a term broader than sale, since the iqala enters many binding exchange contracts; the jurists said 'sale' because most of its questions fall under sale. The Malikis excepted food before taking possession, pre-emption and the murabaha: for food before its possession, the iqala has not the ruling of sale but that of a release of sale, which is why a buyer of food may accept his seller's rescission before taking possession. For pre-emption, the iqala is neither sale nor release of sale but void: one who sold a share of a property and then rescinded with his buyer is not heeded, and pre-emption stands, along with the pre-emptor's covenant upon the buyer. For the murabaha, the iqala is a release of sale: one who bought goods for 10 and sold them for 15, then rescinded, may not resell them as murabaha with a capital of 10 except by disclosure; the disclosure is required because the buyer may disapprove of it.
The third view: specification; it is the Hanafis' view, with three opinions. The first: the iqala is a rescission between the two contracting parties and a new sale with respect to a third party; this is Abu Hanifa's view, who argued as those who hold it a rescission. Its being a sale with respect to the third is because the meaning of sale is the exchange of wealth for wealth, the taking and giving of counter-values, which exists in the iqala: it is therefore a sale, the meaning of sale being present in it, and consideration attaches to the meaning, not the form. But the meaning of sale cannot appear in a rescission with respect to the two contractors, due to the contradiction; it appears with respect to the third: it is a rescission between the two and a sale with respect to the third. This is not impossible: one act of one person can be obedience from one angle and disobedience from another; all the more so for two persons. The second opinion: it is a sale, unless it cannot be made a sale, in which case it is a rescission; and if it cannot be made a rescission, it is void; a narration from Abu Yusuf and Abu Hanifa. The third opinion: the iqala is a rescission unless it cannot be made a rescission; it is then made a new sale by necessity; this is the view of Muhammad ibn al-Hasan.
Sources: al-Mabsut (25/166), Tuhfat al-Fuqaha (2/110), Bada'i' al-Sana'i' (5/306), al-Jawhara al-Nayyira (3/99, 100), al-Lubab (1/390, 391), al-Hidaya (3/55), al-Ikhtiyar (2/13), Khulasat al-Dala'il (2/70, 71), al-'Inaya, commentary on al-Hidaya (6/487), Tabyin al-Haqa'iq (4/70), al-Bahr al-Ra'iq (6/110), Radd al-Muhtar with Ibn Abidin's glosses (5/120), al-Qawanin al-fiqhiyya (p. 179), Tahbir al-Mukhtasar (3/652), Mawahib al-Jalil (6/345), al-Sharh al-Kabir by al-Dardir, Hashiyat al-Dasuqi (2/252, 253), al-Taj wa'l-Iklil (3/508), al-Umm by al-Shafi'i (3/77), al-Wasit fi l-madhhab (3/140), al-Bayan fi madhhab al-imam al-Shafi'i (5/451), Fath al-'Aziz (8/385), al-Majmu' (9/200), Rawdat al-Talibin (3/142, 143), Asna al-Matalib (2/75), al-Hidaya (p. 252), al-Mughni (4/95, 97), al-Sharh al-Kabir (4/121), Taqrir al-Qawa'id by Ibn Rajab (3/309), al-Furu' wa-tashih al-Furu' (6/263), Sharh al-Zarkashi (3/549), al-'Idda, commentary on al-'Umda (p. 264), al-Insaf (4/475), Kashshaf al-Qina' (3/289, 290), Matalib Uli al-Nuha (3/154), al-Rawd al-Murbi' (1/575, 576), Manar al-Sabil (2/43).
The majority of jurists, the Hanafis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis, hold that if the merchandise is intact and unaffected by defect, an iqala for more than the contracted price, or less, or in another kind, is not valid; for the requirement of iqala is restoring the matter to its original state. If he rescinds for more than the contracted price, it is at the price and nothing else according to the Hanafis. According to the Shafi'is and Hanbalis, the iqala is void and the sale remains intact.
If the sale has a defect, an iqala for less than the price is permitted, in compensation for the defect, according to the Hanafis. The Hanbalis add: if one of the two seeks the iqala and the other refuses, and they begin a new sale, it is valid with an increase over the first price, a decrease, or in another kind.
The Malikis say: the iqala is permitted at the like of the first price, or more or less; if it is for more or less, it is a sale by agreement; if it is at the like of the first price, there has been disagreement: is it the undoing of the first sale or the beginning of a new sale? The third position: it is the beginning of a sale except in three questions, where it is the undoing of the sale: food before its possession, for were it a sale it would be barred by the prohibition of selling food before possession; pre-emption; and the murabaha, as with one who sold a garment for 10 and then rescinded with his buyer: he may not resell it as murabaha with a capital of 10 except by disclosure, for that is what souls dislike; were the iqala here deemed the beginning of a sale, it would be permitted.
Sources: al-Jawhara al-Nayyira (3/99), al-Lubab (1/390), Khulasat al-Dala'il (2/70), Sharh Mayyara (2/118, 120), al-Bahja, commentary on al-Tuhfa (2/242), Hashiyat al-Dasuqi (4/251), Rawdat al-Talibin (3/143), Kashshaf al-Qina' (3/291), Matalib Uli al-Nuha (3/156).
If the merchandise perishes totally, the iqala is not valid according to the Hanafis and the Hanbalis in the madhhab, against the Hanbalis in one position and what is understood from the Malikis' words; for return is impossible: rescission requires the merchandise to exist, and it presupposes its continuance.
The Malikis say: whatever you bought of what is measured or weighed, food or goods, if you took possession of it and then destroyed it, it is permitted for you to rescind it and return its like, after the seller knows of its destruction, and after the like is present with you, and you deliver it to him at the place where you took possession, even if the markets are disrupted.
If part of the merchandise perished, or it did not perish and he wishes to return part of it, is the iqala valid for the remainder? The jurists of the four madhhabs, the Hanafis, Malikis, Shafi'is and Hanbalis, hold that if part of the merchandise perished or he wishes to return part of it, the iqala is permitted for the remainder, for the sale still stands in it.
Sources: al-Jawhara al-Nayyira (3/103), al-Ikhtiyar (2/14, 15), al-Lubab (1/392), Tahdhib al-Mudawwana (1/502), al-Taj wa'l-Iklil (3/508), Mawahib al-Jalil (6/345), Hashiyat al-Dasuqi (3/215), Rawdat al-Talibin (3/143), Asna al-Matalib (2/75), al-Mughni (4/163), Kashshaf al-Qina' (3/291), al-Durar wa-l-Fawa'id al-Saniyya on the Mushkil al-Muharrar of Ibn Muflih (1/270).
As for the mandate by ratification, if the mandatary revokes the sulh it is void, for no disposition may be made over a person without his permission and ratification. And the sulh of an unauthorized interloper is valid only if he is a free adult (Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 6/40, 53; al-Fatawa al-Hindiyya 4/230).
The Hanafis say: the sulh has rulings, some original that do not separate from the genus of lawful sulh, and some accessory, entering some types of sulh and not others. The original is the cessation of dispute and contest between the two litigants in law, so that their claims are no longer heard thereafter: this is a ruling inherent to the genus of sulh.
The accessory rulings include several types. First, the pre-emptor's right of pre-emption. In sum: if the claimed object was a house and the sulh compensation was other than the house, in dirhams, dinars or the like, then if the sulh was by the defendant's acknowledgment, the pre-emptor's right of pre-emption is established over it, for it is in the meaning of sale from both sides, and pre-emption becomes obligatory; if the sulh was by denial, it is not established, for it is not in the meaning of sale from the defendant's side: it is a giving of wealth to repel dispute and oath. The pre-emptor, however, may stand in the claimant's place and submit his proof against the defendant: if the claimant has proof, the pre-emptor establishes it against him and takes the house by pre-emption, for the establishing of the proof has shown that the sulh was in the meaning of sale; likewise if he has no proof but the defendant swears and then retracts.
If the sulh compensation is a house and the sulh was by acknowledgment, the pre-emptor's right of pre-emption is established over both houses together, for the sulh here is in the meaning of sale from both sides: it is as if they sold a house for a house, and the pre-emptor of each house takes the house subject to pre-emption for the value of the other. If they agreed that the claimant take the claimed house and give the defendant another house: if the sulh was by denial, pre-emption becomes obligatory over both at the value of each, for this sulh is in the meaning of sale from both sides; if it was by acknowledgment it is not valid, for both houses belong to the claimant, it being impossible for his property to be compensation for his property; and when the sulh is not valid, pre-emption does not become obligatory.
If they settled the house for usufructs, pre-emption is not established, even by acknowledgment, for the usufruct is not a specific wealth, and pre-emption cannot be taken by it. If the sulh was by denial, the pre-emptor's right of pre-emption is established over the house that is the sulh compensation, not over the claimed house; for taking by pre-emption requires that what is taken be a sale with respect to the one from whom it is taken: the sulh by denial is, on the claimant's side, an exchange, so the sulh compensation is in the meaning of sale with respect to him if it is a specified object, and the pre-emptor has the right to take it by pre-emption. On the defendant's side it is not an exchange but the waiving of dispute and the repelling of the oath from himself: the claimed house therefore has not the ruling of sale with respect to him, and the pre-emptor cannot take it by pre-emption, unless he submits the claimant's proof, establishes the proof, or makes the defendant swear and he retracts, as mentioned.
Next is the right of return for defect: it is established from both sides together if the sulh was by acknowledgment, for it is like sale. If it was by denial, it is established on the claimant's side and not on the defendant's side, for it is like sale with respect to him and not with respect to the defendant; the defect lies with the defendant in his claim: if he establishes proof, he takes the share of the defect. Since the right of return for defect is not established for the defendant, he recovers nothing. Likewise, if the house is rightfully taken from him when he had built a construction that was demolished, he does not claim the construction's value from the claimant. Likewise, if the defendant is a slave girl and he engendered a child by her, he was not deceived and does not claim the child's value, for what the claimant took is not the defendant's compensation with respect to him; yet if the claimed house is rightfully taken, the claimant returns what he paid him, for what he paid is the compensation for dispute with respect to him, and it has become clear there was no dispute: he therefore has the right to recover what he paid. If he finds a defect in the sulh compensation and cannot return it because of destruction, increase or decrease in his hand: if the sulh was by acknowledgment, he recovers from the defendant the share of the defect in what he received; if by denial, he recovers the share of the defect against the defendant in his claim; if he establishes proof, he takes the share of the defect, and likewise if he makes him swear and he retracts; and if he swears, nothing is against him.
Further rulings: the return by the option of inspection in both types of sulh, for the option is established for the claimant, requiring that it be an exchange for his right, which exists; and the rulings also attest to the validity of this. And that it is not permitted to dispose of the sulh compensation before taking possession if it is movable, in both types of sulh: the claimant may not sell it, give it away, or the like. If it is real estate, this is permitted according to Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf, and not according to Muhammad. It is permitted in the sulh over retaliation (qisas) for the reconciled party to sell it and be discharged before taking possession, and likewise the dower (mahr) and the khul'. The difference is that the impediment to permissibility elsewhere is guarding against the contract's dissolution in case of destruction, which is absent here, for the sulh over qisas cannot bear dissolution, so there is no need to protect it by prohibition, like inherited property. If he settled for qisas upon a specified person and that person perished before delivery, its value is due from him: the sulh did not dissolve, delivery remains obligatory, and he is unable to deliver the person to the reconciled party, so delivering its value becomes obligatory.
Finally comes the mandate in the sulh: when the mandatary settles with a sulh compensation, it binds him or the defendant. In principle there are two aspects: the sulh in the meaning of exchange, or in the meaning of obtaining the right itself. If it is in the meaning of exchange, it binds the mandatary and not the defendant, for it runs like sale, whose rights revert to the mandatary. If it is in the meaning of obtaining the right, there are two further aspects: he guarantees the sulh compensation or he does not. If he does not guarantee, it does not bind him, for he is an ambassador, like a messenger: rights do not revert to him; if he guarantees, it binds him by the ruling of suretyship, not by the ruling of contract.
As for the interloper: if his sulh takes effect, the compensation is upon him and he does not recover from the defendant, for he is a volunteer. If his sulh is suspended: if the defendant ratifies it, it is valid; if he revokes it, it is void and nothing is upon either of them; if he ratifies it, it is valid and the compensation is upon the defendant, not the interloper (Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 6/53, 57).
The Hanafi jurists stated in plain text what annuls the sulh after its existence. The causes of annulment are four.
First: the iqala in everything other than qisas; for everything other than qisas necessarily bears the meaning of exchanging wealth for wealth, so it admits rescission like sale and the like. As for qisas, the sulh in it is pure waiver: it is a pardon, and pardon is waiver; it therefore does not admit rescission, like divorce.
Second: the apostate's joining the abode of war or his death in apostasy, according to Abu Hanifa, on the basis that the apostate's dispositions are suspended upon his return to Islam or his joining the abode of war and death: if he returns to Islam, the sulh takes effect; if he joins the abode of war, or the judge rules with him, or he is killed or dies in apostasy, the sulh is annulled. According to Abu Yusuf and Muhammad, it remains in force. As for the apostate woman, if she joins the abode of war, what is annulled of the sulh of the woman of the abode of war is annulled of her sulh, for her ruling is that woman's.
Third: the return by the options of defect and inspection, for they dissolve the contract, as is known.
Fourth: the sulh is annulled by the death of one of the two contracting parties in a sulh over usufructs before the term ends, for it is a lease: if the beneficiary dies before benefiting from what the sulh concerns, the claimant returns to his claim. If he benefited from half the term or a third of it, his sulh is annulled to that extent and he returns to his claim for the remainder: this is Muhammad's view, who made it like a lease. Abu Yusuf said: the sulh differs from the lease; if the defendant dies, the sulh is not annulled, and the claimant may enforce the liability after his death. Likewise if the claimant dies, the sulh is likewise not annulled in the slave's service, the house's dwelling and the land's cultivation, and his heirs stand in his place in enforcement; it is annulled in riding the mount and wearing the garment, and his heirs do not stand in his place in enforcement, for people differ. And if the thing whose usufruct the sulh concerns perishes or is rightfully taken, the sulh is annulled by consensus.
Its form: a man claims something against a man who acknowledges it, then they settle on the dwelling of a house for a year and the riding of a known mount, or on wearing his garment or cultivating his land for a known period: this sulh is lawful, being in the meaning of a lease, and the rulings of lease apply to it; it is the transfer of usufructs for wealth: every usufruct whose acquisition is possible by a lease contract is possible by a sulh contract (Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 6/53, 54; al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 4/36, 37).
The claimant returns to the original of his claim if the sulh was by denial; if it was by acknowledgment, he recovers from the defendant the claimed object, nothing else. Except in the sulh over qisas: if it was not valid, he may recover from the killer the blood money (diya), not qisas, unless he was deceived by the defendant, in which case he also recovers from him the guarantee of risk.
The explanation of this whole set: if they mutually rescinded the sulh in what is other than qisas, or returned the compensation for defect and the option of inspection, the claimant recovers the claimed object if the sulh was by acknowledgment; if it was by denial, he returns to his claim; for the iqala, the return for defect and the option of inspection are a dissolution of the contract: once dissolved, it is as if it never was, and the situation returns to what it was before. Likewise if the property is rightfully taken: the taking has shown the sulh was not valid, the condition of validity having lapsed, so it is as if it never existed; its existence and non-existence are equivalent. Except in the sulh over qisas by acknowledgment: he does not recover the claimed object even if the condition of validity has lapsed, for the form of the sulh introduced the doubt that repels qisas, and qisas is not enforced in the presence of doubt; so it falls, but to a compensation, which is the diya.
As for wealth and what is other than qisas of rights and punishments whose enforcement is possible in the presence of doubt, recovery of the claimed object is possible, and he recovers nothing else, unless he has become exposed to risk from the defendant: if the sulh compensation was a slave girl whom he took and by whom he engendered a child, then a rightful claimant came, took her and took her offspring at the time of the dispute, he recovers from the defendant the claimed object, and the child's value if the sulh was by acknowledgment, for he has become exposed to risk from his side.
If the sulh was by denial, he returns to his claim, nothing else: if he establishes proof of his claim, or the defendant swears and retracts, he then recovers what he claimed and the child's value, for it has become clear he was exposed to risk, and he recovers the guarantee of risk; he does not recover the offspring in either type of sulh, for the offspring is the compensation for the usufruct obtained: it is therefore upon him (Bada'i' al-Sana'i' 6/55, 56).
Whoever mandates a man to settle on his behalf: what the mandatary settles does not bind him, unless he guarantees it; he is then held by the contract of suretyship, not by the contract of sulh, the mandatary saying: 'I settled with you while I am guarantor by the sulh compensation'; the mandatary is then sued under the ruling of suretyship, and the wealth remains binding upon the mandator. This is when the sulh is over intentional bloodshed, or over part of what he claims of the debt, for it is pure waiver: the mandatary is therein an envoy of the mandator or a transmitter, and there is no suretyship against him, like the agent in marriage upon whom the dower does not bind.
When he was mandated for a sulh of wealth for wealth, a man claiming against him goods or real estate or the like, and he was mandated to settle for wealth: the wealth is binding upon the mandatary, for the rights of the contract are here upon the mandatary, not the mandator; and he recovers from the mandator what he guaranteed.
If he settled for him over something without his order, there are four cases. The first: if he settled for wealth and guaranteed it, the sulh is completed and the wealth binds him, saying for instance: 'settle my claim with so-and-so for 1,000, and I am guarantor of this 1,000'; or: 'for 1,000 from my wealth, or 1,000 upon me, or upon this my 1,000': the wealth then binds the mandatary, for he is a volunteer and has nothing from the claimant; his is only what is in his hand. The second: if he says 'I settled with you upon this my 1,000, or upon this slave of mine', the sulh is completed and delivery binds him, for he has attributed them to his own wealth and bound himself to deliver them. The third: if he says 'I settled with you for 1,000' and delivers it, the contract is completed, for delivery secures for him the safety of the counter-value. The fourth: if he says 'I settled with you for 1,000' and remains silent, the contract is suspended: if the defendant ratifies it, it is valid and the 1,000 binds him; if he does not ratify it, it is void. The suspension is because the contractor made a gift of the contract but not of the wealth, not having attributed the wealth to himself, so it does not bind him: if the defendant ratifies, the wealth binds him; if not, it is void (al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 3/45, 47; Tabyin al-Haqa'iq 5/40, 41; Majma' al-Damanat 2/808; Majma' al-Anhar 3/431, 432).
The Hanafis say: if a debt lies between two partners and one settles his share for a garment, his partner has the choice: if he wishes, the debtor sells his half, for his share remains in the debtor's liability, the receiver having taken possession of his share; but he has the right of participation, for before participating in it it remains the receiver's property. And if he wishes, he takes half the garment, for he has the right to participate in it, unless his partner guarantees him a quarter of the debt, for that is his right: if he does not take half the garment and wishes to pursue his debtor, and the wealth perishes, he may pursue his partner for half the garment, for what was taken was shared in origin. If one of the two defers his share and the other does not, that is not permitted according to Abu Hanifa, this being a narrated view from Muhammad, for it leads to dividing the debt before possession: one's share becomes deferred and the other's immediate, so one's share becomes distinct from the other's, and dividing a debt while it is in liability is not permitted. According to Abu Yusuf, this being a narrated view from Muhammad, it is valid, in consideration of the absolute release, for one's deferring his share entails the waiving of his right of claim: it becomes like release and gift.
If he obtained half of his share of the debt, his partner may participate with him in what he took, then the two pursue the debtor for the remainder, for what was taken has become shared, belonging to both rights. If one buys goods for himself with his share of the debt, his partner may guarantee him a quarter of the debt, for he has become one who took his right in full by compensation; the basis of sale is mutual exchange, unlike the sulh, whose basis is indulgence and condescension: were the receiver compelled to pay a quarter of the debt in the sulh, he would be harmed by it and would choose taking in the sulh. His partner may guarantee him a quarter of the debt, this being when the price of the goods equals half the debt; and the partner has no claim upon the garment in sale, for he acquired it by his contract, enforcement being by compensation between its price and the debt. The partner may pursue the debtor in all that we mentioned, for his right remains in his liability, the receiver having obtained his share in reality; but he has the right of participation, and he may refrain from participating.
If the salam is between two partners, that is, what is delivered under it, and one settles from his share upon the capital, that is not permitted according to Abu Hanifa, this being a narrated view from Muhammad: were it permitted for his share alone, he would have divided the debt in liability; and were it permitted for both shares, the other's ratification would be required, for it entails dissolving the contract upon his partner without his permission, which he does not own. Abu Yusuf said, this being a narrated view from Muhammad: the sulh is permitted, in consideration of other debts, and like when they buy a slave and one of the two rescinds for his share alone (al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 3/52, 55; al-Hidaya 3/199, 200; al-'Inaya 12/106, 107; al-Fatawa al-Hindiyya 4/233; al-Lubab 1/597, 598).
If the estate lies among heirs and they remove one of them from it against wealth given to him, there are five cases.
First: if the estate is real estate or goods, this is permitted, whether what they give him is little or much, for it can be validated as a sale; there is the precedent of Uthman, who settled with Tumadir, the wife of Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf, for a quarter (of her share) against 80,000 dinars.
Second: if the estate is silver and they give him gold, or gold and they give him silver, this is permitted; mutual taking within the sitting is taken into account, for it is taken into account in exchange, and if they part before the taking, the sulh is void.
Third: if the partnership is of gold, silver and other, and they settle with him for silver or gold, what they give him must exceed his share of that kind, so that his share is like for like and the excess is his right from the rest of the inheritance, as a precaution against riba; and mutual taking is required for what corresponds to his share of the gold and silver, for the exchange takes place in that amount; if the counter-value of the exchange is goods, it is permitted absolutely, there being no riba. What they give him must therefore exceed his share: the sulh at the like of his share or less is void in the case of acknowledgment; but if they deny that she is the deceased's wife, the sulh is permitted, for the gift is only to cut off dispute, not for exchange, to the point that if they settled gold against lesser gold, it would be permitted.
Fourth: if the estate includes a debt owed by people and they settle with one of them for wealth, on condition of removing him from his share of the debt which becomes theirs, the sulh is void, both as to the object and as to the debt, for it entails transferring the debt to one who is not the debtor, which is the reconciled party's share.
Fifth: if they stipulate that the creditors be released from the debt and not return against them for the reconciled party's share, the sulh is permitted, for it is a waiver, or the transfer of the debt by its debtor, which is permitted; this is the stratagem of lawfulness. Another stratagem is to hasten payment of his share voluntarily. In both there is harm to them; the better course is to lend the reconciled party the amount of his share, settle with him beyond the debt, and direct him to the creditors for the recovery of his share.
If the deceased has a debt, they neither settle nor divide until they have paid it, because of the priority of his share and Allah's words.
after any bequest he has made or debt
Surah An-Nisa, 11
If they divide it: if the debt engulfs the estate, the division is void, for they have no ownership of it; if it does not engulf it, it is permitted by istihsan, not by analogy (al-Jawhara al-Nayyira 3/55, 58; al-Ikhtiyar 3/11, 12; al-Lubab 1/599, 600).